Home Get Started Reading Content Elwes translation	SPINOZAE ETHICA ORDINE GEOMETRICO DEMONSTRATA IN QUINQUE PARTES DISTINCTA
Part I  Concerning God	PARS PRIMA DE DEO
DEFINITIONS	DEFINITIONES [about definitions]
1d01 causa sui	1d01 causa sui  [notes] [geomap]
I. By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.	I. Per causam sui intelligo id cujus essentia involvit existentiam sive id cujus natura non potest concipi nisi existens.
1d02 in suo genere finita^absoluta infinita	1d02 in suo genere finita^absoluta infinita  [notes] [geomap]
II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.	II. Ea res dicitur in suo genere finita quae alia ejusdem naturae terminari potest. Exempli gratia corpus dicitur finitum quia aliud semper majus concipimus. Sic cogitatio alia cogitatione terminatur. At corpus non terminatur cogitatione nec cogitatio corpore.
1d03 substantia	1d03 substantia [notes] [geomap]
III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.	III. Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur hoc est id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo formari debeat.
1d04 attributus	1d04 attributus [notes] [geomap]
IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.	IV. Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens.
1d05 modus	1d05 modus [notes] [geomap]
V. By mode, I mean the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.	V. Per modum intelligo  substantiae affectiones sive  [mng eqv] id quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur.
1d06 deus	1d06 deus [notes] [geomap]
VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite-that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.	VI. Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum hoc est [new mng eqv] substantiam constantem infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit.
1d06e absolutus-suo genere infinitus	1d06e absolutus-suo genere infinitus
Explanation-I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.	EXPLICATIO: Dico absolute infinitum, non autem in suo genere; quicquid enim in suo genere tantum infinitum est, infinita de eo attributa negare possumus; quod autem absolute infinitum est, ad ejus essentiam pertinet quicquid essentiam exprimit et negationem nullam involvit.
1d07 liber^necessarius	1d07 liber^necessarius [notes] [geomap]
VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or operation.	VII. Ea res libera dicitur quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur. Necessaria autem vel potius coacta quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione.
1d08 aeternitas	1d08 aeternitas [notes] [geomap]
VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.	VIII. Per aeternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam quatenus ex sola rei  aeternae definitione necessario sequi concipitur.
1d08e aeternitas duratio	1d08e aeternitas duratio
Explanation-Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.	EXPLICATIO : Talis enim existentia ut aeterna veritas sicut rei essentia concipitur proptereaque per durationem aut tempus explicari non potest tametsi duratio principio et fine carere concipiatur.
AXIOMS	AXIOMATA
1a01 vel se alio	1a01 vel se alio [geomap]
I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.	I. Omnia quae sunt vel [excl exh] in se vel [excl exh] in alio sunt.
1a02 Id quod non per aliud, per se	1a02 Id quod non per aliud, per se [geomap]
II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself.	II. Id quod per aliud non potest concipi, per se concipi debet
1a03 de causae effectus	1a03 de causae effectus [geomap]
III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow.	III. Ex data causa determinata necessario sequitur effectus et contra si nulla detur determinata causa, impossibile est ut effectus sequatur.
1a04 causa effectus cognitio	1a04 causa effectus cognitio [geomap]
IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.	IV. Effectus cognitio a cognitione causae dependet et eandem involvit.
1a05 commune intelligi	1a05 commune intelligi [geomap]
V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.	V. Quae nihil commune cum se invicem habent, etiam per se invicem intelligi non possunt sive  [mng eqv] conceptus unius alterius conceptum non involvit.
1a06 idea convenire	1a06 idea convenire [geomap]
VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.	VI. Idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire.
1a07 essentia existentia	1a07 essentia existentia [geomap]
VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence.	VII. Quicquid ut non existens potest concipi, ejus essentia non involvit existentiam.
PROPOSITIONS	PROPOSITIONES
1p01 substantia prior	1p01 substantia prior [geomap]
PROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications [Lat: affectiones].	PROPOSITIO I: Substantia prior est natura suis affectionibus.
Proof.-This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex definitione 3 {1d03} et 5 {1d05}.
1p02 substantiae nihil commune	1p02 substantiae nihil commune [geomap]
PROP. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common.	PROPOSITIO II: Du  substantiae diversa attributa habentes nihil inter se commune habent.
Proof.-Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet etiam ex definitione 3 {1d03}. Unaquque enim in se debet esse et per se debet concipi sive  [mng eqv] conceptus unius conceptum alterius non involvit.
1p03 nihil commune non causa	1p03 nihil commune non causa [geomap]
PROP. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.	PROPOSITIO III: quae res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa esse non potest.
Proof.-If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and, therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si nihil commune cum se invicem habent, ergo (per axioma 5 {1a05}) nec per se invicem possunt intelligi adeoque (per axioma 4 {1a04}) una alterius causa esse non potest. Q.E.D.
1p04 distinctae attributorum vel affectionum	1p04 distinctae attributorum vel affectionum [geomap]
PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications [Lat: affectiones].	PROPOSITIO IV: duae aut [excl exh] plures res distinctae vel [excl exh] inter se distinguuntur ex diversitate attributorum substantiarum vel [excl exh] ex diversitate earundem affectionum.
Proof.-Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else (Ax. i.),-that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its modifications [Lat: affectiones]. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications [Lat: affectiones]. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Omnia quae sunt vel [excl exh] in se vel [excl exh] in alio sunt (per axioma 1 {1a01}) hoc est [new mng eqv] (per definitiones 3  {1d03} et 5 {1d05}) extra intellectum nihil datur praeter substantias earumque affectiones. Nihil ergo extra intellectum datur per quod plures res distingui inter se possunt praeter substantias sive  [prf eqv] quod idem est (per definitionem 4 {1d04}) earum attributa earumque affectiones. Q.E.D.
1p05 in rerum natura	1p05 in rerum natura [geomap]
PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.	PROPOSITIO V: In rerum natura non possunt dari duae aut [hence] plures  substantiae ejusdem naturae sive  [mng eqv]  attributi.
Proof.If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications [Lat: affectiones] (Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications [Lat: affectiones]as substance is naturally prior to its modifications [Lat: affectiones] (Prop. i.),it follows that setting the modifications [Lat: affectiones] aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another,that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si darentur plures distinct, deberent inter se distingui vel [excl exh] ex diversitate attributorum vel [excl exh] ex diversitate affectionum (per propositionem praecedentem {1p04}). Si tantum ex diversitate attributorum, concedetur ergo non dari nisi unam ejusdem attributi. At si ex diversitate affectionum, cum substantia sit prior natura suis affectionibus (per propositionem 1 {1p01}) depositis ergo affectionibus et in se considerata hoc est (per definitionem 3  {1d03} et axioma 6 {1a06}) vere considerata, non poterit concipi ab alia distingui hoc est (per propositionem praecedentem {1p04}) non poterunt dari plures sed tantum una. Q.E.D.
1p06 substantia produci substantia	1p06 substantia produci substantia [geomap]
PROP. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.	PROPOSITIO VI: Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia.
Proof.-It is impossible that there should be in the universe two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop. iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be produced by the other. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: In rerum natura non possunt dari duae  substantiae ejusdem attributi (per propositionem praecedentem {1p05}) hoc est (per propositionem 2 {1p02}) quae aliquid inter se commune habent. Adeoque (per propositionem 3 {1p03}) una alterius causa esse nequit sive  [mng eqv]  ab alia non potest produci. Q.E.D.
Another proof: This is easier proven by reductio to absurdity. Because if a substance could be produced by another one, the knowledge of it would depend (by {1a04} on the knowledge of its cause), therefore (by {1d03}) would not be substance.	ALITER: Demonstratur hoc etiam facilius ex absurdo contradictorio. Nam si substantia ab alio posset produci, ejus cognitio a cognitione suae causae deberet pendere (per axioma 4) adeoque (per definitionem 3) non esset substantia.
1p06c substantia ab alio produci	1p06c substantia ab alio produci [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications [Lat: affectiones] (as appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.). Now (by the last Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance, therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself. Q.E.D. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be substance.	COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur substantiam ab alio produci non posse. Nam in rerum natura nihil datur praeter substantias earumque affectiones ut patet ex axiomate 1 {1a01} et definitionibus 3 {1d03} et 5 {1d05}. Atqui a substantia produci non potest (per praecedentem propositionem {1p05}). Ergo substantia absolute ab alio produci non potest. Q.E.D.
1p07 substanti existere	1p07  substantiae existere [geomap]
PROP. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substances.	PROPOSITIO VII: Ad naturam  substantiae pertinet existere.
Proof.-Substance cannot be produced by anything external (Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause-that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to its nature.	DEMONSTRATIO: Substantia non potest produci ab alio (per corollarium propositionis praecedentis {1p06c}); erit itaque causa sui id est (per definitionem 1 {1d01}) ipsius essentia involvit necessario existentiam sive  [mng eqv]  ad ejus naturam pertinet existere. Q.E.D.
1p08 substantia infinita	1p08 substantia infinita [geomap]
PROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.	PROPOSITIO VIII: Omnis substantia est necessario infinita.
Proof.-There can only be one substance with an identical attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.); its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Substantia unius attributi non nisi unica existit (per propositionem 5 {1p05}) et ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere (per propositionem 7 {1p07}). Erit ergo de ipsius natura vel [excl exh] finita vel [excl exh] infinita existere. At non finita. Nam (per definitionem 2 {1d02}) deberet terminari ab alia ejusdem naturae quae etiam necessario deberet existere (per propositionem 7 {1p07}) adeoque darentur du  substantiae ejusdem attributi, quod est absurdum (per propositionem 5 {1p05}). Existit ergo infinita. Q.E.D.
1p08s1 absoluta affirmatio	1p08s1 absoluta affirmatio
Note I.-As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance is necessarily infinite.	SCHOLIUM I: Cum finitum esse revera sit ex parte negatio et infinitum absoluta affirmatio existentiae alicujus natur, sequitur ergo ex sola 7 propositione omnem substantiam debere esse infinitam.
1p08s2 modificationum non existentium	1p08s2 modificationum non existentium
Note II.-No doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop. vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of substances and the substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe in natural objects.	SCHOLIUM II: Non dubito quin omnibus qui de rebus confuse judicant nec res per primas suas causas cognoscere consueverunt, difficile sit demonstrationem 7 propositionis concipere; nimirum quia non distinguunt inter modificationes substantiarum et ipsas substantias neque sciunt quomodo res producuntur. Unde fit ut principium quod res naturales habere vident, substantiis affingant;
Those who are ignorant of true causes, make complete confusion-think that trees might talk just as well as men-that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed; and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So, also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind	qui enim veras rerum causas ignorant, omnia confundunt et sine ulla mentis repugnantia tam arbores quam homines loquentes fingunt et homines tam ex lapidibus quam ex semine formari et quascunque formas in alias quascunque mutari imaginantur. Sic etiam qui naturam divinam cum humana confundunt, facile Deo affectus humanos tribuunt praesertim quamdiu etiam ignorant quomodo affectus in mente producuntur.
But, if people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no doubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this proposition would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism. For, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself-that is, something of which the conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas modifications [Lat: affectiones] exist in something external to themselves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the thing in which they exist.	Si autem homines ad naturam  substantiae attenderent, minime de veritate 7 propositionis dubitarent; imo haec propositio omnibus axioma esset et inter notiones communes numeraretur. Nam per substantiam intelligerent id quod in se est et per se concipitur hoc est id cujus cognitio non indiget cognitione alterius rei. Per modificationes autem id quod in alio est et quarum conceptus a conceptu rei in qua sunt, formatur :
Therefore, we may have true ideas of non-existent modifications [Lat: affectiones]; for, although they may have no actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their essence is so involved in something external to themselves that they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in their existence, because they are conceived through themselves.	quocirca modificationum non existentium veras ideas possumus habere quandoquidem quamvis non existant actu extra intellectum, earum tamen essentia ita in alio comprehenditur ut per idem concipi possint. Verum substantiarum veritas extra intellectum non est nisi in se ipsis quia per se concipiuntur.
Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct-that is, a true-idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same as saying that a false idea was true-in short, the height of absurdity.	Si quis ergo diceret se claram et distinctam hoc est veram ideam  substantiae habere et nihilominus dubitare num talis substantia existat, idem hercle esset ac si diceret se veram habere ideam et nihilominus dubitare num falsa sit (ut satis attendentiae sit manifestum); vel si quis statuat substantiam creari, simul statuit ideam falsam factam esse veram, quo sane nihil absurdius concipi potest
It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning-that there is but one such substance.	adeoque fatendum necessario est  substantiae existentiam sicut ejus essentiam aeternam esse veritatem. Atque hinc alio modo concludere possumus non dari nisi unicam ejusdem naturae,
I think that this may profitably be done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the demonstration, we must premise:-- 1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From this it follows that--2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it does not imply any fixed number of triangles.3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause why it should exist.4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated apart from such definition.	quod hic ostendere oper pretium esse duxi. Ut autem hoc ordine faciam notandum est I. veram uniuscujusque rei definitionem nihil involvere neque exprimere praeter rei definitae naturam. Ex quo sequitur hoc II. nempe nullam definitionem certum aliquem numerum individuorum involvere neque exprimere quandoquidem nihil aliud exprimit quam naturam rei definit. Exempli gratia definitio trianguli nihil aliud exprimit quam simplicem naturam trianguli; at non certum aliquem triangulorum numerum. III. notandum dari necessario uniuscujusque rei existentis certam aliquam causam propter quam existit. IV. denique notandum hanc causam propter quam aliqua res existit, vel debere contineri in ipsa natura et definitione rei existentis (nimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere) vel debere extra ipsam dari.
It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less.	His positis sequitur quod si in natura certus aliquis numerus individuorum existat, debeat necessario dari causa cur illa individua et cur non plura nec pauciora existunt.
For example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general; we must also show why there are exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual.	Si exempli gratia in rerum natura 20 homines existant (quos majoris perspicuitatis causa suppono simul existere nec alios antea in natura exstitisse) non satis erit (ut scilicet rationem reddamus cur 20 homines existant) causam naturae humanae in genere ostendere sed insuper necesse erit causam ostendere cur non plures nec pauciores quam 20 existant quandoquidem (per III notam) uniuscujusque debet necessario dari causa cur existat.
Now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition of man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty. Consequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must necessarily be sought externally to each individual.	At haec causa (per notam II et III) non potest in ipsa natura humana contineri quandoquidem vera hominis definitio numerum vicenarium non involvit adeoque (per notam IV) causa cur hi vigintiae homines existunt et consequenter cur unusquisque existit, debet necessario extra unumquemque dari
Hence we may lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of several individuals must have an external cause. And, as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of substance, existence must necessarily be included in its definition; and from its definition alone existence must be deducible.	et propterea absolute concludendum omne id cujus naturae plura individua existere possunt, debere necessario ut existant causam externam habere. Jam quoniam ad naturam  substantiae (per jam ostensa in hoc scholio) pertinet existere, debet ejus definitio necessariam existentiam involvere et consequenter ex sola ejus definitione debet ipsius existentia concludi.
But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii., iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances; therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.	At ex ipsius definitione (ut jam ex nota II et III ostendimus) non potest sequi plurium substantiarum existentia; sequitur ergo ex ea necessario unicam tantum ejusdem naturae existere, ut proponebatur.
1p09 plus realitatis plura attributa	1p09 plus realitatis plura attributa [geomap]
PROP. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the number of its attributes	PROPOSITIO IX: Quo plus realitatis aut [mng eqv] esse unaquque res habet eo plura attributa ipsi competunt.
Proof.(Def. iv.).	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex definitione 4 {1d04}.
1p10 attributum concipi per se	1p10 attributum concipi per se  [geomap]
PROP. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.	PROPOSITIO X: Unumquodque unius  substantiae attributum per se concipi debet.
Proof.-An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and, therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Attributum enim est id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejus essentiam constituens (per definitionem 4 {1d04}) adeoque (per definitionem 3 {1d03}) per se concipi debet. Q.E.D.
1p10s attributa non entia sive substantias distincta	1p10s attributa non entia sive substantias distincta
Note-It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in fact, conceived as distinct-that is, one without the help of the other-yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other; but each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is, then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence. If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be sought in vain.	SCHOLIUM: Ex his apparet quod quamvis duo attributa realiter distincta concipiantur hoc est unum sine ope alterius, non possumus tamen inde concludere ipsa dua entia sive duas diversas substantias constituere; id enim est de natura  substantiae ut unumquodque ejus attributorum per se concipiatur quandoquidem omnia quae habet attributa, simul in ipsa semper fuerunt nec unum ab alio produci potuit sed unumquodque realitatem sive esse  substantiae exprimit. Longe ergo abest ut absurdum sit uni  substantiae plura attributa tribuere; quin nihil in natura clarius quam quod unumquodque ens sub aliquo attributo debeat concipi et quo plus realitatis aut esse habeat eo plura attributa quae et necessitatem sive aeternitatem et infinitatem exprimunt, habeat et consequenter nihil etiam clarius quam quod ens absolute infinitum necessario sit definiendum (ut definitione 6 tradidimus) ens quod constat infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam certam essentiam exprimit. Si quis autem jam qurit ex quo ergo signo diversitatem substantiarum poterimus dignoscere, legat sequentes propositiones, quae ostendunt in rerum natura non nisi unicam substantiam existere eamque absolute infinitam esse, quapropter id signum frustra qureretur.
1p11 Deus sive substantia necessario existit	1p11 Deus sive substantia necessario existit [geomap]
PROP. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.	PROPOSITIO XI: Deus sive [prf eqv] substantia constans infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit, necessario existit.
Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si negas, concipe si fieri potest, Deum non existere. Ergo (per axioma 7 {1a7}) ejus essentia non involvit existentiam. Atqui hoc (per propositionem 7 {1p7}) est absurdum : ergo Deus necessario existit. Q.E.D.
Another proof.-Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its non-existence-e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from existing, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be external to it. For instance, the reason for the  non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it would involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.) But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the order of universal nature in extension. From the latter it must follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it should exist. So much is self-evident. It follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or reason be granted which prevents its existence. If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the very nature of God, or be external to him-that is, drawn from another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence. As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.	ALITER: Cujuscunque rei assignari debet causa seu ratio tam cur existit quam cur non existit. Exempli gratia si triangulus existit, ratio seu causa dari debet cur existit; si autem non existit, ratio etiam seu causa dari debet quae impedit quominus existat sive quae ejus existentiam tollat. Haec vero ratio seu causa vel in natura rei contineri debet vel extra ipsam. Exempli gratia rationem cur circulus quadratus non existat, ipsa ejus natura indicat; nimirum quia contradictionem involvit. Cur autem contra substantia existat, ex sola etiam ejus natura sequitur quia scilicet existentiam involvit (vide propositionem 7). At ratio cur circulus vel triangulus existit vel cur non existit, ex eorum natura non sequitur sed ex ordine universae naturae corpore; ex eo enim sequi debet vel jam triangulum necessario existere vel impossibile esse ut jam existat. Atque haec per se manifesta sunt. Ex quibus sequitur id necessario existere cujus nulla ratio nec causa datur quae impedit quominus existat. Si itaque nulla ratio nec causa dari possit quae impedit quominus Deus existat vel quae ejus existentiam tollat, omnino concludendum est eundem necessario existere. At si talis ratio seu causa daretur, ea vel in ipsa Dei natura vel extra ipsam dari deberet hoc est in alia substantia alterius natur. Nam si ejusdem naturae esset, eo ipso concederetur dari Deum. At substantia quae alterius esset natur, nihil cum Deo commune habere (per 2 propositionem) adeoque neque ejus existentiam ponere neque tollere posset. Cum igitur ratio seu causa quae divinam existentiam tollat, extra divinam naturam dari non possit, debebit necessario dari, siquidem non existit, in ipsa ejus natura, quae propterea contradictionem involveret. Atqui hoc de Ente absolute infinito et summe perfecto affirmare absurdum est; ergo nec in Deo nec extra Deum ulla causa seu ratio datur quae ejus existentiam tollat ac proinde Deus necessario existit. Q.E.D.
Another proof.-The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence is a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see Axiom. i. and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutely infinite-in other words, God (Def. vi.)-necessarily exists. Q.E.D.	ALITER: Posse non existere impotentia est et contra posse existere potentia est (ut per se notum). Si itaque id quod jam necessario existit, non nisi entia finita sunt, sunt ergo entia finita potentiora Ente absolute infinito atque hoc (ut per se notum) absurdum est; ergo vel nihil existit vel Ens absolute infinitum necessario etiam existit. Atqui nos vel in nobis vel in alio quod necessario existit, existimus (vide axioma 1 et propositionem 7). Ergo Ens absolute infinitum hoc est (per definitionem 6) Deus necessario existit. Q.E.D.
1p11s posteriori priori	1p11s posteriori priori
Note.-In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's existence posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence does not follow priori. For, as the potentiality of existence is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength for existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from external causes. Of such things, they see that those which quickly come to pass-that is, quickly come into existence-quickly also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of accomplishment-that is, not so easily brought into existence-those things which they conceive as more complicated. However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here show the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly, goes quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any external cause. Things which are produced by external causes, whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause; and therefore their existence arises solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from their own. Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by substance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is nothing else but its essence. Thus, the perfection of a thing does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it. Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect-that is, of God. For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is given. This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive reader.	SCHOLIUM: In hac ultima demonstratione Dei existentiam a posteriori ostendere volui ut demonstratio facilius perciperetur; non autem propterea quod ex hoc eodem fundamento Dei existentia a priori non sequatur. Nam cum posse existere potentia sit, sequitur quo plus realitatis alicujus rei naturae competit eo plus virium a se habere ut existat adeoque Ens absolute infinitum sive Deum infinitam absolute potentiam existendi a se habere, qui propterea absolute existit. Multi tamen forsan non facile hujus demonstrationis evidentiam videre poterunt quia assueti sunt eas solummodo res contemplari quae a causis externis fiunt et ex his quae cito fiunt hoc est quae facile existunt, eas etiam facile perire vident et contra eas res factu difficiliores judicant hoc est ad existendum non adeo faciles ad quas plura pertinere concipiunt. Verum ut ab his praejudiciis liberentur, non opus habeo hic ostendere qua ratione hoc enunciatum "quod cito fit cito perit" verum sit nec etiam an respectu totius naturae omnia que facilia sint an secus. Sed hoc tantum notare sufficit me hic non loqui de rebus quae a causis externis fiunt sed de solis substantiis, quae (per propositionem 6) a nulla causa externa produci possunt. Res enim quae a causis externis fiunt, sive e multis partibus constent sive paucis, quicquid perfectionis sive realitatis habent, id omne virtutiae causae externae debetur adeoque earum existentia ex sola perfectione causae externae, non autem suae oritur. Contra quicquid substantia perfectionis habet, nulli  causae externae debetur; quare ejus etiam existentia ex sola ejus natura sequi debet, quae proinde nihil aliud est quam ejus essentia. Perfectio igitur rei existentiam non tollit sed contra ponit; imperfectio autem contra eandem tollit adeoque de nullius rei existentia certiores esse possumus quam de existentia Entis absolute infiniti seu perfecti hoc est Dei. Nam quandoquidem ejus essentia omnem imperfectionem secludit absolutamque perfectionem involvit, eo ipso omnem causam dubitandi de ipsius existentia tollit summamque de eadem certitudinem dat, quod mediocriter attendenti perspicuum fore credo.
1p12 substanti dividi	1p12  substantiae dividi [geomap]
PROP. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.	PROPOSITIO XII: Nullum  substantiae attributum potest vere concipi ex quo sequatur substantiam posse dividi.
Proof.-The parts into which substance as thus conceived would be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they will not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self-caused, and (by Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts (by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be absurd. If we adopt the second alternative-namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance-then, if the whole substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is absurd.	DEMONSTRATIO: Partes enim in quas substantia sic concepta divideretur, vel [excl exh] naturam  substantiae retinebunt vel [excl exh] non. Si primum, tum (per 8 propositionem {1p08}) unaquque pars debebit esse infinita et (per propositionem 6 {1p06}) causa sui et (per propositionem 5 {1p05}) constare debebit ex diverso attributo adeoque ex una substantia plures constitui poterunt, quod (per propositionem 6 {1p06}) est absurdum. Adde quod partes (per propositionem 2 {1p02}) nihil commune cum suo toto haberent et totum (per definitionem 4  {1d04} et propositionem 10 {1p10}) absque suis partibus et esse et concipi posset, quod absurdum esse nemo dubitare poterit. Si autem secundum ponatur quod scilicet partes naturam substantiae non retinebunt, ergo cum tota substantia in quales partes esset divisa, naturam substantiae amitteret et esse desineret, quod (per propositionem 7 {1p07}) est absurdum.
1p13 Substantia indivisibilis	1p13 Substantia indivisibilis [geomap]
PROP. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.	PROPOSITIO XIII: Substantia absolute infinita est indivisibilis.
Proof.-If it could be divided, the parts into which it was divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite substance, or they would not. If the former, we should have several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd. If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also absurd.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim divisibilis esset, partes in quas divideretur vel [excl exh] naturam  substantiae absolute infinitae retinebunt vel non. Si primum, dabuntur ergo plures  substantiae ejusdem naturae, quod (per propositionem 5 {1p05}) est absurdum. Si secundum ponatur, ergo (ut supra {1p07}) poterit substantia absolute infinita desinere esse, quod (per propositionem 11 {1p11}) est etiam absurdum.
1p13c consequenter nullam substantiam corpoream	1p13c consequenter nullam substantiam corpoream [geomap]
Corollary.-It follows, that no substance, and consequently no extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.	COROLLARIUM {1p13}: Ex his sequitur nullam substantiam et consequenter nullam substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, esse divisibilem.
1p13s infinita finita	1p13s infinita finita
Note.-The indivisibility of substance may be more easily understood as follows. The nature of substance can only be conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii) involves a manifest contradiction.	SCHOLIUM: Quod substantia sit indivisibilis, simplicius ex hoc solo intelligitur quod natura  substantiae non potest concipi nisi infinita et quod per partem  substantiae nihil aliud intelligi potest quam substantia finita, quod (per propositionem 8) manifestam contradictionem implicat.
1p14 Praeter Deum nulla	1p14 praeter Deum nulla [geomap]
PROP. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.	PROPOSITIO XIV: praeter Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia.
Proof.-As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied (by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore, besides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be conceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Cum Deus sit ens absolute infinitum de quo nullum attributum quod essentiam  substantiae exprimit, negari potest (per definitionem 6 {1d06}) isque necessario existat (per propositionem 11 {1p11}) si aliqua substantia praeter Deum daretur, ea explicari deberet per aliquod attributum Dei sicque du  substantiae ejusdem attributi existerent, quod (per propositionem 5 {1p05}) est absurdum adeoque nulla substantia extra Deum dari potest et consequenter non etiam concipi. Nam si posset concipi, deberet necessario concipi ut existens; atqui hoc (per primam partem hujus demonstrationis) est absurdum. Ergo extra Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia. Q.E.D.
1p14c1 Deum unicum infinitam	1p14c1 Deum unicum infinitam [geomap]
Corollary I.-Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).	COROLLARIUM {1p14} I: Hinc clarissime sequitur I. Deum esse unicum hoc est (per definitionem 6 {1d06}) in rerum natura non nisi unam substantiam dari eamque absolute infinitam esse, ut in scholio propositionis 10 {non-deductive reference} jam innuimus.
1p14c2 rem vel attributa vel affectiones	1p14c2 rem vel attributa vel affectiones [geomap]
Corollary II.-It follows: 2. That extension and thought are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents (affectiones) of the attributes of God.	COROLLARIUM {1p14} II: Sequitur II. rem extensam et rem cogitantem vel [excl exh] Dei attributa esse vel (per axioma 1 {1a01}) affectiones attributorum Dei.
1p15 est in Deo est	1p15 est in Deo est [geomap]
PROP. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.	PROPOSITIO XV: Quicquid est, in Deo est et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest.
Proof.-Besides God, no substance is granted or can be conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def. v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance; wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only through it be conceived. But substances and modes form the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing can be, or be conceived. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: praeter Deum nulla datur neque concipi potest substantia (per 14 propositionem {1p14}) hoc est (per definitionem 3) res quae in se est et per se concipitur. Modi autem (per definitionem 5 {1d05}) sine substantia nec esse nec concipi possunt; quare hi in sola divina natura esse et per ipsam solam concipi possunt. Atqui praeter substantias et modos nil datur (per axioma 1 {1a01}). Ergo nihil sine Deo  esse neque concipi potest. Q.E.D.
1p15s Deum hominis corpore et mente	1p15s Deum hominis corpore et mente
Note.-Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant; thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of their own words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi, and note 2, Prop. viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain more fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all start from the following points:-- Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God. This they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or two. If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then be either finite or infinite. If the former, then infinite substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another infinite, which is also absurd. Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths, it will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part measured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve times as great as the other. Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance apart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the distance between the two lines will be continually increased, until at length it changes from definite to indefinable. As these absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance must necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain to the nature of God. The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme perfection. God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect being, cannot be passive; but extended substance, insofar as it is divisible, is passive. It follows, therefore, that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God. Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto. However, I think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered their propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such a hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.) to be absurd. Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all these absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that: infinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of finite parts. This is exactly what we have already proved (in Prop. xii.). Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in reality recoiled upon themselves. If, from this absurdity of theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares, and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to deny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For, taking extended substance, which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible (Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can be multiplied and divided. So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be infinitely divided. Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface of lines, and a line of points. This must be admitted by all who know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who deny the possibility of a vacuum. For if extended substance could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others remaining joined together as before? And why should all be so fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum? Surely in the case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one can exist without the other, and can remain in its original condition. As, then, there does not exist a vacuum in nature (of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to prevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is substance cannot be divided. If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally so prone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is conceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect. If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is infinite, one, and indivisible. This will be plain enough to all who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination, especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are distinguished, not really, but modally. For instance, water, in so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is extended substance; from this point of view it is neither separated nor divisible. Further, water, in so far as it is water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted. I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in fact, founded on the same assumption as the first-namely, that matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed of parts. Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God (by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could receive its modifications [Lat: affectiones]. All things, I repeat, are in God, and all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly show) from the necessity of his essence. Wherefore it can in nowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything other than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the Divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is granted to be infinite and eternal. But enough of this for the present.	SCHOLIUM: Sunt qui Deum instar hominis corpore et mente constantem atque passionibus obnoxium fingunt sed quam longe hi a vera Dei cognitione aberrent, satis ex jam demonstratis constat. Sed hos mitto : nam omnes qui naturam divinam aliquo modo contemplati sunt, Deum esse corporeum negant. Quod etiam optime probant ex eo quod per corpus intelligimus quamcunque quantitatem longam, latam et profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatam, quo nihil absurdius de Deo, ente scilicet absolute infinito, dici potest. Attamen interim aliis rationibus quibus hoc idem demonstrare conantur, clare ostendunt se substantiam ipsam corpoream sive extensam a natura divina omnino removere atque ipsam a Deo creatam statuunt. Ex qua autem divina potentia creari potuerit, prorsus ignorant; quod clare ostendit illos id quod ipsimet dicunt, non intelligere. Ego saltem satis clare meo quidem judicio demonstravi (vide corollarium propositionis 6 et scholium II propositionis 8) nullam substantiam ab alio produci vel creari. Porro propositione 14 ostendimus praeter Deum nullam dari neque concipi posse substantiam atque hinc conclusimus substantiam extensam unum ex infinitis Dei attributis esse. Verum ad pleniorem explicationem adversariorum argumenta refutabo quae omnia huc redeunt primo quod substantia corporea quatenus substantia constat ut putant partibus et ideo eandem infinitam posse esse et consequenter ad Deum pertinere posse negant. Atque hoc multis exemplis explicant ex quibus unum aut alterum afferam. Si substantia corporea aiunt est infinita, concipiatur in duas partes dividi; erit unaquque pars vel finita vel infinita. Si illud, componitur ergo infinitum ex duabus partibus finitis, quod est absurdum. Si hoc, datur ergo infinitum duplo majus alio infinito, quod etiam est absurdum. Porro si quantitas infinita mensuratur partibus pedes quantibus, infinitis talibus partibus constare debebit ut et si partibus mensuretur digitos quantibus ac propterea unus numerus infinitus erit duodecies major alio infinito. Denique si ex uno puncto infinitae cujusdam quantitatis concipiatur duas lineas ut AB, AC, certa ac determinata in initio distantia in infinitum protendi, certum est distantiam inter B et C continuo augeri et tandem ex determinata indeterminabilem fore. Cum igitur haec absurda sequantur ut putant ex eo quod quantitas infinita supponitur, inde concludunt substantiam corpoream debere esse finitam et consequenter ad Dei essentiam non pertinere. Secundum argumentum petitur etiam a summa Dei perfectione. Deus enim inquiunt cum sit ens summe perfectum, pati non potest : atqui substantia corporea quandoquidem divisibilis est, pati potest; sequitur ergo ipsam ad Dei essentiam non pertinere. Haec sunt quae apud scriptores invenio argumenta quibus ostendere conantur substantiam corpoream divina natura indignam esse nec ad eandem posse pertinere. Verumenimvero si quis recte attendat, me ad haec jam respondisse comperiet quandoquidem haec argumenta in eo tantum fundantur quod substantiam corpoream ex partibus componi supponunt, quod jam (per propositionem 12 cum corollario propositionis 13) absurdum esse ostendi. Deinde si quis rem recte perpendere velit, videbit omnia illa absurda (siquidem omnia absurda sunt, de quo non jam disputo) ex quibus concludere volunt substantiam extensam finitam esse, minime ex eo sequi quod quantitas infinita supponatur sed quod quantitatem infinitam mensurabilem et ex partibus finitis conflari supponunt; quare ex absurdis quae inde sequuntur, nihil aliud concludere possunt quam quod quantitas infinita non sit mensurabilis et quod ex partibus finitis conflari non possit. Atque hoc idem est quod nos supra (propositione 12 etc.) jam demonstravimus. Quare telum quod in nos intendunt, in se ipsos revera conjiciunt. Si igitur ipsi ex suo hoc absurdo concludere tamen volunt substantiam extensam debere esse finitam, nihil aliud hercle faciunt quam si quis ex eo quod finxit circulum quadrati proprietates habere, concludit circulum non habere centrum ex quo omnes ad circumferentiam duct line sunt quales. Nam substantiam corpoream quae non nisi infinita, non nisi unica et non nisi indivisibilis potest concipi (vide propositiones 8, 5 et 12) eam ipsi ad concludendum eandem esse finitam, ex partibus finitis conflari et multiplicem esse et divisibilem concipiunt. Sic etiam alii postquam fingunt lineam ex punctis componi, multa sciunt invenire argumenta quibus ostendant lineam non posse in infinitum dividi. Et profecto non minus absurdum est ponere quod substantia corporea ex corporibus sive partibus componatur quam quod corpus ex superficiebus, superficies ex lineis, line denique ex punctis componantur. Atque hoc omnes qui claram rationem infallibilem esse sciunt, fateri debent et imprimis ii qui negant dari vacuum. Nam si substantia corporea ita posset dividi ut ejus partes realiter distinctae essent, cur ergo una pars non posset annihilari manentibus reliquis ut ante inter se connexis? et cur omnes ita aptari debent ne detur vacuum? Sane rerum quae realiter ab invicem distinctae sunt, una sine alia esse et in suo statu manere potest. Cum igitur vacuum in natura non detur (de quo alias) sed omnes partes ita concurrere debent ne detur vacuum, sequitur hinc etiam easdem non posse realiter distingui hoc est substantiam corpoream quatenus substantia est, non posse dividi. Si quis tamen jam qurat cur nos ex natura ita propensi simus ad dividendam quantitatem? ei respondeo quod quantitas duobus modis a nobis concipitur, abstracte scilicet sive superficialiter prout nempe ipsam imaginamur vel ut substantia, quod a solo intellectu fit. Si itaque ad quantitatem attendimus prout in imaginatione est, quod spe et facilius a nobis fit, reperietur finita, divisibilis et partibus conflata; si autem ad ipsam prout in intellectu est, attendimus et eam quatenus substantia est, concipimus, quod difficillime fit, tum ut jam satis demonstravimus, infinita, unica et indivisibilis reperietur. Quod omnibus qui inter imaginationem et intellectum distinguere sciverint, satis manifestum erit, praecipue si ad hoc etiam attendatur quod materia ubique eadem est nec partes in eadem distinguuntur nisi quatenus materiam diversimode affectam esse concipimus, unde ejus partes modaliter tantum distinguuntur, non autem realiter. Exempli gratia aquam quatenus aqua est, dividi concipimus ejusque partes ab invicem separari; at non quatenus substantia est corporea; eatenus enim neque separatur neque dividitur. Porro aqua quatenus aqua generatur et corrumpitur; at quatenus substantia nec generatur nec corrumpitur. Atque his me ad secundum argumentum etiam respondisse puto quandoquidem id in eo etiam fundatur quod materia quatenus substantia divisibilis sit et partibus confletur. Et quamvis hoc non esset, nescio cur divina natura indigna esset quandoquidem (per propositionem 14) extra Deum nulla substantia dari potest a qua ipsa pateretur. Omnia inquam in Deo sunt et omnia quae fiunt per solas leges infinitae Dei naturae fiunt et ex necessitate ejus essentiae (ut mox ostendam) sequuntur; quare nulla ratione dici potest Deum ab alio pati aut substantiam extensam divina natura indignam esse tametsi divisibilis supponatur dummodo aeterna et infinita concedatur. Sed de his impraesentiarum satis.
1p16 infinita infinitis modis sequi	1p16 infinita infinitis modis sequi [geomap]
PROP. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways-that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.	PROPOSITIO XVI: Ex necessitate divinae naturae infinita infinitis modis (hoc est omnia quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.
Proof.-This proposition will be clear to everyone, who remembers that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more reality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Haec propositio unicuique manifesta esse debet si modo ad hoc attendat quod ex data cujuscunque rei definitione plures proprietates intellectus concludit, quae revera ex eadem (hoc est ipsa rei essentia) necessario sequuntur et eo plures quo plus realitatis rei definitio exprimit hoc est quo plus realitatis rei definitae essentia involvit. Cum autem natura divina infinita absolute attributa habeat (per definitionem 6 {1d06}) quorum etiam unumquodque infinitam essentiam in suo genere exprimit, ex ejusdem ergo necessitate infinita infinitis modis (hoc est omnia quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) necessario sequi debent. Q.E.D.
1p16c1 intellectum infinitum	1p16c1 intellectum infinitum  [geomap]
Corollary I.-Hence it follows, that God is the efficient cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect.	COROLLARIUM {1p16} I: Hinc sequitur Deum omnium rerum quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, esse causam efficientem.
1p16c2 non accidens	1p16c2 non accidens [geomap]
Corollary II.-It also follows that God is a cause in himself, and not through an accident of his nature.	COROLLARIUM {1p16} II: Sequitur II. Deum causam esse per se, non vero per accidens.
1p16c3 causam primam	1p16c3 causam primam [geomap]
Corollary III.-It follows, thirdly, that God is the absolutely first cause.	COROLLARIUM {1p16}  III: Sequitur III. Deum esse absolute causam primam.
1p17 Deus nemine coactus	1p17 Deus nemine coactus [geomap]
PROP. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone.	PROPOSITIO XVII: Deus ex solis suae naturae legibus et a nemine coactus agit.
Proof.-We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing, solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved (in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived but that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist; outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to act. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ex sola divinae naturae necessitate vel [mng eqv] (quod idem est) ex solis ejusdem naturae legibus infinita absolute sequi modo propositione 16 {1p16} ostendimus et propositione 15 {1p15} demonstravimus nihil sine Deo esse nec concipi posse sed omnia in Deo esse; quare nihil extra ipsum esse potest a quo ad agendum determinetur vel [a fortiori] cogatur atque adeo Deus ex solis suae naturae legibus et a nemine coactus agit. Q.E.D.
1p17c1 extrinsece vel intrinsece	1p17c1 extrinsece vel intrinsece [geomap]
Corollary I.-It follows: 1. That there can be no cause which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.	COROLLARIUM {1p17} I: Hinc sequitur I. nullam dari causam quae Deum extrinsece vel [excl exh] intrinsece praeter ipsius naturae perfectionem incitet ad agendum.
1p17c2 solum Deum causam liberam	1p17c2 solum Deum causam liberam [geomap]
Corollary II.-It follows: 2. That God is the sole free cause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature (by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the sole free cause. Q.E.D.	COROLLARIUM {1p17} II: Sequitur II. solum Deum esse causam liberam. Deus enim solus ex sola suae naturae  necessitate existit (per propositionem 11 {1p11} et corollarium I propositionis 14 {1p14c1}) et ex sola suae naturae necessitate agit (per propositionem praecedentem {1p16}). Adeoque (per definitionem 7 {1d07}) solus est causa libera. Q.E.D.
1p17s Deum causam liberam	1p17s Deum causam liberam
Note.-Others think that God is a free cause, because he can, as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have said follow from his nature-that is, which are in his power, should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about, that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd.	SCHOLIUM: Alii putant Deum esse causam liberam propterea quod potest ut putant efficere ut ea quae ex ejus natura sequi diximus hoc est quae in ejus potestate sunt, non fiant sive ut ab ipso non producantur. Sed hoc idem est ac si dicerent quod Deus potest efficere ut ex natura trianguli non sequatur ejus tres angulos quales esse duobus rectis sive ut ex data causa non sequatur effectus, quod est absurdum.
Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show, that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves.	Porro infra absque ope hujus propositionis ostendam ad Dei naturam neque intellectum neque voluntatem pertinere. Scio equidem plures esse qui putant se posse demonstrare ad Dei naturam summum intellectum et liberam voluntatem pertinere; nihil enim perfectius cognoscere sese aiunt quod Deo tribuere possunt quam id quod in nobis summa est perfectio.
Further, although they conceive God as actually supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring into existence everything which he actually understands, for they think that they would thus destroy God's power.	Porro tametsi Deum actu summe intelligentem concipiant, non tamen credunt eum posse omnia quae actu intelligit, efficere ut existant nam se eo modo Dei potentiam destruere putant.
If, they contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think, would clash with God's omnipotence;	Si omnia inquiunt quae in ejus intellectu sunt, creavisset, nihil tum amplius creare potuisset, quod credunt Dei omnipotenti repugnare
therefore, they prefer to assert that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute exercise of will, to create.	ideoque maluerunt Deum ad omnia indifferentem statuere nec aliud creantem praeter id quod absoluta quadam voluntate decrevit creare.
However, I think I have shown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God's supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things-that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles.	Verum ego me satis clare ostendisse puto (vide propositionem 16) a summa Dei potentia sive infinita natura infinita infinitis modis hoc est omnia necessario effluxisse vel semper eadem necessitate sequi eodem modo ac ex natura trianguli ab aeterno et in aeternum sequitur ejus tres angulos quari duobus rectis.
Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity.	Quare Dei omnipotentia actu ab aeterno fuit et in aeternum in eadem actualitate manebit.
This manner of treating the question attributes to God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect.	Et hoc modo Dei omnipotentia longe meo quidem judicio perfectior statuitur. Imo adversarii Dei omnipotentiam (liceat aperte loqui) negare videntur.
For, otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render himself imperfect.	Coguntur enim fateri Deum infinita creabilia intelligere quae tamen nunquam creare poterit. Nam alias si scilicet omnia quae intelligit crearet, suam juxta ipsos exhauriret omnipotentiam et se imperfectum redderet.
Wherefore, in order to establish that God is perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time, that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power extends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most repugnant to God's omnipotence.	Ut igitur Deum perfectum statuant, eo rediguntur ut simul statuere debeant ipsum non posse omnia efficere ad quae ejus potentia se extendit, quo absurdius aut Dei omnipotenti magis repugnans non video quid fingi possit.
Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some significance quite different from those they usually bear.	Porro ut de intellectu et voluntate quos Deo communiter tribuimus, hic etiam aliquid dicam, si ad aeternam Dei essentiam intellectus scilicet et voluntas pertinent, aliud sane per utrumque hoc attributum intelligendum est quam quod vulgo solent homines.
For intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God, would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in com mon with them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks.	Nam intellectus et voluntas qui Dei essentiam constituerent, a nostro intellectu et voluntate toto clo differre deberent nec in ulla re praeterquam in nomine convenire possent; non aliter scilicet quam inter se conveniunt canis, signum cleste et canis, animal latrans.
This I will prove as follows. If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be, posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood, inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality (Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.).	Quod sic demonstrabo. Si intellectus ad divinam naturam pertinet, non poterit uti noster intellectus posterior (ut plerisque placet) vel simul natura esse cum rebus intellectis quandoquidem Deus omnibus rebus prior est causalitate (per corollarium I propositionis 16)
On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is as it is, because it exists by representation as such in the intellect of God. Wherefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence.	sed contra veritas et formalis rerum essentia ideo talis est quia talis in Dei intellectu existit objective. Quare Dei intellectus quatenus Dei essentiam constituere concipitur, est revera causa rerum tam earum essentiae quam earum existenti,
This seems to have been recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect, God's will, and God's power, are one and the same. As, therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely, both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its existence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely in the quality which the latter gains from the former.	quod ab iis videtur etiam fuisse animadversum qui Dei intellectum, voluntatem et potentiam unum et idem esse asseruerunt. Cum itaque Dei intellectus sit unica rerum causa videlicet (ut ostendimus) tam earum essentiae quam earum existenti, debet ipse necessario ab iisdem differre tam ratione essentiae quam ratione existenti. Nam causatum differt a sua causa praecise in eo quod a causa habet.
For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence, but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and, therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of one of them cease, the existence of the other will not necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also.	Exempli gratia homo est causa existenti, non vero essentiae alterius hominis; est enim haec aeterna veritas et ideo secundum essentiam prorsus convenire possunt; in existendo autem differre debent et propterea si unius existentia pereat, non ideo alterius peribit sed si unius essentia destrui posset et fieri falsa, destrueretur etiam alterius essentia.
Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in respect to its existence.	Quapropter res quae et essentiae et existenti alicujus effectus est causa, a tali effectu differre debet tam ratione essentiae quam ratione existenti.
Now the intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and the existence of our intellect; therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before. The reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone can easily see.	Atqui Dei intellectus est et essentiae et existenti nostri intellectus causa; ergo Dei intellectus quatenus divinam essentiam constituere concipitur, a nostro intellectu tam ratione essentiae quam ratione existenti differt nec in ulla re praeterquam in nomine cum eo convenire potest, ut volebamus. Circa voluntatem eodem modo proceditur, ut facile unusquisque videre potest.
1p18 Deus immanens transiens	1p18 Deus immanens transiens [geomap]
PROP. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.	PROPOSITIO XVIII: Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens.
Proof.-All things which are, are in God, and must be conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him. This is our first point. Further, besides God there can be no substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to God. This is our second point. God, therefore, is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Omnia quae sunt, in Deo sunt et per Deum concipi debent (per propositionem 15 {1p15}) adeoque (per corollarium I propositionis 16 hujus {1p16c1}) Deus rerum quae in ipso sunt, est causa, quod est primum. Deinde extra Deum nulla potest dari substantia (per propositionem 14 {1p14}) hoc est (per definitionem 3 {1d03}) res quae extra Deum in se sit, quod erat secundum. Deus ergo est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens. Q.E.D.
1p19 Deus aeterna	1p19 Deus aeterna [geomap]
PROP. XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.	PROPOSITIO XIX: Deus sive [non-excl non-exh] omnia Dei attributa sunt aeterna.
Proof.-God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.) necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its definition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.). Further, by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def. iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance-in other words, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should be involved in the attributes of substance. Now eternity appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in Prop. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the attributes, and thus all are eternal. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Deus enim (per definitionem 6 {1d06}) est [mng eqv] substantia quae (per propositionem 11 {1p11}) necessario existit hoc est [mng eqv] (per propositionem 7 {1p07}) ad cujus naturam pertinet existere sive [mng eqv] (quod idem est) ex cujus definitione sequitur ipsum existere adeoque [mng eqv] (per definitionem 8) est aeternus. Deinde per Dei attributa intelligendum est id quod (per definitionem 4 {1d04}) divinae  substantiae essentiam exprimit hoc est [mng eqv] id quod ad substantiam pertinet : id ipsum inquam ipsa attributa involvere debent. Atqui ad naturam  substantiae (ut jam ex propositione 7 demonstravi) pertinet aeternitas. Ergo unumquodque attributorum aeternitatem involvere debet adeoque omnia sunt aeterna. Q.E.D.
1p19s aliter (content of scholium is aliter)	1p19s aliter (content of scholium is aliter)
Note.-This proposition is also evident from the manner in which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God, like his essence, is an eternal truth. Further (in Prop. xix. of my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.	SCHOLIUM: Haec propositio quam clarissime etiam patet ex modo quo (propositione 11) Dei existentiam demonstravi; ex ea inquam demonstratione constat Dei existentiam sicut ejus essentiam aeternam esse veritatem. Deinde (propositione 19 Principiorum Cartesii) alio etiam modo Dei aeternitatem demonstravi nec opus est eum hic repetere.
1p20 Deus existentia essentia idem	1p20 Deus existentia essentia idem [geomap]
PROP. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.	PROPOSITIO XX: Dei existentia ejusque essentia unum et idem sunt.
Proof.-God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore the same attributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain at the same time his eternal existence-in other words, that which constitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time his existence. Wherefore God's existence and God's essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Deus (per antecedentem propositionem {1p19}) ejusque omnia attributa sunt aeterna hoc est (per definitionem 8 {1d08}) unumquodque ejus attributorum existentiam exprimit. Eadem ergo Dei attributa quae (per definitionem 4 {1d04}) Dei aeternam essentiam explicant, ejus simul aeternam existentiam explicant hoc est illud ipsum quod essentiam Dei constituit, constituit simul ipsius existentiam adeoque haec et ipsius essentia unum et idem sunt. Q.E.D.
1p20c1 aeternam veritatem	1p20c1 aeternam veritatem [geomap]
Coroll. I.-Hence it follows that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.	COROLLARIUM {1p20} I: Hinc sequitur I. Dei existentiam sicut ejus essentiam aeternam esse veritatem.
1p20c2 immutabilia	1p20c2 immutabilia [geomap]
Coroll. II-Secondly, it follows that God, and all the attributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could be changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be changed in respect to essence-that is, obviously, be changed from true to false, which is absurd.	COROLLARIUM {1p20} II: Sequitur II. Deum sive [non-excl exh] omnia Dei attributa esse immutabilia. Nam si ratione existenti mutarentur, deberent etiam (per propositionem praecedentem {1p18}) ratione essentiae mutari hoc est (ut per se notum) ex veris falsa fieri, quod est absurdum.
1p21 Omnia sequuntur infinita aeterna	1p21 Omnia sequuntur infinita aeterna [geomap]
PROP. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.	PROPOSITIO XXI: Omnia quae ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei sequuntur, semper et infinita existere debuerunt sive [mng eqv]  per idem attributum aeterna et infinita sunt.
Proof.-Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition to be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its nature infinite.	DEMONSTRATIO: Concipe si fieri potest (siquidem neges) aliquid in aliquo Dei attributo ex ipsius absoluta natura sequi quod finitum sit et determinatam habeat existentiam sive [prf eqv]  durationem; exempli gratia ideam Dei in cogitatione. At cogitatio quandoquidem Dei attributum supponitur, est necessario (per propositionem 11 {1p11}) sua natura infinita.
But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God, it is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived as finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite); therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.) must necessarily exist.	Verum quatenus ipsa ideam Dei habet, finita supponitur. At (per definitionem 2 {1d02}) finita concipi non potest nisi per ipsam cogitationem determinetur. Sed non per ipsam cogitationem quatenus ideam Dei constituit; eatenus enim finita supponitur esse : ergo per cogitationem quatenus ideam Dei non constituit, quae tamen (per propositionem 11) necessario existere debet.
We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting, the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis.	Datur igitur cogitatio non constituens ideam Dei ac propterea ex ejus natura quatenus est absoluta cogitatio, non sequitur necessario idea Dei (concipitur enim ideam Dei constituens et non constituens). Quod est contra hypothesin.
Wherefore, if the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed, anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first point.	Quare si idea Dei in cogitatione aut [excl exh] aliquid (perinde est quicquid sumatur quandoquidem demonstratio universalis est) in aliquo Dei attributo ex necessitate absolutae naturae ipsius attributi sequatur, id debet necessario esse infinitum; quod erat primum.
Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be about not to exist.	Deinde id quod ex necessitate naturae alicujus attributi ita sequitur, non potest determinatam habere existentiam sive [mng eqv]  durationem. Nam si neges, supponatur res quae ex necessitate naturae alicujus attributi sequitur, dari in aliquo Dei attributo exempli gratia idea Dei in cogitatione eaque supponatur aliquando non exstitisse vel [excl non-exh] non exstitura.
Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the latter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of God, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that, thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed therefrom.	Cum autem cogitatio Dei attributum supponatur, debet et necessario et immutabilis existere (per propositionem 11 et corollarium II propositionis 20 {1p20c2}). Quare ultra limites durationis ideae Dei (supponitur enim aliquando non exstitisse aut [excl non-exh] non exstitura) cogitatio sine idea Dei existere debebit; atqui hoc est contra hypothesin; supponitur enim ex data cogitatione necessario sequi ideam Dei.
Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point. Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's absolute nature.	Ergo idea Dei in cogitatione aut [excl non-exh] aliquid quod necessario ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei sequitur, non potest determinatam habere durationem sed per idem attributum aeternum est, quod erat secundum. Nota hoc idem esse affirmandum de quacunque re quae in aliquo Dei attributo ex Dei absoluta natura necessario sequitur.
1p22 modificatione infinitum	1p22 modificatione infinitum [geomap]
PROP. XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified into a modification which exists necessarily and as infinite through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite.	PROPOSITIO XXII: Quicquid ex aliquo Dei attributo quatenus modificatum est tali modificatione quae et necessario et infinita per idem existit, sequitur, debet quoque et necessario et infinitum existere.
Proof.-The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the preceding one.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus propositionis demonstratio procedit eodem modo ac demonstratio praecedentis. [, which used:  Concipe, ideam, cogitatione, {1p11}, {1d02}, Datur, {1p20c2}). B.H.]
1p23 modus infinitus absoluta	1p23 modus infinitus absoluta  [geomap]
PROP. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a modification [Lat: modificatione] which exists necessarily, and as infinite.	PROPOSITIO XXIII: Omnis modus qui et necessario et infinitus existit, necessario sequi debuit vel [excl non-exh] ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei vel ex aliquo attributo modificato modificatione quae et necessario et infinita existit.
Proof.-A mode exists in something else, through which it must be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in God, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of God, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the infinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.) eternity; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely. A mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some modification [Lat: affectiones], which follows from the absolute nature of the said attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily and as infinite.	DEMONSTRATIO: Modus enim in alio est per quod concipi debet (per definitionem 5) {1d05} hoc est (per propositionem 15) {1p15} in solo Deo est et per solum Deum concipi potest. Si ergo modus concipitur necessario existere et infinitus esse, utrumque hoc debet necessario concludi sive [excl non-exh]  percipi per aliquod Dei attributum quatenus idem concipitur infinitatem et necessitatem existentiae sive [prf eqv] (quod per definitionem 8 idem est) aeternitatem exprimere hoc est (per definitionem 6 {1d06} et propositionem 19 {1p19}) quatenus absolute consideratur. Modus ergo qui et necessario et infinitus existit, ex absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi sequi debuit hocque vel [excl exh] immediate (de quo vide propositionem 21 {1p21}) vel mediante aliqua modificatione quae ex ejus absoluta natura sequitur hoc est (per propositionem praecedentem) quae et necessario et infinita existit. Q.E.D.
1p24 Rerum essentia existentiam	1p24 Rerum essentia existentiam [geomap]
PROP. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.	PROPOSITIO XXIV: Rerum a Deo productarum essentia non involvit existentiam.
Proof.-This proposition is evident from Def. i. For that of which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is self-caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex definitione 1 {1d01}. Id enim cujus natura (in se scilicet considerata) involvit existentiam, causa est sui et ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit.
1p24c deum causam perseverent	1p24c deum causam perseverent [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of the being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist, or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently, it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence appertain. (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.	COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur Deum non tantum esse causam ut res incipiant existere sed etiam ut in existendo perseverent sive [mng eqv] (ut termino scholastico utar) Deum esse causam essendi rerum. Nam sive [excl exh] res existant sive [excl exh] non existant, quotiescunque ad earum essentiam attendimus, eandem nec existentiam nec durationem involvere comperimus adeoque earum essentia neque suae existenti neque suae durationis potest esse causa sed tantum Deus ad cujus solam naturam pertinet existere (per corollarium I propositionis 14 {1p14c1}).
1p25 Deus causa essenti	1p25 Deus causa essenti [geomap]
PROP. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.	PROPOSITIO XXV: Deus non tantum est causa efficiens rerum existentiae sed etiam essentiae.
Proof.-If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by Ax. iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is absurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si negas, ergo rerum essentiae Deus non est causa adeoque (per axioma 4 {1a04}) potest rerum essentia sine Deo concipi : atqui hoc (per propositionem 15 {1p15}) est absurdum. Ergo rerum etiam essentiae Deus est causa. Q.E.D.
1p25s aliter in scholio	1p25s aliter in scholio
Note.-This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi. For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their existence-in a word, God must be called the cause of all things, in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This will be made still clearer by the following corollary.	SCHOLIUM: Haec propositio clarius sequitur ex propositione 16. Ex ea enim sequitur quod ex data natura divina tam rerum essentia quam existentia debeat necessario concludi et ut verbo dicam eo sen su quo Deus dicitur causa sui, etiam omnium rerum causa dicendus est, quod adhuc clarius ex sequenti corollario constabit.
1p25c res particulares attributorum affectiones	1p25c res particulares attributorum affectiones [geomap]
Corollary.-Individual things are nothing but modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from Prop. xv. and Def. v.	COROLLARIUM: Res particulares nihil sunt nisi [mng eqv] Dei attributorum affectiones sive [mng eqv]  modi quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur. Demonstratio patet ex propositione 15 {1p15} et definitione 5 {1d05}.
1p26 non ipsam determinare	1p26 non ipsam determinare [geomap]
PROP. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to operate in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to operate.	PROPOSITIO XXVI: Res quae ad aliquid operandum determinata est, a Deo necessario sic fuit determinata et quae a Deo non est determinata, non potest se ipsam ad operandum determinare.
Proof.-That by which things are said to be conditioned to operate in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props. xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point. Our second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is absurd.	DEMONSTRATIO: Id per quod res determinatae ad aliquid operandum dicuntur, necessario quid positivum est (ut per se notum). Adeoque tam ejus essentiae quam existenti Deus ex necessitate suae naturae est causa efficiens (per propositiones 25 {1p25}et 16 {1p16}) quod erat primum. Ex quo etiam quod secundo proponitur clarissime sequitur. Nam si res quae a Deo determinata non est, se ipsam determinare posset, prima pars hujus falsa esset, quod est absurdum, ut ostendimus.
1p27 non ipsam indeterminatam reddere	1p27 non ipsam indeterminatam reddere [geomap]
PROP. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to operate in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.	PROPOSITIO XXVII: Res quae a Deo ad aliquid operandum determinata est, se ipsam indeterminatam reddere non potest.
Proof.-This proposition is evident from the third axiom.	DEMONSTRATIO: Haec propositio patet ex axiomate tertio. {1a03}
1p28 nisi alia causa finita	1p28 nisi alia causa finita [geomap]
PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to operate, unless it be conditioned for existence and operation by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to operate, unless it be conditioned for existence and operation by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.	PROPOSITIO XXVIII: Quodcunque singulare sive [mng eqv] quaevis res quae finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, non potest existere nec ad operandum determinarinisi ad existendum et operandum determineturab alia causa quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam et rursus haec causa non potest etiam existere neque ad operandum determinarinisi ab alia quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, determinetur ad existendum et operandumet sic in infinitum.
Proof.-Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and operate, has been thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv., Coroll.). But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; for substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i. and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the attributes of God. But from God, or from any of his attributes, in so far as the latter is modified by a modification [Lat: affectiones] infinite and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Wherefore it must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and operation by God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are modified by some modification which is finite, and has a conditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this cause or this modification [Lat: affectiones] (for the reason by which we established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid determinatum est ad existendum et operandum, a Deo sic determinatum est (per propositionem 26 {1p26} et corollarium propositionis 24 {1p24}). At id quod finitum est et determinatam habet existentiam, ab absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi produci non potuit; quicquid enim ex absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi sequitur, id infinitum et aeternum est (per propositionem 21 {1p21}). Debuit ergo ex Deo vel [excl exh] aliquo ejus attributo sequi quatenus aliquo modo affectum consideratur; praeter enim substantiam et modos nil datur (per axioma 1 {1a01} et definitionibus 3  {1d03} et 5 {1d05}) et modi (per corollarium propositionis 25 {1p25}) nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones. At ex Deo vel [excl exh]aliquo ejus attributo quatenus affectum est modificatione quae aeterna et infinita est, sequi etiam non potuit (per propositionem 22  {1p22}). Debuit ergo sequi vel [mng eqv] ad existendum et operandum determinaria Deo vel  [excl exh] aliquo ejus attributo quatenus modificatum est modificatione quae finita est et determinatam habet existentiam. Quod erat primum. Deinde haec rursus causa sive [mng eqv] hic modus (per eandem rationem qua primam partem hujus jam jam demonstravimus) debuit etiam determinari ab alia quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam et rursus haec ultima (per eandem rationem) ab alia et sic semper (per eandem rationem) in infinitum. Q.E.D.
1p28s causa absolute proxima remota	1p28s causa absolute proxima remota
Note.-As certain things must be produced immediately by God, namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which, nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it follows:-1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those things immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after his kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop. xxiv. Coroll.). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what follows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote cause, we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect. But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.	SCHOLIUM: Cum quaedam a Deo immediate produci debuerunt videlicet ea quae ex absoluta ejus natura necessario sequuntur et alia mediantibus his primis quae tamen sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt, hinc sequitur I. quod Deus sit rerum immediate ab ipso productarum causa absolute proxima, non vero in suo genere ut aiunt. Nam Dei effectus sine sua causa nec esse nec concipi possunt (per propositionem 15 et corollarium propositionis 24). Sequitur II. quod Deus non potest proprie dici causa esse remota rerum singularium nisi forte ea de causa ut scilicet has ab iis quas immediate produxit vel potius quae ex absoluta ejus natura sequuntur, distinguamus. Nam per causam remotam talem intelligimus quae cum effectu nullo modo conjuncta est. At omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt et a Deo ita dependent ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint.
1p29 contingens necessitate	1p29 contingens necessitate [geomap]
PROP. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.	PROPOSITIO XXIX: In rerum natura nullum datur contingens sed omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae determinata sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum.
Proof.-Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But God cannot be called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists necessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of the divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently (Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, God is not only the cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop. xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.). If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should render themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing that is contingent. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid est in Deo est (per propositionem 15 {1p15}) : Deus autem non potest dici res contingens. Nam (per propositionem 11 {1p11}) necessario, non vero contingenter existit. Modi deinde divinae naturae ex eadem etiam necessario, non vero contingenter secuti sunt (per propositionem 16  {1p16}) idque vel [excl exh] quatenus divina natura absolute (per propositionem 21 {1p21}) vel quatenus certo modo ad agendum determinata consideratur (per propositionem 27 {1p27}). Porro horum modorum Deus non tantum est causa quatenus simpliciter existunt (per corollarium propositionis 24 {1p24}) sed etiam (per propositionem 26 {1p26}) quatenus ad aliquid operandum  determinati considerantur. Quod si a Deo (per eandem propositionem) determinati non sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est ut se ipsos determinent et contra (per propositionem 27 {1p27}) si a Deo determinati sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est ut se ipsos indeterminatos reddant. Quare omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae determinata sunt, non tantum ad existendum sed etiam ad certo modo existendum et operandumnullumque datur contingens. Q.E.D.
1p29s natura naturans	1p29s natura naturans
Note.-Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I say to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause. By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.	SCHOLIUM: Antequam ulterius pergam, hic quid nobis per Naturam naturantem et quid per Naturam naturatam intelligendum sit, explicare volo vel potius monere. Nam ex antecedentibus jam constare existimo nempe quod per Naturam naturantem nobis intelligendum est id quod in se est et per se concipitur sive talia  substantiae attributa quae aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimunt hoc est (per corollarium I propositionis 14 et corollarium II propositionis 17) Deus quatenus ut causa libera consideratur. Per naturatam autem intelligo id omne quod ex necessitate Dei naturae sive uniuscujusque Dei attributorum sequitur hoc est omnes Dei attributorum modos quatenus considerantur ut res quae in Deo sunt et quae sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt.
1p30 Intellectus comprehendere	1p30 Intellectus comprehendere [geomap]
PROP. XXX. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of God, and nothing else.	PROPOSITIO XXX: Intellectus actu finitus aut [excl exh] actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud.
Proof.-A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect in representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save God, nor any modifications [Lat: affectiones] save those (Prop. xv.) which are in God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived. Therefore the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of God, and nothing else. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Idea vera debet convenire cum suo ideato (per axioma 6 {1p06}) hoc est (ut per se notum) id quod in intellectu objective continetur, debet necessario in natura dari. Atqui in natura (per corollarium I propositionis 14 {1p14}) non nisi una substantia datur nempe Deus nec ullae aliae affectiones (per propositionem 15 {1p15}) quam quae in Deo sunt et quae (per eandem propositionem) sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt; ergo intellectus actu finitus aut [excl exh] actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud. Q.E.D.
1p31 Intellectus naturatam naturantem	1p31 Intellectus naturatam naturantem [geomap]
PROP. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, just like will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive nature and not to active nature.	PROPOSITIO XXXI: Intellectus actu sive [excl exh] is finitus sit sive [excl exh] infinitus, ut et voluntas, cupiditas, amor etc. ad Naturam naturatam, non vero ad naturantem referri debent.
Proof.-By the intellect we (obviously) do not mean absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.) requiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must (by Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be conceived. It must therefore be referred to nature passive rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of thinking. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Per intellectum enim (ut per se notum) non intelligimus absolutam cogitationem sed certum tantum modum cogitandi, qui modus ab aliis scilicet cupiditate, amore, etc. differt adeoque (per definitionem 5 {1d05}) per absolutam cogitationem concipi debet nempe (per propositionem 15  {1p15} et definitionem 6 {1d06}) per aliquod Dei attributum quod aeternam et infinitam cogitationis essentiam exprimit, ita concipi debet ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possit ac propterea (per scholium propositionis 29 {no deductive reference}) ad Naturam naturatam, non vero naturantem referri debet ut etiam reliqui modi cogitandi. Q.E.D.
1p31s intellectu actu potentia	1p31s intellectu actu potentia
Note.-I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function, admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality: but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of understanding [Lat no actio but: "de ipsa scilicet intellectione " BH], than which nothing is more clearly perceived. For we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of the act of understanding.	SCHOLIUM: Ratio cur hic loquar de intellectu actu non est quia concedo ullum dari intellectum potentia sed quia omnem confusionem vitare cupio, nolui loqui nisi de re nobis quam clarissime percepta, de ipsa scilicet intellectione qua nihil nobis clarius percipitur. Nihil enim intelligere possumus quod ad perfectiorem intellectionis cognitionem non conducat.
1p32 Voluntas causa necessaria	1p32 Voluntas causa necessaria [geomap]
PROP. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause.	PROPOSITIO XXXII: Voluntas non potest vocari causa libera sed tantum necessaria.
Proof.-Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist, nor be conditioned to operate, unless it be conditioned by some cause other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause, and so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it must also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.). Thus, however it be conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus (Def. vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or constrained cause. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Voluntas certus tantum cogitandi modus est sicuti intellectus adeoque (per propositionem 28 {1p28}) unaquque volitio non potest existere neque ad operandum determinarinisi ab alia causa determinetur et haec rursus ab alia et sic porro in infinitum. Quod si voluntas infinita supponatur, debet etiam ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo, non quatenus substantia absolute infinita est sed quatenus attributum habet quod infinitam et aeternam cogitationis essentiam exprimit (per propositionem 23  {1p23}). Quocunque igitur modo sive [excl exh] finita sive [excl exh] infinita concipiatur, causam requirit a qua ad existendum et operandum determineturadeoque (per definitionem 7 {1d07}) non potest dici causa libera sed tantum necessaria vel [mng eqv] coacta. Q.E.D.
1p32c1 Deum non libertate voluntatis	1p32c1 Deum non libertate voluntatis [geomap]
Coroll. I.-Hence it follows, first, that God does not act according to freedom of the will.	COROLLARIUM {1p32} I: Hinc sequitur I. Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis.
1p32c2 voluntatem et intellectum omnia naturalia	1p32c2 voluntatem et intellectum omnia naturalia [geomap]
Coroll. II.-It follows, secondly, that will and intellect stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and operate in a particular manner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by which it is conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner. And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying that motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no more appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular manner.	COROLLARIUM {1p32} II: Sequitur II. voluntatem et intellectum ad Dei naturam ita sese habere ut motus et quies et absolute ut omnia naturalia quae (per propositionem 29 {1p29}) a Deo ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinaridebent. Nam voluntas, ut reliqua omnia, causa indiget a qua ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinetur. Et quamvis ex data voluntate sive [prf eqv] vid. {2p49c}] intellectu infinita sequantur, non tamen propterea Deus magis dici potest ex libertate voluntatis agere quam propter ea quae ex motu et quiete sequuntur (infinita enim ex his etiam sequuntur) dici potest ex libertate motus et quietis agere. Quare voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet quam reliqua naturalia sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet ut motus et quies et omnia reliqua quae ostendimus ex necessitate divinae naturae sequi et ab eadem ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari.
1p33 res Deo nullo alio modo produci potuerunt	1p33 res Deo nullo alio modo produci potuerunt [geomap]
PROP. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained.	PROPOSITIO XXXIII: Res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt quam productae sunt.
Proof-All things necessarily follow from the nature of God (Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular way (Prop. xxix.). If things, therefore, could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned to operate in a different way, so that the order of nature would have been different, God's nature would also have been able to be different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that different nature also would have perforce existed, and consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods. This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd. Therefore things could not have been brought into being by God in any other manner, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Res enim omnes ex data Dei natura necessario sequutae sunt (per propositionem 16 {1p16}) et ex necessitate naturae Dei determinatae sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum (per propositionem 29 {1p29}). Si itaque res alterius naturae potuissent esse vel [mng eqv]  alio modo ad operandum determinari ut naturae ordo alius esset, ergo Dei etiam natura alia posset esse quam jam est ac proinde (per propositionem 11 {1p11}) illa etiam deberet existere et consequenter duo vel [excl non-exh] plures possent dari Dii, quod (per corollarium I propositionis 14  {1p14}) est absurdum. Quapropter res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine etc. Q.E.D.
1p33s1 contingentes	1p33s1 contingentes
Note I.-As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the words necessary and impossible. A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing is said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge. A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes us,-such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or impossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.	SCHOLIUM I: Quoniam his luce meridiana clarius ostendi nihil absolute in rebus dari propter quod contingentes dicantur, explicare jam paucis volo quid nobis per contingens erit intelligendum sed prius quid per necessarium et impossibile. Res aliqua necessaria dicitur vel ratione suae essentiae vel ratione causae. Rei enim alicujus existentia vel ex ipsius essentia et definitione vel ex data causa efficiente necessario sequitur. Deinde his etiam de causis res aliqua impossibilis dicitur; nimirum quia vel ipsius essentia seu definitio contradictionem involvit vel quia nulla causa externa datur ad talem rem producendam determinata. At res aliqua nulla alia de causa contingens dicitur nisi respectu defectus nostrae cognitionis. Res enim cujus essentiam contradictionem involvere ignoramus vel de qua probe scimus eandem nullam contradictionem involvere et tamen de ipsius existentia nihil certo affirmare possumus propterea quod ordo causarum nos latet, ea nunquam nec ut necessaria nec ut impossibilis videri nobis potest ideoque eandem vel contingentem vel possibilem vocamus.
1p33s2 perfectissima	1p33s2 perfectissima
Note II.-It clearly follows from what we have said, that things have been brought into being by God in the highest perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a most perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From its contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being. I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They assign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am also convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory, but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There is no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop. xvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further, that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. If it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things. Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all eternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be convicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is no such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never could have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist before his decrees, and would not exist without them. But, it is said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in God. But persons who say this must admit that God can change his decrees. For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature and her order, different from those which he has ordained-in other words, if he had willed and conceived something different concerning nature-he would perforce have had a different intellect from that which he has, and also a different will. But if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a different will, without any change in his essence or his perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the decrees which he has made concerning created things, and nevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect and will concerning things created and their order are the same, in respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived. Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as they also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a different actual intellect and a different will, his essence would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at first, if things had been brought into being by God in a different way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have been different, which is absurd. As these things could not have been brought into being by God in any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection of God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he had understood them. But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the will of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought it about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection, and vice versae. What is such an assertion, but an open declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should understand things differently from the way in which he does understand them? This (as we have just shown) is the height of absurdity. Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its employers, as follows:-All things depend on the power of God. In order that things should be different from what they are, God's will would necessarily have to be different. But God's will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly demonstrated) from God's perfection. Therefore neither can things be different. I confess, that the theory which subjects all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all things with a view of promoting what is good. For these latter persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar, or which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only another name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of their existence. I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting such wild theories.	SCHOLIUM II: Ex praecedentibus clare sequitur res summa perfectione a Deo fuisse productas quandoquidem ex data perfectissima natura necessario secut sunt. Neque hoc Deum ullius arguit imperfectionis; ipsius enim perfectio hoc nos affirmare coegit. Imo ex hujus contrario clare sequeretur (ut modo ostendi) Deum non esse summe perfectum; nimirum quia si res alio modo fuissent product, Deo alia natura esset tribuenda, diversa ab ea quam ex consideratione Entis perfectissimi coacti sumus ei tribuere. Verum non dubito quin multi hanc sententiam ut absurdam explodant nec animum ad eandem perpendendam instituere velint idque nulla alia de causa quam quia Deo aliam libertatem assueti sunt tribuere, longe diversam ab illa quae a nobis (definitione 7) tradita est videlicet absolutam voluntatem. Verum neque etiam dubito si rem meditari vellent nostrarumque demonstrationum seriem recte secum perpendere, quin tandem talem libertatem qualem jam Deo tribuunt, non tantum ut nugatoriam sed ut magnum scienti obstaculum plane rejiciant. Nec opus est ut ea quae in scholio propositionis 17 dicta sunt, hic repetam. Attamen in eorum gratiam adhuc ostendam quod quamvis concedatur voluntatem ad Dei essentiam pertinere, ex ejus perfectione nihilominus sequatur res nullo alio potuisse modo neque ordine a Deo creari; quod facile erit ostendere si prius consideremus id quod ipsimet concedunt videlicet ex solo Dei decreto et voluntate pendere ut unaquque res id quod est sit. Nam alias Deus omnium rerum causa non esset. Deinde quod omnia decreta ab aeterno ab ipso Deo sancita fuerunt. Nam alias imperfectionis et inconstanti argueretur. At cum in aeterno non detur quando, ante nec post, hinc ex sola scilicet Dei perfectione sequitur Deum aliud decernere nunquam posse nec unquam potuisse sive Deum ante sua decreta non fuisse nec sine ipsis esse posse. At dicent quod quamvis supponeretur quod Deus aliam rerum naturam fecisset vel quod ab aeterno aliud de natura ejusque ordine decrevisset, nulla inde in Deo sequeretur imperfectio. Verum si hoc dicant, concedent simul Deum posse sua mutare decreta. Nam si Deus de natura ejusque ordine aliud quam decrevit decrevisset hoc est ut aliud de natura voluisset et concepisset, alium necessario quam jam habet intellectum et aliam quam jam habet voluntatem habuisset. Et si Deo alium intellectum aliamque voluntatem tribuere licet absque ulla ejus essentiae ejusque perfectionis mutatione, quid causae est cur jam non possit sua de rebus creatis decreta mutare et nihilominus que perfectus manere? Ejus enim intellectus et voluntas circa res creatas et earum ordinem in respectu suae essentiae et perfectionis perinde est, quomodocunque concipiatur. Deinde omnes quos vidi philosophi concedunt nullum in Deo dari intellectum potentia sed tantum actu; cum autem et ejus intellectus et ejus voluntas ab ejusdem essentia non distinguantur ut etiam omnes concedunt, sequitur ergo hinc etiam quod si Deus alium intellectum actu habuisset et aliam voluntatem, ejus etiam essentia alia necessario esset ac proinde (ut a principio conclusi) si aliter res quam jam sunt, a Deo product essent, Dei intellectus ejusque voluntas hoc est (ut conceditur) ejus essentia alia esse deberet, quod est absurdum. Cum itaque res nullo alio modo nec ordine a Deo produci potuerint et hoc verum esse ex summa Dei perfectione sequatur, nulla profecto sana ratio persuadere nobis potest ut credamus quod Deus noluerit omnia quae in suo intellectu sunt, eadem illa perfectione qua ipsa intelligit, creare. At dicent in rebus nullam esse perfectionem neque imperfectionem sed id quod in ipsis est propter quod perfect sunt aut imperfectae et bonae aut malae dicuntur, a Dei tantum voluntate pendere atque adeo si Deus voluisset, potuisset efficere ut id quod jam perfectio est, summa esset imperfectio et contra. Verum quid hoc aliud esset quam aperte affirmare quod Deus qui id quod vult necessario intelligit, sua voluntate efficere potest ut res alio modo quam intelligit, intelligat, quod (ut modo ostendi) magnum est absurdum. Quare argumentum in ipsos retorquere possum hoc modo. Omnia a Dei potestate pendent. Ut res itaque aliter se habere possint, Dei necessario voluntas aliter se habere etiam deberet; atqui Dei voluntas aliter se habere nequit (ut modo ex Dei perfectione evidentissime ostendimus). Ergo neque res aliter se habere possunt. Fateor hanc opinionem quae omnia indifferenti cuidam Dei voluntati subjicit et ab ipsius beneplacito omnia pendere statuit, minus a vero aberrare quam illorum qui statuunt Deum omnia sub ratione boni agere. Nam hi aliquid extra Deum videntur ponere quod a Deo non dependet, ad quod Deus tanquam ad exemplar in operando attendit vel ad quod tanquam ad certum scopum collineat. Quod profecto nihil aliud est quam Deum fato subjicere, quo nihil de Deo absurdius statui potest, quem ostendimus tam omnium rerum essentiae quam earum existenti primam et unicam liberam causam esse. Quare non est ut in hoc absurdo refutando tempus consumam.
1p34 Dei potentia essentia	1p34 Dei potentia essentia [geomap]
PROP. XXXIV. God's power is identical with his essence.	PROPOSITIO XXXIV: Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia.
Proof.-From the sole necessity of the essence of God it follows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.). Wherefore the power of God, by which he and all things are and act, is identical with his essence. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ex sola enim necessitate Dei essentiae sequitur Deum esse causa sui (per propositionem 11 {1p11}) et (per propositionem 16  {1p16} ejusque corollarium  {1p16c1}) omnium rerum. Ergo potentia Dei qua ipse et omnia sunt et agunt, est ipsa ipsius essentia. Q.E.D.
1p35 Dei potestate esse existere	1p35 Dei potestate esse [geomap]
PROP. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God, necessarily exists.	PROPOSITIO XXXV: Quicquid concipimus in Dei potestate esse, id necessario est.
Proof.-Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last Prop.) be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid enim in Dei potestate est, id (per propositionem praecedentem {1p34}) in ejus essentia ita debet comprehendi ut ex ea necessario sequatur adeoque necessario est. Q.E.D.
1p36 de effectus	1p36 de effectus [geomap]
PROP. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not follow.	PROPOSITIO XXXVI: Nihil existit ex cujus natura aliquis effectus non sequatur.
Proof.-Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence in a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is, (by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things, therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid existit, Dei naturam sive [mng eqv] essentiam certo et determinato modo exprimit (per corollarium propositionis 25 {1p25}) hoc est (per propositionem 34 {1p34}) quicquid existit, Dei potentiam quae omnium rerum causa est, certo et determinato modo exprimit adeoque (per propositionem 16 {1p16}) ex eo aliquis effectus sequi debet. Q.E.D.
1apx	1apx
In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so; that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason. All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely, with an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship him). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first, why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows, first, that men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having no cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them personally to bring about the given event, and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware, that they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think they have cause for believing, that some other being has made them for their use. As they look upon things as means, they cannot believe them to be self-created; but, judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor. Hence also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed into superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods, and men are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result: among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c.: so they declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in their worship. Experience day by day protested and showed by infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and start afresh. They therefore laid down as an axiom, that God's judgments far transcend human understanding. Such a doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and properties of figures without regard to their final causes. There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge of the truth. I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in view, and that final causes are mere human figments. This, I think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with the utmost perfection. However, I will add a few remarks, in order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly. That which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versae: it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect. Passing over the questions of cause and priority as self-evident, it is plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in that respect, more imperfect. But if those things which were made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all. Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God: for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something which he lacks. Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a distinction between the object of want and the object of assimilation; still they confess that God made all things for the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation. They are unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he desired them. We must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their theory-namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of exhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a roof on to someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man; for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent circumstances) have all happened together by chance? Perhaps you will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was blowing, and the man was walking that way. "But why," they will insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very time walking that way?" If you again answer, that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why was the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?" So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at last you take refuge in the will of God-in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance. So, again, when they survey the frame of the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt another. Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being, and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the interpreters of nature and the gods. Such persons know that, with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only available means for proving and preserving their authority would vanish also. But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my third point. After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to themselves, and to account those things the best of all which have the most beneficial effect on mankind. Further, they were bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth, cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and blame, sin and merit. I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human nature; the former I will briefly explain here. Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God they have called good, everything which hinders these objects they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things and their own nature. When phenomena are of such a kind, that the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say that they are well-ordered; if the contrary, that they are ill-ordered or confused. Further, as things which are easily imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to confusion-as though there were any order in nature, except in relation to our imagination-and say that God has created all things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it should be most easily imagined. If this be their theory, they would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and very many others which confound its weakness. But enough has been said on this subject. The other abstract notions are nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is differently affected: though they are considered by the ignorant as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that everything was created for the sake of themselves; and, according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion which objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health, the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary motion be excited, they are styled ugly. Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter, full-flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, &c. Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound, or harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to harmony-all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather mistakes for things the forms of his imagination. We need no longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we have witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although human bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another; what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on. I need not further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well known. It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds; everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as palates." All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I have urged. We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted. Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin, &c. But these reasoners are, as I have said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to mankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men, that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi. Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.	APPENDIX: His Dei naturam ejusque proprietates explicui ut quod necessario existit; quod sit unicus; quod ex sola suae naturae necessitate sit et agat; quod sit omnium rerum causa libera et quomodo; quod omnia in Deo sint et ab ipso ita pendeant ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint; et denique quod omnia a Deo fuerint prdeterminata, non quidem ex libertate voluntatis sive absoluto beneplacito sed ex absoluta Dei natura sive infinita potentia. Porro ubicunque data fuit occasio, praejudicia quae impedire poterant quominus me demonstrationes perciperentur, amovere curavi sed quia non pauca adhuc restant praejudicia quae etiam imo maxime impedire poterant et possunt quominus homines rerum concatenationem eo quo ipsam explicui modo, amplecti possint, eadem hic ad examen rationis vocare operae pretium duxi. Et quoniam omnia quae hic indicare suscipio praejudicia pendent ab hoc uno quod scilicet communiter supponant homines omnes res naturales ut ipsos propter finem agere, imo ipsum Deum omnia ad certum aliquem finem dirigere pro certo statuant : dicunt enim Deum omnia propter hominem fecisse, hominem autem ut ipsum coleret. Hoc igitur unum prius considerabo qurendo scilicet primo causam cur plerique hoc in praejudicio acquiescant et omnes natura adeo propensi sint ad idem amplectendum. Deinde ejusdem falsitatem ostendam et tandem quomodo ex hoc orta sint praejudicia de bono et malo, merito et peccato, laude et vituperio, ordine et confusione, pulchritudine et deformitate et de aliis hujus generis. Verum haec ab humanae mentis natura deducere non est hujus loci : satis hic erit si pro fundamento id capiam quod apud omnes debet esse in confesso nempe hoc quod omnes homines rerum causarum ignari nascuntur et quod omnes appetitum habent suum utile quaerendi, cujus rei sunt conscii. Ex his enim sequitur primo quod homines se liberos esse opinentur quandoquidem suarum volitionum suique appetitus sunt conscii et de causis a quibus disponuntur ad appetendum et volendum, quia earum sunt ignari nec per somnium cogitant. Sequitur secundo homines omnia propter finem agere videlicet propter utile quod appetunt; unde fit ut semper rerum peractarum causas finales tantum scire expetant et ubi ipsas audiverint, quiescant; nimirum quia nullam habent causam ulterius dubitandi. Sin autem easdem ex alio audire nequeant, nihil iis restat nisi ut ad semet se convertant et ad fines a quibus ipsi ad similia determinari solent, reflectant et sic ex suo ingenio ingenium alterius necessario judicant. Porro cum in se et extra se non pauca reperiant media quae ad suum utile assequendum non parum conducant ut exempli gratia oculos ad videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas et animantia ad alimentum, solem ad illuminandum, mare ad alendum pisces, hinc factum ut omnia naturalia tanquam ad suum utile media considerent et quia illa media ab ipsis inventa, non autem parata esse sciunt, hinc causam credendi habuerunt aliquem alium esse qui illa media in eorum usum paraverit. Nam postquam res ut media consideraverunt, credere non potuerunt easdem se ipsas fecisse sed ex mediis quae sibi ipsi parare solent, concludere debuerunt dari aliquem vel aliquos naturae rectores humana praeditos libertate qui ipsis omnia curaverint et in eorum usum omnia fecerint. Atque horum etiam ingenium quandoquidem de eo nunquam quid audiverant, ex suo judicare debuerunt atque hinc statuerunt Deos omnia in hominum usum dirigere ut homines sibi devinciant et in summo ab iisdem honore habeantur; unde factum ut unusquisque diversos Deum colendi modos ex suo ingenio excogitaverit ut Deus eos supra reliquos diligeret et totam naturam in usum cc illorum cupiditatis et insatiabilis avariti dirigeret. Atque ita hoc praejudicium in superstitionem versum et altas in mentibus egit radices; quod in causa fuit ut unusquisque maximo conatu omnium rerum causas finales intelligere easque explicare studeret. Sed dum qusiverunt ostendere naturam nihil frustra (hoc est quod in usum hominum non sit) agere, nihil aliud videntur ostendisse quam naturam Deosque que ac homines delirare. Vide quso quo res tandem evasit! Inter tot naturae commoda non pauca reperire debuerunt incommoda, tempestates scilicet, terr motus, morbos etc. atque haec statuerunt propterea evenire quod Dii irati essent ob injurias sibi ab hominibus factas sive ob peccata in suo cultu commissa et quamvis experientia indies reclamaret ac infinitis exemplis ostenderet commoda atque incommoda piis que ac impiis promiscue evenire, non ideo ab inveterato praejudicio destiterunt : facilius enim iis fuit hoc inter alia incognita quorum usum ignorabant, ponere et sic praesentem suum et innatum statum ignoranti retinere quam totam illam fabricam destruere et novam excogitare. Unde pro certo statuerunt Deorum judicia humanum captum longissime superare : quae sane unica fuisset causa ut veritas humanum genus in aeternum lateret nisi mathesis, quae non circa fines sed tantum circa figurarum essentias et proprietates versatur, aliam veritatis normam hominibus ostendisset et praeter mathesin ali etiam adsignari possunt causae (quas hic enumerare supervacaneum est) a quibus fieri potuit ut homines communia haec praejudicia animadverterent et in veram rerum cognitionem ducerentur. His satis explicui id quod primo loco promisi. Ut jam autem ostendam naturam finem nullum sibi praefixum habere et omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta, non opus est multis. Credo enim id jam satis constare tam ex fundamentis et causis unde hoc praejudicium originem suam traxisse ostendi quam ex propositione 16 et corollariis propositionis 32 et praeterea ex iis omnibus quibus ostendi omnia naturae aeterna quadam necessitate summaque perfectione procedere. Hoc tamen adhuc addam nempe hanc de fine doctrinam naturam omnino evertere. Nam id quod revera causa est, ut effectum considerat et contra. Deinde id quod natura prius est, facit posterius. Et denique id quod supremum et perfectissimum est, reddit imperfectissimum. Nam (duobus prioribus omissis quia per se manifesta sunt) ut ex propositionibus 21, 22 et 23 constat, ille effectus perfectissimus est qui a Deo immediate producitur et quo aliquid pluribus causis intermediis indiget ut producatur, eo imperfectius est. At si res quae immediate a Deo product sunt, ea de causa fact essent ut Deus finem assequeretur suum, tum necessario ultim quarum de causa priores fact sunt, omnium praestantissimae essent. Deinde haec doctrina Dei perfectionem tollit nam si Deus propter finem agit, aliquid necessario appetit quo caret. Et quamvis theologi et metaphysici distinguant inter finem indigenti et finem assimilationis, fatentur tamen Deum omnia propter se, non vero propter res creandas egisse quia nihil ante creationem praeter Deum assignare possunt propter quod Deus ageret adeoque necessario fateri coguntur Deum iis propter quae media parare voluit, caruisse eaque cupivisse, ut per se clarum. Nec hic praetereundum est quod hujus doctrin sectatores qui in assignandis rerum finibus suum ingenium ostentare voluerunt, ad hanc suam doctrinam probandam novum attulerunt modum argumentandi reducendo scilicet non ad impossibile sed ad ignorantiam, quod ostendit nullum aliud fuisse huic doctrin argumentandi medium. Nam si exempli gratia ex culmine aliquo lapis in alicujus caput ceciderit eumque interfecerit, hoc modo demonstrabunt lapidem ad hominem interficiendum cecidisse. Ni enim eum in finem Deo id volente ceciderit, quomodo tot circumstanti (spe enim mult simul concurrunt) ca su concurrere potuerunt? Respondebis fortasse id ex eo quod ventus flavit et quod homo illac iter habebat, evenisse. At instabunt, cur ventus illo tempore flavit? Cur homo illo eodemque tempore illac iter habebat? Si iterum respondeas ventum tum ortum quia mare praecedenti die tempore adhuc tranquillo agitari inceperat et quod homo ab amico invitatus fuerat, instabunt iterum quia nullus rogandi finis, cur autem mare agitabatur? cur homo in illud tempus invitatus fuit? et sic porro causarum causas rogare non cessabunt donec ad Dei voluntatem hoc est ignoranti asylum confugeris. Sic etiam ubi corporis humani fabricam vident, stupescunt et ex eo quod tant artis causas ignorant, concludunt eandem non mechanica sed divina vel supernaturali arte fabricari talique modo constitui ut una pars alteram non ldat. Atque hinc fit ut qui miraculorum causas veras qurit quique res naturales ut doctus intelligere, non autem ut stultus admirari studet, passim pro hretico et impio habeatur et proclametur ab iis quos vulgus tanquam naturae Deorumque interpretes adorat. Nam sciunt quod sublata ignorantia stupor hoc est unicum argumentandi tuendque suae auctoritatis medium quod habent, tollitur. Sed haec relinquo et ad id quod tertio loco hic agere constitui, pergo. Postquam homines sibi persuaserunt omnia quae fiunt propter ipsos fieri, id in unaquaque re praecipuum judicare debuerunt quod ipsis utilissimum et illa omnia praestantissima stimare a quibus optime afficiebantur. Unde has formare debuerunt notiones quibus rerum naturas explicarent scilicet bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, calidum, frigidum, pulchritudinem et deformitatem et quia se liberos existimant, inde hae notiones ortae sunt scilicet laus et vituperium, peccatum et meritum sed has infra postquam de natura humana egero, illas autem hic breviter explicabo. Nempe id omne quod ad valetudinem et Dei cultum conducit, bonum, quod autem iis contrarium est, malum vocaverunt. Et quia ii qui rerum naturam non intelligunt sed res tantummodo imaginantur, nihil de rebus affirmant et imaginationem pro intellectu capiunt, ideo ordinem in rebus esse firmiter credunt rerum suque naturae ignari. Nam cum ita sint disposit ut cum nobis per sensus repraesentantur, eas facile imaginari et consequenter earum facile recordari possimus, easdem bene ordinatas, si vero contra, ipsas male ordinatas sive confusas esse dicimus. Et quoniam ea nobis prae caeteris grata sunt quae facile imaginari possumus, ideo homines ordinem confusioni praeferunt quasi ordo aliquid in natura praeter respectum ad nostram imaginationem esset; dicuntque Deum omnia ordine creasse et hoc modo ipsi nescientes Deo imaginationem tribuunt nisi velint forte Deum humanae imaginationi providentem res omnes eo disposuisse modo quo ipsas facillime imaginari possent; nec moram forsan iis injiciet quod infinita reperiantur quae nostram imaginationem longe superant et plurima quae ipsam propter ejus imbecillitatem confundunt. Sed de hac re satis. Caeter deinde notiones etiam praeter imaginandi modos quibus imaginatio diversimode afficitur, nihil sunt et tamen ab ignaris tanquam praecipua rerum attributa considerantur quia ut jam diximus, res omnes propter ipsos factas esse credunt et rei alicujus naturam bonam vel malam, sanam vel putridam et corruptam dicunt prout ab eadem afficiuntur. Exempli gratia si motus quem nervi ab objectis per oculos repraesentatis accipiunt, valetudini conducat, objecta a quibus causatur pulchra dicuntur, quae autem contrarium motum cient, deformia. quae deinde per nares sensum movent, odorifera vel ftida vocant, quae per linguam, dulcia aut amara, sapida aut insipida etc. quae autem per tactum, dura aut mollia, aspera aut lvia etc. Et quae denique aures movent, strepitum, sonum vel harmoniam edere dicuntur quorum postremum homines adeo dementavit ut Deum etiam harmonia delectari crederent. Nec desunt philosophi qui sibi persuaserint motus clestes harmoniam componere. quae omnia satis ostendunt unumquemque pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicasse vel potius imaginationis affectiones pro rebus accepisse. Quare non mirum est (ut hoc etiam obiter notemus) quod inter homines tot quot experimur, controversi ort sint ex quibus tandem scepticismus. Nam quamvis humana corpora in multis conveniant, in plurimis tamen discrepant et ideo id quod uni bonum, alteri malum videtur; quod uni ordinatum, alteri confusum; quod uni gratum, alteri ingratum est et sic de caeteris quibus hic supersedeo cum quia hujus loci non est de his ex professo agere, tum quia hoc omnes satis experti sunt. Omnibus enim in ore est "quot capita tot sensus", "suo quemque sen su abundare", "non minora cerebrorum quam palatorum esse discrimina" : quae sententi satis ostendunt homines pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicare resque potius imaginari quam intelligere. Res enim si intellexissent, illae omnes teste mathesi, si non allicerent, ad minimum convincerent. Videmus itaque omnes notiones quibus vulgus solet naturam explicare, modos esse tantummodo imaginandi nec ullius rei naturam sed tantum imaginationis constitutionem indicare et quia nomina habent, quasi essent entium extra imaginationem existentium, eadem entia non rationis sed imaginationis voco atque adeo omnia argumenta quae contra nos ex similibus notionibus petuntur, facile propulsari possunt. Solent enim multi sic argumentari. Si omnia ex necessitate perfectissim Dei naturae sunt consecuta, unde ergo tot imperfectiones in natura ort? Videlicet rerum corruptio ad ftorem usque, rerum deformitas quae nauseam moveat, confusio, malum, peccatum etc. Sed ut modo dixi, facile confutantur. Nam rerum perfectio ex sola earum natura et potentia est stimanda nec ideo res magis aut minus perfect sunt propterea quod hominum sensum delectant vel offendunt, quod humanae naturae conducunt vel quod eidem repugnant. Iis autem qui qurunt cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur? nihil aliud respondeo quam quia ei non defuit materia ad omnia ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum creanda vel magis proprie loquendo quia ipsius naturae leges adeo ampl fuerunt ut sufficerent ad omnia quae ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt producenda, ut propositione 16 demonstravi. Haec sunt quae hic notare suscepi praejudicia. Si quaedam hujus farin adhuc restant, poterunt eadem ab unoquoque mediocri meditatione emendari. Finis partis prim.
2praef NATURA ORIGINE MENTIS	2praef NATURA ORIGINE MENTIS
PART II. ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND	SPINOZAE ETHICA ORDINE GEOMETRICO DEMONSTRATA ET IN QUINQUE PARTES DISTINCTA PARS  SECUNDA  DE NATURA ET ORIGINE MENTIS
PREFACE
I now pass on to explaining the results, which must necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.	Transeo jam ad ea explicanda quae ex Dei sive Entis aeterni et infiniti essentia necessario debuerunt sequi. Non quidem omnia; infinita enim infinitis modis ex ipsa debere sequi propositione 16 partis I demonstravimus sed ea solummodo quae nos ad mentis humanae ejusque summ beatitudinis cognitionem quasi manu ducere possunt.
DEFINITIONS	DEFINITIONES [about definitions]
2d01 corpus	2d01 corpus [notes] [geomap]
DEFINITION I. By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.)	I. Per corpus intelligo  modum qui Dei essentiam quatenus ut res extensa consideratur, certo et determinato modo exprimit; vide corollarium propositionis 25 partis I.{non-deductive reference}
2d02 essentia	2d02 essentia [notes] [geomap]
DEFINITION II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.	II. Ad essentiam alicujus rei id pertinere dico quo dato res necessario ponitur et quo sublato res necessario tollitur; vel [mng eqv] id sine quo res et vice versa id quod sine re nec esse nec concipi potest.
2d03 idea	2d03 idea [notes] [geomap]
DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing.	III. Per ideam intelligo mentis conceptum quem mens format propterea quod res est cogitans.
Explanation.-I say conception rather than perception, because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind.	EXPLICATIO: Dico potius conceptum quam perceptionem quia perceptionis nomen indicare videtur mentem ab objecto pati. At conceptus actionem mentis exprimere videtur.
2d04 idea (cognitia) adaequata	2d04 idea (cognitia) adaequata [notes] [geomap]
DEFINITION IV. By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.	IV. Per ideam adaequatam intelligo ideam quae quatenus in se sine relatione ad objectum consideratur, omnes verae ideae proprietates sive [mng eqv]  denominationes intrinsecas habet.
Explanation.-I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and its object (ideatum).	EXPLICATIO: Dico intrinsecas ut illam secludam quae extrinseca est nempe convenientiam ideae cum suo ideato.
2d05 duratio	2d05 duratio [notes] [geomap]
DEFINITION V. Duration is the indefinite continuance of existing.	V. Duratio est indefinita existendi continuatio.
Explanation.-I say indefinite, because it cannot be determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of the thing, but does not take it away.	EXPLICATIO: Dico indefinitam quia per ipsam rei existentis naturam determinari nequaquam potest neque etiam a causa efficiente quae scilicet rei existentiam necessario ponit, non autem tollit.
2d06 perfectio	2d06 perfectio [notes] [geomap]
DEFINITION VI. Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.	VI. Per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligo.
2d07 (res) singularis, particularis	2d07 (res) singularis, particularis [notes] [geomap]
DEFINITION VII. By particular things, I mean things which are finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several individual things concur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular thing.	VII. Per res singulares intelligo res quae finitae sunt et determinatam habent existentiam. Quod si plura individua in una actione ita concurrant ut omnia simul unius effectus sint causa, eadem omnia eatenus ut unam rem singularem considero.
AXIOMS	AXIOMATA
2a1.1 Hominis essentia non involvit existentiam	2a1.1 Hominis essentia non involvit existentiam [geomap]
I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or that man does or does not exist.	I. Hominis essentia non involvit necessariam existentiam hoc est [mng-eqv] ex naturae ordine tam fieri potest ut hic et ille homo existat quam ut non existat.
2a1.2 Homo cogitat	2a1.2 Homo cogitat [geomap]
II. Man thinks.	II. Homo cogitat.
2a1.3 Modi cogitandi idea rei	2a1.3 Modi cogitandi idea rei [geomap]
III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.	III. Modi cogitandi ut amor, cupiditas vel [excl non-exh] quicunque nomine affectus animi insigniuntur, non dantur nisi in eodem individuo detur idea rei amat, desiderat etc. At idea dari potest quamvis nullus alius detur cogitandi modus.
2a1.4 affici sentimus	2a1.4 affici sentimus [geomap]
IV. We perceive that our body is affected in many ways.	IV. Nos corpus quoddam multis modis affici sentimus.
2a1.5 sentimus corpora cogitandi modos	2a1.5 sentimus corpora cogitandi modos [geomap]
V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and modes of thought. N.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop. xiii.	V. Nullas res singulares praeter corpora et cogitandi  modos sentimus nec percipimus. Postulata vide post 13 propositionem {non-deductive reference}.
PROPOSITIONS	PROPOSITIONES
2p01 Deus res cogitans	2p01 Deus res cogitans [geomap]
PROP. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.	PROPOSITIO I: Cogitatio attributum Dei est sive [mng eqv]  Deus est res cogitans.
Proof.-Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.). God therefore possesses the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God, which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def. vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Singulares cogitationes sive [mng eqv]  haec et illa cogitatio modi sunt qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimunt (per corollarium propositionis 25 partis I {1p25}). Competit ergo Deo (per definitionem 5 partis I {1d05}) attributum cujus conceptum singulares omnes cogitationes involvunt, per quod etiam concipiuntur. Est igitur cogitatio unum ex infinitis Dei attributis quod Dei aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit (vide definitionem 6 partis I {1d06}) sive [mng eqv]  Deus est res cogitans. Q.E.D.
2p01s possumus ens cogitans infinitum concipere	2p01s possumus ens cogitans infinitum concipere
Note.-This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or perfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from the consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being, thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.	SCHOLIUM: Patet etiam hic propositio ex hoc quod nos possumus ens cogitans infinitum concipere. Nam quo plura ens cogitans potest cogitare, eo plus realitatis sive perfectionis idem continere concipimus; ergo ens quod infinita infinitis modis cogitare potest, est necessario virtute cogitandi infinitum. Cum itaque ad solam cogitationem attendendo Ens infinitum concipiamus, est necessario (per definitiones 4 et 6 partis I) cogitatio unum ex infinitis Dei attributis, ut volebamus.
2p02 Deus res extensa	2p02 Deus res extensa [geomap]
PROP. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.	PROPOSITIO II: Extensio attributum Dei est sive [mng eqv]  Deus est res extensa.
Proof.-The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the last.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus eodem modo procedit ac demonstratio praecedentis propositionis. [using singulares modi naturam exprimunt {1p25}  {1d05} involvunt concipiuntur infinitis  aeternam essentiam {1d06}]
2p03 Deo sequuntur	2p03 Deo sequuntur [geomap]
PROP. III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence.	PROPOSITIO III: In Deo datur necessario idea tam ejus essentiae quam omnium quae ex ipsius essentia necessario sequuntur.
Proof.-God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.). Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and in God alone. Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop. xv.)	DEMONSTRATIO: Deus enim (per propositionem 1 hujus {2p01}) infinita infinitis modis cogitare sive [prf eqv]  (quod idem est per propositionem 16 partis I {1p16}) ideam suae essentiae et omnium quae necessario ex ea sequuntur, formare potest. Atqui omne id quod in Dei potestate est, necessario est (per propositionem 35 partis I {1p35}); ergo datur necessario talis idea et (per propositionem 15 partis I {1p15}) non nisi in Deo. Q.E.D.
2p03s Deus non rex	2p03s Deus non rex
Note.-The multitude understand by the power of God the free will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. For it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to reduce them to nothing. Further, the power of God is very often likened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we have refuted (Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit), that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. We further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive him as non-existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a negation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the same ground so often. I would only beg the reader again and again, to turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow my meaning, unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of God with the human power and right of kings.	SCHOLIUM: Vulgus per Dei potentiam intelligit Dei liberam voluntatem et jus in omnia quae sunt quque propterea communiter ut contingentia considerantur. Deum enim potestatem omnia destruendi habere dicunt et in nihilum redigendi. Dei porro potentiam cum potentia regum spissime comparant. Sed hoc in corollario I et II propositionis 32 partis I refutavimus et propositione 16 partis I ostendimus Deum eadem necessitate agere qua seipsum intelligit hoc est sicuti ex necessitate divinae naturae sequitur (sicut omnes uno ore statuunt) ut Deus seipsum intelligat, eadem etiam necessitate sequitur ut Deus infinita infinitis modis agat. Deinde propositione 34 partis I ostendimus Dei potentiam nihil esse praeterquam Dei actuosam essentiam adeoque tam nobis impossibile est concipere Deum non agere quam Deum non esse. Porro si haec ulterius persequi liberet, possem hic etiam ostendere potentiam illam quam vulgus Deo affingit, non tantum humanam esse (quod ostendit Deum hominem vel instar hominis a vulgo concipi) sed etiam impotentiam involvere. Sed nolo de eadem re toties sermonem instituere. Lectorem solummodo iterum atque iterum rogo ut quae in prima parte ex propositione 16 usque ad finem de hac re dicta sunt, semel atque iterum perpendat. Nam nemo ea quae volo percipere recte poterit nisi magnopere caveat ne Dei potentiam cum humana regum potentia vel jure confundat.
2p04 Idea Dei unica	2p04 idea Dei unica [geomap]
PROP. IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.	PROPOSITIO IV: Idea  Dei ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum esse potest.
Proof.-Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes of God and his modifications [Lat: affectiones] (Part i., Prop. xxx.). Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.). Therefore the idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Intellectus infinitus nihil praeter Dei attributa ejusque affectiones comprehendit (per propositionem 30 partis I {1p30}). Atqui Deus est unicus (per corollarium I propositionis 14 partis I {1p14}). Ergo idea Dei ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum esse potest. Q.E.D.
2p05 Esse formale idearum	2p05 Esse formale idearum [geomap]
PROP. V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.	PROPOSITIO V: Esse formale idearum Deum quatenus tantum ut res cogitans consideratur, pro causa agnoscit et non quatenus alio attributo explicatur. Hoc est tam Dei attributorum quam rerum singularium ideae non ipsa ideata sive [mng eqv]  res perceptas pro causa efficiente agnoscunt sed ipsum Deum quatenus est res cogitans.
Proof.-This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this Part. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing. It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore (Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet quidem ex propositione 3 hujus  {2p03}. Ibi enim concludebamus Deum ideam suae essentiae et omnium quae ex ea necessario sequuntur, formare posse ex hoc solo nempe quod Deus est res cogitans et non ex eo quod sit suae ideae objectum. Quare esse formale idearum Deum quatenus est res cogitans, pro causa agnoscit. Sed aliter hoc modo demonstratur. Esse  formale idearum modus est cogitandi (ut per se notum) hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 25 partis I {1p25}) modus qui Dei naturam quatenus est res cogitans, certo modo exprimit adeoque (per propositionem 10 partis I {1p10}) nullius alterius attributi Dei conceptum involvit et consequenter (per axioma 4 partis I {1a04}) nullius alterius attributi nisi cogitationis est effectus adeoque Esse  formale idearum Deum quatenus tantum ut res cogitans consideratur etc. Q.E.D.
2p06 modi Deum causa attributo	2p06 modi Deum causa attributo [geomap]
PROP. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute.	PROPOSITIO VI: Cujuscunque attributi  modi Deum quatenus tantum sub illo attributo cujus modi sunt et non quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, pro causa habent.
Proof.-Each attribute is conceived through itself, without any other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of any other. Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any other. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Unumquodque enim attributum per se absque alio concipitur (per propositionem 10 partis I) {1p10}. Quare uniuscujusque attributi modi conceptum sui attributi, non autem alterius involvunt adeoque (per axioma 4 partis I) {1a04} Deum quatenus tantum sub illo attributo cujus modi sunt et non quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, pro causa habent. Q.E.D.
2p06c res ideatae ex suis attributis	2p06c res ideatae ex suis attributis [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence the actual being of things which are not modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because that nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from the attribute of thought.	COROLLARIUM {2p06}: Hinc sequitur quod esse formale rerum quae modi non sunt cogitandi, non sequitur ideo ex divina natura quia res prius cognovit sed eodem modo eademque necessitate res ideatae ex suis attributis consequuntur et concluduntur ac ideas ex attributo cogitationis consequi ostendimus.
2p07 ordo et connexio	2p07 ordo et connexio [geomap]
PROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.	PROPOSITIO VII: ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum.
Proof.-This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv. For the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of the cause, whereof it is an effect.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex axiomate 4 partis I. {1a04} Nam cujuscunque causati idea a cognitione causae cujus est effectus, dependet.
2p07c formaliter objective	2p07c formaliter objective [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his realized power of action-that is, whatsoever follows from the infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter), follows without exception in the same order and connection from the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).	COROLLARIUM {2p07}: Hinc sequitur quod Dei cogitandi potentia qualis est ipsius actualiae agendi potentiae. Hoc est quicquid ex infinita Dei natura sequitur formaliter, id omne ex Dei idea eodem ordine eademque connexione sequitur in Deo objective.
2p07s substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una	2p07s substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una
Note.-Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above-namely, that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance: consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes-that is, the same things following in either case. I said that God is the cause of an idea-for instance, of the idea of a circle,-in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly.	SCHOLIUM: Hic antequam ulterius pergamus, revocandum nobis in memoriam est id quod supra ostendimus nempe quod quicquid ab infinito intellectu percipi potest tanquam  substantiae essentiam constituens, id omne ad unicam tantum substantiam pertinet et consequenter quod substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia quae jam sub hoc jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur. Sic etiam modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res sed duobus modis expressa, quod quidam Hebrorum quasi per nebulam vidisse videntur, qui scilicet statuunt Deum, Dei intellectum resque ab ipso intellectas unum et idem esse. Exempli gratia circulus in natura existens et idea circuli existentis quae etiam in Deo est, una eademque est res quae per diversa attributa explicatur et ideo sive naturam sub attributo extensionis sive sub attributo cogitationis sive sub alio quocunque concipiamus, unum eundemque ordinem sive unam eandemque causarum connexionem hoc est easdem res invicem sequi reperiemus. Nec ulla alia de causa dixi quod Deus sit causa ideae exempli gratia circuli quatenus tantum est res cogitans et circuli quatenus tantum est res extensa nisi quia esse formale ideae circuli non nisi per alium cogitandi modum tanquam causam proximam et ille iterum per alium et sic in infinitum, potest percipi ita ut quamdiu res ut cogitandi modi considerantur, ordinem totius naturae sive causarum connexionem per solum cogitationis attributum explicare debemus et quatenus ut modi extensionis considerantur, ordo etiam totius naturae per solum extensionis attributum explicari debet et idem de aliis attributis intelligo. Quare rerum ut in se sunt, Deus revera est causa quatenus infinitis constat attributis nec impraesentiarum haec clarius possum explicare.
2p08 rerum non existentium	2p08 rerum non existentium [geomap]
PROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.	PROPOSITIO VIII: ideae rerum singularium sive [mng eqv] modorum non existentium ita debent comprehendi in Dei infinita idea ac rerum singularium sive [mng eqv]  modorum essentiae formales in Dei attributis continentur.
Proof.-This proposition is evident from the last; it is understood more clearly from the preceding note.	DEMONSTRATIO: Haec propositio patet ex praecedenti {2p07} sed intelligitur clarius ex praecedenti scholio {non-deductive reference}.
2p08c rerum non existentium ideae non existunt	2p08c  rerum non existentium ideae non existunt [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence, so long as particular things do not exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence, through which they are said to continue.	COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur quod quamdiu res singulares non existunt nisi quatenus in Dei attributis comprehenduntur, earum esse  objectivum sive[mng eqv] ideae non existunt nisi quatenus infinita Dei idea existit et ubi res singulares dicuntur existere non tantum quatenus in Dei attributis comprehenduntur sed quatenus etiam durare dicuntur, earum ideae etiam existentiam per quam durare dicuntur, involvent.
2p08s nempe E et D existere	2p08s nempe E et D existere
Note.-If anyone desires an example to throw more light on this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any, which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak, inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to illustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that, from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.	SCHOLIUM: Si quis ad uberiorem hujus rei explicationem exemplum desideret, nullum sane dare potero quod rem de qua hic loquor, utpote unicam adaequate explicet; conabor tamen rem ut fieri potest, illustrare. Nempe circulus talis est naturae ut omnium linearum rectarum in eodem sese invicem secantium rectangula sub segmentis sint inter se qualia; quare in circulo infinita inter se qualia rectangula continentur : attamen nullum eorum potest dici existere nisi quatenus circulus existit nec etiam alicujus horum rectangulorum idea potest dici existere nisi quatenus in circuli idea comprehenditur. Concipiantur jam ex infinitis illis duo tantum nempe E et D existere. Sane eorum etiam ideae jam non tantum existunt quatenus solummodo in circuli idea comprehenduntur sed etiam quatenus illorum rectangulorum existentiam involvunt, quo fit ut a reliquis reliquorum rectangulorum ideis distinguantur.
2p09 Idea rei singularis causa	2p09 Idea rei singularis causa  [geomap]
PROP. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected by a third idea, and so on to infinity.	PROPOSITIO IX: Idea rei singularis actu  existentis  Deum pro causa habet non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus alia rei singularis actu  existentis idea affectus consideratur cujus etiam Deus est causa quatenus alia tertia affectus est et sic in infinitum.
Proof.-The idea of an individual thing actually existing is an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes (by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus (by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only as he is a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.) in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so on to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of causes. Therefore of a given individual idea another individual idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Idea rei singularis actu  existentis modus singularis cogitandi est et a reliquis distinctus (per corollarium {2p08c} et scholium {non-deductive reference} propositionis 8 hujus ) adeoque (per propositionem 6 hujus {2p06}) Deum quatenus est tantum res cogitans, pro causa habet. At non (per propositionem 28 partis I {1p28}) quatenus est res absolute cogitans sed quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus consideratur et hujus etiam Deus est causa quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus est et sic in infinitum. Atqui ordo et connexio idearum (per propositionem 7 hujus {2p07}) idem est ac ordo et connexio causarum; ergo unius singularis ideae alia idea sive [mng eqv]  Deus quatenus alia idea affectus consideratur, est causa et hujus etiam quatenus alia affectus est et sic in infinitum. Q.E.D.
2p09c  Quicquid in objecto contingit	2p09c  Quicquid in objecto contingit [geomap]
Corollary.-Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far as he has the idea of that object only.	COROLLARIUM {2p09}: Quicquid in singulari cujuscunque ideae objecto contingit, ejus datur in Deo cognitio quatenus tantum ejusdem objecti ideam habet.
Proof.-Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. The knowledge, therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object will be in God, in so far as he has the idea of that object only. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid in objecto cujuscunque ideae contingit, ejus datur in Deo idea (per propositionem 3 hujus {2p03}) non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus consideratur (per praecedentem propositionem {{2p09}) sed (per propositionem 7 hujus {2p07}) ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum; erit ergo cognitio ejus quod in singulari aliquo objecto contingit, in Deo quatenus tantum ejusdem objecti habet ideam. Q.E.D.
2p10 hominis substanti formam	2p10 hominis  substantiae formam [geomap]
PROP. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man-in other words, substance does not constitute the actual being[2] of man. [2] "Forma"	PROPOSITIO X: Ad essentiam hominis non pertinet esse  substantiae sive [mng eqv]  substantia formam hominis non constituit.
Proof.-The being of substance involves necessary existence (Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and, consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd (II. Ax. i.). Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Esse enim  substantiae involvit necessariam existentiam (per propositionem 7 partis I {1p07}). Si igitur ad hominis essentiam pertineret esse substantiae, data ergo substantia, daretur necessario homo (per definitionem 2 hujus {2d02}) et consequenter homo necessario existeret, quod (per axioma 1 hujus {2a1.1}) est absurdum. Ergo etc. Q.E.D.
2p10s1 Demonstratur ex propositione 5 partis I	2p10s1 Demonstratur ex propositione 5 partis I
Note.-This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man. Again, the proposition is evident from the other properties of substance-namely, that substance is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.	SCHOLIUM: Demonstratur etiam hic propositio ex propositione 5 partis I nempe quod duae ejusdem naturae  substantiae non dentur. Cum autem plures homines existere possint, ergo id quod hominis formam constituit, non est esse substanti. Patet praeterea haec propositio ex reliquis  substantiae proprietatibus videlicet quod substantia sit sua natura infinita, immutabilis, indivisibilis etc. ut facile unusquisque videre potest.
2p10c essentiam hominis modificationibus	2p10c essentiam hominis modificationibus [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows, that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the attributes of God.	COROLLARIUM {2p10}: Hinc sequitur essentiam hominis constitui a certis Dei attributorum modificationibus.
Proof. For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to the essence of man. That essence therefore (by i. 15) is something which is in God, and which without God can neither be nor be conceived as a modification [Lat: affectiones] (i. 25. Coroll.) in other words, as a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned manner.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nam esse  substantiae (per propositionem praecedentem {2p10}) ad essentiam hominis non pertinet. Est ergo (per propositionem 15 partis I {1p15}) aliquid quod in Deo est et quod sine Deo nec esse nec concipi potest sive [prf eqv]  (per corollarium propositionis 25 partis I {1p25}) affectio sive [prf eqv]  modus qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimit.
2p10s2 essentia concipere II. Def. ii.	2p10s2 essentia concipere II. Def. ii.
Note.-Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be conceived without God. All men agree that God is the one and only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect to their being (secundum esse). At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict themselves freely. However, I pass over this point. My intention here was only to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing: individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God does not appertain to their essence. I said that "I considered as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived." (II. Def. ii.)	SCHOLIUM: Omnes sane concedere debent nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi posse. Nam apud omnes in confesso est quod Deus omnium rerum tam earum essentiae quam earum existenti unica est causa hoc est Deus non tantum est causa rerum secundum fieri ut aiunt sed etiam secundum esse. At interim plerique id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere dicunt sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest adeoque vel naturam Dei ad essentiam rerum creatarum pertinere vel res creatas sine Deo vel esse vel concipi posse credunt vel quod certius est, sibi non satis constant. Cujus rei causam fuisse credo quod ordinem philosophandi non tenuerint. Nam naturam divinam quam ante omnia contemplari debebant quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est, ordine cognitionis ultimam et res quae sensuum objecta vocantur, omnibus priores esse crediderunt; unde factum est ut dum res naturales contemplati sunt, de nulla re minus cogitaverint quam de divina natura et cum postea animum ad divinam naturam contemplandum appulerint, de nulla re minus cogitare potuerint quam de primis suis figmentis quibus rerum naturalium cognitionem superstruxerant; utpote quae ad cognitionem divinae naturae nihil juvare poterant adeoque nihil mirum si sibi passim contradixerint. Sed hoc mitto. Nam meum intentum hic tantum fuit causam reddere cur non dixerim id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest; nimirum quia res singulares non possunt sine Deo esse nec concipi et tamen Deus ad earum essentiam non pertinet sed id necessario essentiam alicujus rei constituere dixi quo dato, res ponitur et quo sublato, res tollitur vel id sine quo res et vice versa id quod sine re nec esse nec concipi potest.
2p11 mentis humanae	2p11 mentis humanae [geomap]
PROP. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing.	PROPOSITIO XI: Primum quod actuale mentis humanae esse constituit, nihil aliud est quam idea  rei alicujus singularis actu existentis.
Proof.-The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.) is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely (by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II. Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom). Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human mind. But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II. viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must therefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an absurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually existing. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Essentia hominis (per corollarium praecedentis propositionis) a certis Dei attributorum  modis constituitur nempe (per axioma 2 hujus {2a1.2}) a modis cogitandi quorum omnium (per axioma 3 hujus {2a1.3}) idea natura prior est et ea data reliqui modi (quibus scilicet idea natura prior est) in eodem debent esse individuo (per axioma 3 hujus {2a1.3}). Atque adeo idea primum est quod humanae mentis esse constituit. At non idea rei non existentis. Nam tum (per corollarium propositionis 8 hujus {2p08}) ipsa idea non potest dici existere; erit ergo idea rei actu existentis. At non rei infinitae. res namque infinita (per propositiones 21 et 22 partis I {1p[21} {1p22}) debet semper necessario existere; atqui hoc (per axioma 1 hujus {2a1.1}) est absurdum; ergo primum quod esse humanae mentis actuale constituit, est idea rei singularis actu existentis. Q.E.D.
2p11c mens partem infiniti intellectus Dei	2p11c mens partem infiniti intellectus Dei [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately.	COROLLARIUM {2p11}: Hinc sequitur mentem humanam partem esse infiniti intellectus Dei ac proinde cum dicimus mentem humanam hoc vel illud percipere, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod Deus non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus per naturam humanae mentis explicatur sive [mng eqv] quatenus humanae mentis essentiam constituit, hanc vel illam habet ideam et cum dicimus Deum hanc vel  illam ideam habere non tantum quatenus naturam humanae mentis constituit sed quatenus simul cum mente humana alterius rei etiam habet ideam, tum dicimus mentem humanam rem ex partesive sive [mng eqv] inadaequate percipere.
2p11s rogo	2p11s rogo
Note.-Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate; I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the end.	SCHOLIUM: Hic sine dubio lectores hrebunt multaque comminiscentur quae moram injiciant et hac de causa ipsos rogo ut lento gradu mecum pergant nec de his judicium ferant donec omnia perlegerint.
2p12 objecto ideae contingit, debet percipi	2p12 objecto ideae contingit, debet percipi [geomap]
PROP. XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind.	PROPOSITIO XII: Quicquid in objecto ideae humanam mentem constituentis contingit, id ab humana mente debet percipi sive [mng eqv]  ejus rei dabitur in mente necessario idea hoc est [mng eqv] si objectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis sit corpus, nihil in eo corpore poterit contingere quod a mente non percipiatur.
Proof.-Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind of anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words the mind perceives it.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid enim in objecto cujuscunque ideae contingit, ejus rei datur necessario in Deo cognitio (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus {2p09}) quatenus ejusdem objecti idea affectus consideraturhoc est (per propositionem 11 hujus {2p11}) quatenus mentem alicujus rei constituit. Quicquid igitur in objecto ideae humanam mentem constituentis contingit, ejus datur necessario in Deo cognitio quatenus naturam humanae mentis constituit hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus {2p11c}) ejus rei cognitio erit necessario in mente sive [mng eqv]  mens id percipit. Q.E.D.
2p12s II. vii.	2p12s II. vii.
Note.-This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly to be understood from II. vii., which see.	SCHOLIUM: Haec propositio patet etiam et clarius intelligitur ex scholio propositionis 7 hujus, quod vide.
2p13 corpus objectum mentem	2p13 corpus objectum mentem [geomap]
PROP. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else.	PROPOSITIO XIII: Objectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis est corpus sive [a kind of]  certus extensionis modus actu existens et nihil aliud.
Proof.-If indeed the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body would not be in God (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body would not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the idea of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as it actually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I. xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea, which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but (I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim corpus non esset humanae mentis objectum, ideae affectionum corporis non essent in Deo (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus {2p09}) quatenus mentem nostramsed quatenus alterius rei mentem constitueret hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus {2p11c}) ideae affectionum corporis non essent in nostra mente; atqui (per axioma 4 hujus {2a1.4}) ideas affectionum corporis habemus. Ergo objectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis est corpus idque (per propositionem 11 hujus {2p11}) actu existens. Deinde si praeter corpus etiam aliud esset mentis objectum, cum nihil (per propositionem 36 partis I {1p36}) existat ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur, deberet (per propositionem 12 hujus {2p12}) necessario alicujus ejus effectus idea in mente nostra dari; atqui (per axioma 5 hujus {2a1.5}) nulla ejus idea datur. Ergo objectum nostrae mentis est corpus existens et nihil aliud. Q.E.D.
2p13c ipsum sentimus existere	2p13c ipsum sentimus existere [geomap]
Corrollary: From this follows that the human consists of mind and body and that the human body exists exactly as we perceive it	COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur hominem mente et corpore constare et corpus humanum prout ipsum sentimus existere.
2p13s mentis et corporis unionem, praestantiorem realitatis	2p13s mentis et corporis unionem, praestantiorem realitatis
Note.-We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind and body. However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the nature of our body. The propositions we have advanced hitherto have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to other individual things, all of which, though in different degrees, are animated.[3] For of everything there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else. Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than another and containing more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent than the object of another idea, and contains more reality. [3] "Animata" Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of the human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance, that I should do so. I will only say generally, that in proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following propositions, deduce from what has been advanced. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my present statements. In order to do so, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of bodies.	SCHOLIUM: Ex his non tantum intelligimus mentem humanam unitam esse corpori sed etiam quid per mentis et corporis unionem intelligendum sit. Verum ipsam adaequate sive distincte intelligere nemo poterit nisi prius nostri corporis naturam adaequate cognoscat. Nam ea quae hucusque ostendimus, admodum communia sunt nec magis ad homines quam ad reliqua individua pertinent, quae omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata tamen sunt. Nam cujuscunque rei datur necessario in Deo idea cujus Deus est causa eodem modo ac humani corporis ideae atque adeo quicquid de idea humani corporis diximus, id de cujuscunque rei idea necessario dicendum est. Attamen nec etiam negare possumus ideas inter se ut ipsa objecta differre unamque alia praestantiorem esse plusque realitatis continere prout objectum unius objecto alterius praestantius est plusque realitatis continet ac propterea ad determinandum quid mens humana reliquis intersit quidque reliquis praestet, necesse nobis est ejus objecti ut diximus hoc est corporis humani naturam cognoscere. Eam autem hic explicare nec possum nec id ad ea quae demonstrare volo, necesse est. Hoc tamen in genere dico quo corpus aliquod reliquis aptius est ad plura simul agendum vel patiendum, eo ejus mens reliquis aptior est ad plura simul percipiendum et quo unius corporis actiones magis ab ipso solo pendent et quo minus alia corpora cum eodem in agendo concurrunt, eo ejus mens aptior est ad distincte intelligendum. Atque ex his praestantiam unius mentis prae aliis cognoscere possumus, deinde causam etiam videre cur nostri corporis non nisi admodum confusam habeamus cognitionem et alia plura quae in sequentibus ex his deducam. Qua de causa operae pretium esse duxi haec ipsa accuratius explicare et demonstrare, ad quod necesse est pauca de natura corporum praemittere.
2a2.1 corpora moventur quiescunt	2a2.1 corpora moventur quiescunt [geomap]
AXIOM I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.	AXIOMA I: Omnia corpora vel [excl exh] moventur vel quiescunt.
2a2.2 tardius celerius	2a2.2 tardius celerius [geomap]
AXIOM II. Every body is moved sometimes more slowly, sometimes more quickly.	AXIOMA II: Unumquodque corpus jam tardius jam celerius movetur.
2L01 Corpora non substanti distinguuntur	2L01 Corpora non  substantiae distinguuntur [geomap]
LEMMA I. Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of substance.	LEMMA I: corpora ratione motus et quietis, celeritatis et tarditatis et non ratione  substantiae ab invicem distinguuntur.
Proof.-The first part of this proposition is, I take it, self-evident. That bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii. It is brought out still more clearly from I. xv, note.	DEMONSTRATIO: Primam partem hujus per se notam suppono. At quod ratione  substantiae non distinguantur corpora, patet tam ex propositione 5 {1p05} quam 8 {1p08} partis I sed clarius ex iis quae in scholio propositionis 15 partis {non-deductive reference} I dicta sunt.
2L02 corpora conveniunt	2L02 corpora conveniunt [geomap]
LEMMA II. All bodies agree in certain respects.	LEMMA II: Omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt.
Proof.-All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.). Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.	DEMONSTRATIO: In his enim omnia corpora conveniunt quod unius ejusdemque attributi conceptum involvunt (per definitionem 1 hujus {2d01}), deinde quod jam tardius jam celerius et absolute jam moveri jam quiescere possunt.
2L03 corpus motum determinari ab alio	2L03 corpus motum determinari ab alio [geomap]
LEMMA III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which other body has been determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.	LEMMA III: corpus motum vel [excl exh] quiescens ad motum vel [excl exh] quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore quod etiam ad motum vel [excl exh] quietem determinatum fuit ab alio et illud iterum ab alio et sic in infinitum.
Proof.-Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which (Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to motion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely (II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in motion or at rest. And this body again can only have been set in motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to motion or rest. This third body again by a fourth, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: corpora (per definitionem 1 hujus {2d01}) res singulares sunt quae (per lemma 1 {2L01}) ratione motus et quietis ab invicem distinguuntur adeoque (per propositionem 28 partis I {1p28}) unumquodque ad motum vel [excl exh] quietem necessario determinari debuit ab alia re singulari nempe (per propositionem 6 hujus {2p06}) ab alio corpore quod (per axioma 1 {2a2.1}) etiam vel [excl exh] movetur vel quiescit. At hoc etiam (per eandem rationem) moveri vel [excl exh] quiescere non potuit nisi ab alio ad motum vel [excl exh] quietem determinatum fuisset et hoc iterum (per eandem rationem) ab alio et sic in infinitum. Q.E.D.
2L03c corpus motum tamdiu moveri	2L03c corpus motum tamdiu moveri [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other body; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a state of motion by some other body. This is indeed self-evident. For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion, I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is at rest. If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion, this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at rest. If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything concerning it, except that it is in motion. If A is subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result of A's previous motion, for such motion can only have led to continued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external cause determining A to a state of rest.	COROLLARIUM {2L03}: Hinc sequitur corpus motum tamdiu moveri donec ab alio corpore ad quiescendum determinetur et corpus quiescens tamdiu etiam quiescere donec ab alio ad motum determinetur. Quod etiam per se notum est. Nam cum suppono corpus exempli gratia A quiescere nec ad alia corpora mota attendo, nihil de corpore A dicere potero nisi quod quiescat. Quod si postea contingat ut corpus A moveatur, id sane evenire non potuit ex eo quod quiescebat; ex eo enim nil aliud sequi poterat quam ut corpus A quiesceret. Si contra supponatur A moveri, quotiescunque ad A tantum attendimus, nihil de eodem affirmare poterimus nisi quod moveatur. Quod si postea contingat ut A quiescat, id sane evenire etiam non potuit ex motu quem habebat; ex motu enim nihil aliud sequi poterat quam ut A moveretur : contingit itaque a re quae non erat in A nempe a causa externa a qua ad quiescendum determinatum fuit.
2a3.1 corporis affecti afficientis	2a3.1 corporis affecti afficientis [geomap]
Axiom I.-All modes, wherein one body is affected by another body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected and the body affecting; so that one and the same body may be moved in different modes, according to the difference in the nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.	AXIOMA I: Omnes modi quibus corpus aliquod ab alio afficitur corpore, ex natura corporis affecti et simul ex natura corporis afficientis sequuntur ita ut unum idemque corpus diversimode moveatur pro diversitate naturae corporum moventium et contra ut diversa corpora ab uno eodemque corpore diversimode moveantur.
2a3.2 angulus line motus reflectionis	2a3.2 angulus line motus reflectionis [geomap]
Axiom II.-When a body in motion impinges on another body at rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line of motion of incidence and the same plane.	AXIOMA II: Cum corpus motum alterius quiescenti quod dimovere nequit, impingit, reflectitur ut moveri pergat et angulus line motus reflectionis cum plano corporis quiescentis cui impegit, qualis erit angulo quem linea motus incidenti cum eodem plano efficit.
So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies, which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and rest, quickness and slowness. We now pass on to compound bodies.	Atque haec de corporibus simplicissimis quae scilicet solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate ab invicem distinguuntur : jam ad composita ascendamus.
2d08 (corpora) unita	2d08 (corpora) unita [notes] [geomap]
Definition.-When any given bodies of the same or different magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that together they compose one body or individual, which is distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.	DEFINITIO: Cum corpora aliquot ejusdem aut [excl exh] diversae magnitudinis a reliquis ita coercentur ut invicem incumbant vel [excl non-exh] si eodem aut [excl exh] diversis celeritatis gradibus moventur ut motus suos invicem certa quadam ratione communicent, illa corpora invicem unita dicemus et omnia simul unum corpus sive [mng eqv]  individuum componere quod a reliquis per hanc corporum unionem distinguitur.
2a3.3 dura mollia fluida	2a3.3 dura mollia fluida [geomap]
Axiom III.-In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a compound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies, they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved from their position; consequently the individual will, with greater or less difficulty, be brought to assume another form. Those bodies, whose parts are in contact over large superficies, are called hard; those, whose parts are in contact over small superficies, are called soft; those, whose parts are in motion among one another, are called fluid.	AXIOMA III: Quo partes individui vel [excl exh] corporis compositi secundum majores vel [excl non-exh] minores superficies sibi invicem incumbunt, eo difficilius vel [excl non-exh] facilius cogi possunt ut situm suum mutent et consequenter eo difficilius vel [excl non-exh] facilius effici potest ut ipsum individuum aliam figuram induat. Atque hinc corpora quorum partes secundum magnas superficies invicem incumbunt, dura, quorum autem partes secundum parvas, mollia et quorum denique partes inter se moventur, fluida vocabo.
2L04 alia succedant	2L04 alia succedant [geomap]
LEMMA IV. If from a body or individual, compounded of several bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same time, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take their place, the individual will preserve its nature as before, without any change in its actuality (forma).	LEMMA IV: Si corporis sive [mng eqv]  individui quod ex pluribus corporibus componitur, quaedam corpora segregentur et simul totidem alia ejusdem naturae eorum loco succedant, retinebit individuum suam naturam uti antea absque ulla ejus formae mutatione.
Proof.-Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of substance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will (by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore, will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance and in respect of mode. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: corpora enim (per lemma 1 {2L01}) ratione  substantiae non distinguuntur; id autem quod formam individui constituit, in corporum unione (per definitionem praecedentem {2d08}) consistit; atqui haec (per hypothesin) tametsi corporum continua fiat mutatio, retinetur : retinebit ergo individuum tam ratione  substantiae quam modi suam naturam uti ante. Q.E.D.
2L05 invicem motus et quietis rationem	2L05 invicem motus et quietis rationem [geomap]
LEMMA V. If the parts composing an individual become greater or less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same mutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be changed.	LEMMA V : Si partes individuum componentes majores minoresve evadant, ea tamen proportione ut omnes eandem ut antea ad invicem motus et quietis rationem servent, retinebit itidem individuum suam naturam ut antea absque ulla formae mutatione.
Proof.-The same as for the last Lemma.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus eadem est ac praecedentis lemmatis {2L04}.
2L06 qua antea ratione communicare	2L06 qua antea ratione communicare [geomap]
LEMMA VI. If certain bodies composing an individual be compelled to change the motion, which they have in one direction, for motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication in the same relations as before, the individual will retain its own nature without any change of its actuality.	LEMMA VI: Si corpora quaedam individuum componentia motum quem versus unam partem habent, aliam versus flectere cogantur at ita ut motus suos continuare possint atque invicem eadem qua antea ratione communicare, retinebit itidem individuum suam naturam absque ulla formae mutatione.
Proof.-This proposition is self-evident, for the individual is supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we spoke of as its actual being.	DEMONSTRATIO: Per se patet. Id enim omne retinere supponitur quod in ejusdem definitione formam ipsius constituere diximus.
2L07 motum retineat antea reliquis communicet	2L07 motum retineat antea reliquis communicet [geomap]
LEMMA VII. Furthermore, the individual thus composed preserves its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at rest, whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long as each part retains its motion, and preserves its communication with other parts as before.	LEMMA VII: Retinet praeterea individuum sic compositum suam naturam sive [non-excl exh triple]  id secundum totum moveatur  sive [excl exh triple] quiescat  sive [non-excl exh triple] versus hanc sive versus illam partem moveatur dummodo unaquque pars motum suum retineat eumque uti antea reliquis communicet.
Proof.-This proposition is evident from the definition of an individual prefixed to Lemma iv.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex ipsius definitione {2d08}, quam vide ante lemma 4.
2L07s aliud pluribus individuis compositum tertium	2L07s aliud pluribus individuis compositum tertium
Note.-We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected in many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding. Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and rest, speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple character. If, however, we now conceive another individual composed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find that the number of ways in which it can be affected, without losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied. Each of its parts would consist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.) each part would admit, without change to its nature, of quicker or slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts. If we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their actuality. We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the individual as a whole. I should feel bound to explain and demonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing a special treatise on body. But I have already said that such is not my object; I have only touched on the question, because it enables me to prove easily that which I have in view.	SCHOLIUM: His itaque videmus qua ratione individuum compositum possit multis modis affici, ejus nihilominus natura servata. Atque hucusque individuum concepimus quod non nisi ex corporibus quae solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate inter se distinguuntur hoc est quod ex corporibus simplicissimis componitur. Quod si jam aliud concipiamus ex pluribus diversae naturae individuis compositum, idem pluribus aliis modis posse affici reperiemus, ipsius nihilominus natura servata. Nam quandoquidem ejus unaquque pars ex pluribus corporibus est composita, poterit ergo (per lemma praecedens) unaquque pars absque ulla ipsius naturae mutatione jam tardius jam celerius moveri et consequenter motus suos citius vel tardius reliquis communicare. Quod si praeterea tertium individuorum genus ex his secundis compositum concipiamus, idem multis aliis modis affici posse reperiemus absque ulla ejus form mutatione. Et si sic porro in infinitum pergamus, facile concipiemus totam naturam unum esse Individuum cujus partes hoc est omnia corpora infinitis modis variant absque ulla totius Individui mutatione. Atque haec, si animus fuisset de corpore ex professo agere, prolixius explicare et demonstrare debuissem. Sed jam dixi me aliud velle nec alia de causa haec adferre quam quia ex ipsis ea quae demonstrare constitui, facile possum deducere.
POSTULATES	POSTULATA
2post01 plurimis individuis	2post01 plurimis individuis [geomap]
I. The human body is composed of a number of individual parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself extremely complex.	I. Corpus humanum componitur ex plurimis (diversae naturae) individuis quorum unumquodque valde compositum est.
2post02 fluida mollia dura	2post02 fluida mollia dura [geomap]
II. Of the individual parts composing the human body some are fluid, some soft, some hard.	II. Individuorum ex quibus corpus humanum componitur quaedam fluida, quaedam mollia et quaedam denique dura sunt.
2post03 externis plurimis modis afficitur	2post03 externis plurimis modis afficitur [geomap]
III. The individual parts composing the human body, and consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of ways by external bodies.	III. Individua corpus humanum componentia et consequenter ipsum humanum corpus a corporibus externis plurimis modis afficitur.
2post04 regeneratur	2post04 regeneratur [geomap]
IV. The human body stands in need for its preservation of a number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak, regenerated.	IV. Corpus humanum indiget ut conservetur plurimis aliis corporibus a quibus continuo quasi regeneratur.
2post05 in aliam mollem imprimit	2post05 in aliam mollem imprimit [geomap]
V. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression thereupon of the external body which impels it.	V. Cum corporis humani pars fluida a corpore externo determinatur ut in aliam mollem spe impingat, ejus planum mutat et veluti quaedam corporis externi impellentis vestigia eidem imprimit.
2post06 corpora externa movere	2post06 corpora externa movere [geomap]
VI. The human body can move external bodies, and arrange them in a variety of ways.	VI. Corpus humanum potest corpora externa plurimis modis movere plurimisque modis disponere.
2p14 Mens plurima percipiendum	2p14 Mens plurima percipiendum [geomap]
PROP. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of impressions.	PROPOSITIO XIV: Mens humana apta est ad plurima percipiendum et eo aptior quo ejus corpus pluribus modis disponi potest.
Proof.-The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many ways of affecting external bodies. But (II. xii.) the human mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Corpus enim humanum (per postulata 3 {2post03} et 6 {2post06}) plurimis modis a corporibus externis afficitur disponiturque ad corpora externa plurimis modis afficiendum. At omnia quae in corpore humano contingunt (per propositionem 12 hujus {2p12}) mens humana percipere debet; est ergo mens humana apta ad plurima percipiendum et eo aptior etc. Q.E.D.
2p15 Idea mentis composita	2p15 Idea mentis composita [geomap]
PROP. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.	PROPOSITIO XV: Idea quae esse  formale humanae mentis constituit non est simplex sed ex plurimis ideis composita.
Proof.-The idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is composed of a great number of complex individual parts. But there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part whereof the body is composed (II. viii. Coroll.); therefore (II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these numerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Idea quae esse  formale humanae mentis constituit, est idea corporis (per propositionem 13 hujus {2post01}) ex plurimis valde compositis individuis componitur. At cujuscunque individui corpus componentis datur necessario (per corollarium propositionis 8 hujus {2p08}) in Deo idea; ergo (per propositionem 7 hujus {2p07}) idea corporis humani ex plurimis hisce partium componentium ideis est composita. Q.E.D.
2p16 Idea afficitur corporis humani et externi	2p16 Idea afficitur corporis humani et externi [geomap]
PROP. XVI. The idea of every way in which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body, and also the nature of the external body.	PROPOSITIO XVI : Idea cujuscunque modi quo corpus humanum a corporibus externis afficitur, involvere debet naturam corporis humani et simul naturam corporis externi.
Proof.-All the ways in which any given body is affected, follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax. iv.) involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of every way in which the human body is affected by external bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external body. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes enim modi quibus corpus aliquod afficitur ex natura corporis affecti et simul ex natura corporis afficientis sequuntur (per axioma 1  post corollarium lemmatis 3) {2a3.1}: quare eorum idea (per axioma 4 partis I {1a04}) utriusque corporis naturam necessario involvet adeoque idea  cujuscunque modi quo corpus humanum a corpore externo afficitur, corporis humani et corporis externi naturam involvit. Q.E.D.
2p16c1 plurimorum corporum naturam	2p16c1 plurimorum corporum naturam [geomap]
Corollary I.-Hence it follows, first, that the human mind perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the nature of its own.	COROLLARIUM {2p16} I: Hinc sequitur primo mentem humanam plurimorum corporum naturam una cum sui corporis natura percipere.
2p16c2 magis nostri corporis	2p16c2 magis nostri corporis [geomap]
Corollary II.-It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our own body than the nature of external bodies. I have amply illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.	COROLLARIUM {2p16} II: Sequitur secundo quod ideae quas corporum externorum habemus, magis nostri corporis constitutionem quam corporum externorum naturam indicant; quod in appendice partis prim multis exemplis explicui.
2p17 existens vel ut sibi praesens	2p17 existens vel ut sibi praesens [geomap]
PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.	PROPOSITIO XVII: Si humanum corpus affectum est modo qui naturam corporis alicujus externi involvit, mens humana idem corpus externum ut actu existens vel [mng eqv] ut sibi praesens contemplabitur donec corpus afficiatur affectu qui ejusdem corporis existentiam vel [mng eqv] praesentiam secludat.
Proof.-This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human mind (II. xii.) regard this modification [Lat: affectiones] of the body-that is (by the last Prop.), it will have the idea as (in the way of) actually existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body. In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will regard the external body as actually existing, until it is affected, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet. Nam quamdiu corpus humanum sic affectum est tamdiu mens humana (per propositionem 12 hujus {2p12}) hanc corporis affectionem contemplabitur hoc est (per propositionem praecedentem) ideam habebit modi actu existentis quae naturam corporis externi involvit hoc est ideam quae existentiam vel [mng eqv] praesentiam naturae corporis externi non secludit sed ponit adeoque mens (per corollarium I praecedentis {2p16c1}) corpus externum ut actu existens vel [mng eqv] ut praesens contemplabitur donec afficiatur etc. Q.E.D.
2p17c quamvis non existant nec praesentia	2p17c quamvis non existant nec praesentia [geomap]
Corollary.-The mind is able to regard as present external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even though they be no longer in existence or present.	COROLLARIUM: Mens corpora externa a quibus corpus humanum semel affectum fuit, quamvis non existant nec praesentia sint, contemplari tamen poterit velut  praesentia essent.
Proof.-When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they change the surface of the last named (Post. v.); hence (Ax. ii., after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which they followed before such change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again take cognizance-that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Dum corpora externa corporis humani partes fluidas ita determinant ut in molliores spe impingant, earum plana (per postulatum 5 {2post05}) mutant, unde fit (vide axioma 2 post corollarium lemmatis 3 {2a3.2}) ut inde alio modo reflectantur quam antea solebant et ut etiam postea iisdem novis planis spontaneo suo motu occurrendo eodem modo reflectantur ac cum a corporibus externis versus illa plana impulsae sunt et consequenter ut corpus humanum dum sic reflex moveri pergunt, eodem modo afficiant, de quo mens (per propositionem 12 hujus {2p12}) iterum cogitabit hoc est (per propositionem 17 hujus {2p17}) mens iterum corpus externum ut praesens contemplabitur et hoc toties quoties corporis humani partes fluid spontaneo suo motu iisdem planis occurrent. Quare quamvis corpora externa a quibus corpus humanum affectum semel fuit, non existant, mens tamen eadem toties ut praesentia contemplabitur quoties haec corporis actio repetetur. Q.E.D.
2p17s Videmus itaque non sunt veluti praesentia	2p17s Videmus itaque non sunt veluti praesentia
Note.-We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, that we regard as present many things which are not. It is possible that the same result may be brought about by other causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.). Furthermore (II. vii. Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own nature-that is (I. Def. vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.	SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque qui fieri potest ut ea quae non sunt veluti praesentia contemplemur, ut spe fit. Et fieri potest ut hoc aliis de causis contingat sed mihi hic sufficit ostendisse unam per quam rem sic possim explicare ac si ipsam per veram causam ostendissem nec tamen credo me a vera longe aberrare quandoquidem omnia illa quae sumpsi postulata, vix quicquam continent quod non constet experientia de qua nobis non licet dubitare postquam ostendimus corpus humanum prout ipsum sentimus, existere (vide corollarium post propositionem 13 hujus). praeterea (ex corollario praecedentis et corollario II propositionis 16 hujus) clare intelligimus quaenam sit differentia inter ideam exempli gratia Petri quae essentiam mentis ipsius Petri constituit et inter ideam ipsius Petri quae in alio homine, puta in Paulo, est. Illa enim essentiam corporis ipsius Petri directe explicat nec existentiam involvit nisi quamdiu Petrus existit; haec autem magis constitutionem corporis Pauli quam Petri naturam indicat et ideo durante illa corporis Pauli constitutione mens Pauli quamvis Petrus non existat, ipsum tamen ut sibi praesentem contemplabitur. Porro ut verba usitata retineamus, corporis humani affectiones quarum ideae corpora externa velut nobis praesentia repraesentant, rerum imagines vocabimus tametsi rerum figuras non referunt. Et cum mens hac ratione contemplatur corpora, eandem imaginari dicemus. Atque hic ut quid sit error indicare incipiam, notetis velim mentis imaginationes in se spectatas nihil erroris continere sive mentem ex eo quod imaginatur, non errare sed tantum quatenus consideratur carere idea quae existentiam illarum rerum quas sibi praesentes imaginatur, secludat. Nam si mens dum res non existentes ut sibi praesentes imaginatur, simul sciret res illas revera non existere, hanc sane imaginandi potentiam virtuti suae naturae, non vitio tribueret praesertim si haec imaginandi facultas a sola sua natura penderet hoc est (per definitionem 7 partis I) si haec mentis imaginandi facultas libera esset.
2p18 pluribus corporibus simul	2p18 pluribus corporibus simul [geomap]
PROP. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.	PROPOSITIO XVIII: Si corpus humanum a duobus vel pluribus corporibus simul affectum fuerit semel, ubi mens postea eorum aliquod imaginabitur, statim et aliorum recordabitur.
Proof.-The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body, because the human body is affected and rearranged by the impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is affected when certain of its parts are operated on by the said external body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore, it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the other. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mens (per corollarium praecedentis {2p17c}) corpus aliquod ea de causa imaginatur quia scilicet humanum corpus a corporis externi vestigiis eodem modo afficitur disponiturque ac affectum est cum quaedam ejus partes ab ipso corpore externo fuerunt impuls sed (per hypothesin) corpus tum ita fuit dispositum ut mens duo simul corpora imaginaretur; ergo jam etiam duo simul imaginabitur atque mens ubi alterutrum imaginabitur, statim et alterius recordabitur. Q.E.D.
2p18s memoria	2p18s memoria
Note.-We now clearly see what memory is. It is simply a certain association of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body, which association arises in the mind according to the order and association of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] (affectiones) of the human body. I say, first, it is an association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of things outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the nature of the said things: ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies. I say, secondly, that this association arises according to the order and association of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the human body, in order to distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same. And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first; for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple, which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man has often been affected by these two things; that is, that the man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the fruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought to another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things in his body. For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought of war, &c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c. Thus every man will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has been in the habit of conjoining and associating the images of things in this or that manner.	SCHOLIUM: Hinc clare intelligimus quid sit memoria. Est enim nihil aliud quam quaedam concatenatio idearum naturam rerum quae extra corpus humanum sunt involventium quae in mente fit secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis humani. Dico primo concatenationem esse illarum tantum idearum quae naturam rerum quae extra corpus humanum sunt, involvunt, non autem idearum quae earundem rerum naturam explicant. Sunt enim revera (per propositionem 16 hujus) ideae affectionum corporis humani quae tam hujus quam corporum externorum naturam involvunt. Dico secundo hanc concatenationem fieri secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis humani ut ipsam distinguerem a concatenatione idearum quae fit secundum ordinem intellectus quo res per primas suas causas mens percipit et qui in omnibus hominibus idem est. Atque hinc porro clare intelligimus cur mens ex cogitatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat quae nullam cum priore habet similitudinem; ut exempli gratia ex cogitatione vocis pomi homo romanus statim in cogitationem fructus incidet qui nullam cum articulato illo sono habet similitudinem nec aliquid commune nisi quod ejusdem hominis corpus ab his duobus affectum spe fuit hoc est quod ipse homo spe vocem pomum audivit dum ipsum fructum videret et sic unusquisque ex una in aliam cogitationem incidet prout rerum imagines uniuscujusque consuetudo in corpore ordinavit. Nam miles exempli gratia visis in arena equi vestigiis statim ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem equitis et inde in cogitationem belli etc. incidet. At rusticus ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem aratri, agri etc. incidet et sic unusquisque prout rerum imagines consuevit hoc vel alio modo jungere et concatenare, ex una in hanc vel aliam incidet cogitationem.
2p19 Mens nisi per affectionum	2p19 Mens nisi per affectionum [geomap]
PROP. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] whereby the body is affected.	PROPOSITIO XIX: Mens humana ipsum humanum corpus non cognoscit nec ipsum existere scit nisi per ideas affectionum quibus corpus afficitur.
Proof.-The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing actually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were, continually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.); this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does not know the human body. But the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of body are in God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind perceives those modifications [Lat: affectiones] (II. xii.), and consequently (II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing; therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mens enim humana est ipsa idea sive [mng eqv]   cognitio corporis humani (per propositionem 13 hujus {2p09}) in Deo quidem est quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus consideraturvel [mng eqv] quia (per postulatum 4 {2post04}) corpus humanum plurimis corporibus indiget a quibus continuo quasi regeneratur et ordo et connexio idearum idem est (per propositionem 7 hujus {2p07}) ac ordo et connexio causarum, erit haec idea in Deo quatenus plurimarum rerum singularium ideis affectus consideratur. Deus itaque ideam corporis humani habet sive [mng eqv]   corpus humanum cognoscit quatenus plurimis aliis ideis affectus est et non quatenus naturam humanae mentis constituit hoc est [hence] (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus {2p11}) mens humana corpus humanum non cognoscit. At ideae affectionum corporis in Deo sunt quatenus humanae mentis naturam constituit sive [mng eqv]   mens humana easdem affectiones percipit (per propositionem 12 hujus {2p12}) et consequenter (per propositionem 16 hujus {2p16}) ipsum corpus humanum idque (per propositionem 17 hujus {2p17}) ut actu existens; percipit ergo eatenus tantum mens humana ipsum humanum corpus. Q.E.D.
2p20 Mentis humanae datur etiam in Deo idea	2p20 Mentis humanae datur etiam in Deo idea [geomap]
PROP. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body.	PROPOSITIO XX: Mentis humanae datur etiam in Deo idea sive [mng eqv]   cognitio quae in Deo eodem modo sequitur et ad Deum eodem modo refertur ac idea sive [mng eqv] cognitio corporis humani.
Proof.-Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore (II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of thought itself and of all its modifications [Lat: affectiones], consequently also of the human mind (II. xi.). Further, this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing (II. ix.). But (II. vii.) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes; therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Cogitatio attributum Dei est (per propositionem 1 hujus {2p01}) adeoque (per propositionem 3 hujus {2p03}) tam ejus quam omnium ejus affectionum et consequenter (per propositionem 11 hujus {2p11}) mentis etiam humanae debet necessario in Deo dari idea. Deinde haec mentis idea sive [mng eqv] cognitio non sequitur in Deo dari quatenus infinitus sed quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus est(per propositionem 9 hujus {2p09}). Sed ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio causarum (per propositionem 7 hujus {2p07}); sequitur ergo haec mentis idea sive [mng eqv]   cognitio in Deo et ad Deum eodem modo refertur ac idea sive [mng eqv] cognitio corporis. Q.E.D.
2p21 mentis idea menti mens corpori	2p21 mentis idea menti mens corpori [geomap]
PROP. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body.	PROPOSITIO XXI: Haec mentis idea eodem modo unita est menti ac ipsa mens unita est corpori.
Proof.-That the mind is united to the body we have shown from the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii. and xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the body. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mentem unitam esse corpori ex eo ostendimus quod scilicet corpus mentis sit objectum (vide propositiones 12 {2p12} et 13 {2p13} hujus) adeoque per eandem illam rationem idea mentis cum suo objecto hoc est cum ipsa mente eodem modo unita esse debet ac ipsa mens unita est corpori. Q.E.D.
2p21s mentem et corpus unum	2p21s mentem et corpus unum
Note.-This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from what we have said in the note to II. vii. We there showed that the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.), are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension; wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same power of thinking. Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality (forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object; if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity. But I will treat of this hereafter.	SCHOLIUM: Haec propositio longe clarius intelligitur ex dictis in scholio propositionis 7 hujus; ibi enim ostendimus corporis ideam et corpus hoc est (per propositionem 13 hujus) mentem et corpus unum et idem esse individuum quod jam sub cogitationis jam sub extensionis attributo concipitur; quare mentis idea et ipsa mens una eademque est res quae sub uno eodemque attributo nempe cogitationis concipitur. Mentis inquam idea et ipsa mens in Deo eadem necessitate ex eadem cogitandi potentia sequuntur dari. Nam revera idea mentis hoc est idea ideae nihil aliud est quam forma ideae quatenus haec ut modus cogitandi absque relatione ad objectum consideratur; simulac enim quis aliquid scit, eo ipso scit se id scire et simul scit se scire quod scit et sic in infinitum. Sed de his postea.
2p22 Mens corporis affectiones etiam affectionum ideas	2p22 Mens corporis affectiones etiam affectionum ideas [geomap]
PROP. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications [Lat: affectiones].	PROPOSITIO XXII: Mens humana non tantum corporis affectiones sed etiam harum affectionum ideas percipit.
Proof.-The ideas of the ideas of modifications [Lat: affectiones] follow in God in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner, as the ideas of the said modifications [Lat: affectiones]. This is proved in the same way as II. xx. But the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not only the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications [Lat: affectiones]. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Affectionum idearum ideae in Deo eodem modo sequuntur et ad Deum eodem modo referuntur ac ipsae affectionum ide; quod eodem modo demonstratur ac propositio 20 {2p20} hujus. At ideae affectionum corporis in mente humana sunt (per propositionem 12 hujus {2p12}) hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus {2p11}) in Deo quatenus humanae mentis essentiam constituit; ergo harum idearum ideae in Deo erunt quatenus humanae mentis cognitionem sive [mng eqv]   ideam habet hoc est (per propositionem 21 hujus {2p21}) in ipsa mente humana quae propterea non tantum corporis affectiones sed earum etiam ideas percipit. Q.E.D.
2p23 Mens se non cognoscit nisi	2p23 Mens se non cognoscit nisi [geomap]
PROP. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body.	PROPOSITIO XXIII: Mens se ipsam non cognoscit nisi quatenus corporis affectionum ideas percipit.
Proof.-The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (II. xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is (II. xi. Coroll.), since the knowledge of the human body is not referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the human mind thus far has no knowledge of itself. Further the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones], whereby the body is affected, involve the nature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.), they agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but (by the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has knowledge of itself. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis idea sive [mng eqv]   cognitio (per propositionem 20 hujus {2p20}) in Deo eodem modo sequitur et ad Deum eodem modo refertur ac corporis idea sive [mng eqv]  cognitio. At quoniam (per propositionem 19 hujus {2p19}) mens humana ipsum humanum corpus non cognoscit hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus {2p11}) quoniam cognitio corporis humani ad Deum non refertur quatenus humanae mentis naturam constituit; ergo nec cognitio mentis ad Deum refertur quatenus essentiam mentis humanae constituitatque adeo (per idem corollarium propositionis 11 hujus {2p11}) mens humana eatenus se ipsam non cognoscit. Deinde affectionum quibus corpus afficitur ideae naturam ipsius corporis humani involvunt (per propositionem 16 hujus {2p16}) hoc est (per propositionem 13 hujus) conveniunt; quare harum idearum cognitio cognitionem mentis necessario involvet; at (per propositionem praecedentem) harum idearum cognitio in ipsa humana mente est; ergo mens humana eatenus tantum se ipsam novit. Q.E.D.
2p24 Mens partium corpus non involvit	2p24 Mens partium corpus non involvit [geomap]
PROP. XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body.	PROPOSITIO XXIV: Mens humana partium corpus humanum componentium adaequatam cognitionem non involvit.
Proof.-The parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def. after Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as individuals without relation to the human body. The parts of the human body are highly complex individuals (Post. i.), whose parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the latter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after Lemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II. iii.) the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God, inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the order of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.). We may affirm the same thing of each part of each individual composing the human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind (II. xiii); therefore (II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Partes corpus humanum componentes ad essentiam ipsius corporis non pertinent nisi quatenus motus suos certa quadam ratione invicem communicant (vide definitionem post corollarium lemmatis 3 {2d08}) et non quatenus ut individua absque relatione ad humanum corpus considerari possunt. Sunt enim partes humani corporis (per postulatum 1 {2post01}) valde composita individua quorum partes (per lemma 4 {2L04}) a corpore humano, servata omnino ejusdem natura et forma, segregari possunt motusque suos (vide axioma 1 post lemma 3 {2a3.1}) aliis corporibus alia ratione communicare adeoque (per propositionem 3 hujus {2p03}) cujuscunque partis idea sive [mng eqv]  cognitio in Deo erit et quidem (per propositionem 9 hujus {2p09}) quatenus affectus consideratur alia idea rei singularis, quae res singularis ipsa parte ordine naturae prior est (per propositionem 7 hujus {2p07}). Quod idem praeterea etiam de quacunque parte ipsius individui corpus humanum componentis est dicendum adeoque cujuscunque partis corpus humanum componentis cognitio in Deo est quatenus plurimis rerum ideis affectus est et non quatenus corporis humani tantum habet ideam hoc est (per propositionem 13 hujus {2p13}) ideam quae humanae mentis naturam constituit atque adeo (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus {2p11c}) humana mens partium corpus humanum componentium adaequatam cognitionem non involvit. Q.E.D.
2p25 corporis externi cognitionem non involvit	2p25 corporis externi cognitionem non involvit [geomap]
PROP. XXV. The idea of each modification [Lat: affectiones] of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.	PROPOSITIO XXV: Idea cujuscunque affectionis corporis humani adaequatam corporis externi cognitionem non involvit.
Proof.-We have shown that the idea of a modification [Lat: affectiones] of the human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as that external body conditions the human body in a given manner. But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to the said external body. Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the modification [Lat: affectiones] of the human body; in other words, the idea of the modification [Lat: affectiones] of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: ideam affectionis corporis humani eatenus corporis externi naturam involvere ostendimus (vide propositionem 16 hujus {2p16}) quatenus externum ipsum humanum corpus certo quodam modo determinat. At quatenus externum corpus individuum est quod ad corpus humanum non refertur, ejus idea sive [mng eqv]  cognitio in Deo  est (per propositionem 9 hujus {2p09}) quatenus Deus affectus consideratur alterius rei idea quae (per propositionem 7 hujus {2p07}) ipso corpore externo prior est natura. Quare corporis externi adaequata cognitio in Deo non est quatenus ideam affectionis humani corporis habet sive [mng eqv]  idea affectionis corporis humani adaequatam corporis externi cognitionem non involvit. Q.E.D.
2p26 mens percipit per ideas affectionum	2p26 mens percipit per ideas affectionum [geomap]
PROP. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of its own body.	PROPOSITIO XXVI: Mens humana nullum corpus externum ut actu existens percipit nisi per ideas affectionum sui corporis.
Proof.-If the human body is in no way affected by a given external body, then (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in any manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the human body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far (II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si a corpore aliquo externo corpus humanum nullo modo affectum est, ergo (per propositionem 7 hujus {2p07}) nec idea corporis humani hoc est (per propositionem 13 hujus {2p13}) nec mens humana idea existentiae illius corporis ullo etiam modo affecta est sive [prf eqv]  existentiam illius corporis externi ullo modo percipit. At quatenus corpus humanum a corpore aliquo externo aliquo modo afficitur eatenus (per propositionem 16 hujus  {2p16} cum corollario I ejusdem {2p16c1}) corpus externum percipit. Q.E.D.
2p26c corpus imaginatur cognitionem non habet	2p26c corpus imaginatur cognitionem non habet [geomap]
Corollary.-In so far as the human mind imagines an external body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.	COROLLARIUM {2p26}: quatenus mens humana corpus externum imaginatur eatenus adaequatam ejus cognitionem non habet.
Proof.-When the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of its own body, we say that it imagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind (by II. xvi) can only imagine external bodies as actually existing. Therefore (by II. xxv.), in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an adequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Cum mens humana per ideas affectionum sui corporis corpora externa contemplatur, eandem tum imaginari dicimus (vide scholium propositionis 17 hujus {non-deductive reference}) nec mens alia ratione (per propositionem praecedentem {2p26}) corpora externa ut actu existentia imaginari potest. Atque adeo (per propositionem 25 hujus {2p25}) quatenus mens corpora externa imaginatur, eorum adaequatam cognitionem non habet. Q.E.D.
2p27 Idea affectionis corporis cognitionem non involvit	2p27 Idea affectionis corporis cognitionem non involvit [geomap]
PROP. XXVII. The idea of each modification [Lat: affectiones] of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.	PROPOSITIO XXVII: Idea cujuscunque affectionis corporis humani adaequatam ipsius humani corporis cognitionem non involvit.
Proof.-Every idea of a modification [Lat: affectiones] of the human body involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.). But, inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected in many other ways, the idea of the said modification [Lat: affectiones], &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quaelibet idea cujuscunque affectionis humani corporis eatenus naturam corporis humani involvit quatenus ipsum humanum corpus certo quodam modo affici consideratur (vide propositionem 16 hujus {2p16}). At quatenus corpus humanum individuum est quod multis aliis modis affici potest, ejus idea etc. Vide demonstrationem propositionis 25 hujus {2p25}.
2p28 ideae affectionum corporis ad mentem referuntur non clarae	2p28 ideae affectionum corporis ad mentem referuntur non clarae [geomap]
PROP. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.	PROPOSITIO XXVIII: Ideae affectionum corporis humani quatenus ad humanam mentem tantum referuntur, non sunt clarae et distinctae sed confusae.
Proof.-The ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the human body involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies (II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts; for the modifications [Lat: affectiones] are modes (Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and, consequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (by II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas of modifications [Lat: affectiones], in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words, confused ideas. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ideae enim affectionum corporis humani tam corporum externorum quam ipsius humani corporis naturam involvunt (per propositionem 16 hujus {2p16}) nec tantum corporis humani sed ejus etiam partium naturam involvere debent; affectiones namque modi sunt (per postulatum 3 {2post3}) quibus partes corporis humani et consequenter totum corpus afficitur. At (per propositiones 24 {2p24} et 25 hujus {2p25}) corporum externorum adaequata cognitio ut et partium corpus humanum componentium in Deo non est quatenus humana mente sed quatenus aliis ideis affectus consideratur. Sunt ergo hae affectionum ideae quatenus ad solam humanam mentem referuntur, veluti consequenti absque praemissis hoc est [mng eqv] (ut per se notum) ideae confusae. Q.E.D.
2p28s Idea naturam mentis humanae non clara	2p28s Idea naturam mentis humanae non clara
Note.-The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in itself alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.	SCHOLIUM: Idea quae naturam mentis humanae constituit, demonstratur eodem modo non esse, in se sola considerata, clara et distincta, ut etiam idea mentis humanae et ideae idearum affectionum corporis humani quatenus ad solam mentem referuntur, quod unusquisque facile videre potest.
2p29 Idea ideae affectionis cognitionem non involvit	2p29 Idea ideae affectionis cognitionem non involvit [geomap]
PROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification [Lat: affectiones] of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.	PROPOSITIO XXIX: Idea ideae cujuscunque affectionis corporis humani adaequatam humanae mentis cognitionem non involvit.
Proof.-The idea of a modification [Lat: affectiones] of the human body (II. xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body, in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is (II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind adequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not involve an adequate knowledge thereof.	DEMONSTRATIO: Idea enim affectionis corporis humani (per propositionem 27 hujus {2p27}) adaequatam ipsius corporis cognitionem non involvit sive [mng eqv]  ejus naturam adaequate non exprimit hoc est [mng eqv]  per propositionem 13 hujus {2p23}) cum natura mentis non convenit adaequate adeoque [mng eqv] (per axioma 6 partis I {1a06}) hujus ideae idea adaequate humanae mentis naturam non exprimit sive [mng eqv]  adaequatam ejus cognitionem non involvit. Q.E.D.
2p29c mentem confusam tantum cognitionem	2p29c mentem confusam tantum cognitionem [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows that the human mind, when it perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of body (II. xxiii.). It only perceives its own body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones], and only perceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so far as it has such ideas of modification [Lat: affectiones], it has not an adequate knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II. xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and note). Q.E.D.	COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur mentem humanam quoties ex communi naturae ordine res percipit, nec sui ipsius nec sui corporis nec corporum externorum adaequatam sed confusam tantum et mutilatam habere cognitionem. Nam mens se ipsam non cognoscit nisi quatenus ideas affectionum corporis percipit (per propositionem 23 hujus {2p23}). Corpus autem suum (per propositionem 19 hujus {2p19}) non percipit nisi per ipsas affectionum ideas per quas etiam tantum (per propositionem 26 hujus {2p26}) corpora externa percipit atque adeo quatenus eas habet, nec sui ipsius (per propositionem 29 hujus {2p29}) nec sui corporis (per propositionem 27 hujus {2p27}) nec corporum externorum (per propositionem 25 hujus {2p25}) habet adaequatam cognitionem sed tantum (per propositionem 28 hujus {2p28} cum ejus scholio {non-deductive reference}) mutilatam et confusam. Q.E.D.
2p29s rerum nempe fortuito occursu	2p29s rerum nempe fortuito occursu
Note.-I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this or that; not at such times as it is determined from within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference, and contrast. Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.	SCHOLIUM: Dico expresse quod mens nec sui ipsius nec sui corporis nec corporum externorum adaequatam sed confusam tantum et mutilatam cognitionem habeat quoties ex communi naturae ordine res percipit hoc est quoties externe, ex rerum nempe fortuito occursu, determinatur ad hoc vel illud contemplandum et non quoties interne, ex eo scilicet quod res plures simul contemplatur, determinatur ad earundem convenientias, differentias et oppugnantias intelligendum; quoties enim hoc vel alio modo interne disponitur, tum res clare et distincte contemplatur, ut infra ostendam.
2p30 duratione inadaequatam cognitionem	2p30 duratione inadaequatam cognitionem [geomap]
PROP. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.	PROPOSITIO XXX: Nos de duratione nostri corporis nullam nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere possumus.
Proof.-The duration of our body does not depend on its essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I. xxi.). But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity. The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of nature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing may be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God, in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only. (II. ix. Coroll.) Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting the nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this knowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nostri corporis duratio ab ejus essentia non dependet (per axioma 1 hujus {2a1.1}) nec etiam ab absoluta Dei natura (per propositionem 21 partis I {1p25}). Sed (per propositionem 28 partis I {1p28}) ad existendum et operandum determinatura talibus causis quae etiam ab aliis determinatae sunt ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione et hae iterum ab aliis et sic in infinitum. Nostri igitur corporis duratio a communi naturae ordine et rerum constitutione pendet. Qua autem ratione constitut sint, ejus rei adaequata cognitio datur in Deo quatenus earum omnium ideas et non quatenus tantum humani corporis ideam habet (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus {2p09c}); quare cognitio durationis nostri corporis est in Deo admodum inadaequata quatenus tantum naturam mentis humanae constituere consideratur hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus {2p11c}) haec cognitio est in nostra mente admodum inadaequata. Q.E.D.
2p31 duratione rerum extra nos inadaequatam cognitionem	2p31 duratione rerum extra nos inadaequatam cognitionem [geomap]
PROP. XXmaps/2p31c omnes res contingentes et corruptibiles.html XI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to ourselves.	PROPOSITIO XXXI: Nos de duratione rerum  singularium quae extra nos sunt, nullam nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere  possumus.
Proof.-Every particular thing, like the human body, must be conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity. (I. xxviii.) As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from this common property of particular things, we have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Unaquque enim res singularis sicuti humanum corpus ab alia re singulari determinari debet ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione et haec iterum ab alia et sic in infinitum(per propositionem 28 partis I {1p28}). Cum autem ex hac communi rerum singularium proprietate in praecedenti propositione demonstraverimus nos de duratione nostri corporis non nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere, ergo hoc idem de rerum singularium duratione erit concludendum quod scilicet ejus non nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere possumus. Q.E.D.
2p31c omnes res contingentes et corruptibiles	2p31c omnes res contingentes et corruptibiles [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows that all particular things are contingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea of their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must understand by the contingency and perishableness of things. (I. xxxiii., Note i.) For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing is contingent.	COROLLARIUM {2p31}: Hinc sequitur omnes res particulares contingentes et corruptibiles esse. Nam de earum duratione nullam adaequatam cognitionem habere possumus (per propositionem praecedentem {2p31}) et hoc est id quod per rerum contingentiam et corruptionis possibilitatem nobis est intelligendum (vide scholium I propositionis 33 partis I {non-deductive reference}). Nam (per propositionem 29 partis I {1p29}) praeter hoc nullum datur contingens.
2p32 ideae Deum referuntur verae	2p32 ideae Deum referuntur verae [geomap]
PROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true.	PROPOSITIO XXXII: Omnes ideae quatenus ad Deum referuntur, verae sunt.
Proof.-All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are all true. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes enim ideae quae in Deo sunt, cum suis ideatis omnino conveniunt (per corollarium propositionis 7 hujus {2p07}) adeoque (per axioma 6 partis I {1a06}) omnes verae sunt. Q.E.D.
2p33 Nihil positivum falsae	2p33 Nihil positivum falsae [geomap]
PROP. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false.	PROPOSITIO XXXIII: Nihil in ideis positivum est propter quod falsae dicuntur.
Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality of falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II. xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.). Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si negas, concipe si fieri potest, modum positivum cogitandi qui formam erroris sive [mng eqv]  falsitatis constituat. Hic cogitandi modus non potest esse in Deo (per propositionem praecedentem {2p32}); extra Deum autem etiam nec esse nec concipi potest (per propositionem 15 partis I {1p15}). Atque adeo nihil potest dari positivum in ideis propter quod falsae dicuntur. Q.E.D.
2p34 absoluta sive adaequata et perfecta vera	2p34 absoluta sive adaequata et perfecta vera [geomap]
PROP. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect, is true.	PROPOSITIO XXXIV: Omnis idea quae in nobis est absoluta sive [prf eqv]  adaequata et [prf eqv] perfecta, vera est.
Proof.-When we say that an idea in us is adequate and perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such an idea is true. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Cum dicimus dari in nobis ideam adaequatam et perfectam, nihil aliud dicimus (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus {2p11}) quam quod in Deo quatenus nostrae mentis essentiam constituit, detur idea adaequata et perfecta et consequenter (per propositionem 32 hujus {2p32}) nihil aliud dicimus quam quod talis idea sit vera. Q.E.D.
2p35 Falsitas consistit privatione	2p35 Falsitas consistit privatione [geomap]
PROP. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.	PROPOSITIO XXXV: Falsitas consistit in cognitionis privatione quam ideae inadaequatae sive [mng eqv]  mutilatae et confusae involvunt.
Proof.-There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in absolute privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for ignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nihil in ideis positivum datur quod falsitatis formam constituat (per propositionem 33 hujus {2p33}); at falsitas in absoluta privatione consistere nequit (mentes enim, non corpora errare nec falli dicuntur) neque etiam in absoluta ignorantia; diversa enim sunt ignorare et errare; quare in cognitionis privatione quam rerum inadaequata cognitio sive [mng eqv]  ideae inadaequatae et confusae involvunt, consistit. Q.E.D.
2p35s exemplum liberos	2p35s exemplum liberos
Note.-In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light on the subject I will give an example. For instance, men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their operations. As for their saying that human actions depend on the will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond thereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true distance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification [Lat: affectiones] of our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said body is affected thereby.	SCHOLIUM: In scholio propositionis 17 hujus partis explicui qua ratione error in cognitionis privatione consistit sed ad uberiorem hujus rei explicationem exemplum dabo nempe falluntur homines quod se liberos esse putant, quae opinio in hoc solo consistit quod suarum actionum sint conscii et ignari causarum a quibus determinantur. Haec ergo est eorum libertatis idea quod suarum actionum nullam cognoscant causam. Nam quod aiunt humanas actiones a voluntate pendere, verba sunt quorum nullam habent ideam. Quid enim voluntas sit et quomodo moveat corpus, ignorant omnes; qui aliud jactant et animae sedes et habitacula fingunt, vel risum vel nauseam movere solent. Sic cum solem intuemur, eum ducentos circiter pedes a nobis distare imaginamur, qui error in hac sola imaginatione non consistit sed in eo quod dum ipsum sic imaginamur, veram ejus distantiam et hujus imaginationis causam ignoramus. Nam tametsi postea cognoscamus eundem ultra 600 terr diametros a nobis distare, ipsum nihilominus prope adesse imaginabimur; non enim solem adeo propinquum imaginamur propterea quod veram ejus distantiam ignoramus sed propterea quod affectio nostri corporis essentiam solis involvit quatenus ipsum corpus ab eodem afficitur.
2p36 ideae inadaequatae et confusae eadem necessitate	2p36 ideae inadaequatae et confusae eadem necessitate [geomap]
PROP. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.	PROPOSITIO XXXVI: Ideae inadaequatae et confusae eadem necessitate consequuntur ac adaequatae sive [mng eqv]  clarae  ac distinctae ideae.
Proof.-All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.) adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate, except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and xxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate, follow by the same necessity (II. vi.). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ideae omnes in Deo sunt (per propositionem 15 partis I {1p15}) et quatenus ad  Deum referuntur, sunt verae (per propositionem 32 hujus {2p32}) et (per corollarium propositionis 7 hujus) adaequatae adeoque nullae inadaequatae nec confusae sunt nisi quatenus ad singularem alicujus mentem referuntur (qua de re vide propositiones 24 {2p24} et 28 {2p28} hujus) adeoque omnes tam adaequatae quam inadaequatae eadem necessitate (per corollarium propositionis 6 hujus {2p06c}) consequuntur. Q.E.D.
2p37 commune nullius essentiam	2p37 commune nullius essentiam [geomap]
PROP. XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II., above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any particular thing.	PROPOSITIO XXXVII: Id quod omnibus commune (de his vide supra lemma 2) quodque que in parte ac in toto est, nullius rei singularis essentiam constituit.
Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it constitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance, the essence of B. Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis. Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it constitute the essence of any particular thing. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si negas, concipe si fieri potest, id essentiam alicujus rei singularis constituere nempe essentiam B. Ergo (per definitionem 2 hujus {2d02}) id sine B non poterit esse neque concipi; atqui hoc est contra hypothesin : ergo id ad essentiam B non pertinet nec alterius rei singularis essentiam constituit. Q.E.D.
2p38 omnibus communia non concipi nisi adaequate	2p38 omnibus communia non concipi nisi adaequate [geomap]
PROP. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately.	PROPOSITIO XXXVIII: Illa quae omnibus communia quaeque que in parte ac in toto sunt, non possunt concipi nisi adaequate.
Proof.-Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the whole. I say A cannot be conceived except adequately. For the idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human body, and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part the nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies; that is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind. Therefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or any external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Sit A aliquid quod omnibus corporibus commune quodque que in parte cujuscunque corporis ac in toto est. Dico A non posse concipi nisi adaequate. Nam ejus idea (per corollarium propositionis 7 hujus {2p07c}) erit necessario in Deo adaequata tam quatenus ideam corporis humani quam quatenus ideas habet ejusdem affectionum quae (per propositiones 16 {2p16}, 25 {2p25} et 27 {2p27} hujus) tam corporis humani quam corporum externorum naturam ex parte involvunt hoc est (per propositiones 12 {2p12} et 13 {2p13} necessario in Deo adaequata quatenus mentem humanam constituit  sive [excl non-exh] quatenus ideas habet quae in mente humana sunt; mens igitur (per corollarium propositionis 11 {2p11c} hujus) A necessario adaequate percipit idque tam quatenus se quam quatenus suum vel [excl exh] quodcunque externum corpus percipit nec A alio modo potest concipi. Q.E.D.
2p38c dari quasdam ideas omnibus communes	2p38c dari quasdam ideas omnibus communes [geomap]
Corollary-Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.	COROLLARIUM {2p38}: Hinc sequitur dari quasdam ideas sive [mng eqv]   notiones omnibus hominibus communes. Nam (per lemma 2 {2L02}) omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt, quae (per propositionem praecedentem {2p38}) ab omnibus debent adaequate sive [mng eqv]   clare et distincte percipi.
2p39 corpori humano corporibus externis commune in mente adaequata	2p39 corpori humano corporibus externis commune in mente adaequata [geomap]
PROP. XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.	PROPOSITIO XXXIX: Id quod corpori humano et quibusdam corporibus externis a quibus corpus humanum affici solet, commune est et proprium quodque in cujuscunque horum parte que ac in toto est, ejus etiam idea erit in mente adaequata.
Proof.-If A be that, which is common to and a property of the human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of A in God (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given external bodies. Let it now be granted, that the human body is affected by an external body through that, which it has in common therewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification [Lat: affectiones] will involve the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the idea of this modification [Lat: affectiones], in so far as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi. Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Sit A id quod corpori humano et quibusdam corporibus externis commune est et proprium quodque que in humano corpore ac in iisdem corporibus externis et quod denique que in cujuscunque corporis externi parte ac in toto est. Ipsius A dabitur in Deo idea adaequata (per corollarium propositionis 7 hujus {2p07c}) tam quatenus ideam corporis humani quam quatenus positorum corporum externorum ideas habet. Ponatur jam humanum corpus a corpore externo affici per id quod cum eo habet commune hoc est ab A; hujus affectionis idea proprietatem A involvet (per propositionem 16 hujus {2p16}) atque adeo (per idem corollarium propositionis 7 hujus {2p07c}) idea hujus affectionis quatenus proprietatem A involvit, erit in Deo adaequata quatenus idea corporis humani affectus est hoc est (per propositionem 13 hujus) quatenus mentis humanae naturam constituit adeoque (per corollarium propositionis 11 {2p11c} hujus) haec idea est etiam in mente humana adaequata. Q.E.D.
2p39c plura adaequate percipiendum plura communia	2p39c plura adaequate percipiendum plura communia [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to perceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body has more in common with other bodies.	COROLLARIUM {2p39}: Hinc sequitur quod mens eo aptior est ad plura adaequate percipiendum quo ejus corpus plura habet cum aliis corporibus communia.
2p40 sequuntur adaequatae etiam	2p40 sequuntur adaequatae etiam [geomap]
PROP. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.	PROPOSITIO XL: Quaecunque ideae in mente sequuntur ex ideis quae in ipsa sunt adaequatae, sunt etiam adaequatae.
Proof.-This proposition is self-evident. For when we say that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet. Nam cum dicimus in mente humana ideam sequi ex ideis quae in ipsa sunt adaequatae, nihil aliud dicimus (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus {2p11}) quam quod in ipso divino intellectu detur idea cujus Deus est causa, non quatenus infinitus est nec quatenus plurimarum rerum singularium ideis affectus est sed quatenus tantum humanae mentis essentiam constituit.
2p40s1 aliae causae	2p40s1 aliae causae
Note I.-I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are ill-founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on which they are founded, and other points of interest connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this number of images, of which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human body, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body. It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so many controversies should have arisen.	SCHOLIUM I: His causam notionum quae communes vocantur quaeque ratiocinii nostri fundamenta sunt, explicui. Sed ali quorundam axiomatum sive notionum causae dantur quas hac nostra methodo explicare e re foret; ex iis namque constaret quaenam notiones prae reliquis utiliores, quaenam vero vix ullius usus essent. Deinde quaenam communes et quaenam iis tantum qui praejudiciis non laborant, clarae  et distinctae et quaenam denique male fundat sint. praeterea constaret unde notiones illae quas secundas vocant et consequenter axiomata quae in iisdem fundantur suam duxerunt originem et alia quae circa haec aliquando meditatus sum. Sed quoniam haec alii dicavi tractatui et etiam ne propter nimiam hujus rei prolixitatem fastidium crearem, hac re hic supersedere decrevi. Attamen ne quid horum omittam quod scitu necessarium sit, causas breviter addam ex quibus termini transcendentales dicti suam duxerunt originem ut Ens, Res, Aliquid. Hi termini ex hoc oriuntur quod scilicet humanum corpus quandoquidem limitatum est, tantum est capax certi imaginum numeri (quid imago sit explicui in scholio propositionis 17 hujus) in se distincte simul formandi, qui si excedatur, hae imagines confundi incipient et si hic imaginum numerus quarum corpus est capax ut eas in se simul distincte formet, longe excedatur, omnes inter se plane confundentur. Cum hoc ita se habeat, patet ex corollario propositionis 17 et propositione 18 hujus quod mens humana tot corpora distincte simul imaginari poterit quot in ipsius corpore imagines possunt simul formari. At ubi imagines in corpore plane confunduntur, mens etiam omnia corpora confuse sine ulla distinctione imaginabitur et quasi sub uno attributo comprehendet nempe sub attributo entis, rei etc. Potest hoc etiam ex eo deduci quod imagines non semper que vigeant et ex aliis causis his analogis quas hic explicare non est opus nam ad nostrum ad quem collimamus scopum, unam tantum sufficit considerare. Nam omnes huc redeunt quod hi termini ideas significent summo gradu confusas. Ex similibus deinde causis ort sunt notiones illae quas universales vocant ut Homo, Equus, Canis etc. videlicet quia in corpore humano tot imagines exempli gratia hominum formantur simul ut vim imaginandi, non quidem penitus sed eo usque tamen superent ut singulorum parvas differentias (videlicet uniuscujusque colorem, magnitudinem etc.) eorumque determinatum numerum mens imaginari nequeat et id tantum in quo omnes quatenus corpus ab iisdem afficitur, conveniunt, distincte imaginetur nam ab eo corpus maxime scilicet ab unoquoque singulari affectum fuit atque hoc nomine hominis exprimit hocque de infinitis singularibus praedicat. Nam singularium determinatum numerum ut diximus imaginari nequit. Sed notandum has notiones non ab omnibus eodem modo formari sed apud unumquemque variare pro ratione rei a qua corpus affectum spius fuit quamque facilius mens imaginatur vel recordatur. Exempli gratia qui spius cum admiratione hominum staturam contemplati sunt, sub nomine hominis intelligent animal erect statur; qui vero aliud assueti sunt contemplari, aliam hominum communem imaginem formabunt nempe hominem esse animal risibile, animal bipes sine plumis, animal rationale et sic de reliquis unusquisque pro dispositione sui corporis rerum universales imagines formabit. Quare non mirum est quod inter philosophos qui res naturales per solas rerum imagines explicare voluerunt, tot sint ort controversi.
2p40s2 percipere 1 sensus mutilate 2 signis 3 notiones communes	2p40s2 percipere 1 sensus mutilate 2 signis 3 notiones communes
Note II.-From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:-(1.) From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses (II. xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.[4] [4] A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n.] (2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things (II. xviii. note). I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. (3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll., xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof, or because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals. But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio, which the first bears to the second.	SCHOLIUM II: Ex omnibus supra dictis clare apparet nos multa percipere et notiones universales formare I ex singularibus nobis per sensus mutilate, confuse et sine ordine ad intellectum repraesentatis (vide corollarium propositionis 29 hujus) et ideo tales perceptiones cognitionem ab experientia vaga vocare consuevi. II ex signis exempli gratia ex eo quod auditis aut lectis quibusdam verbis rerum recordemur et earum quasdam ideas formemus similes iis per quas res imaginamur (vide scholium propositionis 18 hujus). Utrumque hunc res contemplandi modum cognitionem primi generis, opinionem vel imaginationem in posterum vocabo. III denique ex eo quod notiones communes rerumque proprietatum ideas adaequatas habemus (vide corollarium propositionis 38 et propositionem 39 cum ejus corollario et propositionem 40 hujus) atque hunc rationem et secundi generis cognitionem vocabo. praeter haec duo cognitionis genera datur, ut in sequentibus ostendam, aliud tertium quod scientiam intuitivam vocabimus. Atque hoc cognoscendi genus procedit ab adaequata idea essentiae formalis quorundam Dei attributorum ad adaequatam cognitionem essentiae rerum. Haec omnia unius rei exemplo explicabo. Dantur exempli gratia tres numeri ad quartum obtinendum qui sit ad tertium ut secundus ad primum. Non dubitant mercatores secundum in tertium ducere et productum per primum dividere quia scilicet ea quae a magistro absque ulla demonstratione audiverunt, nondum tradiderunt oblivioni vel quia id spe in numeris simplicissimis experti sunt vel ex vi demonstrationis propositionis 19 libri 7 Euclidis nempe ex communi proprietate proportionalium. At in numeris simplicissimis nihil horum opus est. Exempli gratia datis numeris 1, 2, 3, nemo non videt quartum numerum proportionalem esse 6 atque hoc multo clarius quia ex ipsa ratione quam primum ad secundum habere uno intuitu videmus, ipsum quartum concludimus.
2p41 primi generis falsitatis, secundi tertii vera	2p41 primi generis falsitatis, secundi tertii vera [geomap]
PROP. XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.	PROPOSITIO XLI: Cognitio primi generis unica est falsitatis causa, secundi autem et tertii est necessario vera.
Proof.-To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity (II. xxxv.). Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II. xxxiv.). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ad primi generis cognitionem illas omnes ideas diximus in praecedenti scholio {non-deductive reference} pertinere quae sunt inadaequatae et confusae atque adeo (per propositionem 35 hujus {2p35}) haec cognitio unica est falsitatis causa. Deinde ad cognitionem secundi et tertii illas pertinere diximus quae sunt adaequatae adeoque (per propositionem 34 hujus {2p34}) est necessario vera. Q.E.D.
2p42 Secundi  tertii non primi verum falso distinguere.	2p42 Secundi  tertii non primi verum falso distinguere [geomap]
PROP. XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.	PROPOSITIO XLII: Secundi et tertii et non primi generis cognitio docet nos verum a falso distinguere.
Proof.-This proposition is self-evident. He, who knows how to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea of true and false. That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.	DEMONSTRATIO: Haec propositio per se patet. Qui enim inter verum et falsum scit distinguere, debet adaequatam veri et falsi habere ideam hoc est (per II scholium propositionis 40 hujus {non-deductive reference}) verum et falsum secundo aut [non-excl non-exh] tertio cognitionis genere cognoscere.
2p43 veram habet simul scit	2p43 veram habet simul scit [geomap]
PROP. XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived.	PROPOSITIO XLIII: Qui veram habet ideam, simul scit se veram habere ideam nec de rei veritate potest dubitare.
Proof.-A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God, in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind (II. xi. Coroll.). Let us suppose that there is in God, in so far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea, A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx., whereof the proof is of universal application). But the idea A is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed through the human mind; therefore, the idea of the idea A must be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind, which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an adequate idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that is, obviously, he must be assured. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Idea vera in nobis est illa quae in Deo quatenus per naturam mentis humanae explicatur, est adaequata (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus {2p11c}). Ponamus itaque dari in Deo quatenus per naturam mentis humanae explicatur, ideam adaequatam A. Hujus ideae debet necessario dari etiam in Deo idea quae ad Deum eodem modo refertur ac idea A (per propositionem 20 hujus {2p20} cujus demonstratio universalis est). At idea A ad Deum referri supponitur quatenus per naturam mentis humanae explicatur; ergo etiam idea ideae A ad Deum eodem modo debet referri hoc est (per idem corollarium propositionis 11 hujus {2p11c}) haec adaequata idea ideae A erit in ipsa mente quae ideam adaequatam A habet adeoque qui adaequatam habet ideam sive [prf eqv]  (per propositionem 34 hujus {2p34}) qui vere rem cognoscit, debet simul suae cognitionis adaequatam habere ideam sive [prf eqv]  veram cognitionem hoc est (ut per se manifestum) debet simul esse certus. Q.E.D.
2p43s praecedentem propositionem manifestam	2p43s praecedentem propositionem manifestam
Note.-I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one, indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of thinking-namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do first understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a standard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity. I think I have thus sufficiently answered these questions-namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea (since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark); consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure, that he has ideas which agree with their objects? These questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea is plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to the latter as being is to not-being. The causes of falsity I have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the note. From what is there stated, the difference between a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made apparent. As for the last question-as to how a man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with its object-in other words, that truth is its own standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.	SCHOLIUM: In scholio propositionis 21 hujus partis explicui quid sit idea ideae sed notandum praecedentem propositionem per se satis esse manifestam. Nam nemo qui veram habet ideam, ignorat veram ideam summam certitudinem involvere; veram namque habere ideam nihil aliud significat quam perfecte sive optime rem cognoscere nec sane aliquis de hac re dubitare potest nisi putet ideam quid mutum instar picturae in tabula et non modum cogitandi esse nempe ipsum intelligere et quaeso quis scire potest se rem aliquam intelligere nisi prius rem intelligat? hoc est quis potest scire se de aliqua re certum esse nisi prius de ea re certus sit? Deinde quid idea vera clarius et certius dari potest quod norma sit veritatis? Sane sicut lux seipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est. Atque his me ad has qustiones respondisse puto nempe si idea vera quatenus tantum dicitur cum suo ideato convenire, a falsa distinguitur, nihil ergo realitatis aut perfectionis idea vera habet prae falsa (quandoquidem per solam denominationem extrinsecam distinguuntur) et consequenter neque etiam homo qui veras prae illo qui falsas tantum ideas habet? Deinde unde fit ut homines falsas habeant ideas? Et denique unde aliquis certo scire potest se ideas habere quae cum suis ideatis conveniant? Ad has inquam qustiones me jam respondisse puto. Nam quod ad differentiam inter ideam veram et falsam attinet, constat ex propositione 35 hujus illam ad hanc sese habere ut ens ad non-ens. Falsitatis autem causas a propositione 19 usque ad 35 cum ejus scholio clarissime ostendi. Ex quibus etiam apparet quid homo qui veras habet ideas, homini qui non nisi falsas habet, intersit. Quod denique ultimum attinet nempe undenam homo scire potest se habere ideam quae cum suo ideato conveniat, id modo satis superque ostendi ex hoc solo oriri quod ideam habet quae cum suo ideato convenit sive quod veritas sui sit norma. His adde quod mens nostra quatenus res vere percipit, pars est infiniti Dei intellectus (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) adeoque tam necesse est ut mentis clarae  et distinctae ideae verae sint ac Dei ide.
2p44 natura rationis necessarias	2p44 natura rationis necessarias [geomap]
PROP. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary.	PROPOSITIO XLIV: De natura rationis non est res ut contingentes sed ut necessarias contemplari.
Proof.-It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves-that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: De natura rationis est res vere percipere (per propositionem 41 hujus {2p41}) nempe (per axioma 6 partis I {1a06}) ut in se sunt hoc est (per propositionem 29 partis I {1p29}) non ut contingentes sed ut necessarias. Q.E.D.
2p44c1 sola imaginatione contingentes	2p44c1 sola imaginatione contingentes [geomap]
Corollary I.-Hence it follows, that it is only through our imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the future or the past, as contingent.	COROLLARIUM {2p44} I: Hinc sequitur a sola imaginatione pendere quod res tam respectu praeteriti quam [excl non-exh] futuri ut contingentes contemplemur.
2p44s ratione hoc fiat	2p44s ratione hoc fiat
Note.-How this way of looking at things arises, I will briefly explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.) that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which exclude their existence and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway remember the other-that is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that today he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon-that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past time. If it should at any time happen, that on some other evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, not both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and, with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one, then the other-that is, he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time present, past, or future.	SCHOLIUM: Qua autem ratione hoc fiat paucis explicabo. Ostendimus supra (propositione 17 hujus cum ejus corollario) mentem, quamvis res non existant, eas tamen semper ut sibi praesentes imaginari nisi causae occurrant quae earum praesentem existentiam secludant. Deinde (propositione 18 hujus) ostendimus quod si corpus humanum semel a duobus corporibus externis simul affectum fuit, ubi mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginabitur, statim et alterius recordabitur hoc est ambo ut sibi praesentia contemplabitur nisi causae occurrant quae eorum praesentem existentiam secludant. praeterea nemo dubitat quin etiam tempus imaginemur nempe ex eo quod corpora alia aliis tardius vel celerius vel que celeriter moveri imaginemur. Ponamus itaque puerum qui heri prima vice hora matutina viderit Petrum, meridiana autem Paulum et vespertina Simeonem atque hodie iterum matutina hora Petrum. Ex propositione 18 hujus patet quod simulac matutinam lucem videt, illico solem eandem cli quam die praecedenti viderit partem percurrentem sive diem integrum et simul cum tempore matutino Petrum, cum meridiano autem Paulum et cum vespertino Simeonem imaginabitur hoc est Pauli et Simeonis existentiam cum relatione ad futurum tempus imaginabitur et contra si hora vespertina Simeonem videat, Paulum et Petrum ad tempus praeteritum referet, eosdem scilicet simul cum tempore praeterito imaginando atque haec eo constantius quo spius eos eodem hoc ordine viderit. Quod si aliquando contingat ut alia quadam vespera loco Simeonis Jacobum videat, tum sequenti mane cum tempore vespertino jam Simeonem jam Jacobum, non vero ambos simul imaginabitur. Nam alterutrum tantum, non autem ambos simul tempore vespertino vidisse supponitur. Fluctuabitur itaque ejus imaginatio et cum futuro tempore vespertino jam hunc jam illum imaginabitur hoc est neutrum certo sed utrumque contingenter futurum contemplabitur. Atque haec imaginationis fluctuatio eadem erit si imaginatio rerum sit quas eodem modo cum relatione ad tempus praeteritum vel praesens contemplamur et consequenter res tam ad tempus praesens quam ad praeteritum vel futurum relatas ut contingentes imaginabimur.
2p44c2 aeternitatis specie	2p44c2 aeternitatis specie [geomap]
Corollary II.-It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity (sub quadam aeternitatis specie).	COROLLARIUM  {2p44} II: De natura rationis est res sub quadam aeternitatis specie percipere.
Proof.-It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives this necessity of things (II. xli.) truly-that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it is in itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II. xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II. xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity.	DEMONSTRATIO: De natura enim rationis est res ut necessarias et non ut contingentes contemplari (per propositionem praecedentem {2p44}). Hanc autem rerum necessitatem (per propositionem 41 hujus {2p41}) vere hoc est (per axioma 6 partis I {1a06}) ut in se est, percipit. Sed (per propositionem 16 partis I {1p16}) haec rerum necessitas est ipsa Dei aeternae naturae necessitas; ergo de natura rationis est res sub hac aeternitatis specie contemplari. Adde quod fundamenta rationis notiones sint (per propositionem 38 hujus {2p38}) quae illa explicant quae omnibus communia sunt quque (per propositionem 37 hujus {2p37}) nullius rei singularis essentiam explicant quque propterea absque ulla temporis relatione sed sub quadam aeternitatis specie debent concipi. Q.E.D.
2p45 Unaquque idea Dei involvit	2p45 Unaquque idea Dei involvit [geomap]
PROP. XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.	PROPOSITIO XLV: Unaquaeque cujuscunque corporis vel [mng eqv] rei singularis actu existentis idea Dei aeternam et infinitam essentiam necessario involvit.
Proof.-The idea of a particular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the said thing (II. viii.). Now particular things cannot be conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the attributes of those ideas-that is (I. vi.), the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Idea rei singularis actu existentis ipsius rei tam essentiam quam existentiam necessario involvit (per corollarium propositionis 8 hujus {2p08c}). At res singularis (per propositionem 15 partis I {1p15}) non possunt sine Deo concipi sed quia (per propositionem 6 hujus {2p06}) Deum pro causa habent quatenus sub attributo consideratur cujus res ipsae modi sunt, debent necessario earum ideae (per axioma 4 partis I {1a04}) ipsarum attributi conceptum hoc est (per definitionem 6 partis I {1d06}) Dei aeternam et infinitam essentiam involvere. Q.E.D.
2p45s per existentiam intelligo	2p45s per existentiam intelligo
Note.-By existence I do not here mean duration-that is, existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat, of the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).	SCHOLIUM: Hic per existentiam non intelligo durationem hoc est existentiam quatenus abstracte concipitur et tanquam quaedam quantitatis species. Nam loquor de ipsa natura existenti quae rebus singularibus tribuitur propterea quod ex aeterna necessitate Dei naturae infinita infinitis modis sequuntur (vide propositionem 16 partis I). Loquor inquam de ipsa existentia rerum singularium quatenus in Deo sunt. Nam etsi unaquque ab alia re singulari determinetur ad certo modo existendum, vis tamen qua unaquque in existendo perseverat, ex aeterna necessitate naturae Dei sequitur. Qua de re vide corollarium propositionis 24 partis I.
2p46 Cognitio essentiae Dei adaequata perfecta	2p46 Cognitio essentiae Dei adaequata perfecta [geomap]
PROP. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.	PROPOSITIO XLVI: Cognitio aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei quam unaquaeque idea involvit, est adaequata et perfecta.
Proof.-The proof of the last proposition is universal; and whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.), will involve God's eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore, that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Demonstratio praecedentis propositionis universalis est et sive [excl exh] res ut pars  sive [excl exh] ut totum consideretur, ejus idea sive [excl exh] totius sit  sive [excl exh] partis (per propositionem praecedentem {2p45}) Dei aeternam et infinitam essentiam involvet. Quare id quod cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei dat, omnibus commune et que in parte ac in toto est adeoque (per propositionem 38 hujus {2p38}) erit haec cognitio adaequata. Q.E.D.
2p47 Mens adaequatam cognitionem Dei	2p47 Mens adaequatam cognitionem Dei [geomap]
PROP. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.	PROPOSITIO XLVII : Mens humana adaequatam habet cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei.
Proof.-The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II. xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mens humana ideas habet (per propositionem 22 hujus {2p22}) ex quibus (per propositionem 23 hujus {2p23}) se suumque corpus (per propositionem 19 hujus) {2p19} et (per corollarium I propositionis 16 {2p16c1} et per propositionem 17 hujus  {2p17}) corpora externa ut actu existentia percipit adeoque (per propositiones 45  {2p45} et 46 hujus {2p46}) cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei habet adaequatam. Q.E.D.
2p47s tertium illud cognitionis genus	2p47s tertium illud cognitionis genus
Note.-Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God, and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl., and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the name God with images of things that they are in the habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they are, men, and continually affected by external bodies. Many errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do not apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and another on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the paper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear. Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret the meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in their opponents.	SCHOLIUM: Hinc videmus Dei infinitam essentiam ejusque aeternitatem omnibus esse notam. Cum autem omnia in Deo sint et per Deum concipiantur, sequitur nos ex cognitione hac plurima posse deducere quae adaequate cognoscamus atque adeo tertium illud cognitionis genus formare de quo diximus in scholio II propositionis 40 hujus partis et de cujus praestantia et utilitate in quinta parte erit nobis dicendi locus. Quod autem homines non que claram Dei ac notionum communium habeant cognitionem, inde fit quod Deum imaginari nequeant ut corpora et quod nomen "Deus" junxerunt imaginibus rerum quas videre solent; quod homines vix vitare possunt quia continuo a corporibus externis afficiuntur. Et profecto plerique errores in hoc solo consistunt quod scilicet nomina rebus non recte applicamus. Cum enim aliquis ait lineas quae ex centro circuli ad ejusdem circumferentiam ducuntur esse inquales, ille sane aliud tum saltem per circulum intelligit quam mathematici. Sic cum homines in calculo errant, alios numeros in mente, alios in charta habent. Quare si ipsorum mentem spectes, non errant sane; videntur tamen errare quia ipsos in mente putamus habere numeros qui in charta sunt. Si hoc non esset, nihil eosdem errare crederemus; ut non credidi quendam errare quem nuper audivi clamantem suum atrium volasse in gallinam vicini quia scilicet ipsius mens satis perspecta mihi videbatur. Atque hinc plerque oriuntur controversi nempe quia homines mentem suam non recte explicant vel quia alterius mentem male interpretantur. Nam revera dum sibi maxime contradicunt, vel eadem vel diversa cogitant ita ut quos in alio errores et absurda esse putant, non sint.
2p48 In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas	2p48 In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas [geomap]
PROP. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity.	PROPOSITIO XLVIII: In mente nulla est absoluta sive [mng eqv]  libera voluntas sed mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa quae etiam ab alia determinata est et haec iterum ab alia et sic in infinitum.
Proof.-The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II. xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I. xvii. Coroll. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mens certus et determinatus modus cogitandi est (per propositionem 11 hujus {2p11}) adeoque (per corollarium II propositionis 17 partis I {1p17c2}) suarum actionum non potest esse causa libera sive [mng eqv]  absolutam facultatem volendi et nolendi habere non potest sed ad hoc vel illud volendum (per propositionem 28 partis I {1p28}) determinari debet a causa quae etiam ab alia determinata est et haec iterum ab alia etc. Q.E.D.
2p48s nullam dari facultatem absolutam intelligendi, cupiendi, amandi etc.	2p48s nullam dari facultatem absolutam intelligendi, cupiendi, amandi etc.
Note.-In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c. Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms, such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things. Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul. The cause which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in the Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed further, I would here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing. After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves. On which subject see the following proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should suggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.	SCHOLIUM: Eodem hoc modo demonstratur in mente nullam dari facultatem absolutam intelligendi, cupiendi, amandi etc. Unde sequitur has et similes facultates vel prorsus fictitias vel nihil esse praeter entia metaphysica vel universalia quae ex particularibus formare solemus. Adeo ut intellectus et voluntas ad hanc et illam ideam vel ad hanc et illam volitionem eodem modo sese habeant ac lapideitas ad hunc et illum lapidem vel ut homo ad Petrum et Paulum. Causam autem cur homines se liberos esse putent explicuimus in appendice partis prim. Verum antequam ulterius pergam, venit hic notandum me per voluntatem affirmandi et negandi facultatem, non autem cupiditatem intelligere; facultatem inquam intelligo qua mens quid verum quidve falsum sit, affirmat vel negat et non cupiditatem qua mens res appetit vel aversatur. At postquam demonstravimus has facultates notiones esse universales quae a singularibus ex quibus easdem formamus, non distinguuntur, inquirendum jam est an ips volitiones aliquid sint praeter ipsas rerum ideas. Inquirendum inquam est an in mente alia affirmatio et negatio detur praeter illam quam idea quatenus idea est, involvit, qua de re vide sequentem propositionem ut et demonstrationem 3 hujus ne cogitatio in picturas incidat. Non enim per ideas imagines quales in fundo oculi et si placet, in medio cerebro formantur sed cogitationis conceptus intelligo.
2p49 volitio idea involvit	2p49 volitio idea involvit [geomap]
PROP. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves.	PROPOSITIO XLIX: In mente nulla datur volitio sive [mng eqv]  affirmatio et negatio praeter illam quam idea quatenus idea est, involvit.
Proof.-There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let us conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further, this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea of a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore, and vice versae, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing besides. What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: In mente (per propositionem praecedentem) nulla datur absoluta facultas volendi et volendi sed tantum singulares volitiones nempe haec et illa affirmatio et haec et illa negatio. Concipiamus itaque singularem aliquam volitionem nempe modum cogitandi quo mens affirmat tres angulos trianguli quales esse duobus rectis. Haec affirmatio conceptum sive [mng eqv]  ideam trianguli involvit hoc est sine idea trianguli non potest concipi. Idem enim est si dicam quod A conceptum B debeat involvere ac quod A sine B non possit concipi. Deinde haec affirmatio (per axioma 3 hujus {2a1.3}) non potest etiam sine idea trianguli esse. Haec ergo affirmatio sine idea trianguli nec esse nec concipi potest. Porro haec trianguli idea hanc eandem affirmationem involvere debet nempe quod tres ejus anguli quentur duobus rectis. Quare et vice versa haec trianguli idea sine hac affirmatione nec esse nec concipi potest adeoque (per definitionem 2 hujus {2d02}) haec affirmatio ad essentiam ideae trianguli pertinet nec aliud praeter ipsam est. Et quod de hac volitione diximus (quandoquidem eam ad libitum sumpsimus) dicendum etiam est de quacunque volitione nempe quod praeter ideam nihil sit. Q.E.D.
2p49c Voluntas intellectus idem	2p49c Voluntas intellectus idem [geomap]
Corollary.-Will and understanding are one and the same.	COROLLARIUM {2p49}: Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt.
Proof.-Will and understanding are nothing beyond the individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note). But a particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are one and the same. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Voluntas et intellectus nihil praeter ipsas singulares volitiones et ideas sunt (per propositionem 48 hujus {2p48} et ejusdem scholium {non-deductive reference}). At singularis volitio et idea (per propositionem praecedentem {2p49}) unum et idem sunt, ergo voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt. Q.E.D.
2p49s certitudinem non involvit in falsis acquiescere	2p49s certitudinem non involvit in falsis acquiescere
Note.-We have thus removed the cause which is commonly assigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea, inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note). Thus, although the man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say that he is certain. For by certainty we mean something positive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt. However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple, I have thought it worth while to point out some of the advantages, which follow therefrom. I say "some," for they will be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth part.	SCHOLIUM: His causam quae communiter erroris esse statuitur, sustulimus. Supra autem ostendimus falsitatem in sola privatione quam ideae mutilat et confusae involvunt, consistere. Quare idea falsa quatenus falsa est, certitudinem non involvit. Cum itaque dicimus hominem in falsis acquiescere nec de iis dubitare, non ideo ipsum certum esse sed tantum non dubitare dicimus vel quod in falsis acquiescit quia null causae dantur quae efficiant ut ipsius imaginatio fluctuetur. Qua de re vide scholium propositionis 44 hujus partis. Quantumvis igitur homo falsis adhrere supponatur, nunquam tamen ipsum certum esse dicemus. Nam per certitudinem quid positivum intelligimus (vide propositionem 43 hujus cum ejusdem scholio) non vero dubitationis privationem. At per certitudinis privationem falsitatem intelligimus. Sed ad uberiorem explicationem praecedentis propositionis quaedam monenda supersunt. Superest deinde ut ad objectiones quae in nostram hanc doctrinam objici possunt, respondeam et denique ut omnem amoveam scrupulum, operae pretium esse duxi hujus doctrin quasdam utilitates indicare. Quasdam inquam nam praecipu ex iis quae in quinta parte dicemus, melius intelligentur.
I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words, whereby we signify things. These three-namely, images, words, and ideas-are by many persons either entirely confused together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care, and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no wise involve the conception of thought.	Incipio igitur a primo lectoresque moneo ut accurate distinguant inter ideam sive mentis conceptum et inter imagines rerum quas imaginamur. Deinde necesse est ut distinguant inter ideas et verba quibus res significamus. Nam quia haec tria, imagines scilicet verba et ide, a multis vel plane confunduntur vel non satis accurate vel denique non satis caute distinguuntur, ideo hanc de voluntate doctrinam scitu prorsus necessariam tam ad speculationem quam ad vitam sapienter instituendam plane ignorarunt. Quippe qui putant ideas consistere in imaginibus quae in nobis ex corporum occur su formantur, sibi persuadent ideas illas rerum quarum similem nullam imaginem formare possumus, non esse ideas sed tantum figmenta quae ex libero voluntatis arbitrio fingimus; ideas igitur veluti picturas in tabula mutas aspiciunt et hoc praejudicio proccupati non vident ideam quatenus idea est, affirmationem aut negationem involvere. Deinde qui verba confundunt cum idea vel cum ipsa affirmatione quam idea involvit, putant se posse contra id quod sentiunt velle quando aliquid solis verbis contra id quod sentiunt affirmant aut negant. Haec autem praejudicia exuere facile is poterit qui ad naturam cogitationis attendit, quae extensionis conceptum minime involvit atque adeo clare intelliget ideam (quandoquidem modus cogitandi est) neque in rei alicujus imagine neque in verbis consistere. Verborum namque et imaginum essentia a solis motibus corporeis constituitur, qui cogitationis conceptum minime involvunt.
These few words on this subject will suffice: I will therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised against our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those, who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and that therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their faculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite. Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents	Atque haec pauca de his monuisse sufficiat, quare ad praedictas objectiones transeo. Harum prima est quod constare putant voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum atque adeo ab eodem diversam esse. Ratio autem cur putant voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum est quia se experiri aiunt se non majore assentiendi sive affirmandi et negandi facultate indigere ad infinitis aliis rebus quas non percipimus, assentiendum quam jam habemus, at quidem majore facultate intelligendi. Distinguitur ergo voluntas ab intellectu quod finitus hic sit, illa autem infinita. Secundo nobis objici potest quod experientia nihil clarius videatur docere quam quod nostrum judicium possumus suspendere ne rebus quas percipimus, assentiamur; quod hinc etiam confirmatur quod nemo dicitur decipi quatenus aliquid percipit sed tantum quatenus assentitur aut dissentitur.
For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist. Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for affirming, that what is false is true. We have, however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and the will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would, I shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather than an actual man. If I say that he would not, he would then determine his own action, and would consequently possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible.	Exempli gratia qui equum alatum fingit, non ideo concedit dari equum alatum hoc est non ideo decipitur nisi simul concedat dari equum alatum; nihil igitur clarius videtur docere experientia quam quod voluntas sive facultas assentiendi libera sit et a facultate intelligendi diversa. Tertio objici potest quod una affirmatio non plus realitatis videtur continere quam alia hoc est non majore potentia indigere videmur ad affirmandum verum esse id quod verum est, quam ad aliquid quod falsum est, verum esse affirmandum; at unam ideam plus realitatis sive perfectionis quam aliam habere percipimus; quantum enim objecta alia aliis praestantiora tantum etiam eorum ideae ali aliis perfectiores sunt; ex quibus etiam constare videtur differentia inter voluntatem et intellectum. Quarto objici potest si homo non operatur ex libertate voluntatis, quid ergo fiet si in quilibrio sit ut Buridani asina? Famene et siti peribit? Quod si concedam, viderer asinam vel hominis statuam, non hominem concipere; si autem negem, ergo seipsum determinabit et consequenter eundi facultatem et faciendi quicquid velit, habet. praeter haec alia forsan possunt objici sed quia inculcare non teneor quid unusquisque somniare potest, ad has objectiones tantum respondere curabo idque quam potero breviter.
To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling: for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer, that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor, consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities. We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all particular volitions-in other words, that which is common to all such volitions. As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an infinite number of individuals.	Et quidem ad primam dico me concedere voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum si per intellectum claras tantummodo et distinctas ideas intelligant sed nego voluntatem latius se extendere quam perceptiones sive concipiendi facultatem nec sane video cur facultas volendi potius dicenda est infinita quam sentiendi facultas; sicut enim infinita (unum tamen post aliud nam infinita simul affirmare non possumus) eadem volendi facultate possumus affirmare, sic etiam infinita corpora (unum nempe post aliud) eadem sentiendi facultate possumus sentire sive percipere. Quod si dicant infinita dari quae percipere non possumus? regero nos ea ipsa nulla cogitatione et consequenter nulla volendi facultate posse assequi. At dicunt si Deus vellet efficere ut ea etiam perciperemus, majorem quidem facultatem percipiendi deberet nobis dare sed non majorem quam dedit volendi facultatem; quod idem est ac si dicerent quod si Deus velit efficere ut infinita alia entia intelligeremus, necesse quidem esset ut nobis daret majorem intellectum sed non universaliorem entis ideam quam dedit ad eadem infinita entia amplectendum. Ostendimus enim voluntatem ens esse universale sive ideam qua omnes singulares volitiones hoc est id quod iis omnibus commune est, explicamus. Cum itaque hanc omnium volitionum communem sive universalem ideam facultatem esse credant, minime mirum si hanc facultatem ultra limites intellectus in infinitum se extendere dicant. Universale enim que de uno ac de pluribus ac de infinitis individuis dicitur.
To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does not perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing else. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof. We have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming. Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual perception extends-that is, I grant that the mind's imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II. xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of perception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject.	Ad secundam objectionem respondeo negando nos liberam habere potestatem judicium suspendendi. Nam cum dicimus aliquem judicium suspendere, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod videt se rem non adaequate percipere. Est igitur judicii suspensio revera perceptio et non libera voluntas. Quod ut clare intelligatur, concipiamus puerum equum alatum imaginantem nec aliud quicquam percipientem. Quandoquidem haec imaginatio equi existentiam involvit (per corollarium propositionis 17 hujus) nec puer quicquam percipit quod equi existentiam tollat, ille necessario equum ut praesentem contemplabitur nec de ejus existentia poterit dubitare quamvis de eadem non sit certus. Atque hoc quotidie in somnis experimur nec credo aliquem esse qui putet se, dum somniat, liberam habere potestatem suspendendi de iis quae somniat, judicium efficiendique ut ea quae se videre somniat, non somniet et nihilominus contingit ut etiam in somnis judicium suspendamus nempe cum somniamus nos somniare. Porro concedo neminem decipi quatenus percipit hoc est mentis imaginationes in se consideratas nihil erroris involvere concedo (vide scholium propositionis 17 hujus) sed nego hominem nihil affirmare quatenus percipit. Nam quid aliud est equum alatum percipere quam alas de equo affirmare? Si enim mens praeter equum alatum nihil aliud perciperet, eundem sibi praesentem contemplaretur nec causam haberet ullam dubitandi de ejusdem existentia nec ullam dissentiendi facultatem nisi imaginatio equi alati juncta sit ideae quae existentiam ejusdem equi tollit vel quod percipit ideam equi alati quam habet esse inadaequatam atque tum vel ejusdem equi existentiam necessario negabit vel de eadem necessario dubitabit.
I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's essence: for, in this respect, particular affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. For instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle. Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and to affirm that that which is false is true. These two affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to one another as being and not-being; for there is nothing positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note). We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason and abstractions with realities.	Atque his puto me ad tertiam etiam objectionem respondisse nempe quod voluntas universale quid sit quod de omnibus ideis praedicatur quodque id tantum significat quod omnibus ideis commune est nempe affirmationem. Cujus propterea adaequata essentia quatenus sic abstracte concipitur, debet esse in unaquaque idea et hac ratione tantum in omnibus eadem sed non quatenus consideratur essentiam ideae constituere nam eatenus singulares affirmationes que inter se differunt ac ips ide. Exempli gratia affirmatio quam idea circuli ab illa quam idea trianguli involvit que differt ac idea circuli ab idea trianguli. Deinde absolute nego nos quali cogitandi potentia indigere ad affirmandum verum esse id quod verum est quam ad affirmandum verum esse id quod falsum est. Nam hae duae affirmationes, si mentem spectes, se habent ad invicem ut ens ad non-ens; nihil enim in ideis positivum est quod falsitatis formam constituit (vide propositionem 35 hujus cum ejus scholio et scholium propositionis 47 hujus). Quare hic apprime venit notandum quam facile decipimur quando universalia cum singularibus, et entia rationis et abstracta cum realibus confundimus.
As for the fourth objection, I am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from him) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider children, fools, madmen, &c. It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered from what has been said. The doctrine is good, 1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.	Quod denique ad quartam objectionem attinet, dico me omnino concedere quod homo in tali quilibrio positus (nempe qui nihil aliud percipit quam sitim et famem, talem cibum et talem potum qui que ab eo distant) fame et siti peribit. Si me rogant an talis homo non potius asinus quam homo sit stimandus? dico me nescire ut etiam nescio quanti stimandus sit ille qui se pensilem facit et quanti stimandi sint pueri, stulti, vesani, etc. Superest tandem indicare quantum hujus doctrin cognitio ad usum vit conferat, quod facile ex his animadvertemus. Nempe I quatenus docet nos ex solo Dei nutu agere divinque naturae esse participes et eo magis quo perfectiores actiones agimus et quo magis magisque Deum intelligimus. Haec ergo doctrina praeterquam quod animum omnimode quietum reddit, hoc etiam habet quod nos docet in quo nostra summa felicitas sive beatitudo consistit nempe in sola Dei cognitione ex qua ad ea tantum agenda inducimur quae amor et pietas suadent. Unde clare intelligimus quantum illi a vera virtutis stimatione aberrant qui pro virtute et optimis actionibus tanquam pro summa servitute, summis prmiis a Deo decorari exspectant quasi ipsa virtus Deique servitus non esset ipsa felicitas et summa libertas.
2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles. 3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as I will show in Part III. 4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best. I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a close. I think I have therein explained the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and, considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient clearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.	II quatenus docet quomodo circa res fortun sive quae in nostra potestate non sunt hoc est circa res quae ex nostra natura non sequuntur, nos gerere debeamus nempe utramque fortun faciem quo animo exspectare et ferre : nimirum quia omnia ab aeterno Dei decreto eadem necessitate sequuntur ac ex essentia trianguli sequitur quod tres ejus anguli sunt quales duobus rectis. III Confert haec doctrina ad vitam socialem quatenus docet neminem odio habere, contemnere, irridere, nemini irasci, invidere. praeterea quatenus docet ut unusquisque suis sit contentus et proximo auxilio, non ex muliebri misericordia, partialitate neque superstitione sed ex solo rationis ductu prout scilicet tempus et res postulat ut in quarta parte ostendam. IV Denique confert etiam haec doctrina non parum ad communem societatem quatenus docet qua ratione cives gubernandi sint et ducendi nempe non ut serviant sed ut libere ea quae optima sunt, agant. Atque his quae in hoc scholio agere constitueram, absolvi et eo finem huic nostrae secund parti impono in qua puto me naturam mentis humanae ejusque proprietates satis prolixe et quantum rei difficultas fert, clare explicuisse atque talia tradidisse ex quibus multa praeclara, maxime utilia et cognitu necessaria concludi possunt, ut partim ex sequentibus constabit.
	Finis secund partis
SPINOZAE ETHICA ORDINE GEOMETRICO DEMONSTRATA ET IN QUINQUE PARTES DISTINCTA PART III: ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS	SPINOZAE ETHICA ORDINE GEOMETRICO DEMONSTRATA ET IN QUINQUE PARTES DISTINCTA PARS TERTIA: DE ORIGINE ET NATURA AFFECTUUM
3praef ORIGINE NATURA AFFECTUUM	3praef ORIGINE NATURA AFFECTUUM
Preface	PRAEFATIO
Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked upon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted), who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one, so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their restraint.	Plerique qui de affectibus et hominum vivendi ratione scripserunt, videntur non de rebus naturalibus quae communes naturae leges sequuntur sed de rebus quae extra naturam sunt, agere. Imo hominem in natura veluti imperium in imperio concipere videntur. Nam hominem naturae ordinem magis perturbare quam sequi ipsumque in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam nec aliunde quam a se ipso determinari credunt. humanae deinde impotenti et inconstanti causam non communi naturae potenti sed nescio cui naturae humanae vitio tribuunt quam propterea flent, rident, contemnunt vel quod plerumque fit, detestantur et qui humanae mentis impotentiam eloquentius vel argutius carpere novit, veluti divinus habetur. Non defuerunt tamen viri praestantissimi (quorum labori et industri nos multum debere fatemur) qui de recta vivendi ratione praeclara multa scripserint et plena prudenti consilia mortalibus dederint; verum affectuum naturam et vires et quid contra mens in iisdem moderandis possit, nemo quod sciam determinavit.
I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions, strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion, he accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will show in the proper place. For the present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or deride human emotions than understand them. Such persons will, doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful.	Scio equidem celeberrimum Cartesium, licet etiam crediderit mentem in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam, affectus tamen humanos per primas suas causas explicare simulque viam ostendere studuisse qua mens in affectus absolutum habere possit imperium sed mea quidem sententia nihil praeter magni sui ingenii acumen ostendit, ut suo loco demonstrabo. Nam ad illos revertere volo qui hominum affectus et actiones detestari vel ridere malunt quam intelligere. His sine dubio mirum videbitur quod hominum vitia et ineptias more geometrico tractare aggrediar et certa ratione demonstrare velim ea quae rationi repugnare quque vana, absurda et horrenda esse clamitant.
However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action; that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's universal laws and rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the mind. I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids.	Sed mea haec est ratio. Nihil in natura fit quod ipsius vitio possit tribui; est namque natura semper eadem et ubique una eademque ejus virtus et agendi potentia hoc est naturae leges et regul secundum quas omnia fiunt et ex unis formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper edem atque adeo una eademque etiam debet esse ratio rerum qualiumcunque naturam intelligendi nempe per leges et regulas naturae universales. Affectus itaque odii, ir, invidi etc. in se considerati ex eadem naturae necessitate et virtute consequuntur ac reliqua singularia ac proinde certas causas agnoscunt per quas intelliguntur certasque proprietates habent cognitione nostra que dignas ac proprietates cujuscunque alterius rei cujus sola contemplatione delectamur. De affectuum itaque natura et viribus ac mentis in eosdem potentia eadem methodo agam qua in praecedentibus de Deo et mente egi et humanas actiones atque appetitus considerabo perinde ac si qustio de lineis, planis aut de corporibus esset.
DEFINITIONS	DEFINITIONES [about definitions]
3d01 (causa) adaequata^inadaequata, partiale	3d01 (causa) adaequata^inadaequata, partiale  [notes] [geomap]
I. By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an inadequate or partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its effect cannot be understood.	I. Causam adaequatam appello eam cujus effectus potest clare et distincte per eandem percipi. Inadaequatam autem seu [mng eqv] partialem illam voco cujus effectus per ipsam solam intelligi nequit.
3d02 agere^patere aliquid, actio^passio NOT actu	3d02 agere^patere aliquid, actio^passio NOT actu [notes] [geomap]
II. I say that we act when anything takes place, either within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something when that something takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally, we being only the partial cause.	II. Nos tum agere dico cum aliquid in nobis aut [excl exh] extra nos fit cujus adaequata sumus causa hoc est (per definitionem praecedentem) cum ex nostra natura aliquid in nobis aut [excl exh] extra nos sequitur quod per eandem solam potest clare et distincte intelligi. At contra nos pati dico cum in nobis aliquid fit vel [non-excl non-exh] ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur cujus nos non nisi partialis sumus causa.
3d03 affectus	3d03 affectus [notes] [geomap]
III. By emotion I mean the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body, whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications [Lat: affectiones]. N.B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications [Lat: affectiones], I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive.	III. Per affectum intelligo corporis affectiones quibus ipsius corporis agendi potentia augetur vel [excl non-exh] minuitur, juvatur vel [excl non-exh] coercetur et simul harum affectionum ideas. Si itaque alicujus harum affectionum adaequata possimus esse causa, tum per affectum actionem intelligo, alias passionem.
POSTULATES	POSTULATA
3post01 multis affici modis agendi potentia	3post01 multis affici modis agendi potentia [geomap]
I. The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or less. N.B. This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.	I. Corpus humanum potest multis affici modis quibus ipsius agendi potentia augetur vel [excl non-exh] minuitur et etiam aliis qui ejusdem agendi potentiam nec majorem nec minorem reddunt. Hoc postulatum seu [mng eqv] axioma nititur postulato 1 et lemmatibus 5 et 7, quae vide post propositionem 13 partis II.
3post02 retinere objectorum impressiones	3post02 retinere objectorum impressiones [geomap]
II. The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless, retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.), and, consequently, the same images of things (see note II. xvii.).	II. Corpus humanum multas pati potest mutationes et nihilominus retinere objectorum impressiones seu [mng eqv] vestigia (de quibus vide postulatum 5 partis II) et consequenter easdem rerum imagines; quarum definitionem vide in scholio propositionis 17 partis II.
3p01 mens agit patitur ideas	3p01 mens agit patitur ideas [geomap]
PROP. I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive.	PROPOSITIO I: Mens nostra quaedam agit, quaedam vero patitur nempe quatenus adaequatas habet ideas eatenus quaedam necessario agit et quatenus ideas habet inadaequatas eatenus necessario quaedam patitur.
Proof.-In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and some ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note). Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in God, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl. Coroll.), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise (by the same Coroll.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as he, at the same time, contains the minds of other things. Again, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (I. 36); of this effect God is the adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not inasmuch as he is infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as affected by the given idea (II. ix.). But of that effect whereof God is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the mind in question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Coroll.). Therefore our mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III. Def. ii.), is in certain cases necessarily active; this was our first point. Again, whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is adequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, together with the mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, of such an effect (II. xi. Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus (III. Def. ii.) the mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases necessarily passive; this was our second point. Therefore our mind, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Cujuscunque humanae mentis ideae ali adaequatae sunt, ali autem mutilatae et confusae (per scholia propositionis 40 partis II {non-deductive reference}). Ideae autem quae in alicujus mente sunt adaequatae, sunt in Deo adaequatae quatenus ejusdem mentis essentiam constituit (per corollarium propositionis 11 partis II {2p11c}) et quae deinde inadaequatae sunt in mente, sunt etiam in Deo (per idem corollarium) adaequatae non quatenus ejusdem solummodo mentis essentiam sed etiam quatenus aliarum rerum mentes in se simul continet. Deinde ex data quacunque idea aliquis effectus sequi necessario debet (per propositionem 36 partis I {1p36}) cujus effectus Deus causa est adaequata (vide definitionem 1 hujus {3d01}) non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus data illa idea affectus consideratur (vide propositionem 9 partis II {2p09}). At ejus effectus cujus Deus est causa quatenus affectus est idea quae in alicujus mente est adaequata, illa eadem mens est causa adaequata (per corollarium propositionis 11 partis II {2p11c}). Ergo mens nostra (per definitionem 2 hujus {3d02}) quatenus ideas habet adaequatas, quaedam necessario agit, quod erat primum. Deinde quicquid necessario sequitur ex idea quae in Deo est adaequata, non quatenus mentem unius hominis tantum sed quatenus aliarum rerum mentes simul cum ejusdem hominis mente in se habet, ejus (per idem corollarium propositionis 11 partis II {2p11c}) illius hominis mens non est causa adaequata sed partialis ac proinde (per definitionem 2 hujus {3d02}) mens quatenus ideas inadaequatas habet, quaedam necessario patitur. Quod erat secundum. Ergo mens nostra etc. Q.E.D.
3p01c pluribus passionibus obnoxiam inadaequatas	3p01c pluribus passionibus obnoxiam inadaequatas [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind is more or less liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses inadequate ideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less active in proportion as it possesses adequate ideas.	COROLLARIUM {3p01}: Hinc sequitur mentem eo pluribus passionibus esse obnoxiam quo plures ideas inadaequatas habet et contra eo plura agere quo plures habet adaequatas.
3p02 Nec corpus mentem determinare potest	3p02 Nec corpus mentem determinare potest [geomap]
PROP. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these, if such there be.	PROPOSITIO II: Nec corpus mentem ad cogitandum nec mens corpus ad motum neque ad quietem nec ad aliquid (si quid est) aliud determinare potest.
Proof.-All modes of thinking have for their cause God, by virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his being displayed under any other attribute (II. vi.). That, therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of thought, and not a mode of extension; that is (II. Def. i.), it is not body. This was our first point. Again, the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body, which has also been determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, and absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring from God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of extension, and not by some mode of thought (II. vi.); that is, it cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode of thought. This was our second point. Therefore body cannot determine mind, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes cogitandi modi Deum quatenus res est cogitans et non quatenus alio attributo explicatur, pro causa habent (per propositionem 6 partis II {2p06}); id ergo quod mentem ad cogitandum determinat, modus cogitandi est et non extensionis hoc est (per definitionem 1 partis II {2d01}) non est corpus: quod erat primum. corporis deinde motus et quies ab alio oriri debet corpore quod etiam ad motum vel [excl exh] quietem determinatum fuit ab alio et absolute quicquid in corpore oritur, id a Deo oriri debuit quatenus aliquo extensionis modus et non quatenus aliquo cogitandi modo affectus consideratur (per eandem propositionem 6 partis II {2p06}) hoc est a mente quae (per propositionem 11 partis II {2p11}) modus cogitandi est, oriri non potest : quod erat secundum. Ergo nec corpus mentem etc. Q.E.D.
3p02s scholio propositionis 7 partis II	3p02s scholio propositionis 7 partis II
Note.-This is made more clear by what was said in the note to II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under the attribute of extension. Thus it follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the mind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we proved II. xii. Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is proved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that it is merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set in motion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought. However, no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far as she is regarded as extension. No one hitherto has gained such an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can explain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the fact that many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things in their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake: these instances are enough to show, that the body can by the sole laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.	SCHOLIUM: Haec clarius intelliguntur ex iis quae in scholio propositionis 7 partis II dicta sunt quod scilicet mens et corpus una eademque res sit quae jam sub cogitationis jam sub extensionis attributo concipitur. Unde fit ut ordo sive rerum concatenatio una sit sive natura sub hoc sive sub illo attributo concipiatur, consequenter ut ordo actionum et passionum corporis nostri simul sit natura cum ordine actionum et passionum mentis : quod etiam patet ex modo quo propositionem 12 partis II demonstravimus. At quamvis haec ita se habeant ut nulla dubitandi ratio supersit, vix tamen credo nisi rem experientia comprobavero, homines induci posse ad haec quo animo perpendendum adeo firmiter persuasi sunt corpus ex solo mentis nutu jam moveri jam quiescere plurimaque agere quae a sola mentis voluntate et excogitandi arte pendent. Etenim quid corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit hoc est neminem hucusque experientia docuit quid corpus ex solis legibus naturae quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, possit agere et quid non possit nisi a mente determinetur. Nam nemo hucusque corporis fabricam tam accurate novit ut omnes ejus functiones potuerit explicare ut jam taceam quod in brutis plura observentur quae humanam sagacitatem longe superant et quod somnambuli in somnis plurima agant quae vigilando non auderent; quod satis ostendit ipsum corpus ex solis suae naturae legibus multa posse quae ipsius mens admiratur.
Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the body, nor how quickly it can move it. Thus, when men say that this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it. But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate, experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit state to think, the body remains inert. Moreover, we have experience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or are silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly, we say depend on the mind's decree. But, as to the first point, I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach, that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of thinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake. Again, I think everyone's experience will confirm the statement, that the mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object.	Deinde nemo scit qua ratione quibusve mediis mens moveat corpus neque quot motus gradus possit corpori tribuere quantaque cum celeritate idem movere queat. Unde sequitur cum homines dicunt hanc vel illam actionem corporis oriri a mente quae imperium in corpus habet, eos nescire quid dicant nec aliud agere quam speciosis verbis fateri se veram illius actionis causam absque admiratione ignorare. At dicent sive sciant sive nesciant quibus mediis mens moveat corpus, se tamen experiri quod nisi mens humana apta esset ad excogitandum, corpus iners esset. Deinde se experiri in sola mentis potestate esse tam loqui quam tacere et alia multa quae proinde a mentis decreto pendere credunt. Sed quod ad primum attinet, ipsos rogo num experientia non etiam doceat quod si contra corpus iners sit, mens simul ad cogitandum sit inepta? Nam cum corpus somno quiescit, mens simul cum ipso sopita manet nec potestatem habet veluti cum vigilat, excogitandi. Deinde omnes expertos esse credo mentem non semper que aptam esse ad cogitandum de eodem objecto sed prout corpus aptius est ut in eo hujus vel illius objecti imago excitetur, ita mentem aptiorem esse ad hoc vel illud objectum contemplandum.
But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the laws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of that kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would the human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, be capable of building a single temple. However, I have just pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would never have believed possible except under the direction of mind: such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their performers when awake. I would further call attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak. Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of anything else.	At dicent ex solis legibus naturae quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, fieri non posse ut causae dificiorum, picturarum rerumque hujusmodi quae sola humana arte fiunt, possint deduci nec corpus humanum nisi a mente determinaretur ducereturque, pote esset ad templum aliquod dificandum. Verum ego jam ostendi ipsos nescire quid corpus possit quidve ex sola ipsius naturae contemplatione possit deduci ipsosque plurima experiri ex solis naturae legibus fieri quae nunquam credidissent posse fieri nisi ex mentis directione ut sunt ea quae somnambuli in somnis agunt quque ipsi, dum vigilant, admirantur. Addo hic ipsam corporis humani fabricam quae artificio longissime superat omnes quae humana arte fabricatae sunt, ut jam taceam, quod supra ostenderim, ex natura sub quovis attributo considerata, infinita sequi. Quod porro ad secundum attinet, sane longe felicius sese res humanae haberent si que in hominis potestate esset tam tacere quam loqui. At experientia satis superque docet homines nihil minus in potestate habere quam linguam nec minus posse quam appetitus moderari suos; unde factum ut plerique credant nos ea tantum libere agere quae leviter petimus quia earum rerum appetitus facile contrahi potest memoria alterius rei cujus frequenter recordamur sed illa minime quae magno cum affectu petimus et qui alterius rei memoria sedari nequit.
However, unless such persons had proved by experience that we do many things which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all things. Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and therefore vary according to the varying state of the body. Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish; those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this way or that. All these considerations clearly show that a mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the laws of motion and rest. This will appear yet more plainly in the sequel.	Verumenimvero nisi experti essent nos plura agere quorum postea pnitet nosque spe, quando scilicet contrariis affectibus conflictamur, meliora videre et deteriora sequi, nihil impediret quominus crederent nos omnia libere agere. Sic infans se lac libere appetere credit, puer autem iratus vindictam velle et timidus fugam. Ebrius deinde credit se ex libero mentis decreto ea loqui quae postea sobrius vellet tacuisse : sic delirans, garrula, puer et hujus farin plurimi ex libero mentis decreto credunt loqui cum tamen loquendi impetum quem habent, continere nequeant, ita ut ipsa experientia non minus clare quam ratio doceat quod homines ea sola de causa liberos se esse credant quia suarum actionum sunt conscii et causarum a quibus determinantur, ignari et praeterea quod mentis decreta nihil sint praeter ipsos appetitus, quae propterea varia sunt pro varia corporis dispositione. Nam unusquisque ex suo affectu omnia moderatur et qui praeterea contrariis affectibus conflictantur, quid velint nesciunt; qui autem nullo, facili momento huc atque illuc pelluntur. quae omnia profecto clare ostendunt mentis tam decretum quam appetitum et corporis determinationem simul esse natura vel potius unam eandemque rem quam quando sub cogitationis attributo consideratur et per ipsum explicatur, decretum appellamus et quando sub extensionis attributo consideratur et ex legibus motus et quietis deducitur, determinationem vocamus; quod adhuc clarius ex jam dicendis patebit.
For the present I wish to call attention to another point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind, unless we have a remembrance of having done so. For instance, we cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so. Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will. Therefore the freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers. But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and we seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby we keep silence when awake concerning something we know. Lastly, we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something, which we should not dare to do when awake. Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free? If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II. xlix.). Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream with their eyes open.	Nam aliud est quod hic apprime notari vellem nempe quod nos nihil ex mentis decreto agere possumus nisi ejus recordemur. Exempli gratia non possumus verbum loqui nisi ejusdem recordemur. Deinde in libera mentis potestate non est rei alicujus recordari vel ejusdem oblivisci. Quare hoc tantum in mentis potestate esse creditur quod rem cujus recordamur vel tacere vel loqui ex solo mentis decreto possumus. Verum cum nos loqui somniamus, credimus nos ex libero mentis decreto loqui nec tamen loquimur vel si loquimur, id ex corporis spontaneo motu fit. Somniamus deinde nos quaedam homines celare idque eodem mentis decreto quo dum vigilamus ea quae scimus, tacemus. Somniamus denique nos ex mentis decreto quaedam agere quae dum vigilamus non audemus atque adeo pervelim scire an in mente duo decretorum genera dentur, phantasticorum unum et liberorum alterum? Quod si eo usque insanire non libet, necessario concedendum est hoc mentis decretum quod liberum esse creditur, ab ipsa imaginatione sive memoria non distingui nec aliud esse praeter illam affirmationem quam idea quatenus idea est, necessario involvit (vide propositionem 49 partis II). Atque adeo haec mentis decreta eadem necessitate in mente oriuntur ac ideae rerum actu existentium. Qui igitur credunt se ex libero mentis decreto loqui vel tacere vel quicquam agere, oculis apertis somniant.
3p03 actiones adaequatis passiones inadaequatis	3p03 actiones adaequatis passiones inadaequatis [geomap]
PROP. III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on inadequate ideas.	PROPOSITIO III: Mentis actiones ex solis ideis adaequatis oriuntur, passiones autem a solis inadaequatis pendent.
Proof.-The first element, which constitutes the essence of the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II. xxix. Coroll., II. xxxviii. Coroll.). Whatsoever therefore follows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea. But in so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Primum quod mentis essentiam constituit, nihil aliud est quam idea corporis actu existentis (per propositiones 11 {2p11} et 13 partis II {2p13}) quae (per propositionem 15 partis II) ex multis aliis componitur quarum quaedam (per corollarium propositionis 38 partis II {2p38c}) sunt adaequatae, quaedam autem inadaequatae (per corollarium propositionis 29 partis II {2p29c}). Quicquid ergo ex mentis natura sequitur et cujus mens causa est proxima per quam id debet intelligi, necessario ex idea adaequata vel [excl exh] inadaequata sequi debet. At quatenus mens (per propositionem 1 hujus {3p01}) ideas habet inadaequatas eatenus necessario patitur; ergo mentis actiones ex solis ideis adaequatis sequuntur et mens propterea tantum patitur quia ideas habet inadaequatas. Q.E.D.
3p03s passiones ad mentem non referri nisi	3p03s passiones ad mentem non referri nisi
Note.-Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to the mind, except in so far as it contains something involving negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself without other parts: I could thus show, that passive states are attributed to individual things in the same way that they are attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.	SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque passiones ad mentem non referri nisi quatenus aliquid habet quod negationem involvit sive quatenus consideratur ut naturae pars quae per se absque aliis non potest clare et distincte percipi et hac ratione ostendere possem passiones eodem modo ad res singulares ac ad mentem referri nec alia ratione posse percipi sed meum institutum est de sola mente humana agere.
3p04 nisi a causa externa destrui	3p04 nisi a causa externa destrui [geomap]
PROP. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to itself.	PROPOSITIO IV: Nulla res nisi a causa externa potest destrui.
Proof.-This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence of the thing, but does not take it away. So long therefore as we regard only the thing itself, without taking into account external causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could destroy it. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Haec propositio per se patet; definitio enim cujuscunque rei ipsius rei essentiam affirmat sed non negat  sive [mng eqv] rei essentiam ponit sed non tollit. Dum itaque ad rem ipsam tantum, non autem ad causas externas attendimus, nihil in eadem poterimus invenire quod ipsam possit destruere. Q.E.D.
3p05 Res contrariae sunt naturae	3p05 Res contrariae sunt naturae [geomap]
PROP. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other.	PROPOSITIO V: Res eatenus contrariae sunt naturae hoc est eatenus in eodem subjecto esse nequeunt quatenus una alteram potest destruere.
Proof.-If they could agree together or co-exist in the same object, tmaps/3p07 Conatus essentiam.html here would then be in the said object something which could destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is absurd, therefore things, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim inter se convenire vel [mng eqv] in eodem subjecto simul esse possent, posset ergo in eodem subjecto aliquid dari quod ipsum posset destruere, quod (per propositionem praecedentem {3p04}) est absurdum. Ergo res etc. Q.E.D.
3p06 Unaquaeque in suo perseverare conatur	3p06 Unaquaeque in suo perseverare conatur [geomap]
PROP. VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being.	PROPOSITIO VI: Unaquaeque res quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur.
Proof.-Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of God are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.); that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given determinate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts; now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be destroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.); but contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its existence (III. v.). Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its own being. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Res enim singulares modi sunt quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur (per corollarium propositionis 25 partis I {1p25}) hoc est (per propositionem 34 partis I {1p34}) res quae Dei potentiam qua Deus est et agit, certo et determinato modo exprimunt neque ulla res aliquid in se habet a quo possit destrui sive [mng eqv]  quod ejus existentiam tollat (per propositionem 4 hujus {3p04}) sed contra ei omni quod ejusdem existentiam potest tollere, opponitur (per propositionem praecedentem {3p05}) adeoque quantum potest et in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur. Q.E.D.
3p07 Conatus essentiam.	3p07 Conatus essentiam [geomap]
PROP. VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question.	PROPOSITIO VII: Conatus quo unaquque res in suo  esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter [prf eqv] ipsius rei actualem essentiam.
Proof.-From the given essence of any thing certain consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as determined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing, or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, it acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in question. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ex data cujuscunque rei essentia quaedam necessario sequuntur (per propositionem 36 partis I {1p36}) nec res aliud possunt quam id quod ex determinata earum natura necessario sequitur (per propositionem 29 partis I {1p29}); quare cujuscunque rei potentia sive [mng eqv]  conatus quo ipsa vel [excl exh]  sola vel [excl exh] cum aliis quidquam agit vel [non-excl non-exh] agere conatur hoc est [prf eqv] (per propositionem 6 hujus {3p06}) potentia sive [mng eqv]  conatus quo in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei datam sive [mng eqv]  actualem essentiam. Q.E.D.
3p08 Conatus tempus indefinitum involvit	3p08 Conatus tempus indefinitum involvit [geomap]
PROP. VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.	PROPOSITIO VIII: Conatus quo unaquque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nullum tempus finitum sed indefinitum involvit.
Proof.-If it involved a limited time, which should determine the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed; but this (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore the endeavour wherewith a thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise, since (III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already exists always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some external cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim tempus limitatum involveret quod rei durationem determinaret, tum ex sola ipsa potentia qua res existit, sequeretur quod res post limitatum illud tempus non posset existere sed quod deberet destrui; atqui hoc (per propositionem 4 hujus {3p04}) est absurdum : ergo conatus quo res existit, nullum tempus definitum involvit sed contra quoniam (per eandem propositionem 4 hujus) si a nulla externa causa destruatur, eadem potentia qua jam existit, existere perget semper, ergo hic conatus tempus indefinitum involvit. Q.E.D.
3p09 conatus est conscia	3p09 conatus est conscia [geomap]
PROP. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavour it is conscious.	PROPOSITIO IX: Mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, conatur in suo esse perseverare indefinita quadam duratione et hujus sui conatus est conscia.
Proof.-The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so far as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the latter, it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for an indefinite time (III. viii.). Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.) conscious of its own endeavour.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis essentia ex ideis adaequatis et inadaequatis constituitur (ut in propositione 3 hujus ostendimus {3p03}) adeoque (per propositionem 7 hujus {3p07}) tam quatenus has quam quatenus illas habet, in suo esse perseverare conatur idque (per propositionem 8 hujus) indefinita quadam duratione. Cum autem mens (per propositionem 23 partis II {2p23}) per ideas affectionum corporis necessario sui sit conscia, est ergo (per propositionem 7 hujus {3p07}) mens sui conatus conscia. Q.E.D.
3p09s conatus voluntas appetitus essentia cupiditas	3p09s conatus voluntas appetitus essentia cupiditas
Note.-This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus been determined to perform. Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof. It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the contrary we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it.	SCHOLIUM: Hic conatus cum ad mentem solam refertur, voluntas appellatur sed cum ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, vocatur appetitus, qui proinde nihil aliud est quam ipsa hominis essentia ex cujus natura ea quae ipsius conservationi inserviunt, necessario sequuntur atque adeo homo ad eadem agendum determinatus est. Deinde inter appetitum et cupiditatem nulla est differentia nisi quod cupiditas ad homines plerumque referatur quatenus sui appetitus sunt conscii et propterea sic definiri potest nempe cupiditas est appetitus cum ejusdem conscientia. Constat itaque ex his omnibus nihil nos conari, velle, appetere neque cupere quia id bonum esse judicamus sed contra nos propterea aliquid bonum esse judicare quia id conamur, volumus, appetimus atque cupimus.
3p10 mente secludit contraria	3p10 mente secludit contraria [geomap]
PROP. X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.	PROPOSITIO X: Idea quae corporis nostri existentiam secludit in nostra mente dari nequit sed eidem est contraria.
Proof.-Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated therein (III. v.). Therefore neither can the idea of such a thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II. ix. Coroll.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing cannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II. xi., xiii.) the first element, that constitutes the essence of the mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body: thus, an idea, which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to our mind, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid corpus nostrum potest destruere, in eodem dari nequit (per propositionem 5 hujus {3p05}) adeoque neque ejus rei idea potest in Deo dari quatenus nostri corporis ideam habet (per corollarium propositionis 9 partis II {2p09}) hoc est (per propositiones 11 {2p11} et 13 {2p13} partis II) ejus rei idea in nostra mente dari nequit sed contra quoniam (per propositiones 11 {2p11} et 13 essentiam constituit, est idea corporis actu existentis, primum et praecipuum nostrae mentis conatus est (per propositionem 7 hujus {3p07}) corporis nostri existentiam affirmare atque adeo idea quae corporis nostri existentiam negat, nostrae menti est contraria etc. Q.E.D.
3p11 agendi potentiam mentis cogitandi	3p11 agendi potentiam mentis cogitandi [geomap]
PROP. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.	PROPOSITIO XI: Quicquid corporis nostri agendi potentiam auget vel [excl non-exh] minuit, juvat vel [non-excl non-exh] coercet, ejusdem rei idea mentis nostrae cogitandi potentiam auget vel [excl non-exh] minuit, juvat vel [excl non-exh] coercet.
Proof.-This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II. xiv.	DEMONSTRATIO: Haec propositio patet ex propositione 7 partis II {2p07} vel [non-excl non-exh] etiam {aliter reference} ex propositione 14 partis II.
3p11s pati mutationes majorem minorem perfectionem	3p11s pati mutationes majorem minorem perfectionem
Note.-Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive transitions explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall signify a passive transition wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection. By pain I shall signify a passive transition wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection. Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy. But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other emotions arise from these three.	SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque mentem magnas posse pati mutationes et jam ad majorem jam autem ad minorem perfectionem transire, quae quidem passiones nobis explicant affectus laetitiae et tristitiae. Per laetitiam itaque in sequentibus intelligam passionem qua mens ad majorem perfectionem transit. Per tristitiam autem passionem qua ipsa ad minorem transit perfectionem. Porro affectum laetitiae ad mentem et corpus simul relatum titillationem vel hilaritatem voco, tristitiae autem dolorem vel melancholiam. Sed notandum titillationem et dolorem ad hominem referri quando una ejus pars prae reliquis est affecta; hilaritatem autem et melancholiam quando omnes pariter sunt affect. Quid deinde cupiditas sit in scholio propositionis 9 hujus partis explicui et praeter hos tres nullum alium agnosco affectum primarium nam reliquos ex his tribus oriri in sequentibus ostendam.
But, before I go further, I should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x of this part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another. In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so long as the body itself exists. Again, it follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. viii., that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body. Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist. For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist; therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but (II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence of our mind.	Sed antequam ulterius pergam, lubet hic fusius propositionem 10 hujus partis explicare ut clarius intelligatur qua ratione idea ideae sit contraria. In scholio propositionis 17 partis II ostendimus ideam quae mentis essentiam constituit, corporis existentiam tamdiu involvere quamdiu ipsum corpus existit. Deinde ex iis quae in corollario propositionis 8 partis II et in ejusdem scholio ostendimus, sequitur praesentem nostrae mentis existentiam ab hoc solo pendere quod scilicet mens actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Denique mentis potentiam qua ipsa res imaginatur earumque recordatur, ab hoc etiam pendere ostendimus (vide propositiones 17 et 18 partis II cum ejus scholio) quod ipsa actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Ex quibus sequitur mentis praesentem existentiam ejusque imaginandi potentiam tolli simulatque mens praesentem corporis existentiam affirmare desinit. At causa cur mens hanc corporis existentiam affirmare desinit, non potest esse ipsa mens (per propositionem 4 hujus) nec etiam quod corpus esse desinit. Nam (per propositionem 6 partis II) causa cur mens corporis existentiam affirmat, non est quia corpus existere incepit : quare per eandem rationem nec ipsius corporis existentiam affirmare desinit quia corpus esse desinit sed (per propositionem 8 partis II) hoc ab alia idea oritur quae nostri corporis et consequenter nostrae mentis praesentem existentiam secludit quque adeo ideae quae nostrae mentis essentiam constituit, est contraria.
3p12 conatur agendi potentiam augent	3p12 conatur agendi potentiam augent [geomap]
PROP. XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body.	PROPOSITIO XII: Mens quantum potest ea imaginari conatur quae corporis agendi potentiam augent vel [non-excl non-exh] juvant.
Proof.-So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and consequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an external body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it, the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature of the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceives things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body, the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of activity (III. Post. i.); consequently (III. xi.) the mind's power of thinking is for that period increased or helped. Thus (III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine such things. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quamdiu humanum corpus affectum est modo qui naturam corporis alicujus externi involvit tamdiu mens humana idem corpus ut praesens contemplabitur (per propositionem 17 partis II {2p17}) et consequenter (per propositionem 7 partis II {2p07}) quamdiu mens aliquod externum corpus ut praesens contemplatur hoc est (per ejusdem propositionis 17 scholium {non-deductive reference}) imaginatur tamdiu humanum corpus affectum est modo qui naturam ejusdem corporis externi involvit atque adeo quamdiu mens ea imaginatur quae corporis nostri agendi potentiam augent vel [non-excl non-exh] juvant tamdiu corpus affectum est modis qui ejusdem agendi potentiam augent vel [non-excl non-exh] juvant (vide postulatum 1 hujus {3post1}) et consequenter (per propositionem 11 hujus {3p11}) tamdiu mentis cogitandi potentia augetur vel [non-excl non-exh] juvatur ac proinde (per propositionem 6 {3p06} vel [non-excl non-exh] {aliter reference} 9 hujus) mens quantum potest eadem imaginari conatur. Q.E.D.
3p13 agendi potentiam minuunt recordari	3p13 agendi potentiam minuunt recordari [geomap]
PROP. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the first-named things.	PROPOSITIO XIII: Cum mens ea imaginatur quae corporis agendi potentiam minuunt vel [excl non-exh] coercent, conatur quantum potest rerum recordari quae horum existentiam secludunt.
Proof.-So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived: therefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it can, will endeavour to conceive or remember the latter. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quamdiu mens quicquam tale imaginatur tamdiu mentis et corporis potentia minuitur vel [excl non-exh] coercetur (ut in praecedenti propositione demonstravimus {3p12}) et nihilominus id tamdiu imaginabitur donec mens aliud imaginetur quod hujus praesentem existentiam secludat (per propositionem 17 partis II {2p17}) hoc est (ut modo ostendimus) mentis et corporis potentia tamdiu minuitur vel [non-excl non-exh] coercetur donec mens aliud imaginetur quod hujus existentiam secludit quodque adeo mens (per propositionem 9 hujus {3p09}) quantum potest imaginari vel [non-excl non-exh] recordari conabitur. Q.E.D.
3p13c mens aversatur quae potentiam minuunt	3p13c mens aversatur quae potentiam minuunt [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of itself and of the body.	COROLLARIUM {3p13}: Hinc sequitur quod mens ea imaginari aversatur quae ipsius et corporis potentiam minuunt vel [non-excl non-exh] coercent.
3p13s amor odium	3p13s amor odium
Note.-From what has been said we may clearly understand the nature of Love and Hate. Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.	SCHOLIUM: Ex his clare intelligimus quid amor quidque odium sit. Nempe amor nihil aliud est quam laetitia concomitante idea  causae externae et odium nihil aliud quam tristitia concomitante idea  causae externae. Videmus deinde quod ille qui amatae necessario conatur rem quam amatae praesentem habere et conservare et contra qui odit, rem quam odio habet, amovere et destruere conatur. Sed de his omnibus in sequentibus prolixius.
3p14 duobus affectibus simul	3p14 duobus affectibus simul [geomap]
PROP. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of these two, be also affected by the other.	PROPOSITIO XIV: Si mens duobus affectibus simul affecta semel fuit, ubi postea eorum alterutro afficietur, afficietur etiam alterius.
Proof.-If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.). But the mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.); therefore, if the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si corpus humanum a duobus corporibus simul affectum semel fuit, ubi mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginatur, statim et alterius recordabitur (per propositionem 18 partis II {2p18}). At mentis imaginationes magis nostri corporis affectus quam corporum externorum naturam indicant (per corollarium II propositionis 16 partis II {2p16}) : ergo si corpus et consequenter mens (vide definitionem 3 hujus {3d03}) duobus affectibus semel affecta fuit, ubi postea eorum alterutro afficietur, afficietur etiam altero. Q.E.D.
3p15 quaecunque potest esse causa	3p15 quaecunque potest esse causa [geomap]
PROP. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire.	PROPOSITIO XV: Res quaecunque potest esse per accidens causa laetitiae, tristitiae vel [excl non-exh] cupiditatis.
Proof.-Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either increase or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.). From the foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III. xi. note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain. Thus the former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain. In the same way also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the cause of desire. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ponatur mens duobus affectibus simul affici, uno scilicet qui ejus agendi potentiam neque auget neque minuit et altero qui eandem vel [excl non-exh] auget vel minuit (vide postulatum 1 hujus {3post01}). Ex praecedenti propositione patet quod ubi mens postea illo a sua vera causa quae (per hypothesin) per se ejus cogitandi potentiam nec auget nec minuit, afficietur, statim et hoc altero qui ipsius cognitandi potentiam auget vel [excl non-exh] minuit hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}) laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia afficietur atque adeo illa res non per se sed per accidens causa erit laetitiae vel [excl non-exh] tristitiae. Atque hac eadem via facile ostendi potest rem illam posse per accidens causam esse cupiditatis. Q.E.D.
3p15c solo affectu contemplati	3p15c solo affectu contemplati [geomap]
Corollary. Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it.	COROLLARIUM: Ex eo solo quod rem aliquam affectu laetitiae vel [excl non-exh] tristitiae cujus ipsa non est causa efficiens, contemplati sumus, eandem amare vel [excl non-exh] odio habere possumus.
Proof.-For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note), according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished, &c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii. Coroll.), in other words (III. xiii. note), according as it may love or hate the same. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nam ex hoc solo fit (per propositionem 14 hujus {3p14}) ut mens hanc rem postea imaginando affectu laetitiae vel [excl non-exh] tristitiae afficiatur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}) ut mentis et corporis potentia augeatur vel [excl non-exh] minuatur etc. Et consequenter (per propositionem 12 hujus {3p12}) ut mens eandem imaginari cupiat vel [excl non-exh] (per corollarium propositionis 13 hujus {3p13c}) aversetur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) ut eandem amet vel [excl non-exh]  odio habeat. Q.E.D.
3p15s absque causa cognita	3p15s absque causa cognita
Note.-Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us; merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. We should refer to the same category those objects, which affect us pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the next Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest qualities.	SCHOLIUM: Hinc intelligimus qui fieri potest ut quaedam amemus vel odio habeamus absque ulla causa nobis cognita sed tantum ex sympathia (ut aiunt) et antipathia. Atque huc referenda etiam ea objecta quae nos laetitia vel tristitia afficiunt ex eo solo quod aliquid simile habent objectis quae nos iisdem affectibus afficere solent ut in sequentibus propositionibus ostendam. Scio equidem auctores qui primi haec nomina sympathi et antipathi introduxerunt, significare iisdem voluisse rerum occultas quasdam qualitates sed nihilominus credo nobis licere per eadem notas vel manifestas etiam qualitates intelligere.
3p16 imaginamur simile	3p16 imaginamur simile [geomap]
PROP. XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.	PROPOSITIO XVI: Ex eo solo quod rem aliquam aliquid habere imaginamur simile objecto quod mentem laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia afficere solet, quamvis id in quo res objecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum efficiens causa, eam tamen amabimus vel [excl non-exh] odio habebimus.
Proof.-The point of resemblance was in the object (by hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus (III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of pleasure or pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Id quod simile est objecto, in ipso objecto (per hypothesin) cum affectu laetitiae vel [excl non-exh] tristitiae contemplati sumus atque adeo (per propositionem 14 hujus {3p14}) cum mens ejus imagine afficietur, statim etiam hoc vel [excl non-exh] illo afficietur affectu et consequenter res quam hoc idem habere percipimus, erit (per propositionem 15 hujus {3p15}) per accidens laetitiae vel [excl non-exh] tristitiae causa adeoque (per praecedens corollarium {3p15c}) quamvis id in quo objecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum causa efficiens, eam tamen amabimus vel [excl non-exh] odio habebimus. Q.E.D.
3p17 odio simul amabimus	3p17 odio simul amabimus [geomap]
PROP. XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall love it.	PROPOSITIO XVII: Si rem quae nos tristitiae affectu afficere solet, aliquid habere imaginamur simile alteri quae nos que magno laetitiae affectu solet afficere, eandem odio habebimus et simul amabimus.
Proof.-The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with this emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive that it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it (III. xvi.); thus we shall both hate and love the same thing. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Est enim (per hypothesin) haec res per se tristitiae causa et (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) quatenus eandem hoc affectu imaginamur, eandem odio habemus et quatenus praeterea aliquid habere imaginamur simile alteri quae nos que magno laetitiae affectu afficere solet, que magno laetitiae   conamine amabimus (per propositionem praecedentem {3p16}) atque adeo eandem odio habebimus et simul amabimus. Q.E.D.
3p17s fluctuatio	3p17s fluctuatio
Note.-This disposition of the mind, which arises from two contrary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination (II. xliv. note); vacillation and doubt do not differ one from the other, except as greater differs from less. But we must bear in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the other accidentally. I have done this, in order that they might be more easily deduced from what went before; but I do not deny that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions. The human body is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts of different nature, and may therefore (Ax.i. after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different ways affect one and the same part of the body. Hence we can easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of many and conflicting emotions.	SCHOLIUM: Haec mentis constitutio quae scilicet ex duobus contrariis affectibus oritur, animi vocatur fluctuatio, quae proinde affectum respicit ut dubitatio imaginationem (vide scholium propositionis 44 partis II) nec animi fluctuatio et dubitatio inter se differunt nisi secundum majus et minus. Sed notandum me in propositione praecedenti has animi fluctuationes ex causis deduxisse quae per se unius et per accidens alterius affectus sunt causa; quod ideo feci quia sic facilius ex praecedentibus deduci poterant; at non quod negem animi fluctuationes plerumque oriri ab objecto quod utriusque affectus sit efficiens causa. Nam corpus humanum (per postulatum 1 partis II) ex plurimis diversae naturae individuis componitur atque adeo (per axioma 1 post lemma 3, quod vide post propositionem 13 partis II) ab uno eodemque corpore plurimis diversisque modis potest affici et contra quia una eademque res multis modis potest affici, multis ergo etiam diversisque modis unam eandemque corporis partem afficere poterit. Ex quibus facile concipere possumus unum idemque objectum posse esse causam multorum contrariorumque affectuum.
3p18 praeterit futurae praesentis	3p18 praeterit futurae praesentis [geomap]
PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing present.	PROPOSITIO XVIII: Homo ex imagine rei praeterit aut [excl non-exh] futurae eodem laetitiae et tristitiae affectu afficitur ac ex imagine rei praesentis.
Proof.-So long as a man is affected by the image of anything, he will regard that thing as present, even though it be non-existent (II. xvii. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the image of time past or future (II. xliv. note). Wherefore the image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether it be referred to time past, time future, or time present; that is (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or present. Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same, whether the image be of a thing past or future. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quamdiu homo rei alicujus imagine affectus est, rem ut praesentem tametsi non existat, contemplabitur (per propositionem 17 partis II {2p17} cum ejusdem corollario {2p17c}) nec ipsam ut praeteritam aut [excl non-exh] futuram imaginatur nisi quatenus ejus imago juncta est imagini temporis praeterit aut [excl non-exh] futuri (vide scholium propositionis 44 partis II {2p44}). Quare rei imago in se sola considerata eadem est sive [excl exh]  ad tempus futurum vel [excl exh]  praeteritum sive [excl exh] ad praesens referatur hoc est (per corollarium II propositionis 16 partis II {2p16c2}) corporis constitutio seu  [mng eqv] affectus idem est  sive [excl exh triple]  imago sit rei praeterit vel [excl exh triple]  futurae sive [excl exh triple] praesentis atque adeo affectus laetitiae et tristitiae idem est sive [excl exh triple] imago sit rei praeterit aut [excl exh triple] futurae sive [excl exh triple] praesentis. Q.E.D.
3p18s1 praeteritam futuram	3p18s1 praeteritam futuram
Note I.-I call a thing past or future, according as we either have been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us, or will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.) the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way as if the thing were actually present. However, as it generally happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things, until men become assured of the issue.	SCHOLIUM I: Rem eatenus praeteritam aut futuram hic voco quatenus ab eadem affecti fuimus aut afficiemur exempli gratia quatenus ipsam vidimus aut videbimus, nos refecit aut reficiet, nos lsit aut ldet etc. Quatenus enim eandem sic imaginamur eatenus ejus existentiam affirmamus hoc est corpus nullo affectu afficitur qui rei existentiam secludat atque adeo (per propositionem 17 partis II) corpus ejusdem rei imagine eodem modo afficitur ac si res ipsa praesens adesset. Verumenimvero quia plerumque fit ut ii qui plura sunt experti, fluctuent quamdiu rem ut futuram vel praeteritam contemplantur deque rei eventu ut plurimum dubitent (vide scholium propositionis 44 partis II) hinc fit ut affectus qui ex similibus rerum imaginibus oriuntur, non sint adeo constantes sed ut plerumque aliarum rerum imaginibus perturbentur donec homines de rei eventu certiores fiant.
3p18s2 spes, metus, securitas, desperatio, gaudium et conscientiae morsus	3p18s2 spes, metus, securitas, desperatio, gaudium et conscientiae morsus
Note II.-From what has just been said, we understand what is meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and Disappointment.[5] Hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we are in doubt. If the element of doubt be removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear becomes Despair. In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared. Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof we have doubted the issue. Disappointment is the Pain opposed to Joy. [5] Conscienti morsus-thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.	SCHOLIUM II: Ex modo dictis intelligimus quid sit spes, metus, securitas, desperatio, gaudium et conscientiae morsus. Spes namque nihil aliud est quam inconstans laetitia orta ex imagine rei futurae vel praeterit de cujus eventu dubitamus, metus contra inconstans tristitia ex rei dubi imagine etiam orta. Porro si horum affectuum dubitatio tollatur, ex spe sit securitas et ex metu desperatio nempe laetitia vel tristitia orta ex imagine rei quam metuimus vel speravimus. Gaudium deinde est laetitia orta ex imagine rei praeterit de cujus eventu dubitavimus. Conscienti denique morsus est tristitia opposita gaudio.
3p19 amatae destrui imaginatur, contristabitur	3p19 amatae destrui imaginatur, contristabitur [geomap]
PROP. XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure.	PROPOSITIO XIX: Qui id quod amatae destrui imaginatur, contristabitur; si contra autem conservari, laetabitur.
Proof.-The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceive those things which increase or help the body's power of activity (III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things which it loves. But conception is helped by those things which postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.); therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive the object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental endeavour; in other words, affect the mind painfully. He, therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mens quantum potest ea imaginari conatur quae corporis agendi potentiam augent vel [non-excl non-exh] juvant (per propositionem 12 hujus {3p12}) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) ea quae amat. At imaginatio ab iis juvatur quae rei existentiam ponunt et contra coercetur iis quae rei existentiam secludunt (per propositionem 17 partis II {2p17}); ergo rerum imagines quae rei existentiam ponunt, mentis conatum quo rem amatam imaginari conatur, juvant hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {3p11}) laetitia mentem afficiunt et quae contra rei amatae existentiam secludunt, eundem mentis conatum coercent hoc est (per idem scholium) tristitia mentem afficiunt. Qui itaque id quod amatae destrui imaginatur, contristabitur, etc. Q.E.D.
3p20 odio destrui imaginatur laetabitur	3p20 odio destrui imaginatur laetabitur [geomap]
PROP. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will also feel pleasure.	PROPOSITIO XX: Qui id quod odio habet, destrui imaginatur, laetabitur.
Proof.-The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III. xiii. note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the existence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing, which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the aforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects the mind pleasurably. Thus he who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mens (per 13 propositionem hujus {3p13}) ea imaginari conatur quae rerum existentiam quibus corporis agendi potentia minuitur vel [non-excl non-exh] coercetur, secludunt hoc est (per scholium ejusdem propositionis) ea imaginari conatur quae rerum quas odio habet, existentiam secludunt atque adeo rei imago quae existentiam ejus quod mens odio habet, secludit, hunc mentis conatum juvat hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {3p11}) mentem laetitia afficit. Qui itaque id quod odio habet, destrui imaginatur, laetabitur. Q.E.D.
3p21 amatae laetitia tristitia imaginatur	3p21 amatae laetitia tristitia imaginatur [geomap]
PROP. XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved.	PROPOSITIO XXI: Qui id quod amatae laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia affectum imaginatur, laetitia etiam vel [excl non-exh] tristitia afficietur et uterque hic affectus major aut [excl non-exh] minor erit in amante prout uterque major aut [excl non-exh] minor est in re amata.
Proof.-The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive the said object. But pleasure postulates the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is (III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental endeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover pleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion may have been greater in the object of love. This was our first point. Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to the amount of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully, will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said emotion is greater or less in the object of love. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Rerum imagines (ut in propositione 19 hujus {3p19} demonstravimus) quae rei amatae existentiam ponunt, mentis conatum quo ipsam rem amatam imaginari conatur, juvant. Sed laetitia existentiam rei lt ponit et eo magis quo laetitiae affectus major est : est enim (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}) transitio ad majorem perfectionem : ergo imago laetitiae rei amatae in amante ipsius mentis conatum juvat hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}) amantem laetitia afficit et eo majore quo major hic affectus in re amata fuerit. Quod erat primum. Deinde quatenus res aliqua tristitia afficitur eatenus destruitur et eo magis quo majore afficitur tristitia (per idem scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}) adeoque (per propositionem 19 hujus {3p19}) qui id quod amatae tristitia affici imaginatur, tristitia etiam afficietur et eo majore quo major hic affectus in re amata fuerit. Q.E.D.
3p22 laetitia amore tristitia odio	3p22 laetitia amore tristitia odio [geomap]
PROP. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards it.	PROPOSITIO XXII: Si aliquem imaginamur laetitia afficere rem quam amamus, amore erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur tristitia eandem afficere, contra odio etiam contra ipsum afficiemur.
Proof.-He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully-that is, if we conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore (III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with love or hatred towards him. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Qui rem quam amamus laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia afficit, ille nos laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia etiam afficit si nimirum rem amatam laetitia illa vel [excl non-exh] tristitia affectam imaginamur (per praecedentem propositionem {3p21}). At haec laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia in nobis supponitur dari concomitante idea  causae externae; ergo (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) si aliquem imaginamur laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia afficere rem quam amamus, erga eundem amore vel [excl non-exh] odio afficiemur. Q.E.D.
3p22s commiseratio amorem favorem odium indignationem	3p22s commiseratio amorem favorem odium indignationem
Note.-Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we may define as pain arising from another's hurt. What term we can use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not. We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on another, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures another, we will call Indignation. We must further remark, that we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles ourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approval on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and, contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.	SCHOLIUM: Propositio 21 nobis explicat quid sit commiseratio quam definire possumus quod sit tristitia orta ex alterius damno. Quo autem nomine appellanda sit laetitia quae ex alterius bono oritur, nescio. Porro amorem erga illum qui alteri bene fecit, favorem et contra odium erga illum qui alteri male fecit, indignationem appellabimus. Denique notandum nos non tantum misereri rei quam amavimus (ut in propositione 21 ostendimus) sed etiam ejus quam antea nullo affectu prosecuti sumus modo eam nobis similem judicemus (ut infra ostendam) atque adeo ei etiam favere qui simili bene fecit et contra in eum indignari qui simili damnum intulit.
3p23 odio tristitia laetabitur laetitia contristabitur	3p23 odio tristitia laetabitur laetitia contristabitur [geomap]
PROP. XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.	PROPOSITIO XXIII: Qui id quod odio habet, tristitia affectum imaginatur, laetabitur; si contra idem laetitia affectum esse imaginetur, contristabitur et uterque hic affectus major aut [excl non-exh] minor erit prout ejus contrarius major aut [excl non-exh] minor est in eo quod odio habet.
Proof.-In so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the strength of the pain (III. xi. note). Therefore, he (III. xx.) who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred. This was our first point. Again, pleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as the pleasure is greater or less. If anyone imagines that an object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception (III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in other words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus res odiosa tristitia afficitur eatenus destruitur et eo magis quo majore tristitia afficitur (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}). Qui igitur (per propositionem 20 hujus {3p20}) rem quam odio habet, tristitia affici imaginatur, laetitia contra afficietur et eo majore quo majore tristitia rem odiosam affectam esse imaginatur; quod erat primum. Deinde laetitia existentiam rei lt ponit (per idem scholium propositionis 11 hujus {3p11}) et eo magis quo major laetitia concipitur. Si quis eum quem odio habet, laetitia affectum imaginatur, haec imaginatio (per propositionem 13 hujus {3p13}) ejusdem conatum coercebit hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}) is qui odio habet, tristitia afficietur etc. Q.E.D.
3p23s conflictu	3p23s conflictu
Note.-This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and without any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop. xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary circumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only.	SCHOLIUM: Haec laetitia vix solida et absque ullo animi conflictu esse potest. Nam (ut statim in propositione 27 hujus ostendam) quatenus rem sibi similem tristitiae affectu affici imaginatur eatenus contristari debet et contra si eandem laetitia affici imaginetur. Sed hic ad solum odium attendimus.
3p24 rem quam odio habemus	3p24 rem quam odio habemus [geomap]
PROP. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall feel love towards him.	PROPOSITIO XXIV: Si aliquem imaginamur laetitia afficere rem quam odio habemus, odio etiam erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur tristitia eandem rem afficere, amore erga ipsum afficiemur.
Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as III. xxii., which see.	DEMONSTRATIO: Demonstratur eodem modo haec propositio ac propositio 22 hujus, quam vide. [using {3p21}, dari, causae, externae; (scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}]
3p24s invidiam	3p24s invidiam
Note.-These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.	SCHOLIUM: Hi et similes odii affectus ad invidiam referuntur, quae propterea nihil aliud est quam ipsum odium quatenus id consideratur hominem ita disponere ut malo alterius gaudeat et contra ut ejusdem bono contristetur.
3p25 affirmare conamur	3p25 affirmare conamur [geomap]
PROP. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. Contrariwise, we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object.	PROPOSITIO XXV: Id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur quod nos vel [excl non-exh] rem amatam laetitia afficere imaginamur et contra id omne negare quod nos vel [excl non-exh] rem amatam tristitia afficere imaginamur.
Proof.-That, which we conceive to affect an object of our love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or painfully (III. xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it endeavours to regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III. xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as affect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quod rem amatam laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia afficere imaginamur, id nos laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia afficit (per propositionem 21 hujus {3p21}). At mens (per propositionem 12 hujus {3p12}) ea quae nos laetitia afficiunt, quantum potest conatur imaginari hoc est (per propositionem 17 partis II {2p17} et ejus corollarium {2p17c}) ut praesentia contemplari et contra (per propositionem 13 hujus {3p13}) quae nos tristitia afficiunt, eorum existentiam secludere; ergo id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur quod nos vel [excl non-exh] rem amatam laetitia afficere imaginamur et contra. Q.E.D.
3p26  affirmare conamur odio tristitia laetitia	3p26  affirmare conamur odio tristitia laetitia [geomap]
PROP. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and, contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.	PROPOSITIO XXVI: Id omne de re quam odio habemus, affirmare conamur quod ipsam tristitia afficere imaginamur et id contra negare quod ipsam laetitia afficere imaginamur.
Proof.-This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.	DEMONSTRATIO: Sequitur haec propositio ex propositione 23 {3p23} ut praecedens ex propositione 21 hujus {3p21}.
3p26s superbia existimatio despectus	3p26s superbia existimatio despectus
Note.-Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling is called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines his own power of action. Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself. Again, the pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called over-esteem. Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain.	SCHOLIUM: His videmus facile contingere ut homo de se deque re amata plus justo et contra de re quam odit, minus justo sentiat, quae quidem imaginatio quando ipsum hominem respicit qui de se plus justo sentit, superbia vocatur et species delirii est quia homo oculis apertis somniat se omnia illa posse quae sola imaginatione assequitur quque propterea veluti realia contemplatur iisque exultat quamdiu ea imaginari non potest quae horum existentiam secludunt et ipsius agendi potentiam determinant. Est igitur superbia laetitia ex eo orta quod homo de se plus justo sentit. Deinde laetitia quae ex eo oritur quod homo de alio plus justo sentit, existimatio vocatur et illa denique despectus quae ex eo oritur quod de alio minus justo sentit.
3p27 nobis similem simili affectu	3p27 nobis similem simili affectu [geomap]
PROP. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion (affectus).	PROPOSITIO XXVII: Ex eo quod rem nobis similem et quam nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, eo ipso simili affectu afficimur.
Proof.-The images of things are modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the human body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature of the external bodies as present. If, therefore, the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the idea which we form of the external body will involve a modification [Lat: affectiones] of our own body similar to the modification [Lat: affectiones] of the external body. Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will express a modification [Lat: affectiones] of our body similar to that emotion. Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion. If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar, emotion. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Rerum imagines sunt corporis humani affectiones quarum ideae corpora externa veluti nobis praesentia repraesentant (per scholium propositionis 17 partis II {2p17}) hoc est (per propositionem 16 partis II {2p16}) quarum ideae naturam nostri corporis et simul praesentem externi corporis naturam involvunt. Si igitur corporis externi natura similis sit naturae nostri corporis, tum idea corporis externi quod imaginamur affectionem nostri corporis involvet similem affectioni corporis externi et consequenter si aliquem nobis similem aliquo affectu affectum imaginamur, haec imaginatio affectionem nostri corporis huic affectui similem exprimet adeoque ex hoc quod rem aliquam nobis similem aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, simili cum ipsa affectu afficimur. Quod si rem nobis similem odio habeamus, eatenus (per propositionem 23 hujus {3p23}) contrario affectu cum ipsa afficiemur, non autem simili. Q.E.D.
3p27s1 commiseratio aemulatio	3p27s1 commiseratio aemulatio
Note I.-This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire.	SCHOLIUM: Haec affectuum imitatio quando ad tristitiam refertur, vocatur commiseratio (de qua vide scholium propositionis 22 hujus) sed ad cupiditatem relata aemulatio, quae proinde nihil aliud est quam alicujus rei cupiditas quae in nobis ingeneratur ex eo quod alios nobis similes eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur.
3p27c1 afficere rem nobis similem	3p27c1 afficere rem nobis similem [geomap]
Corollary I.-If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.	COROLLARIUM {3p27} I: Si aliquem quem nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, imaginamur laetitia afficere rem nobis similem, amore erga eundem afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur eandem afficere, odio erga ipsum afficiemur.
Proof.-This is proved from the last proposition in the same manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hoc eodem modo ex propositione praecedenti demonstratur {3p27} ac propositio 22 {3p22} hujus ex propositione 21.
3p27c2 cujus miseret, odio non	3p27c2 cujus miseret, odio non [geomap]
Corollary II.-We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because its misery affects us painfully.	COROLLARIUM {3p27} II: Rem cujus nos miseret, odio habere non possumus ex eo quod ipsius miseria nos tristitia afficit.
Proof.-If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim ex eo nos eandem odio habere possemus, tum (per propositionem 23 hujus {3p23}) ex ipsius tristitia laetaremur, quod est contra hypothesin.
3p27c3 Rem miseret liberare conabimur	3p27c3 Rem miseret liberare conabimur [geomap]
Corollary III.-We seek to free from misery, as far as we can, a thing which we pity.	COROLLARIUM {3p27} III: Rem cujus nos miseret, a miseria quantum possumus liberare conabimur.
Proof.-That, which painfully affects the object of our pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition); therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we shall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Id quod rem cujus nos miseret, tristitia afficit, nos simili etiam tristitia afficit (per propositionem praecedentem{3p27}) adeoque omne id quod ejus rei existentiam tollit sive [mng eqv] quod rem destruit, comminisci conabimur (per propositionem 13 hujus {3p13}) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 9 hujus {non-deductive reference}) id destruere appetemus sive [non-excl non-exh] ad id destruendum determinabimur atque adeo rem cujus miseremur, a sua miseria liberare conabimur. Q.E.D.
3p27s2 benevolentia	3p27s2 benevolentia
Note II.-This will or appetite for doing good, which arises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from compassion. Concerning love or hate towards him who has done good or harm to something, which we imagine to be like ourselves, see III. xxii. note.	SCHOLIUM: Haec voluntas sive appetitus benefaciendi qui ex eo oritur quod rei in quam beneficium conferre volumus, nos miseret, benevolentia vocatur, quae proinde nihil aliud est quam cupiditas ex commiseratione orta. Caeterum de amore et odio erga illum qui rei quam nobis similem esse imaginamur, bene aut male fecit, vide scholium propositionis 22 hujus.
3p28 ad laetitiam conducere conamur promovere	3p28 ad laetitiam conducere conamur promovere [geomap]
PROP. XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain.	PROPOSITIO XXVIII: Id omne quod ad laetitiam conducere imaginamur, conamur promovere ut fiat; quod vero eidem repugnare sive [mng eqv] ad tristitiam conducere imaginamur, amovere vel [or even] destruere conamur.
Proof.-We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as possible as present or actually existing. But the endeavour of the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power of action. (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.). Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first point. Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall, therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may not regard it as present; this was our second point. Wherefore whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quod ad laetitiam conducere imaginamur, quantum possumus imaginari conamur (per propositionem 12 hujus {3p12}) hoc est (per propositionem 17 partis II {2p17}) id quantum possumus conabimur ut praesens sive [mng eqv] ut actu existens contemplari. Sed mentis conatus seu [mng eqv] potentia in cogitando qualis et simul natura est cum corporis conatu seu [mng eqv] potentia in agendo (ut clare sequitur ex corollario propositionis 7 {2p07c} et corollario propositionis 11 {2p11c} partis II) : ergo ut id existat absolute conamur sive [mng eqv] (quod per scholium propositionis 9 {non-deductive reference} hujus idem est) appetimus et intendimus; quod erat primum. Deinde si id quod tristitiae causam esse credimus hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) si id quod odio habemus, destrui imaginamur, laetabimur (per propositionem 20 hujus) adeoque idem (per primam hujus partem) conabimur destruere sive [prf eqv] (per propositionem 13 hujus) a nobis amovere ne ipsum ut praesens contemplemur, quod erat secundum. Ergo id omne quod ad laetitiam etc. Q.E.D.
3p29 cum laetitia aspicere imaginamur	3p29 cum laetitia aspicere imaginamur [geomap]
PROP. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men[6] to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from. [6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion.	PROPOSITIO XXIX: Nos id omne etiam agere conabimur quod homines cum laetitia aspicere imaginamur et contra id agere aversabimur quod homines aversari imaginamur.
Proof.-From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.). That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure or pain at the thing's presence. And so we shall endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure, etc. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ex eo quod imaginamur homines aliquid amare vel [excl non-exh] odio habere, nos idem amabimus vel [excl non-exh] odio habebimus (per propositionem 27 hujus {3p27}) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non deductive references}) eo ipso ejus rei praesentia laetabimur vel [excl non-exh] contristabimur adeoque (per praecedentem propositionem {3p28}) id omne quod homines amare sive [non-excl non-exh] cum laetitia aspicere imaginamur, conabimur agere etc. Q.E.D.
3p29s ambitio laudem vituperium	3p29s ambitio laudem vituperium
Note.-This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it is generally called kindliness. Furthermore I give the name of praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.	SCHOLIUM: Hic conatus aliquid agendi et etiam omittendi ea sola de causa ut hominibus placeamus, vocatur ambitio praesertim quando adeo impense vulgo placere conamur ut cum nostro aut alterius damno quaedam agamus vel omittamus; alias humanitas appellari solet. Deinde laetitiam qua alterius actionem qua nos conatus est delectari, imaginamur, laudem voco; tristitiam vero qua contra ejusdem actionem aversamur, vituperium voco.
3p30 aliquid laetitia afficere	3p30 aliquid laetitia afficere [geomap]
PROP. XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain.	PROPOSITIO XXX: Si quis aliquid egit quod reliquos laetitia afficere imaginatur, is laetitia concomitante idea sui tanquam causa afficietur sive [mng eqv] se ipsum cum laetitia contemplabitur. Si contra aliquid egit quod reliquos tristitia afficere imaginatur, se ipsum cum tristitia contra contemplabitur.
Proof.-He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications [Lat: affectiones] whereby he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. And so mutatis mutandis in the case of pain. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Qui se reliquos laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia afficere imaginatur, eo ipso (per propositionem 27 hujus {3p27}) laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia afficietur. Cum autem homo (per propositiones 19 {2p19} et {2p23} 23 partis II) sui sit conscius per affectiones quibus ad agendum determinatur, ergo qui aliquid egit quod ipse imaginatur reliquos laetitia afficere, laetitia cum conscientia sui tanquam causa afficietur sive [mng eqv] se ipsum cum laetitia contemplabitur et contra. Q.E.D.
3p30s gloriam pudorem acquiescentiam in se ipso paenitentiam	3p30s gloriam pudorem acquiescentiam in se ipso paenitentiam
Note.-As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in question will be a species of love and hatred. But, as the terms love and hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ other names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause[7] we will style Honour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame: I mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's belief, that he is being praised or blamed: otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause[8] is called self-complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance. Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be an annoyance to all. [7] So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read, "an internal cause." "Honor" = Gloria. [8] See previous endnote.	SCHOLIUM: Cum amor (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) sit laetitia concomitante idea  causae externae et odium tristitia concomitante etiam idea  causae externae, erit ergo haec laetitia et tristitia amoris et odii species. Sed quia amor et odium ad objecta externa referuntur, ideo hos affectus aliis nominibus significabimus nempe laetitiam concomitante idea causae internae gloriam et tristitiam huic contrariam pudorem appellabimus : intellige quando laetitia vel tristitia ex eo oritur quod homo se laudari vel vituperari credit, alias laetitiam concomitante idea causae internae acquiescentiam in se ipso, tristitiam vero eidem contrariam paenitentiam vocabo. Deinde quia (per corollarium propositionis 17 partis II) fieri potest ut laetitia qua aliquis se reliquos afficere imaginatur, imaginaria tantum sit et (per propositionem 25 hujus) unusquisque de se id omne conatur imaginari quod se laetitia afficere imaginatur, facile ergo fieri potest ut gloriosus superbus sit et se omnibus gratum esse imaginetur quando omnibus molestus est.
3p31 aliquem amare aliquid quod ipsi amamus	3p31 aliquem amare aliquid quod ipsi amamus [geomap]
PROP. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, &c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.	PROPOSITIO XXXI: Si aliquem imaginamur amare vel [non-excl non-exh] cupere vel [excl non-exh] odio habere aliquid quod ipsi amamus, cupimus vel [excl non-exh] odio habemus, eo ipso rem constantius amabimus, etc. Si autem id quod amamus, eum aversari imaginamur vel contra, tum animi fluctuationem patiemur.
Proof.-From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.): but we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a new cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly. Again, from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.). If we assume that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously love it and shrink from it; in other words, we shall be subject to vacillation (III. xvii. note). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ex eo solo quod aliquem aliquid amare imaginamur, eo ipso idem amabimus (per propositionem 27 hujus {3p27}). At sine hoc nos idem amare supponimus; accedit ergo amori nova causa a qua fovetur atque adeo id quod amamus hoc ipso constantius amabimus. Deinde ex eo quod aliquem aliquid aversari imaginamur, idem aversabimur (per eandem propositionem). At si supponamus nos eodem tempore id ipsum amare, eodem ergo tempore hoc idem amabimus et aversabimur sive [mng eqv] (vide scholium propositionis 17 hujus {3p17}) animi fluctuationem patiemur. Q.E.D.
3p31c unumquemque conari ipse amat, amet	3p31c unumquemque conari ipse amat, amet [geomap]
Corollary.-From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself hates: as the poet says: "As lovers let us share every hope and every fear: ironhearted were he who should love what the other leaves."[9] [9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5. Spinoza transposes the verses. "Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes; Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."	COROLLARIUM: Hinc et ex propositione 28 hujus {3p28} sequitur unumquemque quantum potest conari ut unusquisque id quod ipse amat, amet et quod ipse odit, odio etiam habeat; unde illud poet: Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes; Ferreus est si quis quod sinit alter, amat.
3p31s ambitio	3p31s ambitio
Note.-This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really ambition (see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone by nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should live according to his own individual disposition: when such a desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all become mutually hateful.	SCHOLIUM: Hic conatus efficiendi ut unusquisque probet id quod ipse amatae vel odio habet, revera est ambitio (vide scholium propositionis 29 hujus) atque adeo videmus unumquemque ex natura appetere ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant, quod dum omnes pariter appetunt, pariter sibi impedimento et dum omnes ab omnibus laudari seu amari volunt, odio invicem sunt.
3p32 unus solus potiri potest	3p32 unus solus potiri potest [geomap]
PROP. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof.	PROPOSITIO XXXII: Si aliquem re aliqua qua unus solus potiri potest, gaudere imaginamur, conabimur efficere ne ille illa re potiatur.
Proof.-From the mere fact of our conceiving that another person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Coroll.) we shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight therein. But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be prevented by another's delight in its object; we shall, therefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (III. xxviii.). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ex eo solo quod aliquem re aliqua gaudere imaginamur (per propositionem 27 hujus {3p17} cum ejusdem I corollario {not found}) rem illam amabimus eaque gaudere cupiemus. At (per hypothesin) huic laetitiae obstare imaginamur quod ille eadem hac re gaudeat; ergo (per propositionem 28 hujus) ne ille eadem potiatur, conabimur. Q.E.D.
3p32s invideant; experientiam consulere	3p32s invideant; experientiam consulere
Note.-We thus see that man's nature is generally so constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his own love for the goods in their possession. Further, we see that from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and ambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to experience, we shall find that she entirely confirms what we have said; more especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our life. We find that children, whose body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves of whatever they conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the images of things are, as we have said, modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the human body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by external causes to act in this or that manner.	SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque cum hominum natura plerumque ita comparatum esse ut eorum quibus male est, misereantur et quibus bene est, invideant et (per propositionem praecedentem) eo majore odio quo rem qua alium potiri imaginantur, magis amant. Videmus deinde ex eadem naturae humanae proprietate ex qua sequitur homines esse misericordes, sequi etiam eosdem esse invidos et ambitiosos. Denique si ipsam experientiam consulere velimus, ipsam haec omnia docere experiemur praesertim si ad priores nostrae tatis annos attenderimus. Nam pueros quia eorum corpus continuo veluti in quilibrio est, ex hoc solo ridere vel flere experimur quod alios ridere vel flere vident et quicquid praeterea vident alios facere, id imitari statim cupiunt et omnia denique sibi cupiunt quibus alios delectari imaginantur; nimirum quia rerum imagines uti diximus sunt ips humani corporis affectiones sive modi quibus corpus humanum a causis externis afficitur disponiturque ad hoc vel illud agendum.
3p33 nos contra amet	3p33 nos contra amet [geomap]
PROP. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in return.	PROPOSITIO XXXIII: Cum rem nobis similem amamus, conamur quantum possumus efficere ut nos contra amet.
Proof.-That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.). If the thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.). In other words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it about, that the thing should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note), that it should love us in return. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Rem quam amamus prae reliquis quantum possumus imaginari conamur (per propositionem 12 hujus {3p12}). Si igitur res nobis sit similis, ipsam prae reliquis laetitia afficere conabimur (per propositionem 29 hujus {3p29}) sive [mng eqv] conabimur quantum possumus efficere ut res amata laetitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri hoc est [hence] (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) ut nos contra amet. Q.E.D.
3p34 majore affectu magis gloriabimur	3p34 majore affectu magis gloriabimur [geomap]
PROP. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our complacency.	PROPOSITIO XXXIV: Quo majore affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis gloriabimur.
Proof.-We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to bring about, that what we love should love us in return: in other words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause. Therefore, in proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected because of us, our endeavour will be assisted.-that is (III. xi. and note) the greater will be our pleasure. But when we take pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something similar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. 30); therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nos (per propositionem praecedentem) conamur quantum possumus ut res amata nos contra amet hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {3p13}) ut res amata laetitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri. Quo itaque rem amatam majore laetitia nostra de causa affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis hic conatus juvatur hoc est (per propositionem 11 hujus {3p11} cum ejus scholio {non-deductive reference}) eo majore laetitia afficimur. At cum ex eo laetemur quod alium nobis similem laetitia affecimus, tum nosmet cum laetitia contemplamur (per propositionem 30 hujus {3p30}) : ergo quo majore affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo majore laetitia nosmet contemplabimur sive [mng eqv] (per scholium propositionis 30 hujus {non-deductive reference}) eo magis gloriabimur. Q.E.D.
3p35 rem amatam alium jungere odio	3p35 rem amatam alium jungere odio [geomap]
PROP. XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards his rival.	PROPOSITIO XXXV: Si quis imaginatur rem amatam eodem vel [excl non-exh] arctiore vinculo amiciti quo ipse eadem solus potiebatur, alium sibi jungere, odio erga ipsam rem amatam afficietur et illi alteri invidebit.
Proof.-In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is well affected towards him, will be the strength of his self-approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), of his pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, as far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound to him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinks that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.). But this endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved object has joined to itself; therefore (III. xi. note) he will for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his rival; that is, he will be (III. xiii.) affected with hatred towards the loved object and also towards his rival (III. xv. Coroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved object. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quo quis majore amore rem amatam erga se affectam esse imaginatur, eo magis gloriabitur (per praecedentem propositionem {3p34}) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 30 hujus) {non-deductive reference} laetabitur adeoque (per propositionem 28 hujus {3p28}) conabitur quantum potest imaginari rem amatam ipsi quam arctissime devinctam, qui quidem conatus sive [non-excl non-exh] appetitus fomentatur si alium idem sibi cupere imaginatur (per propositionem 31 hujus {3p31}). At hic conatus sive [non-excl non-exh] appetitus ab ipsius rei amatae imagine, concomitante imagine illius quem res amata sibi jungit, coerceri supponitur; ergo (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {3p11}) eo ipso tristitia afficietur concomitante idea rei amatae tanquam causa et simul imagine alterius hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {3p13}) odio erga rem amatam afficietur et simul erga illum alterum (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus {3p15}) cui propterea (per propositionem 23 hujus {3p23}) quod re amata delectatur, invidebit. Q.E.D.
3p35s zelotypia	3p35s zelotypia
Note.-This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied. Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater, in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; and also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image of him whom he hates. This condition generally comes into play in the case of love for a woman: for he who thinks, that a woman whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not only because his own desire is restrained, but also because, being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks from her. We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives him pain as a lover, as I will now show.	SCHOLIUM: Hoc odium erga rem amatam invidi junctum zelotypia vocatur, quae proinde nihil aliud est quam animi fluctuatio orta ex amore et odio simul concomitante idea alterius cui invidetur. praeterea hoc odium erga rem amatam majus erit pro ratione laetitiae qua zelotypus ex reciproco rei amatae amore solebat affici et etiam pro ratione affectus quo erga illum quem sibi rem amatam jungere imaginatur, affectus erat. Nam si eum oderat, eo ipso rem amatam (per propositionem 24 hujus) odio habebit quia ipsam id quod ipse odio habet, laetitia afficere imaginatur et etiam (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus) ex eo quod rei amatae imaginem imagini ejus quem odit, jungere cogitur, quae ratio plerumque locum habet in amore erga fminam; qui enim imaginatur mulierem quam amatae alteri sese prostituere, non solum ex eo quod ipsius appetitus coercetur, contristabitur sed etiam quia rei amatae imaginem pudendis et excrementis alterius jungere cogitur, eandem aversatur; ad quod denique accedit quod zelotypus non eodem vultu quem res amata ei praebere solebat, ab eadem excipiatur, qua etiam de causa amans contristatur, ut jam ostendam.
3p36 rei qua semel delectatus	3p36 rei qua semel delectatus [geomap]
PROP. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein.	PROPOSITIO XXXVI: Qui rei qua semel delectatus est, recordatur, cupit eadem cum iisdem potiri circumstantiis ac cum primo ipsa delectatus est.
Proof.-Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of pleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it, in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other words, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid homo simul cum re quae ipsum delectavit, vidit, id omne (per propositionem 15 hujus {3p15}) erit per accidens laetitiae causa adeoque (per propositionem 28 hujus {3p28}) omni eo simul cum re quae ipsum delectavit, potiri cupiet sive [non-excl non-exh] re cum omnibus iisdem circumstantiis potiri cupiet ac cum primo eadem delectatus est. Q.E.D.
3p36c circumstantiis deficere	3p36c circumstantiis deficere [geomap]
Corollary.-A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.	COROLLARIUM {3p36}: Si itaque unam ex iis circumstantiis deficere compererit, amans contristabitur.
Proof.-For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence. As he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he conceives it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nam quatenus aliquam circumstantiam deficere comperit eatenus aliquid imaginatur quod ejus rei existentiam secludit. Cum autem ejus rei  sive [non-excl exh]  circumstanti (per propositionem praecedentem {3p36}) sit prae amore cupidus, ergo (per propositionem 19 hujus {3p19}) quatenus eandem deficere imaginatur, contristabitur. Q.E.D.
3p36s desiderium	3p36s desiderium
Note.-This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence of the object of love, is called Regret.	SCHOLIUM: Haec tristitia quatenus absentiam ejus quod amamus, respicit, desiderium vocatur.
3p37 eo est major quo affectus major est	3p37 eo est major quo affectus major est [geomap]
PROP. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.	PROPOSITIO XXXVII: Cupiditas quae prae tristitia vel [excl non-exh] laetitia praeque odio vel [excl non-exh] amore oritur, eo est major quo affectus major est.
Proof.-Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power of activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes or constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in his own being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said endeavour: thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are directed to removing that pain. But (by the definition of pain), in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity; therefore the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed to remove it; that is, the greater will be the desire or appetite in endeavouring to remove it. Again, since pleasure (III. xi. note) increases or aids a man's power of activity, it may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure. Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater in proportion to the hatred or love. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Tristitia hominis agendi potentiam (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {3p11}) minuit vel [non-excl non-exh] coercet hoc est (per propositionem 7 hujus {3p07}) conatum quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur, minuit vel [non-excl non-exh] coercet adeoque (per propositionem 5 hujus {3p05}) huic conatui est contraria et quicquid homo tristitia affectus conatur, est tristitiam amovere. At (per tristitiae definitionem) quo tristitia major est, eo majori parti hominis agendi potentiae necesse est opponi; ergo quo major tristitia est, eo majore agendi potentia conabitur homo contra tristitiam amovere hoc est (per scholium propositionis 9 hujus {non-deductive reference}) eo majore cupiditate sive [non-excl non-exh] appetitu conabitur tristitiam amovere. Deinde quoniam laetitia (per idem scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}) hominis agendi potentiam auget vel [non-excl non-exh] juvat, facile eadem via demonstratur quod homo laetitia affectus nihil aliud cupit quam eandem conservare idque eo majore cupiditate quo laetitia major erit. Denique quoniam odium et amor sunt ipsi tristitiae vel [excl non-exh] laetitiae affectu sequitur eodem modo quod conatus, appetitus sive [non-excl non-exh] cupiditas quae prae odio vel [excl non-exh] amore oritur, major erit pro ratione odii et amoris. Q.E.D.
3p38 odio majore quo amor antea major	3p38 odio majore quo amor antea major [geomap]
PROP. XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love.	PROPOSITIO XXXVIII: Si quis rem amatam odio habere inceperit ita ut amor plane aboleatur, eandem majore odio ex pari causa prosequetur quam si ipsam nunquam amavisset et eo majore quo amor antea major fuerat.
Proof.-If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never loved it. For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.); he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour is greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his affection (III. xxxiii.). Now these endeavours are constrained by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Coroll. and III. xxiii.); wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will for this cause also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love has been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love was greater. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nam si quis rem quam amat, odio habere incipit, plures ejus appetitus coercentur quam si eandem non amavisset. Amor namque laetitia est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) quam homo quantum potest (per propositionem 28 hujus {3p28}) conservare conatur idque (per idem scholium) rem amatam ut praesentem contemplando eandemque (per propositionem 21 hujus {3p21}) laetitia quantum potest afficiendo, qui quidem conatus (per propositionem praecedentem) eo est major quo amor major est ut et conatus efficiendi ut res amata ipsum contra amet (vide propositionem 33 hujus {3p33}). At hi conatus odio erga rem amatam coercentur (per corollarium propositionis 13 {3p13c} et per propositionem 23 hujus {2p23}); ergo amans (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}) hac etiam de causa tristitia afficietur et eo majore quo amor major fuerat hoc est praeter tristitiam quae odii fuit causa, alia ex eo oritur quod rem amavit et consequenter majore tristitiae affectu rem amatam contemplabitur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) majore odio prosequetur quam si eandem non amavisset et eo majore quo amor major fuerat. Q.E.D.
3p39 odio malum amat benefacere conabitur	3p39 odio malum amat benefacere conabitur [geomap]
PROP. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the same law, seek to benefit him.	PROPOSITIO XXXIX: Qui aliquem odio habet, ei malum inferre conabitur nisi ex eo majus sibi malum oriri timeat et contra qui aliquem amat, ei eadem lege benefacere conabitur.
Proof.-To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to remove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, in other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater thereby-and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not carrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of his hate-he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury (III. xxviii.), and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will therefore prevail over it, as we asserted. The second part of this proof proceeds in the same manner. Wherefore he who hates another, etc. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Aliquem odio habere est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) aliquem ut tristitiae causam imaginari adeoque (per propositionem 28 hujus {3p28}) is qui aliquem odio habet, eundem amovere vel [even] destruere conabitur. Sed si inde aliquid tristius sive [mng eqv] (quod idem est) majus malum sibi timeat idque se vitare posse credit non inferendo ei quem odit malum quod meditabatur, a malo inferendo (per eandem propositionem 28 hujus {3p28}) abstinere cupiet idque (per propositionem 37 hujus {3p37}) majore conatu quam quo tenebatur inferendi malum, qui propterea praevalebit, ut volebamus. Secundae partis demonstratio eodem modo procedit. Ergo qui aliquem odio habet etc. Q.E.D.
3p39s bonum malum	3p39s bonum malum
Note.-By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our longings, whatsoever they may be. By evil, I mean every kind of pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions, judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as glory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing more painful than another's success. So every man, according to his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or useless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.). But if the evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness. Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose, fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared be very great.	SCHOLIUM: Per bonum hic intelligo omne genus laetitiae et quicquid porro ad eandem conducit et praecipue id quod desiderio qualecunque illud sit, satisfacit. Per malum autem omne tristitiae genus et praecipue id quod desiderium frustratur. Supra enim (in scholio propositionis 9 hujus) ostendimus nos nihil cupere quia id bonum esse judicamus sed contra id bonum vocamus quod cupimus et consequenter id quod aversamur malum appellamus; quare unusquisque ex suo affectu judicat seu stimat quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius, quid pejus et quid denique optimum quidve pessimum sit. Sic avarus argenti copiam optimum, ejus autem inopiam pessimum judicat. Ambitiosus autem nihil que ac gloriam cupit et contra nihil que ac pudorem reformidat. Invido deinde nihil jucundius quam alterius infelicitas et nihil molestius quam aliena felicitas ac sic unusquisque ex suo affectu rem aliquam bonam aut malam, utilem aut inutilem esse judicat. Caeterum hic affectus quo homo ita disponitur ut id quod vult nolit vel ut id quod non vult velit, timor vocatur, qui proinde nihil aliud est quam metus quatenus homo ab eodem disponitur ad malum quod futurum judicat, minore vitandum (vide propositionem 28 hujus). Sed si malum quod timet pudor sit, tum timor appellatur verecundia. Denique si cupiditas malum futurum vitandi coercetur timore alterius mali ita ut quid potius velit, nesciat, tum metus vocatur consternatio praecipue si utrumque malum quod timetur ex maximis sit.
3p40 odio imaginatur odio contra	3p40 odio imaginatur odio contra [geomap]
PROP. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate that other in return.	PROPOSITIO XL: Qui se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur nec se ullam odii causam illi dedisse credit, eundem odio contra habebit.
Proof.-He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is, with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But, by the hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him who is his enemy; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by some one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of his enemy; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Qui aliquem odio affectum imaginatur, eo ipso etiam odio afficietur (per propositionem 27 hujus {3p27}) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) tristitia concomitante idea  causae externae. At ipse (per hypothesin) nullam hujus tristitiae causam imaginatur praeter illum qui ipsum odio habet; ergo ex hoc quod se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, tristitia afficietur concomitante idea ejus qui ipsum odio habet sive [mng eqv] (per idem scholium {non-deductive reference}) eundem odio habebit. Q.E.D.
3p40s1 pudore	3p40s1 pudore
Note.-He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but this case (III. xxv.) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred may also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure the object of our hate (III. xxxix.). He therefore who conceives that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with pain or fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; in other words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I said above.	SCHOLIUM: Quod si se justam odii causam praebuisse imaginatur, tum (per propositionem 30 hujus et ejusdem scholium) pudore afficietur. Sed hoc (per propositionem 25 hujus) raro contingit. praeterea haec odii reciprocatio oriri etiam potest ex eo quod odium sequatur conatus malum inferendi ei qui odio habetur (per propositionem 39 hujus). Qui igitur se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, eundem alicujus mali sive tristitiae causam imaginabitur atque adeo tristitia afficietur seu metu concomitante idea ejus qui ipsum odio habet tanquam causa hoc est odio contra afficietur ut supra.
3p40c1 odio et amore simul	3p40c1 odio et amore simul [geomap]
Corollary I.-He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For, in so far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is determined to hate his enemy in return. But, by the hypothesis, he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.	COROLLARIUM {3p40} I: Qui quem amatae  odio erga se affectum imaginatur, odio et amore simul conflictabitur. Nam quatenus imaginatur ab eodem se odio haberi, determinatur (per propositionem praecedentem {3p40}) ad eundem contra odio habendum. At (per hypothesin) ipsum nihilominus amatae : ergo odio et amore simul conflictabitur.
3p40c2 idem malum eidem referre	3p40c2 idem malum eidem referre [geomap]
Corollary II.-If a man conceives that one, whom he has hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in kind.	COROLLARIUM {3p40} II: Si aliquis imaginatur ab aliquo quem antea nullo affectu prosecutus est, malum aliquod prae odio sibi illatum esse, statim idem malum eidem referre conabitur.
Proof.-He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully; he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.). Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury done to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to repay it in kind. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Qui aliquem odio erga se affectum esse imaginatur, eum contra (per praecedentem propositionem {3p40}) odio habebit et (per propositionem 26 hujus {3p26}) id omne comminisci conabitur quod eundem possit tristitia afficere atque id eidem (per propositionem 39 hujus {3p39}) inferre studebit. At (per hypothesin) primum quod hujusmodi imaginatur, est malum sibi illatum; ergo idem statim eidem inferre conabitur. Q.E.D.
3p40s2 ira  vindicta	3p40s2 ira  vindicta
Note.-The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called Anger; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves is called Revenge.	SCHOLIUM: Conatus malum inferendi ei quem odimus ira vocatur; conatus autem malum nobis illatum referendi vindicta appellatur.
3p41 amari nec causa amabit	3p41 amari nec causa amabit [geomap]
PROP. XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love that other in return. (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.)	PROPOSITIO XLI: Si quis ab aliquo se amari imaginatur nec se ullam ad id causam dedisse credit (quod per corollarium propositionis 15 {3p15c} et per propositionem 16 hujus {3p16} fieri potest) eundem contra amabit.
Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as the preceding one. See also the note appended thereto.	DEMONSTRATIO: Haec propositio eadem via demonstratur ac praecedens. {using afficietur, {3p27}, causae , externae.} Cujus etiam scholium vide {non-deductive reference}.
3p41s1 gratia seu gratitudo	3p41s1 gratia seu gratitudo
Note.-If he believes that he has given just cause for the love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is what most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated by another. (See note to preceding proposition.) This reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him who loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is called gratitude or thankfulness. It thus appears that men are much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.	SCHOLIUM: Quod si se justam amoris causam praebuisse crediderit, gloriabitur (per propositionem 30 hujus cum ejusdem scholio) quod quidem (per propositionem 25 hujus) frequentius contingit et cujus contrarium evenire diximus quando aliquis ab aliquo se odio haberi imaginatur (vide scholium propositionis praecedentis). Porro hic reciprocus amor et consequenter (per propositionem 39 hujus) conatus benefaciendi ei qui nos amatae quique (per eandem propositionem 39 hujus) nobis benefacere conatur, gratia seu gratitudo vocatur atque adeo apparet homines longe paratiores esse ad vindictam quam ad referendum beneficium.
3p41c odio et amore simul	3p41c odio et amore simul [geomap]
Corollary.-He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. This is proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding proposition.	COROLLARIUM {3p41}: Qui ab eo quem odio habet, se amari imaginatur, odio et amore simul conflictabitur. Quod eadem via qua primum propositionis praecedentis corollarium demonstratur.
3p41s2 malum inferre conabitur	3p41s2 malum inferre conabitur
Note.-If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour to injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty, especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary cause for hatred.	SCHOLIUM: Quod si odium praevaluerit, ei a quo amatur malum inferre conabitur, qui quidem affectus crudelitas appellatur praecipue si illum qui amatae nullam odii communem causam praebuisse creditur.
3p42 beneficium ingrato	3p42 beneficium ingrato [geomap]
PROP. XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude.	PROPOSITIO XLII: Qui in aliquem amore aut [excl non-exh] spe gloriae motus beneficium contulit, contristabitur si viderit beneficium ingrato animo accipi.
Proof.-When a man loves something similar to himself, he endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.). Therefore he who has conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which he feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from the hope of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will endeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or to regard it as actually existing. But, by the hypothesis, he conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the said cause of honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Qui rem aliquam sibi similem amat, conatur quantum potest efficere ut ab ipsa contra ametur (per propositionem 33 hujus {3p33}). Qui igitur prae amore in aliquem beneficium contulit, id facit desiderio quo tenetur ut contra ametur hoc est [hence] (per propositionem 34 hujus {3p34}) spe gloriae sive [a kind of] (per scholium propositionis 30 hujus {non-deductive reference}) laetitiae adeoque (per propositionem 12 hujus {3p12}) hanc gloriae causam quantum potest imaginari sive [non-excl non-exh] ut actu existentem contemplari conabitur. At (per hypothesin) aliud imaginatur quod ejusdem causae existentiam secludit : ergo (per propositionem 19 hujus {3p19}) eo ipso contristabitur. Q.E.D.
3p43 Odium reciproco odio amore deleri	3p43 Odium reciproco odio amore deleri [geomap]
PROP. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be destroyed by love.	PROPOSITIO XLIII: Odium reciproco odio augetur et amore contra deleri potest.
Proof.-He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hates him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.). But if, on the other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure, and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his emotion. In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III. xli.), and not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion from which it arises. Therefore, if it be greater than that which arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better of it and banish the hatred from his mind. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Qui eum quem odit, odio contra erga se affectum esse imaginatur, eo ipso (per propositionem 40 hujus {3p40}) novum odium oritur durante (per hypothesin) adhuc primo. Sed si contra eundem amore erga se affectum esse imaginetur, quatenus hoc imaginatur eatenus (per propositionem 30 hujus {3p30}) se ipsum cum laetitia contemplatur et eatenus (per propositionem 29 hujus {3p29}) eidem placere conabitur hoc est (per propositionem 41 hujus {3p41}) eatenus conatur ipsum odio non habere nullaque tristitia afficere; qui quidem conatus (per propositionem 37 hujus {3p37}) major vel [excl non-exh] minor erit pro ratione affectus ex quo oritur atque adeo si major fuerit illo qui ex odio oritur et quo rem quam odit (per propositionem 26 hujus {3p26}) tristitia afficere conatur, ei praevalebit et odium ex animo delebit. Q.E.D.
3p44 Odium vincitur in amorem	3p44 Odium vincitur in amorem [geomap]
PROP. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it.	PROPOSITIO XLIV: Odium quod amore plane vincitur in amorem transit et amor propterea major est quam si odium non praecessisset.
Proof.-The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. xxxviii. of this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he was wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving feels pleasure. To this pleasure involved in love is added the pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the idea of the former object of hatred as cause.	DEMONSTRATIO: Eodem modo procedit ac propositionis 38 {3p38} hujus. Nam qui rem quam odit sive [non-excl non-exh] quam cum tristitia contemplari solebat, amare incipit, eo ipso quod amat, laetatur et huic laetitiae quam amor involvit (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) illa etiam accedit quae ex eo oritur quod conatus amovendi tristitiam quam odium involvit (ut in propositione 37 hujus ostendimus {3p37}) prorsus juvatur concomitante idea ejus quem odio habuit tanquam causa.
3p44s nemo spe damnum recuperandi damnum sibi inferri cupiet	3p44s nemo spe damnum recuperandi damnum sibi inferri cupiet
Note.-Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying this greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor long to be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone will always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as far as he can. If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him. For the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason, he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health: in such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.) is absurd.	SCHOLIUM: Quamvis res ita se habeat, nemo tamen conabitur rem aliquam odio habere vel tristitia affici ut majore hac laetitia fruatur hoc est nemo spe damnum recuperandi damnum sibi inferri cupiet nec grotare desiderabit spe convalescendi. Nam unusquisque suum esse conservare et tristitiam quantum potest amovere semper conabitur. Quod si contra concipi posset hominem posse cupere aliquem odio habere ut eum postea majore amore prosequatur, tum eundem odio habere semper desiderabit. Nam quo odium majus fuerit, eo amor erit major atque adeo desiderabit semper ut odium magis magisque augeatur et eadem de causa homo magis ac magis grotare conabitur ut majore laetitia ex restauranda valetudine postea fruatur atque adeo semper grotare conabitur, quod (per propositionem 6 hujus) est absurdum.
3p45 sibi similem odio quam amat odio	3p45 sibi similem odio quam amat odio [geomap]
PROP. XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that person.	PROPOSITIO XLV: Si quis aliquem sibi similem odio in rem sibi similem quam amat, affectum esse imaginatur, eum odio habebit.
Proof.-The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him who hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as affected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain; consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves (III. xiii. note). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nam res amata eum qui ipsam odit, odio contra habet (per propositionem 40 hujus {3p40}) adeoque amans qui aliquem imaginatur rem amatam odio habere, eo ipso rem amatam odio hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) tristitia affectam esse imaginatur et consequenter (per propositionem 21 hujus {3p21}) contristatur idque concomitante idea ejus qui rem amatam odit tanquam causa hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) ipsum odio habebit. Q.E.D.
3p46 classis sive nationis	3p46 classis sive nationis [geomap]
PROP. XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs.	PROPOSITIO XLVI: Si quis ab aliquo cujusdam classis sive [non-excl exh] nationis a sua diversae laetitia vel [non-excl non-exh] tristitia affectus fuerit concomitante ejus idea sub nomine universali classis vel [non-excl non-exh] nationis tanquam causa, is non tantum illum sed omnes ejusdem classis vel [non-excl non-exh] nationis amabit vel [non-excl non-exh] odio habebit.
Proof.-This is evident from III. xvi.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus rei demonstratio patet ex propositione 16 hujus partis {3p16}.
3p47 Laetitia scilicet quam odimus destrui	3p47 Laetitia scilicet quam odimus destrui [geomap]
PROP. XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us.	PROPOSITIO XLVII: Laetitia quae ex eo oritur quod scilicet rem quam odimus destrui aut [excl non-exh] alio malo affici imaginamur, non oritur absque ulla animi tristitia.
Proof.-This is evident from III. xxvii. For in so far as we conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain, we ourselves feel pain.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex propositione 27 hujus {3p27}. Nam quatenus rem nobis similem tristitia affici imaginamur eatenus contristamur.
3p47s ex corollario propositionis 17 partis II	3p47s ex corollario propositionis 17 partis II
Note.-This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary to II. xvii. Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard it with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the said determination is checked: for this reason the joy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we remember that object of hatred. For, as we have said, when the image of the thing in question, is aroused, inasmuch as it involves the thing's existence, it determines the man to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it actually did exist. However, since he has joined to the image of the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place. This is the cause of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped. For when men conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are determined to fear it; this determination is checked afresh by the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secure afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.	SCHOLIUM: Potest haec propositio etiam demonstrari ex corollario propositionis 17 partis II. Quoties enim rei recordamur, quamvis ipsa actu non existat, eandem tamen ut praesentem contemplamur corpusque eodem modo afficitur; quare quatenus rei memoria viget eatenus homo determinatur ad eandem cum tristitia contemplandum; quae determinatio manente adhuc rei imagine coercetur quidem memoria illarum rerum quae hujus existentiam secludunt sed non tollitur atque adeo homo eatenus tantum laetatur quatenus haec determinatio coercetur et hinc fit ut haec laetitia quae ex rei quam odimus malo oritur, toties repetatur quoties ejusdem rei recordamur. Nam uti diximus quando ejusdem rei imago excitatur, quia haec ipsius rei existentiam involvit, hominem determinat ad rem cum eadem tristitia contemplandum qua eandem contemplari solebat cum ipsa existeret. Sed quia ejusdem rei imagini alias junxit quae ejusdem existentiam secludunt, ideo haec ad tristitiam determinatio statim coercetur et homo de novo laetatur et hoc toties quoties haec repetitio fit. Atque haec eadem est causa cur homines laetantur quoties alicujus jam praeteriti mali recordantur et cur pericula a quibus liberati sunt, narrare gaudeant. Nam ubi aliquod periculum imaginantur, idem veluti adhuc futurum contemplantur et ad id metuendum determinantur, quae determinatio de novo coercetur idea libertatis quam hujus periculi ideae junxerunt cum ab eodem liberati sunt quque eos de novo securos reddit atque adeo de novo laetantur.
3p48 Petrum non solum fuisse	3p48 Petrum non solum fuisse [geomap]
PROP. XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.	PROPOSITIO XLVIII: Amor et odium exempli gratia erga Petrum destruitur si tristitia quam hoc et laetitia quam ille involvit, ideae alterius causae jungatur et eatenus uterque diminuitur quatenus imaginamur Petrum non solum fuisse alterutrius causam.
Proof.-This Prop. is evident from the mere definition of love and hatred (III. xiii. note). For pleasure is called love towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the other. When this condition of causality is either wholly or partly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part vanishes. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex sola amoris et odii definitione, quam vide in scholio propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}. Nam propter hoc solum laetitia vocatur amor et tristitia odium erga Petrum quia scilicet Petrus hujus vel illius affectus causa esse consideratur. Hoc itaque prorsus vel [excl non-exh] ex parte sublato affectus quoque erga Petrum prorsus vel [excl non-exh] ex parte diminuitur. Q.E.D.
3p49 erga quam liberam imaginamur	3p49 erga quam liberam imaginamur [geomap]
PROP. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.	PROPOSITIO XLIX: Amor et odium erga rem quam liberam esse imaginamur, major ex pari causa uterque debet esse quam erga necessariam.
Proof.-A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.) be perceived through itself without anything else. If, therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we shall therefore (III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the given emotion. But if the thing which causes the emotion be conceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def. vii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred towards it will be less. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Res quam liberam esse imaginamur, debet (per definitionem 7 partis I {1d07}) per se absque aliis percipi. Si igitur eandem laetitiae vel [excl non-exh] tristitiae causam esse imaginemur, eo ipso (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) eandem amabimus vel [excl non-exh] odio habebimus idque (per propositionem praecedentem) summo amore vel [excl non-exh] odio qui ex dato affectu oriri potest. Sed si rem quae ejusdem affectus est causa ut necessariam imaginemur, tum (per eandem definitionem 7 partis I) ipsam non solam sed cum aliis ejusdem affectus causam esse imaginabimur atque adeo (per propositionem praecedentem) amor et odium erga ipsam minor erit. Q.E.D.
3p49s quia se liberos esse existimant	3p49s quia se liberos esse existimant
Note.-Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.	SCHOLIUM: Hinc sequitur homines, quia se liberos esse existimant, majore amore vel odio se invicem prosequi quam alia; ad quod accedit affectuum imitatio, de qua vide propositiones 27, 34, 40 et 43 hujus.
3p50 quaecunque spei aut metus causa	3p50 quaecunque spei aut metus causa [geomap]
PROP. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear.	PROPOSITIO L: Res quaecunque potest esse per accidens spei aut [excl non-exh] metus causa.
Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as III. xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.	DEMONSTRATIO: Haec propositio eadem via demonstratur qua propositio 15 hujus {using mens, affici, agendi potentia, {3post01}, quam vide una cum scholio II propositionis 18 hujus {non-deductive reference}.
3p50s omina	3p50s omina
Note.-Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or fear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such omens are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles, or causes of that which we fear. It follows, further, from III. xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or below their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions, whereby men are everywhere assailed. However, I do not think it worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope, as I will duly explain in the proper place. Further, in so far as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we have said concerning love and hatred.	SCHOLIUM: Res quae per accidens spei aut metus sunt caus, bona aut mala omina vocantur. Deinde quatenus haec eadem omina sunt spei aut metus causa eatenus (per definitionem spei et metus, quam vide in scholio II propositionis 18 hujus) laetitiae aut tristitiae sunt causa et consequenter (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus) eatenus eadem amamus vel odio habemus et (per propositionem 28 hujus) tanquam media ad ea quae speramus, adhibere vel tanquam obstacula aut metus causas amovere conamur. praeterea ex propositione 25 hujus sequitur nos natura ita esse constitutos ut ea quae speramus, facile, quae autem timemus, difficile credamus et ut de iis plus minusve justo sentiamus. Atque ex his ort sunt superstitiones quibus homines ubique conflictantur. Caeterum non puto operae esse pretium animi hic ostendere fluctuationes quae ex spe et metu oriuntur quandoquidem ex sola horum affectuum definitione sequitur non dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe (ut fusius suo loco explicabimus) et praeterea quandoquidem quatenus aliquid speramus aut metuimus eatenus idem amamus vel odio habemus atque adeo quicquid de amore et odio diximus, facile unusquisque spei et metui applicare poterit.
3p51 diversimode affici	3p51 diversimode affici [geomap]
PROP. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object.	PROPOSITIO LI: Diversi homines ab uno eodemque objecto diversimode affici possunt et unus idemque homo ab uno eodemque objecto potest diversis temporibus diversimode affici.
Proof.-The human body is affected by external bodies in a variety of ways (II. Post. iii.). Two men may therefore be differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i. after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by one and the same object. Further (by the same Post.) the human body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another; consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected at different times by one and the same object. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Corpus humanum (per postulatum 3 partis II {2post03}) a corporibus externis plurimis modis afficitur. Possunt igitur eodem tempore duo homines diversimode esse affecti atque adeo (per axioma 1 quod est post lemma 3 {2a3.1}, quod vide post propositionem 13 partis II) ab uno eodemque objecto possunt diversimode affici. Deinde (per idem postulatum) corpus humanum potest jam hoc jam alio modo esse affectum et consequenter (per idem axioma) ab uno eodemque objecto diversis temporibus diversimode affici. Q.E.D.
3p51s homines tam judicio quam affectu variare posse	3p51s homines tam judicio quam affectu variare posse
Note.-We thus see that it is possible, that what one man loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on. Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good, what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions[10], hence when we compare some with others, we distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet. For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him daring. Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that he is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment. [10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note. Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent, are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of things alluded to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we can easily understand what are Repentance and Self-complacency. Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause; Self-complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).	SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque fieri posse ut quod hic amat, alter odio habeat et quod hic metuit, alter non metuat et ut unus idemque homo jam amet quod antea oderit et ut jam audeat quod antea timuit etc. Deinde quia unusquisque ex suo affectu judicat quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius et quid pejus sit (vide scholium propositionis 39 hujus) sequitur homines tam judicio quam affectu variare posse et hinc fit ut cum alios aliis comparamus, ex sola affectuum differentia a nobis distinguantur et ut alios intrepidos, alios timidos, alios denique alio nomine appellemus. Exempli gratia illum ego intrepidum vocabo qui malum contemnit quod ego timere soleo et si praeterea ad hoc attendam quod ejus cupiditas malum inferendi ei quem odit et benefaciendi ei quem amat, non coercetur timore mali a quo ego contineri soleo, ipsum audacem appellabo. Deinde ille mihi timidus videbitur qui malum timet quod ego contemnere soleo et si insuper ad hoc attendam quod ejus cupiditas coercetur timore mali quod me continere nequit, ipsum pusillanimem esse dicam et sic unusquisque judicabit. Denique ex hac hominis natura et judicii inconstantia ut et quod homo spe ex solo affectu de rebus judicat et quod res quas ad laetitiam vel tristitiam facere credit quasque propterea (per propositionem 28 hujus) ut fiant promovere vel amovere conatur, spe non nisi imaginari sint ut jam taceam alia quae in II parte ostendimus de rerum incertitudine, facile concipimus hominem posse spe in causa esse tam ut contristetur quam ut ltetur sive ut tam tristitia quam laetitia afficiatur concomitante idea sui tanquam causa atque adeo facile intelligimus quid paenitentia et quid acquiescentia in se ipso sit. Nempe paenitentia est tristitia concomitante idea sui et acquiescentia in se ipso est laetitia concomitante idea sui tanquam causa et hi affectus vehementissimi sunt quia homines se liberos esse credunt (vide propositionem 49 hujus).
3p52 tamdiu contemplabimur	3p52 tamdiu contemplabimur [geomap]
PROP. LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long, as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself.	PROPOSITIO LII: Objectum quod simul cum aliis antea vidimus vel [non-excl non-exh] quod nihil habere imaginamur nisi quod commune est pluribus, non tamdiu contemplabimur ac illud quod aliquid singulare habere imaginamur.
Proof.-As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in conjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II. xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another object. And this is the case with the object, which we conceive to have no property that is not common to many. For we thereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not before seen in conjunction with other objects. But when we suppose that we conceive an object something special, which we have never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while regarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to regarding instead thereof; therefore it is determined to the contemplation of that object only. Therefore an object, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Simulatque objectum quod cum aliis vidimus, imaginamur, statim et aliorum recordamur (per propositionem 18 partis II {2p18}, cujus etiam scholium vide) et sic ex unius contemplatione statim in contemplationem alterius incidimus. Atque eadem est ratio objecti quod nihil habere imaginamur nisi quod commune est pluribus. Nam eo ipso supponimus nos nihil in eo contemplari quod antea cum aliis non viderimus. Verum cum supponimus nos in objecto aliquo aliquid singulare quod antea nunquam vidimus, imaginari, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod mens dum illud objectum contemplatur, nullum aliud in se habeat in cujus contemplationem ex contemplatione illius incidere potest atque adeo ad illud solum contemplandum determinata est. Ergo objectum etc. Q.E.D.
3p52s consternatio veneratio horror devotionem	3p52s consternatio veneratio horror devotionem
Note.-This mental modification [Lat: affectiones], or imagination of a particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called Consternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil. If, however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration; otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., be what we wonder at, the emotion is called Horror. Again, if it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater (III. xii.), and when joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion. We may in like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in ordinary speech. Whence it is evident, that the names of the emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their nature. To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c., we are, in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.), determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing, we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more particularly to regard that which is therein. As devotion springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence. Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c., in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any recognized name.	SCHOLIUM: Haec mentis affectio sive rei singularis imaginatio quatenus sola in mente versatur, vocatur admiratio, quae si ab objecto quod timemus moveatur, consternatio dicitur quia mali admiratio hominem suspensum in sola sui contemplatione ita tenet ut de aliis cogitare non valeat quibus illud malum vitare posset. Sed si id quod admiramur sit hominis alicujus prudentia, industria vel aliquid hujusmodi, quia eo ipso hominem nobis longe antecellere contemplamur, tum admiratio vocatur veneratio; alias horror si hominis iram, invidiam etc. admiramur. Deinde si hominis quem amamus prudentiam, industriam etc. admiramur, amor eo ipso (per propositionem 12 hujus) major erit et hunc amorem admirationi sive venerationi junctum devotionem vocamus. Et ad hunc modum concipere etiam possumus odium, spem, securitatem et alios affectus admirationi junctos atque adeo plures affectus deducere poterimus quam qui receptis vocabulis indicari solent. Unde apparet affectuum nomina inventa esse magis ex eorum vulgari u su quam ex eorundem accurata cognitione. Admirationi opponitur contemptus cujus tamen causa haec plerumque est quod scilicet ex eo quod aliquem rem aliquam admirari, amare, metuere etc. videmus vel ex eo quod res aliqua primo aspectu apparet similis rebus quas admiramur, amamus, metuimus etc. (per propositionem 15 cum ejus corollario et propositionem 27 hujus) determinamur ad eandem rem admirandum, amandum, metuendum etc. Sed si ex ipsius rei praesentia vel accuratiore contemplatione, id omne de eadem negare cogamur quod causa admirationis, amoris, metus etc. esse potest, tum mens ex ipsa rei praesentia magis ad ea cogitandum quae in objecto non sunt quam quae in ipso sunt, determinata manet cum tamen contra ex objecti praesentia id praecipue cogitare soleat quod in objecto est. Porro sicut devotio ex rei quam amamus admiratione sic irrisio ex rei quam odimus vel metuimus contemptu oritur et dedignatio ex stulaetitiae contemptu sicuti veneratio ex admiratione prudenti. Possumus denique amorem, spem, gloriam et alios affectus junctos contemptui concipere atque inde alios praeterea affectus deducere quos etiam nullo singulari vocabulo ab aliis distinguere solemus.
3p53 ipsam agendi potentiam laetatur	3p53 ipsam agendi potentiam laetatur [geomap]
PROP. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity.	PROPOSITIO LIII: Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur, laetatur et eo magis quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginatur.
Proof.-A man does not know himself except through the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and xxiii.). When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or (III. xi. note) to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own power of activity. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Homo se ipsum non cognoscit nisi per affectiones sui corporis earumque ideas (per propositiones 19 {2p19} et 23 {2p23} partis II). Cum ergo fit ut mens se ipsam possit contemplari, eo ipso ad majorem perfectionem transire hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}) laetitia affici supponitur et eo majore quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginari potest. Q.E.D.
3p53c ab aliis laudari imaginatur	3p53c ab aliis laudari imaginatur [geomap]
Corollary.-This pleasure is fostered more and more, in proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others. For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.) himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself. Q.E.D.	COROLLARIUM {3p53}: Haec laetitia magis magisque fovetur quo magis homo se ab aliis laudari imaginatur. Nam quo magis se ab aliis laudari imaginatur eo majore laetitia alios ab ipso affici imaginatur idque concomitante idea sui (per scholium propositionis 29 hujus {non-deductive reference}) atque adeo (per propositionem 27 hujus {3p27}) ipse majore laetitia concomitante idea sui afficitur. Q.E.D.
3p54 imaginari agendi potentiam	3p54 imaginari agendi potentiam [geomap]
PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity.	PROPOSITIO LIV: Mens ea tantum imaginari conatur quae ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt.
Proof.-The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual essence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not that which it neither is nor can do; therefore the mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its power of activity. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis conatus sive [mng eqv] potentia est ipsa ipsius mentis essentia (per propositionem 7 hujus {3p07}); mentis autem essentia (ut per se notum) id tantum quod mens est et potest, affirmat; at non id quod non est neque potest adeoque id tantum imaginari conatur quod ipsius agendi potentiam affirmat sive [mng eqv] ponit. Q.E.D.
3p55 impotentiam imaginatur contristatur	3p55 impotentiam imaginatur contristatur [geomap]
PROP. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat.	PROPOSITIO LV: Cum mens suam impotentiam imaginatur, eo ipso contristatur.
Proof.-The essence of the mind only affirms that which the mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to imagine only such things as assert its power of activity (last Prop.). Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is checked in its endeavour--in other words (III. xi. note), it feels pain. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis essentia id tantum quod mens est et potest, affirmat sive [mng eqv] de natura mentis est ea tantummodo imaginari quae ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt (per propositionem praecedentem {3p54}). Cum itaque dicimus quod mens dum se ipsam contemplatur, suam imaginatur impotentiam, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod dum mens aliquid imaginari conatur quod ipsius agendi potentiam ponit, hic ejus conatus coercetur sive [mng eqv] (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}) quod ipsa contristatur. Q.E.D.
3p55c1 ab aliis vituperari imaginatur	3p55c1 ab aliis vituperari imaginatur [geomap]
Corollary.-This pain is more and more fostered, if a man conceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the same way as the corollary to III. liii.	COROLLARIUM: Haec tristitia magis ac magis fovetur si se ab aliis vituperari imaginatur; quod eodem modo demonstratur ac corollarium propositionis 53 hujus {using  {3p53}, affici, scholium propositionis 29 hujus {non-deductive reference}, {3p27}}.
3p55s1 humilitas philautia acquiescentia homines natura proclives ad odium et invidiam	3p55s1 humilitas philautia acquiescentia homines natura proclives ad odium et invidiam
Note.-This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the contemplation of ourselves, is called self-love or self-complacency. And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another. Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv. note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever a man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III. liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and he conceives them more distinctly-that is (II. xl. note), in proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard them as something special. Therefore, a man will take most pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some quality which he denies to others. But, if that which he affirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall short when compared with those of others. This pain (III. xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he can, embellishing his own. It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spur of honour and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's virtues, and venerate their possessors. In order to remove such doubts, I append the following corollary.	SCHOLIUM: Haec tristitia concomitante idea nostrae imbecillitatis humilitas appellatur; laetitia autem quae ex contemplatione nostri oritur, philautia vel acquiescentia in se ipso vocatur. Et quoniam haec toties repetitur quoties homo suas virtutes sive suam agendi potentiam contemplatur, hinc ergo etiam fit ut unusquisque facta sua narrare suique tam corporis quam animi vires ostentare gestiat et ut homines hac de causa sibi invicem molesti sint. Ex quibus iterum sequitur homines natura esse invidos (vide scholium propositionis 24 et scholium propositionis 32 hujus) sive ob suorum qualium imbecillitatem gaudere et contra propter eorundem virtutem contristari. Nam quoties unusquisque suas actiones imaginatur toties laetitia (per propositionem 53 hujus) afficitur et eo majore quo actiones plus perfectionis exprimere et easdem distinctius imaginatur hoc est (per illa quae in scholio I propositionis 40 partis II dicta sunt) quo magis easdem ab aliis distinguere et ut res singulares contemplari potest. Quare unusquisque ex contemplatione sui tunc maxime gaudebit quando aliquid in se contemplatur quod de reliquis negat. Sed si id quod de se affirmat, ad universalem hominis vel animalis ideam refert, non tantopere gaudebit et contra contristabitur si suas ad aliorum actiones comparatas imbecilliores esse imaginetur, quam quidem tristitiam (per propositionem 28 hujus) amovere conabitur idque suorum qualium actiones perperam interpretando vel suas quantum potest adornando. Apparet igitur homines natura proclives esse ad odium et invidiam ad quam accedit ipsa educatio. Nam parentes solo honoris et invidi stimulo liberos ad virtutem concitare solent. Sed scrupulus forsan remanet quod non raro hominum virtutes admiremur eosque veneremur. Hunc ergo ut amoveam sequens addam corollarium.
3p55c2 Nemo virtutem alicui nisi quali invidet	3p55c2 Nemo virtutem alicui nisi quali invidet [geomap]
Corollary.-No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his equal.	COROLLARIUM {3p55}: Nemo virtutem alicui nisi quali invidet.
Proof.-Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III. xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification [Lat: affectiones] whereby a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is checked. But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything, which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to another's nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an one. But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same nature as himself. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Invidia est ipsum odium (vide scholium propositionis 24 hujus {3p24}) sive [a kind of] (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus {non-deductive reference}) tristitia hoc est [mng eqv] (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}) affectio qua hominis agendi potentia seu [mng eqv] conatus coercetur. At homo (per scholium propositionis 9 hujus {non-deductive reference}) nihil agere conatur neque cupit nisi quod ex data sua natura sequi potest; ergo homo nullam de se agendi potentiam seu [mng eqv] (quod idem est) virtutem praedicari cupiet quae naturae alterius est propria et suae aliena adeoque ejus cupiditas coerceri hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}) ipse contristari nequit ex eo quod aliquam virtutem in aliquo ipsi dissimili contemplatur et consequenter neque ei invidere poterit. At quidem suo quali qui cum ipso ejusdem naturae supponitur. Q.E.D.
3p55s2 scholio propositionis 52	3p55s2 scholio propositionis 52
Note.-When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii., we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude, &c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions for being courageous.	SCHOLIUM: Cum igitur supra in scholio propositionis 52 hujus partis dixerimus nos hominem venerari ex eo quod ipsius prudentiam, fortitudinem etc. admiramur, id fit (ut ex ipsa propositione patet) quia has virtutes ei singulariter inesse et non ut nostrae naturae communes imaginamur adeoque easdem ipsi non magis invidebimus quam arboribus alaetitudinem et leonibus fortitudinem etc.
3p56 affectus species quot objectorum afficimur	3p56 affectus species quot objectorum afficimur [geomap]
PROP. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.	PROPOSITIO LVI: Laetitiae, tristitiae et cupiditatis et consequenter uniuscujusque affectus qui ex his componitur ut animi fluctuationis vel [non-excl non-exh] qui ab his derivatur nempe amoris, odii, spei, metus etc. tot species dantur quot sunt species objectorum a quibus afficimur.
Proof.-Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or passive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive (III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is, we are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we conceive, or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by an emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and the nature of an external body. Wherefore the nature of every passive state must necessarily be so explained, that the nature of the object whereby we are affected be expressed. Namely, the pleasure, which arises from, say, the object A, involves the nature of that object A, and the pleasure, which arises from the object B, involves the nature of the object B; wherefore these two pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as the causes whence they arise are by nature different. So again the emotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature different from the pain arising from another object, and, similarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation, &c. Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected. Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any given modification [Lat: affectiones] of itself (III. ix. note); therefore, according as a man is affected through external causes by this or that kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words, according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so will his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire, as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose. Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of pleasure, pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown) there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Laetitia et tristitia et consequenter affectus qui ex his componuntur vel [non-excl non-exh] ex his derivantur, passiones sunt (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus {non-deductive reference}); nos autem (per propositionem 1 hujus {3p01}) necessario patimur quatenus ideas habemus inadaequatas et quatenus easdem habemus (per propositionem 3 hujus {3p03}) eatenus tantum patimur hoc est (vide scholium I propositionis 40 partis II {non-deductive reference}) eatenus tantum necessario patimur quatenus imaginamur sive [prf eqv] (vide propositionem 17 partis II {2p17} cum ejus scholio {non-deductive reference}) quatenus afficimur affectu qui naturam nostri corporis et naturam corporis externi involvit. Natura igitur uniuscujusque passionis ita necessario debet explicari ut objecti a quo afficimur, naturam exprimatur. Nempe laetitia quae ex objecto exempli gratia A oritur, naturam ipsius objecti A et laetitia quae ex objecto B oritur, ipsius objecti B naturam involvit atque adeo hi duo laetitiae affectus natura sunt diversi quia ex causis diversae naturae oriuntur. Sic etiam tristitiae affectus qui ex uno objecto oritur, diversus natura est a tristitia quae ab alia causa oritur, quod etiam de amore, odio, spe, metu, animi fluctuatione etc. intelligendum est ac proinde laetitiae,tristitiae, amoris, odii etc. tot species necessario dantur quot sunt species objectorum a quibus afficimur. At cupiditas est [mng eqv] ipsa uniuscujusque essentia seu [mng eqv] natura quatenus ex data quacunque ejus constitutione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum (vide scholium propositionis 9 hujus {non-deductive reference}); ergo prout unusquisque a causis externis hac aut illa laetitiae, tristitiae, amoris, odii etc. specie afficitur hoc est prout ejus natura hoc aut alio modo constituitur, ita ejus cupiditas alia atque alia esse et natura unius a natura alterius cupiditatis tantum differre necesse est quantum affectus a quibus unaquque oritur, inter se differunt. Dantur itaque tot species cupiditatis quot sunt species laetitiae, tristitiae, amoris etc. et consequenter (per jam ostensa) quot sunt objectorum species a quibus afficimur. Q.E.D.
3p56s luxuria, ebrietas, libido, avaritia et ambitio	3p56s luxuria, ebrietas, libido, avaritia et ambitio
Note.-Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a manner varying according to the object, with which they are concerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition, &c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking, venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the last-named emotions. However, I cannot here explain the remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary. It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have a general definition of each emotion. It is sufficient, I repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions. Thus, though there is a great difference between various emotions of love, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards children, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions.	SCHOLIUM: Inter affectuum species quae (per propositionem praecedentem) perplurim esse debent, insignes sunt luxuria, ebrietas, libido, avaritia et ambitio, quae non nisi amoris vel cupiditatis sunt notiones quae hujus utriusque affectus naturam explicant per objecta ad quae referuntur. Nam per luxuriam, ebrietatem, libidinem, avaritiam et ambitionem nihil aliud intelligimus quam convivandi, potandi, coeundi, divitiarum et glori immoderatum amorem vel cupiditatem. praeterea hi affectus quatenus eos per solum objectum ad quod referuntur ab aliis distinguimus, contrarios non habent. Nam temperantia quam luxuri et sobrietas quam ebrietati et denique castitas quam libidini opponere solemus, affectus seu passiones non sunt sed animi indicant potentiam quae hos affectus moderatur. Caeterum reliquas affectuum species hic explicare nec possum (quia tot sunt quot objectorum species) nec si possem, necesse est. Nam ad id quod intendimus nempe ad affectuum vires et mentis in eosdem potentiam determinandum, nobis sufficit uniuscujusque affectus generalem habere definitionem. Sufficit inquam nobis affectuum et mentis communes proprietates intelligere ut determinare possimus qualis et quanta sit mentis potentia in moderandis et coercendis affectibus. Quamvis itaque magna sit differentia inter hunc et illum amoris, odii vel cupiditatis affectum exempli gratia inter amorem erga liberos et inter amorem erga uxorem, nobis tamen has differentias cognoscere et affectuum naturam et originem ulterius indagare, non est opus.
3p57 individui affectus essentia	3p57 individui affectus essentia [geomap]
PROP. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other.	PROPOSITIO LVII: Quilibet uniuscujusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt.
Proof.-This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.). Nevertheless, we will prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions. All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain, as their definitions above given show. But desire is each man's nature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essence of the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passive states or passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to persist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or hindered (III. xi. and note). But by the endeavour to persist in its being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in conjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note); therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every man's nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the essence of the other; consequently, any emotion of one individual only differs, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Haec propositio patet ex axiomate 1, quod vide post lemma 3 {2a3.1} scholiumque propositionis 13 partis II {non-deductive reference}. At nihilominus eandem ex trium primitivorum affectuum definitionibus demonstrabimus. Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, laetitiam vel [excl non-exh] tristitiam referuntur ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones, ostendunt. At cupiditas est ipsa uniuscujusque natura seu [mng eqv] essentia (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 9 hujus {non-deductive reference}); ergo uniuscujusque individui cupiditas a cupiditate alterius tantum discrepat quantum natura seu [mng eqv] essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt. Laetitia deinde et tristitia passiones sunt quibus uniuscujusque potentia seu [mng eqv] conatus in suo esse perseverandi augetur vel [excl non-exh] minuitur, juvatur vel [non-excl non-exh] coercetur (per propositionem 11 hujus {3p11} et ejus scholium {non-deductive reference}). At per conatum in suo esse perseverandi quatenus ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, appetitum et cupiditatem intelligimus (vide scholium propositionis 9 hujus); ergo laetitia et tristitia est ipsa cupiditas sive [hence] appetitus quatenus a causis externis augetur vel [excl non-exh] minuitur, juvatur vel [excl non-exh] coercetur hoc est (per idem scholium) est ipsa cujusque natura atque adeo uniuscujusque laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia a laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia alterius tantum etiam discrepat quantum natura seu [mng eqv] essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt et consequenter quilibet uniuscujusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat etc. Q.E.D.
3p57s affectus animalium	3p57s affectus animalium
Note.-Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature. Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire of the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the several natures. Thus, although each individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a philosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I have treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is passive. It remains to add a few words on those attributable to him in so far as he is active.	SCHOLIUM: Hinc sequitur affectus animalium quae irrationalia dicuntur (bruta enim sentire nequaquam dubitare possumus postquam mentis novimus originem) ab affectibus hominum tantum differre quantum eorum natura a natura humana differt. Fertur quidem equus et homo libidine procreandi; at ille libidine equina hic autem humana. Sic etiam libidines et appetitus insectorum, piscium et avium alii atque alii esse debent. Quamvis itaque unumquodque individuum sua qua constat natura, contentum vivat eaque gaudeat, vita tamen illa qua unumquodque est contentum et gaudium nihil aliud est quam idea seu anima ejusdem individui atque adeo gaudium unius a gaudio alterius tantum natura discrepat quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt. Denique ex praecedenti propositione sequitur non parum etiam interesse inter gaudium quo ebrius exempli gratia ducitur et inter gaudium quo potitur philosophus, quod hic in transitu monere volui. Atque haec de affectibus qui ad hominem referuntur quatenus patitur. Superest ut pauca addam de iis qui ad eundem referuntur quatenus agit.
3p58 affectus dantur agimus	3p58 affectus dantur agimus [geomap]
PROP. LVIII. Besides the pleasure and desire that are passivities or passions, there are other types of the emotions of pleasure and desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.	PROPOSITIO LVIII: Praeter laetitiam et cupiditatem quae passiones sunt, alii laetitiae et cupiditatis affectus dantur qui ad nos quatenus agimus, referuntur.
Proof.-When the mind conceives itself and its power of activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or adequate idea (II. xliii.). But the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.). Therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as it is active (III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.); therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam concipit, laetatur (per propositionem 53 hujus {3p53}) : mens autem se ipsam necessario contemplatur quando veram sive [or even] adaequatam ideam concipit (per propositionem 43 partis II {2p43}). At mens quasdam ideas adaequatas concipit (per scholium II propositionis 40 partis II {non-deductive reference}) : ergo eatenus etiam laetatur quatenus ideas adaequatas concipit hoc est (per propositionem 1 hujus {3p01}) quatenus agit. Deinde mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, in suo esse perseverare conatur (per propositionem 9 hujus {3p09}) : at per conatum cupiditatem intelligimus (per ejusdem scholium {non-deductive reference}); ergo cupiditas ad nos refertur etiam quatenus intelligimus sive [prf eqv] (per propositionem 1 hujus {3p01}) quatenus agimus. Q.E.D.
3p59 affectus laetitiam vel cupiditatem	3p59 affectus laetitiam vel cupiditatem [geomap]
PROP. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire.	PROPOSITIO LIX: Inter omnes affectus qui ad mentem quatenus agit referuntur, nulli alii sunt quam qui ad laetitiam vel [excl non-exh] cupiditatem referuntur.
Proof.-All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or pain, as their definitions, already given, show. Now by pain we mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked (III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind feels pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is diminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.) are attributable to the mind in that condition. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, laetitiam vel [excl non-exh] tristitiam referuntur ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones ostendunt. Per tristitiam autem intelligimus quod mentis cogitandi potentia minuitur vel [non-excl non-exh] coercetur (per propositionem 11 hujus {3p11} et ejus scholium {non-deductive reference}) adeoque mens quatenus contristatur eatenus ejus intelligendi hoc est ejus agendi potentia (per propositionem 1 hujus {3p01}) minuitur vel [non-excl non-exh] coercetur adeoque nulli tristitiae affectus ad mentem referri possunt quatenus agit sed tantum affectus laetitiae et cupiditatis qui (per propositionem praecedentem) eatenus etiam ad mentem referuntur. Q.E.D.
3p59s fortitudo animositas generositas	3p59s fortitudo animositas generositas
Note.-All actions following from emotion, which are attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas). By courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason. By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours, solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to unite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore, which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c., are varieties of highmindedness. I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit, which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions, to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting emotions, not all that might be given. For, by proceeding in the same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to repentance, scorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will agree from what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However, for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be more curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerning love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment, acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind begins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example, when we conceive something which generally delights us with its flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is otherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thus otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become odious. This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body observable in emotions, such, for instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the mind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be supplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them, interpolating such observations as I think should here and there be added.	SCHOLIUM: Omnes actiones quae sequuntur ex affectibus qui ad mentem referuntur quatenus intelligit, ad fortitudinem refero quam in animositatem et generositatem distinguo. Nam per animositatem intelligo cupiditatem qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo rationis dictamine conservare. Per generositatem autem cupiditatem intelligo qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines juvare et sibi amicitia jungere. Eas itaque actiones quae solum agentis utile intendunt, ad animositatem et quae alterius etiam utile intendunt ad generositatem refero. Temperantia igitur, sobrietas et animi in periculis praesentia etc. animositatis sunt species; modestia autem, clementia etc. species generositatis sunt. Atque his puto me praecipuos affectus animique fluctuationes quae ex compositione trium primitivorum affectuum nempe cupiditatis, laetitiae et tristitiae oriuntur, explicuisse perque primas suas causas ostendisse. Ex quibus apparet nos a causis externis multis modis agitari nosque perinde ut maris und a contrariis ventis agitat fluctuari nostri eventus atque fati inscios. At dixi me praecipuos tantum, non omnes qui dari possunt animi conflictus ostendisse. Nam eadem via qua supra procedendo facile possumus ostendere amorem esse junctum pnitenti, dedignationi, pudori etc. Imo unicuique ex jam dictis clare constare credo affectus tot modis alios cum aliis posse componi indeque tot variationes oriri ut nullo numero definiri queant. Sed ad meum institutum praecipuos tantum enumeravisse sufficit nam reliqui quos omisi plus curiositatis quam utilitatis haberent. Attamen de amore hoc notandum restat quod scilicet spissime contingit dum re quam appetebamus fruimur, ut corpus ex ea fruitione novam acquirat constitutionem a qua aliter determinatur et ali rerum imagines in eo excitantur et simul mens alia imaginari aliaque cupere incipit. Exempli gratia cum aliquid quod nos sapore delectare solet, imaginamur, eodem frui nempe comedere cupimus. At quamdiu eodem sic fruimur, stomachus adimpletur corpusque aliter constituitur. Si igitur corpore jam aliter disposito ejusdem cibi imago quia ipse praesens adest, fomentetur et consequenter conatus etiam sive cupiditas eundem comedendi, huic cupiditati seu conatui nova illa constitutio repugnabit et consequenter cibi quem appetebamus, praesentia odiosa erit et hoc est quod fastidium et tdium vocamus. Caeterum corporis affectiones externas quae in affectibus observantur, ut sunt tremor, livor, singultus, risus etc. neglexi quia ad solum corpus absque ulla ad mentem relatione referuntur. Denique de affectuum definitionibus quaedam notanda sunt, quas propterea hic ordine repetam et quid in unaquaque observandum est, iisdem interponam.
DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS	AFFECTUUM DEFINITIONES [about definitions]
3de01 cupiditas	3de01 cupiditas [notes] [geomap]
I. Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given modification [Lat: affectiones] of itself.	I. Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum.
Explanation.-We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof; further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own persistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that, strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order to avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from explaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define it in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, have said, that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular activity; but from such a definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, in order to imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add, in so far as it is determined by some given modification [Lat: affectiones], &c. For, by a modification [Lat: affectiones] of man's essence, we understand every disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes. By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and knows not where to turn.	EXPLICATIO: Diximus supra in scholio propositionis 9 hujus partis cupiditatem esse appetitum cum ejusdem conscientia; appetitum autem esse ipsam hominis essentiam quatenus determinata est ad ea agendum quae ipsius conservationi inserviunt. Sed in eodem scholio etiam monui me revera inter humanum appetitum et cupiditatem nullam agnoscere differentiam. Nam sive homo sui appetitus sit conscius sive non sit, manet tamen appetitus unus idemque atque adeo ne tautologiam committere viderer, cupiditatem per appetitum explicare nolui sed eandem ita definire studui ut omnes humanae naturae conatus quos nomine appetitus, voluntatis, cupiditatis vel impetus significamus, una comprehenderem. Potueram enim dicere cupiditatem esse ipsam hominis essentiam quatenus determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum sed ex hac definitione (per propositionem 23 partis II) non sequeretur quod mens possit suae cupiditatis sive appetitus esse conscia. Igitur ut hujus conscienti causam involverem, necesse fuit (per eandem propositionem) addere "quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata etc.". Nam per affectionem humanae essentiae quamcunque ejusdem essentiae constitutionem intelligimus, sive ea sit innata sive quod ipsa per solum cogitationis sive per solum extensionis attributum concipiatur sive denique quod ad utrumque simul referatur. Hic igitur cupiditatis nomine intelligo hominis quoscunque conatus, impetus, appetitus et volitiones, qui pro varia ejusdem hominis constitutione varii et non raro adeo sibi invicem oppositi sunt ut homo diversimode trahatur et quo se vertat, nesciat.
3de02 Laetitia	3de02 Laetitia [geomap]
II. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection.	II. Laetitia est hominis transitio a minore ad majorem perfectionem.
3de03 Tristitia	3de03 Tristitia [notes] [geomap]
III. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection.	III. Tristitia est hominis transitio a majore ad minorem perfectionem.
3de03e dico transitionem	3de03e dico transitionem
Explanation-I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection itself. For, if man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of pleasure. This appears more clearly from the consideration of the contrary emotion, pain. No one can deny, that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less perfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree. Neither can we say, that pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection. For absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity; wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition from a greater to a less perfection-in other words, it is an activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or constrained (cf. III. xi. note). I pass over the definitions of merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely kinds of pleasure or pain.	EXPLICATIO: Dico transitionem. Nam laetitia non est ipsa perfectio. Si enim homo cum perfectione ad quam transit nasceretur, ejusdem absque laetitiae affectu compos esset; quod clarius apparet ex tristitiae affectu qui huic est contrarius. Nam quod tristitia in transitione ad minorem perfectionem consistit, non autem in ipsa minore perfectione, nemo negare potest quandoquidem homo eatenus contristari nequit quatenus alicujus perfectionis est particeps. Nec dicere possumus quod tristitia in privatione majoris perfectionis consistat nam privatio nihil est; tristitiae autem affectus actus est qui propterea nullus alius esse potest quam actus transeundi ad minorem perfectionem hoc est actus quo hominis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur (vide scholium propositionis 11 hujus). Caeterum definitiones hilaritatis, titillationis, melancholiae et doloris omitto quia ad corpus potissimum referuntur et non nisi laetitiae aut tristitiae sunt species.
3de04 Admiratio	3de04 Admiratio [geomap]
V. Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and note).	IV. Admiratio est rei alicujus imaginatio in qua mens defixa propterea manet quia haec singularis imaginatio nullam cum reliquis habet connexionem. Vide propositionem 52 cum ejusdem scholio {non-deductive reference}.
3de04e  imago nova	3de04e  imago nova
Explanation-In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason, why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one follows the other. This state of association is impossible, if the image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other causes to think of something else. Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another. I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure, pain, and desire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it is customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the objects of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a definition of contempt.	EXPLICATIO: In scholio propositionis 18 partis II ostendimus quaenam sit causa cur mens ex contemplatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat videlicet quia earum rerum imagines invicem concatenat et ita ordinat sunt ut alia aliam sequatur, quod quidem concipi nequit quando rei imago nova est sed mens in ejusdem rei contemplatione detinebitur donec ab aliis causis ad alia cogitandum determinetur. Rei itaque novae imaginatio in se considerata ejusdem naturae est ac reliquae et hac de causa ego admirationem inter affectus non numero nec causam video cur id facerem quandoquidem haec mentis distractio ex nulla causa positiva quae mentem ab aliis distrahat, oritur sed tantum ex eo quod causa cur mens ex unius rei contemplatione ad alia cogitandum determinatur, deficit. Tres igitur (ut in scholio propositionis 11 hujus monui) tantum affectus primitivos seu primarios agnosco nempe laetitiae,tristitiae et cupiditatis nec alia de causa verba de admiratione feci quam quia u su factum est ut quidam affectus qui ex tribus primitivis derivantur, aliis nominibus indicari soleant quando ad objecta quae admiramur, referuntur; quae quidem ratio me ex quo movet ut etiam contemptus definitionem his adjungam.
3de05 contemptus	3de05 contemptus [geomap]
V. Contempt is the conception (imaginatio) of anything which touches the mind so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf. III. lii. note). The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.	V. Contemptus est rei alicujus imaginatio quae mentem adeo parum tangit ut ipsa mens ex rei praesentia magis moveatur ad ea imaginandum quae in ipsa re non sunt quam quae in ipsa sunt. Vide scholium propositionis 52 hujus {non-deductive reference}. Definitiones venerationis et dedignationis missas hic facio quia nulli quod sciam affectus ex his nomen trahunt.
3de06 amor	3de06 amor [notes] [geomap]
VI. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.	VI. Amor est laetitia concomitante idea  causae externae.
3de06e amor	3de06e amor
Explanation-This definition explains sufficiently clearly the essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved object expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and, as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence, they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.	EXPLICATIO: Haec definitio satis clare amoris essentiam explicat; illa vero auctorum qui definiunt amorem esse voluntatem amantis se jungendi rei amat, non amoris essentiam sed ejus proprietatem exprimit et quia amoris essentia non satis ab auctoribus perspecta fuit, ideo neque ejus proprietatis ullum clarum conceptum habere potuerunt et hinc factum ut eorum definitionem admodum obscuram esse omnes judicaverint. Verum notandum cum dico proprietatem esse in amante se voluntate jungere rei amat, me per voluntatem non intelligere consensum vel animi deliberationem seu liberum decretum (nam hoc fictitium esse demonstravimus propositione 48 partis II) nec etiam cupiditatem sese jungendi rei amatae quando abest vel perseverandi in ipsius praesentia quando adest; potest namque amor absque hac aut illa cupiditate concipi sed per voluntatem me acquiescentiam intelligere quae est in amante ob rei amatae praesentiam a qua laetitia amantis corroboratur aut saltem fovetur.
3de07 odium	3de07 odium [geomap]
VII. Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.	VII. Odium est tristitia concomitante idea  causae externae.
3de07e Vide praeterea scholium propositionis 13 hujus	3de07e Vide praeterea scholium propositionis 13 hujus
Explanation-These observations are easily grasped after what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf. also III. xiii. note).	EXPLICATIO: quae hic notanda sunt, ex dictis in praecedentis definitionis explicatione facile percipiuntur. Vide praeterea scholium propositionis 13 hujus.
3de08 propensio	3de08 propensio [geomap]
VIII. Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.	VIII. Propensio est laetitia concomitante idea alicujus rei quae per accidens causa est laetitiae.
3de09 aversio	3de09 aversio [geomap]
IX. Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).	IX. Aversio est tristitia concomitante idea alicujus rei quae per accidens causa est tristitiae. De his vide scholium propositionis 15 hujus {non-deductive reference}.
3de10 devotio	3de10 devotio [geomap]
X. Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.	X. Devotio est amor erga eum quem admiramur.
3de10e  ex rei novitate	3de10e  ex rei novitate
Explanation-Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III. lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love.	EXPLICATIO: Admirationem oriri ex rei novitate ostendimus propositione 52 hujus. Si igitur contingat ut id quod admiramur spe imaginemur, idem admirari desinemus atque adeo videmus devotionis affectum facile in simplicem amorem degenerare.
3de11 irrisio	3de11 irrisio [geomap]
XI. Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we hate.	XI. Irrisio est laetitia orta ex eo quod aliquid quod contemnimus in re quam odimus inesse imaginamur.
3de11e existentiam negamus	3de11e existentiam negamus
Explanation-In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent rejoice (III. xx.). But since we assume that man hates that which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).	EXPLICATIO: quatenus rem quam odimus contemnimus eatenus de eadem existentiam negamus (vide scholium propositionis 52 hujus) et eatenus (per propositionem 20 hujus) laetamur. Sed quoniam supponimus hominem id quod irridet odio tamen habere, sequitur hanc laetitiam solidam non esse. Vide scholium propositionis 47 hujus.
3de12 spes	3de12 spes [geomap]
XII. Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.	XII. Spes est inconstans laetitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel [excl non-exh] praeterit de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus.
3de13 metus	3de13 metus [notes] [geomap]
XIII. Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).	XIII. Metus est inconstans tristitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel [excl non-exh] praeterit de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus. Vide de his scholium II propositionis 18 hujus {non-deductive reference}.
3de13e dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe.	3de13e dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe.
Explanation-From these definitions it follows, that there is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope. For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this extent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.); consequently, while dependent on hope, he fears for the issue. Contrariwise he, who fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the existence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will turn out as he desires (III. xx.).	EXPLICATIO: Ex his definitionibus sequitur non dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe. Qui enim spe pendet et de rei eventu dubitat, is aliquid imaginari supponitur quod rei futurae existentiam secludit atque adeo eatenus contristari (per propositionem 19 hujus) et consequenter dum spe pendet, metuere ut res eveniat. Qui autem contra in metu est hoc est de rei quam odit eventu dubitat, aliquid etiam imaginatur quod ejusdem rei existentiam secludit atque adeo (per propositionem 20 hujus) laetatur et consequenter eatenus spem habet ne eveniat.
3de14 securitas	3de14 securitas [geomap]
XIV. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.	XIV. Securitas est laetitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel [excl non-exh] praeterit de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.
3de15 desperatio	3de15 desperatio [geomap]
XV. Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.	XV. Desperatio est tristitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel [excl non-exh] praeterit de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.
3de15e non dubitare	3de15e non dubitare
Explanation-Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event has been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives something past or future as present and regards it as such, or else because he conceives other things, which exclude the existence of the causes of his doubt. For, although we can never be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II. xxxi. Coroll.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt concerning it. For we have shown, that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it (II. xlix. note). Thus it may happen that we are affected by the same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or future, as concerning the conception of a thing present; this I have already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I refer the reader.	EXPLICATIO: Oritur itaque ex spe securitas et ex metu desperatio quando de rei eventu dubitandi causa tollitur, quod fit quia homo rem praeteritam vel futuram adesse imaginatur et ut praesentem contemplatur vel quia alia imaginatur quae existentiam earum rerum secludunt quae ipsi dubium injiciebant. Nam tametsi de rerum singularium eventu (per corollarium propositionis 31 partis II) nunquam possumus esse certi, fieri tamen potest ut de earum eventu non dubitemus. Aliud enim esse ostendimus (vide scholium propositionis 49 partis II) de re non dubitare, aliud rei certitudinem habere atque adeo fieri potest ut ex imagine rei praeterit aut futurae eodem laetitiae vel tristitiae affectu afficiamur ac ex rei praesentis imagine, ut in propositione 18 hujus demonstravimus, quam cum ejusdem scholiis vide.
3de16 gaudium	3de16 gaudium [geomap]
XVI. Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.	XVI. Gaudium est laetitia concomitante idea rei praeterit quae praeter spem evenit.
3de17 conscientia morsus	3de17 conscientia morsus [geomap]
XVII. Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.	XVII. Conscientia morsus est tristitia concomitante idea rei praeterit quae praeter spem evenit.
3de18 commiseratio	3de18 commiseratio [geomap]
XVIII. Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has befallen someone else whom we imagine to be like ourselves (cf. III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).	XVIII. Commiseratio est tristitia concomitante idea mali quod alteri quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit. Vide scholium propositionis 22 et scholium propositionis 27 hujus {non-deductive reference}.
3de18e commiserationem misericordiam	3de18e commiserationem misericordiam
Explanation-Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in reference to a disposition.	EXPLICATIO: Inter commiserationem et misericordiam nulla videtur esse differentia nisi forte quod commiseratio singularem affectum respiciat, misericordia autem ejus habitum.
3de19 favor	3de19 favor [geomap]
XIX. Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.	XIX. Favor est amor erga aliquem qui alteri benefecit.
3de20 indignatio	3de20 indignatio [geomap]
XX. Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to another.	XX. Indignatio est odium erga aliquem qui alteri  malefecit.
3de20e verborum significationem	3de20e verborum significationem
Explanation-I am aware that these terms are employed in senses somewhat different from those usually assigned. But my purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature of things. I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary signification. One statement of my method will suffice. As for the cause of the above-named emotions see III. xxvii. Coroll. i., and III. xxii. note.	EXPLICATIO: Haec nomina ex communi usuae aliud significare scio. Sed meum institutum non est verborum significationem sed rerum naturam explicare easque iis vocabulis indicare quorum significatio quam ex u su habent, a significatione qua eadem usurpare volo, non omnino abhorret, quod semel monuisse sufficiat. Caeterum horum affectuum causam vide in corollario I propositionis 27 et scholio propositionis 22 hujus partis.
3de21 existimatio	3de21 existimatio [geomap]
XXI. Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him.	XXI. Existimatio est de aliquo prae amore plus justo sentire.
3de22 despectus	3de22 despectus [geomap]
XXII. Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we hate him.	XXII. Despectus est de aliquo prae odio minus justo sentire.
3de22e existimatio amoris et despectus odii effectus	3de22e existimatio amoris et despectus odii effectus
Explanation-Thus partiality is an effect of love, and disparagement an effect of hatred: so that partiality may also be defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too highly of a beloved object. Contrariwise, disparagement may be defined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object. Cf. III. xxvi. note.	EXPLICATIO: Est itaque existimatio amoris et despectus odii effectus sive proprietas atque adeo potest existimatio etiam definiri quod sit amor quatenus hominem ita afficit ut de re amata plus justo sentiat et contra despectus quod sit odium quatenus hominem ita afficit ut de eo quem odio habet, minus justo sentiat. Vide de his scholium propositionis 26 hujus.
3de23 invidia	3de23 invidia [geomap]
XXIII. Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's evil fortune.	XXIII. Invidia est  odium quatenus hominem ita afficit ut ex alterius felicitate contristetur et contra ut ex alterius malo gaudeat.
3de23e Invidi opponitur misericordia	3de23e Invidi opponitur misericordia
Explanation-Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be thus defined:	EXPLICATIO: Invidi opponitur communiter misericordia quae proinde invita vocabuli significatione sic definiri potest.
3de24 misericordia	3de24 misericordia [geomap]
XXIV. Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at another's evil fortune.	XXIV. Misericordia est amor quatenus hominem ita afficit ut ex bono alterius gaudeat et contra ut ex alterius malo contristetur.
3de24e scholium propositionis 24 et scholium propositionis 32 hujus.	3de24e scholium propositionis 24 et scholium propositionis 32 hujus.
Explanation-Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and xxxii. These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in itself or accidentally. I now pass on to other emotions, which are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.	EXPLICATIO: Caeterum de invidia vide scholium propositionis 24 et scholium propositionis 32 hujus. Atque hi affectus laetitiae et tristitiae sunt quos idea rei externae comitatur tanquam causa per se vel per accidens. Hinc ad alios transeo quos idea rei internae comitatur tanquam causa.
3de25 acquiescentia in se ipso	3de25 acquiescentia in se ipso [geomap]
XXV. Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action.	XXV. Acquiescentia in se ipso est laetitia orta ex eo quod homo se ipsum suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur.
3de26 humilitas	3de26 humilitas [geomap]
XXVI. Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind.	XXVI. Humilitas est tristitia orta ex eo quod homo suam impotentiam sive [mng eqv] imbecillitatem contemplatur.
3de26e Acquiescentia humilitati opponitur	3de26e Acquiescentia humilitati opponitur
Explanation-Self-complacency is opposed to humility, in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of our own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we may thus define:	EXPLICATIO: Acquiescentia in se ipso humilitati opponitur quatenus per eandem intelligimus laetitiam quae ex eo oritur quod nostram agendi potentiam contemplamur sed quatenus per ipsam etiam intelligimus laetitiam concomitante idea alicujus facti quod nos ex mentis libero decreto fecisse credimus, tum pnitenti opponitur quae a nobis sic definitur.
3de27 paenitentia	3de27 paenitentia [geomap]
XXVII. Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind.	XXVII. Paenitentia est  tristitia concomitante idea alicujus facti quod nos ex libero mentis decreto fecisse credimus.
3de27e scholio propositionis 51 hujus et propositionibus 53, 54 et 55 hujus	3de27e scholio propositionis 51 hujus et propositionibus 53, 54 et 55 hujus
Explanation-The causes of these emotions we have set forth in III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note. Concerning the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note. This is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly called wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are called right, are followed by pleasure. We can easily gather from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on education. Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions, and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the latter with pleasure. This is confirmed by experience. For custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some consider honourable others consider disgraceful. According as each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given action or glories therein.	EXPLICATIO: Horum affectuum causas ostendimus in scholio propositionis 51 hujus et propositionibus 53, 54 et 55 hujus ejusque scholio. De libero autem mentis decreto vide scholium propositionis 35 partis II. Sed hic praeterea notandum venit mirum non esse quod omnes omnino actus qui ex consuetudine pravi vocantur, sequatur tristitia et illos qui recti dicuntur, laetitia. Nam hoc ab educatione potissimum pendere facile ex supra dictis intelligimus. Parentes nimirum illos exprobrando liberosque propter eosdem spe objurgando, hos contra suadendo et laudando effecerunt ut tristitiae commotiones illis, laetitiae vero his jungerentur. Quod ipsa etiam experientia comprobatur. Nam consuetudo et religio non est omnibus eadem sed contra quae apud alios sacra, apud alios profana et quae apud alios honesta, apud alios turpia sunt. Prout igitur unusquisque educatus est, ita facti alicujus paenitet vel eodem gloriatur.
3de28 superbia	3de28 superbia [geomap]
XXVIII. Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from self-love.	XXVIII. Superbia est de se prae amore sui plus justo sentire.
3de28e superbia existimatione	3de28e superbia existimatione
Explanation-Thus pride is different from partiality, for the latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself. However, as partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or property of self-love, which may therefore be thus defined, love of self or self-approval, in so far as it leads a man to think too highly of himself. To this emotion there is no contrary. For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self-hatred; I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that. For whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed, that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do. For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider such matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen, that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Again, a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in the present something in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain. As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do nothing but what is wicked and base, &c. We may also say, that a man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals, venture. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an emotion which I will call self-abasement, for as from self-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs self-abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:	EXPLICATIO: Differt igitur superbia ab existimatione quod haec ad objectum externum, superbia autem ad ipsum hominem de se plus justo sentientem referatur. Caeterum ut existimatio amoris sic superbia philauti effectus vel proprietas est, quae propterea etiam definiri potest quod sit amor sui sive acquiescentia in se ipso quatenus hominem ita afficit ut de se plus justo sentiat (vide scholium propositionis 26 hujus). Huic affectui non datur contrarius. Nam nemo de se prae odio sui minus justo sentit; imo nemo de se minus justo sentit quatenus imaginatur se hoc vel illud non posse. Nam quicquid homo imaginatur se non posse, id necessario imaginatur et hac imaginatione ita disponitur ut id agere revera non possit quod se non posse imaginatur. Quamdiu enim imaginatur se hoc vel illud non posse tamdiu ad agendum non est determinatus et consequenter tamdiu impossibile ei est ut id agat. Verumenimvero si ad illa attendamus quae a sola opinione pendent, concipere poterimus fieri posse ut homo de se minus justo sentiat; fieri enim potest ut aliquis dum tristis imbecillitatem contemplatur suam, imaginetur se ab omnibus contemni idque dum reliqui nihil minus cogitant quam ipsum contemnere. Potest praeterea homo de se minus justo sentire si aliquid de se in praesenti neget cum relatione ad futurum tempus cujus est incertus; ut quod neget se nihil certi posse concipere nihilque nisi prava vel turpia posse cupere vel agere etc. Possumus deinde dicere aliquem de se minus justo sentire cum videmus ipsum ex nimio pudoris metu ea non audere quae alii ipsi quales audent. Hunc igitur affectum possumus superbi opponere quem abjectionem vocabo nam ut ex acquiescentia in se ipso superbia, sic ex humilitate abjectio oritur quae proinde a nobis sic definitur.
3de29 abjectio	3de29 abjectio [geomap]
XXIX. Self-abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self by reason of pain.	XXIX. Abjectio est de se prae tristitia minus justo sentire.
3de29e superbi humilitatem	3de29e superbi humilitatem
Explanation-We are nevertheless generally accustomed to oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention to the effect of either emotion than to its nature. We are wont to call proud the man who boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults, who wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station. On the other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, who confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, and who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire. However, these emotions, humility and self-abasement, are extremely rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strives against them as much as it can (see III. xiii., liv.); hence those, who are believed to be most self-abased and humble, are generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.	EXPLICATIO: Solemus tamen spe superbi humilitatem opponere sed tum magis ad utriusque effectus quam naturam attendimus. Solemus namque illum superbum vocare qui nimis gloriatur (vide scholium propositionis 30 hujus) qui non nisi virtutes suas et aliorum non nisi vitia narrat, qui omnibus praeferri vult et qui denique ea gravitate et ornatu incedit quo solent alii qui longe supra ipsum sunt positi. Contra illum humilem vocamus qui spius erubescit, qui sua vitia fatetur et aliorum virtutes narrat, qui omnibus cedit et qui denique submisso capite ambulat et se ornare negligit. Caeterum hi affectus nempe humilitas et abjectio rarissimi sunt. Nam natura humana in se considerata contra eosdem quantum potest nititur (vide propositiones 13 et 54 hujus) et ideo qui maxime creduntur abjecti et humiles esse, maxime plerumque ambitiosi et invidi sunt.
3de30 gloria	3de30 gloria [geomap]
XXX. Honour[11] is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we imagine to be praised by others. [11] Gloria.	XXX. Gloria est laetitia concomitante idea alicujus nostrae actionis quam alios laudare imaginamur.
3de31 pudor	3de31 pudor [geomap]
XXXI. Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.	XXXI. Pudor est tristitia concomitante idea alicujus actionis quam alios vituperare imaginamur.
3de31e pudorem verecundiam	3de31e pudorem verecundiam
Explanation-On this subject see the note to III. xxx. But we should here remark the difference which exists between shame and modesty. Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are ashamed. Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains a man from committing a base action. Modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will duly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature. I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions arising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to treat of those which I refer to desire.	EXPLICATIO: De his vide scholium propositionis 30 hujus partis. Sed hic notanda est differentia quae est inter pudorem et verecundiam. Est enim pudor tristitia quae sequitur factum cujus pudet. Verecundia autem metus seu timor pudoris quo homo continetur ne aliquid turpe committat. Verecundi opponi solet impudentia, quae revera affectus non est ut suo loco ostendam sed affectuum nomina (ut jam monui) magis eorum usum quam naturam respiciunt. Atque his laetitiae et tristitiae affectus quos explicare proposueram, absolvi. Pergo itaque ad illos quos ad cupiditatem refero.
3de32 desiderium	3de32 desiderium [geomap]
XXXII. Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it.t.	XXXII. Desiderium est cupiditas sive [non-excl non-exh] appetitus re aliqua potiundi quae ejusdem rei memoria fovetur et simul aliarum rerum memoria quae ejusdem rei appetend existentiam secludunt, coercetur.
3de32e recordamur si praesens	3de32e recordamur si praesens
Explanation-When we remember a thing, we are by that very fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something present; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake, is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the existence of that which we remember. Thus when we remember something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence of the thing in question. Wherefore regret is, strictly speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note). But, as the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion down, among the emotions springing from desire.	EXPLICATIO: Cum alicujus rei recordamur, ut jam spe diximus, eo ipso disponimur ad eandem eodem affectu contemplandum ac si res praesens adesset sed haec dispositio seu conatus dum vigilamus plerumque cohibetur ab imaginibus rerum quae existentiam ejus cujus recordamur, secludunt. Quando itaque rei meminimus quae nos aliquo laetitiae genere afficit, eo ipso conamur eandem cum eodem laetitiae affectu ut praesentem contemplari, qui quidem conatus statim cohibetur memoria rerum quae illius existentiam secludunt. Quare desiderium revera tristitia est quae laetitiae opponitur illi quae ex absentia rei quam odimus oritur, de qua vide scholium propositionis 47 hujus partis. Sed quia nomen "desiderium" cupiditatem respicere videtur, ideo hunc affectum ad cupiditatis affectus refero.
3de33 aemulatio	3de33 aemulatio [geomap]
XXXIII. Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us by our conception that others have the same desire.e.	XXXIII. Aemulatio est alicujus rei cupiditas quae nobis ingeneratur ex eo quod alios eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur.
3de33e imitari quidem alterius affectum non aemulari	3de33e imitari quidem alterius affectum non aemulari
Explanation-He who runs away, because he sees others running away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again, he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own were burnt; such an one can be said to imitate another's emotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes of emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that which we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As to the cause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note. The reason why this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III. xxxii. and note.	EXPLICATIO: Qui fugit quia alios fugere vel qui timet quia alios timere videt vel etiam ille qui ex eo quod aliquem manum suam combussisse videt, manum ad se contrahit corpusque movet quasi ipsius manus combureretur, eum imitari quidem alterius affectum sed non eundem aemulari dicemus, non quia aliam aemulationis aliam imitationis novimus causam sed quia u su factum est ut illum tantum vocemus mulum qui id quod honestum, utile vel jucundum esse judicamus, imitatur. Caeterum de aemulationis causa vide propositionem 27 hujus partis cum ejus scholio. Cur autem huic affectui plerumque juncta sit invidia, de eo vide propositionem 32 hujus cum ejusdem scholio.
3de34 gratia	3de34 gratia [geomap]
XXXIV. Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us. Cf. III. xxxix. note and xl.l.	XXXIV. Gratia seu [mng eqv] gratitudo est cupiditas seu [non-excl non-exh] amoris studium quo ei benefacere conamur qui in nos pari amoris affectu beneficium contulit. Vide propositionem 39 cum scholio propositionis 41 hujus.
3de35 benevolentia	3de35 benevolentia [geomap]
XXXV. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity. Cf. III. xxvii. note.e.	XXXV. Benevolentia est  cupiditas benefaciendi ei cujus nos miseret. Vide scholium propositionis 27 hujus {non-deductive reference}.
3de36 ira	3de36 ira [geomap]
XXXVI. Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.x.	XXXVI. Ira est  cupiditas qua ex odio incitamur ad illi quem odimus malum inferendum. Vide propositionem 39 hujus {non-deductive reference}.
3de37 vindicta	3de37 vindicta [geomap]
XXXVII. Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has injured us. (See III. xl. Coroll. ii and note.).)	XXXVII. Vindicta est  cupiditas qua ex reciproco odio concitamur ad malum  inferendum ei qui nobis pari affectu damnum intulit. Vide II corollarium propositionis 40 hujus cum ejusdem scholio.
3de38 crudelitas	3de38 crudelitas [geomap]
XXXVIII. Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.y.	XXXVIII. Crudelitas seu [mng eqv] saevitia est cupiditas qua aliquis concitatur ad malum inferendum ei quem amamus vel [excl non-exh] cujus nos miseret.
3de38e Crudelitati opponitur clementia	3de38e Crudelitati opponitur clementia
Explanation-To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his anger and revenge.	EXPLICATIO: Crudelitati opponitur clementia, quae passio non est sed animi potentia qua homo iram et vindictam moderatur.
3de39 timor	3de39 timor [notes] [geomap]
XXXIX. Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. xxxix. note.e.	XXXIX. Timor est cupiditas majus quod metuimus malum minore vitandi. Vide scholium propositionis 39 hujus {non-deductive reference}.
3de40 audacia	3de40 audacia [geomap]
XL. Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.t.	XL. Audacia est cupiditas qua aliquis incitatur ad aliquid agendum cum periculo quod ejus quales subire metuunt.
3de41 pusillanimitas	3de41 pusillanimitas [geomap]
XLI. Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.r.	XLI. Pusillanimitas dicitur de eo cujus cupiditas coercetur timore periculi quod ejus quales subire audent.
3de41e  ad cupiditatis affectus non refero, audaci opponitur	3de41e  ad cupiditatis affectus non refero, audaci opponitur
Explanation-Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire. Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion of daring.	EXPLICATIO: Est igitur pusillanimitas nihil aliud quam metus alicujus mali quod plerique non solent metuere; quare ipsam ad cupiditatis affectus non refero. Eandem tamen hic explicare volui quia quatenus ad cupiditatem attendimus, affectui audaci revera opponitur.
3de42 consternatio	3de42 consternatio [geomap]
XLII. Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.s.	XLII. Consternatio dicitur de eo cujus cupiditas malum vitandi coercetur admiratione mali quod timet.
3de42e consternatio pusillanimitatis species	3de42e consternatio pusillanimitatis species
Explanation-Consternation is, therefore, a species of cowardice. But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a man so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the evil. I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement. I say wavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be constrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments him: whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may avert of the two. On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and III. lii. note. Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li. note.	EXPLICATIO: Est itaque consternatio pusillanimitatis species. Sed quia consternatio ex duplici timore oritur, ideo commodius definiri potest quod sit metus qui hominem stupefactum aut fluctuantem ita continet ut is malum amovere non possit. Dico stupefactum quatenus ejus cupiditatem malum amovendi admiratione coerceri intelligimus. Fluctuantem autem dico quatenus concipimus eandem cupiditatem coerceri timore alterius mali quod ipsum que cruciat : unde fit ut quodnam ex duobus avertat, nesciat. De his vide scholium propositionis 39 et scholium propositionis 52 hujus. Caeterum de pusillanimitate et audacia vide scholium propositionis 51 hujus.
3de43 humanitas	3de43 humanitas [geomap]
XLIII. Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining from that which should displease them.	XLIII. Humanitas seu [mng eqv] modestia est  cupiditas ea faciendi quae hominibus placent et omittendi quae displicent.
3de44 ambitio	3de44 ambitio [geomap]
XLIV. Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.r.	XLIV. Ambitio est immodica gloriae cupiditas.
3de44e vix superari potest	3de44e vix superari potest
Explanation-Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions (cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and strengthened; therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome. For, so long as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time necessarily bound by this. "The best men," says Cicero, "are especially led by honour. Even philosophers, when they write a book condemning honour, sign their names thereto," and so on.	EXPLICATIO: Ambitio est cupiditas qua omnes affectus (per propositiones 27 et 31 hujus) foventur et corroborantur et ideo hic affectus vix superari potest. Nam quamdiu homo aliqua cupiditate tenetur, hac simul necessario tenetur. Optimus quisque inquit Cicero maxime gloria ducitur. Philosophi etiam libris quos de contemnenda gloria scribunt, nomen suum inscribunt etc.
3de45 luxuria	3de45 luxuria [geomap]
XLV. Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living sumptuously.y.	XLV. Luxuria est  immoderata convivandi cupiditas vel [non-excl non-exh] etiam amor.
3de46 ebrietas	3de46 ebrietas [geomap]
XLVI. Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.g.	XLVI. Ebrietas est  immoderata potandi cupiditas et amor.
3de47 avaritia	3de47 avaritia [geomap]
XLVII. Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.s.	XLVII. Avaritia est  immoderata divitiarum cupiditas et amor.
3de48 libido	3de48 libido [geomap]
XLVIII. Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse.e.	XLVIII. Libido est etiam cupiditas et amor in commiscendis corporibus.
3de48e moderata sit sive non	3de48e moderata sit sive non
Explanation-Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is still called lust. These last five emotions (as I have shown in III. lvi.) have no contraries. For deference is a species of ambition. Cf. III. xxix. note. Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety, and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the mind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating, drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. For an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and drink at another man's expense. An ambitious man will restrain himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will, from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those vices. Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not. For though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death, cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention, cease to be lustful. In fact, these emotions are not so much concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the appetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these emotions, but high-mindedness and valour, whereof I will speak presently. The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general knowledge of them. However, it is established from the definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names in accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens. If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.	EXPLICATIO: Sive haec coeundi cupiditas moderata sit sive non sit, libido appellari solet. Porro hi quinque affectus (ut in scholio propositionis 56 hujus monui) contrarios non habent. Nam modestia species est ambitionis, de qua vide scholium propositionis 29 hujus. Temperantiam deinde, sobrietatem et castitatem mentis potentiam, non autem passionem indicare jam etiam monui. Et tametsi fieri potest ut homo avarus, ambitiosus vel timidus a nimio cibo, potu et coitu abstineat, avaritia tamen, ambitio et timor luxuri, ebrietati vel libidini non sunt contrarii. Nam avarus in cibum et potum alienum se ingurgitare plerumque desiderat. Ambitiosus autem, modo speret fore clam, in nulla re sibi temperabit et si inter ebrios vivat et libidinosos, ideo quia ambitiosus est, proclivior erit ad eadem vitia. Timidus denique id quod non vult, facit. Nam quamvis mortis vitand causa divitias in mare projiciat, manet tamen avarus et si libidinosus tristis est quod sibi morem gerere nequeat, non desinit propterea libidinosus esse. Et absolute hi affectus non tam ipsos actus convivandi, potandi etc. respiciunt quam ipsum appetitum et amorem. Nihil igitur his affectibus opponi potest praeter generositatem et animositatem, de quibus in sequentibus. Definitiones zelotypi et reliquarum animi fluctuationum silentio praetermitto tam quia ex compositione affectuum quos jam definivimus, oriuntur quam quia plerque nomina non habent, quod ostendit ad usum vit sufficere easdem in genere tantummodo noscere. Caeterum ex definitionibus affectuum quos explicuimus, liquet eos omnes a cupiditate, laetitia vel tristitia oriri seu potius nihil praeter hos tres esse quorum unusquisque variis nominibus appellari solet propter varias eorum relationes et denominationes extrinsecas. Si jam ad hos primitivos et ad ea quae de natura mentis supra diximus, attendere velimus, affectus quatenus ad solam mentem referuntur sic definire poterimus.
3dg AFFECTUUM GENERALIS DEFINITIO	3dg AFFECTUUM GENERALIS DEFINITIO [notes] [geomap]
GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS. Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another.	AFFECTUUM GENERALIS DEFINITIO. Affectus qui [mng eqv] animi pathema dicitur, est confusa idea qua mens majorem vel minorem sui corporis vel [non-excl non-exh] alicujus ejus partis existendi vim quam antea affirmat et qua data ipsa mens ad hoc potius quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur.
3dge	3dge
Explanation-I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul is a confused idea. For we have shown that the mind is only passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. (III. iii.) I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than before. For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote rather the actual disposition of our own body (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.) than the nature of an external body. But the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, because its power of action or force for existence is increased or diminished, helped or hindered. But it must be noted that, when I say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do not mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact, involves more or less of reality than before.	EXPLICATIO: Dico primo affectum seu passionem animi esse confusam ideam. Nam mentem eatenus tantum pati ostendimus (vide propositionem 3 hujus) quatenus ideas inadaequatas sive confusas habet. Dico deinde "qua mens majorem vel minorem sui corporis vel alicujus ejus partis existendi vim quam antea affirmat". Omnes enim corporum ideae quas habemus magis nostri corporis actualem constitutionem (per corollarium II propositionis 16 partis II) quam corporis externi naturam indicant; at haec quae affectus formam constituit, corporis vel alicujus ejus partis constitutionem indicare vel exprimere debet quam ipsum corpus vel aliqua ejus pars habet ex eo quod ipsius agendi potentia sive existendi vis augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur. Sed notandum cum dico "majorem vel minorem existendi vim quam antea", me non intelligere quod mens praesentem corporis constitutionem cum praeterita comparat sed quod idea quae affectus formam constituit, aliquid de corpore affirmat quod plus minusve realitatis revera involvit quam antea.
And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II. xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own body, or any part thereof, something involving more or less reality than before.	Et quia essentia mentis in hoc consistit (per propositiones 11 et 13 partis II) quod sui corporis actualem existentiam affirmat et nos per perfectionem ipsam rei essentiam intelligimus, sequitur ergo quod mens ad majorem minoremve perfectionem transit quando ei aliquid de suo corpore vel aliqua ejus parte affirmare contingit quod plus minusve realitatis involvit quam antea.
When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its own body. For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of thinking are measured by the excellence of the object. Lastly, I have added "by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another", so that, besides the nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.	Cum igitur supra dixerim mentis cogitandi potentiam augeri vel minui, nihil aliud intelligere volui quam quod mens ideam sui corporis vel alicujus ejus partis formaverit quae plus minusve realitatis exprimit quam de suo corpore affirmaverat. Nam idearum praestantia et actualis cogitandi potentia ex objecti praestantia stimatur. Addidi denique "et qua data ipsa mens ad hoc potius quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur" ut praeter laetitiae et tristitiae naturam quam prima definitionis pars explicat, cupiditatis etiam naturam exprimerem. Finis terti partis
PART IV: Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions	SPINOZAE ETHICA ORDINE GEOMETRICO DEMONSTRATA ET IN QUINQUE PARTES DISTINCTA PARS QUARTA DE SERVITUTE HUMANA SEU DE AFFECTUUM VIRIBUS
4praef perfectione imperfectione bono malo	4praef perfectione imperfectione bono malo
PREFACE. Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse. Why this is so, and what is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part of my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be well to make a few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good and evil.	PRAEFATIO. Humanam impotentiam in moderandis et coercendis affectibus servitutem voco; homo enim affectibus obnoxius sui juris non est sed fortun in cujus potestate ita est ut spe coactus sit quanquam meliora sibi videat, deteriora tamen sequi. Hujus rei causam et quid praeterea affectus boni vel mali habent, in hac parte demonstrare proposui. Sed antequam incipiam, pauca de perfectione et imperfectione deque bono et malo praefari lubet.
When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect, not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks that he knows, the intention and aim of its author. For instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect; he will, on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it. But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect. Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.	Qui rem aliquam facere constituit eamque perfecit, rem suam perfectam esse non tantum ipse sed etiam unusquisque qui mentem auctoris illius operis et scopum recte noverit aut se novisse crediderit, dicet. Exempli gratia si quis aliquod opus (quod suppono nondum esse peractum) viderit noveritque scopum auctoris illius operis esse domum dificare, is domum imperfectam esse dicet et contra perfectam simulatque opus ad finem quem ejus auctor eidem dare constituerat, perductum viderit. Verum si quis opus aliquod videt cujus simile nunquam viderat nec mentem opificis novit, is sane scire non poterit opusne illud perfectum an imperfectum sit. Atque haec videtur prima fuisse horum vocabulorum significatio.
But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out types of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer. This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena, which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types before herself. Therefore, when they behold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete. Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon.	Sed postquam homines ideas universales formare et domuum, dificiorum, turrium etc. exemplaria excogitare et alia rerum exemplaria aliis praeferre inceperunt, factum est ut unusquisque id perfectum vocaret quod cum universali idea quam ejusmodi rei formaverat, videret convenire et id contra imperfectum quod cum concepto suo exemplari minus convenire videret quanquam ex opificis sententia consummatum plane esset. Nec alia videtur esse ratio cur res naturales etiam quae scilicet humana manu non sunt fact, perfectas aut imperfectas vulgo appellent; solent namque homines tam rerum naturalium quam artificialium ideas formare universales quas rerum veluti exemplaria habent et quas naturam (quam nihil nisi alicujus finis causa agere existimant) intueri credunt sibique exemplaria proponere. Cum itaque aliquid in natura fieri vident quod cum concepto exemplari quod rei ejusmodi habent, minus convenit, ipsam naturam tum defecisse vel peccavisse remque illam imperfectam reliquisse credunt. Videmus itaque homines consuevisse res naturales perfectas aut imperfectas vocare magis ex praejudicio quam ex earum vera cognitione.
Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does not work with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists. For we have shown, that by the same necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I. xvi.). The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the reason why he acts, are one and the same. Therefore, as he does not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is neither origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called final is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause of anything. For example, when we say that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of household life, had a desire to build a house. Wherefore, the being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, because men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires. They are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined to any particular desire.	Ostendimus enim in primae partis appendice Naturam propter finem non agere; aeternum namque illud et infinitum Ens quod Deum seu Naturam appellamus, eadem qua existit necessitate agit. Ex qua enim naturae necessitate existit, ex eadem ipsum agere ostendimus (propositione 16 partis I). Ratio igitur seu causa cur Deus seu Natura agit et cur existit una eademque est. Ut ergo nullius finis causa existit, nullius etiam finis causa agit sed ut existendi, sic et agendi principium vel finem habet nullum. Causa autem quae finalis dicitur, nihil est praeter ipsum humanum appetitum quatenus is alicujus rei veluti principium seu causa primaria consideratur. Exempli gratia cum dicimus habitationem causam fuisse finalem hujus aut illius domus, nihil tum sane intelligimus aliud quam quod homo ex eo quod vit domestic commoda imaginatus est, appetitum habuit dificandi domum. Quare habitatio quatenus ut finalis causa consideratur, nihil est praeter hunc singularem appetitum qui revera causa est efficiens quae ut prima consideratur quia homines suorum appetituum causas communiter ignorant. Sunt namque ut jam spe dixi suarum quidem actionum et appetituum conscii sed ignari causarum a quibus ad aliquid appetendum determinantur.
Therefore, the common saying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and produces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses treated of in the Appendix to Part I. Perfection and imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or notions which we form from a comparison among one another of individuals of the same species; hence...... I said above (II. Def. vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong. Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this category, and comparing them one with another, find that some possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent, say that some are more perfect than others. Again, in so far as we attribute to them anything implying negation-as term, end, infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or because Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to pass.	Quod praeterea vulgo aiunt Naturam aliquando deficere vel peccare resque imperfectas producere, inter commenta numero de quibus in appendice partis prim egi. Perfectio igitur et imperfectio revera modi solummodo cogitandi sunt nempe notiones quas fingere solemus ex eo quod ejusdem speciei aut generis individua ad invicem comparamus et hac de causa supra (definitione 6 partis II) dixi me per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligere; solemus enim omnia naturae individua ad unum genus quod generalissimum appellatur, revocare nempe ad notionem entis quae ad omnia absolute naturae individua pertinet. Quatenus itaque naturae individua ad hoc genus revocamus et ad invicem comparamus et alia plus entitatis seu realitatis quam alia habere comperimus eatenus alia aliis perfectiora esse dicimus et quatenus iisdem aliquid tribuimus quod negationem involvit ut terminus, finis, impotentia etc. eatenus ipsa imperfecta appellamus quia nostram mentem non que afficiunt ac illa quae perfecta vocamus et non quod ipsis aliquid quod suum sit, deficiat vel quod Natura peccaverit. Nihil enim naturae alicujus rei competit nisi id quod ex necessitate naturae causae efficientis sequitur et quicquid ex necessitate naturae causae efficientis sequitur, id necessario fit.
As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another. Thus one and the same thing can be at the same time good, bad, and indifferent. For instance, music is good for him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is neither good nor bad. Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be retained. For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have indicated.	Bonum et malum quod attinet, nihil etiam positivum in rebus in se scilicet consideratis indicant nec aliud sunt praeter cogitandi modos seu notiones quas formamus ex eo quod res ad invicem comparamus. Nam una eademque res potest eodem tempore bona et mala et etiam indifferens esse. Exempli gratia musica bona est melancholico, mala lugenti, surdo autem neque bona neque mala. Verum quamvis se res ita habeat, nobis tamen haec vocabula retinenda sunt. Nam quia ideam hominis tanquam naturae humanae exemplar quod intueamur formare cupimus, nobis ex u su erit haec eadem vocabula eo quo dixi sen su retinere.
In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by "bad," that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the said type. Again, we shall say that men are more perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type. For it must be specially remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a greater perfection, or vice versae, I do not mean that he is changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance, a horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man, as by being changed into an insect. What I mean is, that we conceive the thing's power of action, in so far as this is understood by its nature, to be increased or diminished. Lastly, by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality-in other words, each thing's essence, in so far as it exists, and operates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to its duration. For no given thing can be said to be more perfect, because it has passed a longer time in existence. The duration of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence; but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will always be able to persist in existence with the same force wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in this respect, all things are equal.	Per bonum itaque in sequentibus intelligam id quod certo scimus medium esse ut ad exemplar humanae naturae quod nobis proponimus, magis magisque accedamus. Per malum autem id quod certo scimus impedire quominus idem exemplar referamus. Deinde homines perfectiores aut imperfectiores dicemus quatenus ad hoc idem exemplar magis aut minus accedunt. Nam apprime notandum est cum dico aliquem a minore ad majorem perfectionem transire et contra, me non intelligere quod ex una essentia seu forma in aliam mutatur. Equus namque exempli gratia tam destruitur si in hominem quam si in insectum mutetur sed quod ejus agendi potentiam quatenus haec per ipsius naturam intelligitur, augeri vel minui concipimus. Deinde per perfectionem in genere realitatem uti dixi intelligam hoc est rei cujuscunque essentiam quatenus certo modo existit et operatur nulla ipsius durationis habita ratione. Nam nulla res singularis potest ideo dici perfectior quia plus temporis in existendo perseveravit; quippe rerum duratio ex earum essentia determinari nequit quandoquidem rerum essentia nullum certum et determinatum existendi tempus involvit sed res quaecunque, sive ea perfectior sit sive minus, eadem vi qua existere incipit, semper in existendo perseverare poterit ita ut omnes hac in re quales sint.
DEFINITIONS.	DEFINITIONES [about definitions]
4d01 bonus	4d01 bonus [notes] [geomap]
I. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us.	I. Per bonum id intelligam quod certo scimus nobis esse utile.
4d02 malus	4d02 malus [notes] [geomap]
II. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in the attainment of any good. (Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the end.).)	II. Per malum autem id quod certo scimus impedire quominus boni alicujus simus compotes. De his praecedentem vide praefationem sub finem {non-deductive reference}.
4d03 contingens^necessario	4d03 contingens^necessario [notes] [geomap]
III. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.	III. Res singulares voco contingentes quatenus dum ad earum solam essentiam attendimus, nihil invenimus quod earum existentiam necessario ponat vel [excl non-exh] quod ipsam necessario secludat.
4d04 possibile	4d04 possibile [notes] [geomap]
IV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, while regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not, whether such causes be determined for producing them. (In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need to distinguish them accurately.)	IV. Easdem res singulares voco possibiles quatenus dum ad causas ex quibus produci debent, attendimus, nescimus an ipsae determinatae sint ad easdem producendum. In scholio I propositionis 33 partis I inter possibile et contingens nullam feci differentiam quia ibi non opus erat haec accurate distinguere.
4d05 contrarios (affectus)	4d05 contrarios (affectus) [notes] [geomap]
V. By conflicting emotions I mean, in what follows, those which draw a man in different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are contraries, not by nature, but by accident.	V. Per contrarios affectus in sequentibus intelligam eos qui hominem diversum trahunt quamvis ejusdem sint generis ut luxuries et avaritia quae amoris sunt species nec natura sed per accidens sunt contrarii.
4d06 (affectum) erga rem	4d06 (affectum) erga rem [notes] [geomap]
VI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future, present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii., which see. (But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit; that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance from us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the same moment of time.)	VI. Quid per affectum erga rem futuram, praesentem et [excl exh triple] praeteritam intelligam, explicui in scholiis I et II propositionis 18 partis III, quod vide {non-deductive reference}. Sed venit hic praeterea notandum quod ut loci sic etiam temporis distantiam non nisi usque ad certum quendam limitem possumus distincte imaginari hoc est sicut omnia illa objecta quae ultra ducentos pedes a nobis distant seu [non-excl non-exh] quorum distantia a loco in quo sumus, illam superat quam distincte imaginamur, que longe a nobis distare et perinde ac si in eodem plano essent, imaginari solemus, sic etiam objecta quorum existendi tempus longiore a praesenti intervallo abesse imaginamur quam quod distincte imaginari solemus, omnia que longe a praesenti distare imaginamur et ad unum quasi temporis momentum referimus.
4d07 finem cujus causa aliquid facimus	4d07 finem cujus causa aliquid facimus [geomap]
VII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a desire.	VII. Per finem cujus causa aliquid facimus, appetitum intelligo.
4d08 virtus	4d08 virtus [notes] [geomap]
VIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that is (III. vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.	VIII. Per virtutem et potentiam idem intelligo hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}) virtus quatenus ad hominem refertur, est ipsa hominis essentia seu [mng eqv] natura quatenus potestatem habet quaedam efficiendi quae per solas ipsius naturae leges possunt intelligi.
4a Nulla res potentior non detur alia	4a Nulla res potentior non detur alia [geomap]
AXIOM. There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is not another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given, there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.	AXIOMA: Nulla res singularis in rerum natura  datur qua potentior et fortior non detur alia. Sed quacunque data datur alia potentior a qua illa data potest destrui.
PROPOSITIONS	PROPOSITIONES
4p01 Nihil falsa positivum habet tollitur	4p01 Nihil falsa positivum habet tollitur [geomap]
PROP. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true.	PROPOSITIO I: Nihil quod idea falsa positivum habet, tollitur praesentia veri quatenus verum.
Proof.-Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any positive quality on account of which they are called false (II. xxxiii.); contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God, they are true (II. xxxii.). Wherefore, if the positive quality possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd. Therefore, no positive quality possessed by a false idea, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Falsitas in sola privatione cognitionis quam ideae inadaequatae involvunt, consistit (per propositionem 35 partis II {2p35}) nec ips aliquid habent positivum propter quod falsae dicuntur (per propositionem 33 partis II {2p33}) sed contra quatenus ad Deum referuntur, verae sunt (per propositionem 32 partis II {2p32}). Si igitur id quod idea falsa positivum habet praesentia veri quatenus verum est, tolleretur, tolleretur ergo idea vera a se ipsa, quod (per propositionem 4 partis III {3p04}) est absurdum. Ergo nihil quod idea etc. Q.E.D.
4p01s II. xvi. Coroll. ii imaginatio	4p01s II. xvi. Coroll. ii imaginatio
Note.-This proposition is more clearly understood from II. xvi. Coroll. ii. For imagination is an idea, which indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err. For instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so long as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination; or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains the nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected thereby: wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us. For, as we said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at its presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings; thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations, stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.	SCHOLIUM: Intelligitur haec propositio clarius ex II corollario propositionis 16 partis II. Nam imaginatio idea est quae magis corporis humani praesentem constitutionem quam corporis externi naturam indicat, non quidem distincte sed confuse; unde fit ut mens errare dicatur. Exempli gratia cum solem intuemur, eundem ducentos circiter pedes a nobis distare imaginamur, in quo tamdiu fallimur quamdiu veram ejus distantiam ignoramus sed cognita ejusdem distantia tollitur quidem error sed non imaginatio hoc est idea solis quae ejusdem naturam eatenus tantum explicat quatenus corpus ab eodem afficitur adeoque quamvis veram ejusdem distantiam noscamus, ipsum nihilominus prope nobis adesse imaginabimur. Nam ut in scholio propositionis 35 partis II diximus, non ea de causa solem adeo propinquum imaginamur quia ejus veram distantiam ignoramus sed quia mens eatenus magnitudinem solis concipit quatenus corpus ab eodem afficitur. Sic cum solis radii aquae superficiei incidentes ad nostros oculos reflectuntur, eundem perinde ac si in aqua esset, imaginamur tametsi verum ejus locum noverimus et sic reliquae imaginationes quibus mens fallitur, sive e naturalem corporis constitutionem sive quod ejusdem agendi potentiam augeri vel minui indicant, vero non sunt contrari nec ejusdem praesentia evanescunt. Fit quidem cum falso aliquod malum timemus, ut timor evanescat audito vero nuntio sed contra etiam fit cum malum quod certe venturum est, timemus ut timor etiam evanescat audito falso nuntio atque adeo imaginationes non praesentia veri quatenus verum evanescunt sed quia ali occurrunt iis fortiores quae rerum quas imaginamur, praesentem existentiam secludunt, ut propositione 17 partis II ostendimus.
4p02 patimur naturae pars	4p02 patimur naturae pars [geomap]
PROP. II. We are only passive, in so far as we are a part of Nature that cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.	PROPOSITIO II: Nos eatenus patimur quatenus naturae sumus pars quae per se absque aliis non potest concipi.
Proof.-We are said to be passive, when something arises in us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is (III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature. We are passive therefore, in so far as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nos tum pati dicimur cum aliquid in nobis oritur cujus non nisi partialis sumus causa (per definitionem 2 partis III {3d02}) hoc est (per definitionem 1 partis III {3d01}) aliquid quod ex solis legibus nostrae naturae deduci nequit. Patimur igitur quatenus naturae sumus pars quae per se absque aliis nequit concipi. Q.E.D.
4p03 Vis perseverat limitata	4p03 Vis perseverat limitata [geomap]
PROP. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.	PROPOSITIO III: Vis qua homo in existendo perseverat, limitata est et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur.
Proof.-This is evident from the axiom of this part. For, when man is given, there is something else-say A-more powerful; when A is given, there is something else-say B-more powerful than A, and so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex axiomate hujus {4a}. Nam dato homine datur aliquid aliud, puta A potentius et dato A datur deinde aliud, puta B ipso A potentius et hoc in infinitum ac proinde potentia hominis potentia alterius rei definitur et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur. Q.E.D.
4p04 homo natura	4p04 homo natura [geomap]
PROP. IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of Nature, and that he should be capable of undergoing no changes, save such as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate cause.	PROPOSITIO IV: Fieri non potest ut homo non sit naturae pars et ut nullas possit pati mutationes nisi quae per solam suam naturam possint intelligi quarumque adaequata sit causa.
Proof.-The power, whereby each particular thing, and consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence (III. vii.). Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I. xxxiv.). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible, that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist; this would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite; namely, either of man's power only, inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all changes which could spring from external causes; or of the infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended towards his own preservation. But the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things). Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as we have shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must be deducible. It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. It is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Potentia qua res singulares et consequenter homo suum esse conservat, est ipsa Dei sive [mng eqv] naturae potentia (per corollarium propositionis 24 partis I {1p24c}) non quatenus infinita est sed quatenus per humanam actualem essentiam explicari potest (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}). Potentia itaque hominis quatenus per ipsius actualem essentiam explicatur, pars est infinitae Dei seu [mng eqv] naturae potentiae hoc est (per propositionem 34 partis I {1p34}) essentiae, quod erat primum. Deinde si fieri posset ut homo nullas posset pati mutationes nisi quae per solam ipsius hominis naturam possint intelligi, sequeretur (per propositiones 4 {3p04} et 6 {3p06} partis III) ut non posset perire sed ut semper necessario existeret atque hoc sequi deberet ex causa cujus potentia finita aut [excl exh] infinita sit nempe vel [non-excl non-exh] ex sola hominis potentia, qui scilicet potis esset ut a se removeret reliquas mutationes quae a causis externis oriri possent vel [non-excl non-exh] infinita naturae potentiae a qua omnia singularia ita dirigerentur ut homo nullas alias posset pati mutationes nisi quae ipsius conservationi inserviunt. At primum (per propositionem praecedentem cujus demonstratio universalis est et ad omnes res singulares applicari potest) est absurdum; ergo si fieri posset ut homo nullas pateretur mutationes nisi quae per solam ipsius hominis naturam possent intelligi et consequenter (sicut jam ostendimus) ut semper necessario existeret, id sequi deberet ex Dei infinita potentia et consequenter (per propositionem 16 partis I {1p16}) ex necessitate divinae naturae quatenus alicujus hominis idea affectus consideratur, totius naturae ordo quatenus ipsa sub extensionis et cogitationis attributis concipitur, deduci deberet atque adeo (per propositionem 21 partis I {1p21}) sequeretur ut homo esset infinitus, quod (per I partem hujus demonstrationis {4p01}) est absurdum. Fieri itaque nequit ut homo nullas alias patiatur mutationes nisi quarum ipse adaequata sit causa. Q.E.D.
4p04c hominem passionibus obnoxium	4p04c hominem passionibus obnoxium [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order of nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as the nature of things demands.	COROLLARIUM {4p04}: Hinc sequitur hominem necessario passionibus esse semper obnoxium communemque naturae ordinem sequi et eidem parere seseque eidem quantum rerum natura exigit, accommodare.
4p05 passionis causae externae potentia	4p05 passionis causae externae potentia [geomap]
PROP. V. The power and increase of every passion, and its persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own.	PROPOSITIO V: Vis et incrementum cujuscunque passionis ejusque in existendo perseverantia non definitur potentia qua nos in existendo perseverare conamur sed  causae externae potentia cum nostra comparata.
Proof.-The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.), the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in II. xvi.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Passionis essentia non potest per solam nostram essentiam explicari (per definitiones 1 {3d01} et 2 {3d02} partis III) hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}) passionis potentia definiri nequit potentia qua in nostro esse perseverare conamur sed (ut propositione 16 partis II {2p16} ostensum est) definiri necessario debet potentia causae externae cum nostra comparata. Q.E.D.
4p06 Vis passionis actiones superare	4p06 Vis passionis actiones superare [geomap]
PROP. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him.	PROPOSITIO VI: Vis alicujus passionis seu [non-excl non-exh] affectus reliquas hominis actiones seu [non-excl non-exh] potentiam superare potest ita ut affectus pertinaciter homini adhaereat.
Proof.-The force and increase of any passion and its persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore (IV. iii.) it can overcome a man's power, &e. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Vis et incrementum cujuscunque passionis ejusque in existendo perseverantia definitur potentia  causae externae cum nostra comparata (per propositionem praecedentem {4p05}) adeoque (per propositionem 3 hujus {4p03}) hominis potentiam superare potest etc. Q.E.D.
4p07 Affectus per affectum contrarium	4p07 Affectus per affectum contrarium [geomap]
PROP. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for controlling emotion.	PROPOSITIO VII: Affectus nec coerceri nec tolli potest nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem affectu coercendo.
Proof.-Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the Emotions at the end of Part III.). When, therefore, the mind is assailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected with a modification [Lat: affectiones] whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished. Now this modification [Lat: affectiones] of the body (IV. v.) receives from its cause the force for persistence in its being; which force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II. vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a modification [Lat: affectiones] contrary to (III. v.) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax.); wherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a modification [Lat: affectiones] contrary to, and stronger than the former modification [Lat: affectiones], in other words, (by the general definition of the emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy the existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger emotion. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus quatenus ad mentem refertur est idea qua mens majorem vel [excl non-exh] minorem sui corporis existendi vim quam antea affirmat (per generalem affectuum definitionem {3dg} quae reperitur sub finem terti partis). Cum igitur mens aliquo affectu conflictatur, corpus afficitur simul affectione qua ejus agendi potentia augetur vel [excl non-exh] minuitur. Porro haec corporis affectio (per propositionem 5 hujus {4p05}) vim a sua causa accipit perseverandi in suo esse; quae proinde nec coerceri nec tolli potest nisi a causa corporea (per propositionem 6 partis II {2p06}) quae corpus afficiat affectione illi contraria (per propositionem 5 partis III {3p05}) et fortiore (per axioma hujus {4a}) atque adeo (per propositionem 12 partis II {22p12}) mens afficietur idea affectionis fortioris et contrari priori hoc est (per generalem affectuum definitionem) mens afficietur affectu fortiori et contrario priori qui scilicet prioris existentiam secludet vel [mng eqv] tollet ac proinde affectus nec tolli nec coerceri potest nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem. Q.E.D.
4p07c Affectus coerceri tolli per ideam corporis affectionis	4p07c Affectus coerceri tolli per ideam corporis affectionis [geomap]
Corollary.-An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a modification [Lat: affectiones] of the body contrary to, and stronger than, that which we are undergoing. For the emotion which we undergo can only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definition of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification [Lat: affectiones] of the body contrary to, and stronger than, the modification [Lat: affectiones] which we undergo.	COROLLARIUM {4p07}: Affectus quatenus ad mentem refertur nec coerceri nec tolli potest nisi per ideam corporis affectionis contrari et fortioris affectione qua patimur. Nam affectus quo patimur nec coerceri nec tolli potest nisi per affectum eodem fortiorem eique contrarium (per propositionem praecedentem {4p06}) hoc est (per generalem affectuum definitionem) nisi per ideam corporis affectionis fortioris et contrari affectioni qua patimur.
4p08 Cognitio boni et mali laetitiae vel tristitiae	4p08 Cognitio boni et mali laetitiae vel tristitiae [geomap]
PROP. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof.	PROPOSITIO VIII: Cognitio boni et mali nihil aliud est quam laetitiae vel [excl non-exh] tristitiae affectus quatenus ejus sumus conscii.
Proof.-We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or the reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.), when it increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of activity. Thus, in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.). But this idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united to body (II. xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification [Lat: affectiones] of the body, save in conception only. Therefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we are conscious thereof. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Id bonum aut [excl non-exh] malum vocamus quod nostro esse conservando prodest vel  [excl non-exh] obest (per definitiones 1 {4d01} et 2 {4d02} hujus ) hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}) quod nostram agendi potentiam auget vel [excl non-exh] minuit, juvat vel [excl non-exh] coercet. quatenus itaque (per definitiones laetitiae {3de02} et tristitiae {3de03}, quas vide in scholio propositionis 11 partis III {non-deductive reference}) rem aliquam nos laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia afficere percipimus, eandem bonam aut [excl non-exh] malam vocamus atque adeo boni et mali cognitio nihil aliud est quam laetitiae vel [excl non-exh] tristitiae idea quae ex ipso laetitiae vel [excl non-exh] tristitiae affectu necessario sequitur (per propositionem 22 partis II {2p22}). At haec idea eodem modo unita est affectui ac mens unita est corpori (per propositionem 21 partis II {2p21}) hoc est (ut in scholio ejusdem propositionis ostensum {non-deductive reference}) haec idea ab ipso affectu sive [mng eqv] (per generalem affectuum definitionem {3dg} ) ab idea corporis affectionis revera non distinguitur nisi solo conceptu; ergo haec cognitio boni et mali nihil est aliud quam ipse affectus quatenus ejusdem sumus conscii. Q.E.D.
4p09 Affectus nobis adesse imaginamur fortior	4p09 Affectus nobis adesse imaginamur fortior [geomap]
PROP. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us.	PROPOSITIO IX: Affectus cujus causam in praesenti nobis adesse imaginamur, fortior est quam si eandem non adesse imaginaremur.
Proof.-Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). An emotion is therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the disposition of the body. But a conception (by II. xvii.) is stronger, so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Imaginatio est idea qua mens rem ut praesentem contemplatur (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 17 partis II {non-deductive reference}) quae tamen magis corporis humani constitutionem quam rei externae naturam indicat (per corollarium II propositionis 16 partis II {2p16c2}). Est igitur affectus (per generalem affectuum definitionem {3dg}) imaginatio quatenus corporis constitutionem indicat. At imaginatio (per propositionem 17 partis II {2p17}) intensior est quamdiu nihil imaginamur quod rei externae praesentem existentiam secludit; ergo etiam affectus cujus causam in praesenti nobis adesse imaginamur, intensior seu fortior est quam si eandem non adesse imaginaremur. Q.E.D.
4p09s III. xviii debiliorem reddi quando alias res nobis praesentes contemplamur	4p09s III. xviii debiliorem reddi quando alias res nobis praesentes contemplamur
Note.-When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the thing in question itself; for the thing's nature is unchanged, whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny that the image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other things which exclude the present existence of the future object: I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of my work.	SCHOLIUM: Cum supra in propositione 18 partis III dixerim nos ex rei futurae vel praeterit imagine eodem affectu affici ac si res quam imaginamur praesens esset, expresse monui id verum esse quatenus ad solam ipsius rei imaginem attendimus; est enim ejusdem naturae sive res ut praesentes imaginati simus sive non simus sed non negavi eandem debiliorem reddi quando alias res nobis praesentes contemplamur quae rei futurae praesentem existentiam secludunt, quod tum monere neglexi quia in hac parte de affectuum viribus agere constitueram.
4p09c futurae vel praeterit debilior praesentis	4p09c futurae vel praeterit debilior praesentis [geomap]
Corollary.-The image of something past or future, that is, of a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present; consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt towards something present.	COROLLARIUM {4p09}: Imago rei futurae vel [excl non-exh] praeterit hoc est rei quam cum relatione ad tempus futurum vel [excl non-exh] praeteritum secluso praesenti contemplamur, caeteris paribus debilior est imagine rei praesentis et consequenter affectus erga rem futuram vel [excl non-exh] praeteritam caeteris paribus remissior est affectu erga rem praesentem.
4p10 futuram tempus longius memoria diu	4p10 futuram tempus longius memoria diu [geomap]
PROP. X. Towards something future, which we conceive as close at hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer interval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that it has long passed away.	PROPOSITIO X: Erga rem futuram quam cito affuturam imaginamur, intensius afficimur quam si ejus existendi tempus longius a praesenti distare imaginaremur et memoria rei quam non diu praeteriisse imaginamur, intensius etiam afficimur quam si eandem diu praeteriisse imaginaremur.
Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or not long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the presence of the object less, than if its period of future existence were more distant from the present, or if it had long passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop.) we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus enim rem cito affuturam vel [excl non-exh] non diu praeteriisse imaginamur, eo ipso aliquid imaginamur quod rei praesentiam minus secludit quam si ejusdem futurum existendi tempus longius a praesenti distare vel [excl non-exh] quod dudum praeterierit, imaginaremur (ut per se notum) adeoque (per praecedentem propositionem {4p09}) eatenus intensius erga eandem afficimur. Q.E.D.
4p10s definitionem 6 hujus partis	4p10s definitionem 6 hujus partis
Note-From the remarks made in Def. vi. of this part it follows that, if objects are separated from the present by a longer period than we can define in conception, though their dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they all affect us equally faintly.	SCHOLIUM: Ex iis quae ad definitionem 6 hujus partis notavimus, sequitur nos erga objecta quae a praesenti longiore temporis intervallo distant quam quod imaginando determinare possumus quamvis ab invicem longo temporis intervallo distare intelligamus, que tamen remisse affici.
4p11 Affectus rem necessariam intensior quam possibilem	4p11 Affectus rem necessariam intensior quam possibilem [geomap]
PROP. XI. An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion towards that which possible, or contingent, or non-necessary.	PROPOSITIO XI: Affectus erga rem quam ut necessariam imaginamur, caeteris paribus intensior est quam erga possibilem vel [non-excl non-exh] contingentem sive [mng eqv] non necessariam.
Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we, to that extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny a thing's existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary (I. xxxiii. note. i.); wherefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal, more intense than an emotion that which is non-necessary. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus rem aliquam necessariam esse imaginamur eatenus ejus existentiam affirmamus et contra rei existentiam negamus quatenus eandem non necessariam esse imaginamur (per scholium I propositionis 33 partis I {non-deductive reference}) ac proinde (per propositionem 9 hujus {4p09}) affectus erga rem necessariam caeteris paribus intensior est quam erga non necessariam. Q.E.D.
4p12 Affectus erga rem possibilem, contingentem	4p12 Affectus erga rem possibilem, contingentem [geomap]
PROP. XII. An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is more intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a thing contingent.	PROPOSITIO XII: Affectus erga rem quam scimus in praesenti non existere et quam ut possibilem imaginamur, caeteris paribus intensior est quam erga contingentem.
Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are not affected by the conception of some further thing, which would assert the existence of the former (IV. Def. iii.); but, on the other hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, which exclude its present existence. But, in so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future, we there by conceive things which assert its existence (IV. iv.), that is (III. xviii.), things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards something possible is more vehement. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus rem ut contingentem imaginamur, nulla alterius rei imagine afficimur quae rei existentiam ponat (per definitionem 3 hujus {4d03}) sed contra (secundum hypothesin) quaedam imaginamur quae ejusdem praesentem existentiam secludunt. At quatenus rem in futurum possibilem esse imaginamur eatenus quaedam imaginamur quae ejusdem existentiam ponunt (per definitionem 4 hujus {4d04}) hoc est (per propositionem 18 partis III) quae spem vel [excl non-exh]  metum fovent atque adeo affectus erga rem possibilem vehementior est. Q.E.D.
4p12c rem non existere, remissior quam in praesenti	4p12c rem non existere, remissior quam in praesenti [geomap]
Corollary.-An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.	COROLLARIUM {4p12}: Affectus erga rem quam scimus in praesenti non existere et quam ut contingentem imaginamur, multo remissior est quam si rem in praesenti nobis adesse imaginaremur.
Proof.-Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist, is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as future (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV. x.). Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is, nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the thing to be present with us. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus erga rem quam in praesenti existere imaginamur, intensior est quam si eandem ut futuram imaginaremur (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus {4p09c}) et multo vehementior est quam si tempus futurum a praesenti multum distare imaginaremur (per propositionem 10 hujus {4p10}). Est itaque affectus erga rem cujus existendi tempus longe a praesenti distare imaginamur, multo remissior quam si eandem ut praesentem imaginaremur et nihilominus (per propositionem praecedentem {4p11}) intensior est quam si eandem rem ut contingentem imaginaremur atque adeo affectus erga rem contingentem multo remissior erit quam si rem in praesenti nobis adesse imaginaremur. Q.E.D.
4p13 rem contingentem non existere remissior quam praeteritam	4p13 rem contingentem non existere remissior quam praeteritam [geomap]
PROP. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal, fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.	PROPOSITIO XIII: Affectus erga rem contingentem quam scimus in praesenti non existere, caeteris paribus remissior est quam affectus erga rem praeteritam.
Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other hand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its present existence. But, in so far as we conceive it in relation to time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II. xvii. Coroll.). Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is fainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a thing past. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus rem ut contingentem imaginamur, nulla alterius rei imagine afficimur quae rei existentiam ponat (per definitionem 3 {4d03} hujus). Sed contra (secundum hypothesin) quaedam imaginamur quae ejusdem praesentem existentiam secludunt. Verum quatenus eandem cum relatione ad tempus praeteritum imaginamur eatenus aliquid imaginari supponimur quod ipsam ad memoriam redigit sive [non-excl non-exh] quod rei imaginem excitat (vide propositionem 18 partis II {2p18} cum ejusdem scholio {non-deductive reference}) ac proinde eatenus efficit ut ipsam ac si praesens esset, contemplemur (per corollarium propositionis 17 partis II {2p17c}) atque adeo (per propositionem 9 hujus {3p09}) affectus erga rem contingentem quam scimus in praesenti non existere, caeteris paribus remissior est quam affectus erga rem praeteritam.  Q.E.D.
4p14 cognitio nullum affectum sed quatenus affectus	4p14 cognitio nullum affectum sed quatenus affectus [geomap]
PROP. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion.	PROPOSITIO XIV: Vera boni et mali cognitio quatenus vera nullum affectum coercere potest sed tantum quatenus ut affectus consideratur.
Proof.-An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existing than before (by the general Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has no positive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what is true; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by virtue of being true, restrain any emotion. But, in so far as such knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to restrain the given emotion. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus est idea qua mens majorem vel [excl non-exh] minorem sui corporis existendi vim quam antea affirmat (per generalem affectuum definitionem) atque adeo (per propositionem 1 hujus {4p01}) nihil positivum habet quod praesentia veri tolli possit et consequenter vera boni et mali cognitio quatenus vera nullum affectum coercere potest. At quatenus affectus est (vide propositionem 8 hujus {4p08}) si fortior affectu coercendo sit, eatenus tantum (per propositionem 7 hujus {4p07}) affectum coercere poterit. Q.E.D.
4p15 Cupiditas ex cognitione boni et mali restingui	4p15 Cupiditas ex cognitione boni et mali restingui [geomap]
PROP. XV. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed.	PROPOSITIO XV: Cupiditas quae ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur, multis aliis cupiditatibus quae ex affectibus quibus conflictamur oriuntur, restingui vel [non-excl non-exh] coerceri potest.
Proof.-From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the strength of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises (III. xxxvii.). But, inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also present with us, in so far as we are active (III. i.), and must therefore be understood through our essence only (III. Def. ii.); consequently (III. vii.) its force and increase can be defined solely by human power. Again, the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes, which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it (IV. iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ex vera boni et mali cognitione quatenus haec (per propositionem 8 hujus {4p08}) affectus est, oritur necessario cupiditas (per 1 affectuum definitionem {3de01}) quae eo est major quo affectus ex quo oritur major est (per propositionem 37 partis III {3p37}). Sed quia haec cupiditas (per hypothesin) ex eo quod aliquid vere intelligimus, oritur, sequitur ergo ipsa in nobis quatenus agimus (per propositionem 3 partis III {3p03}) atque adeo per solam nostram essentiam debet intelligi (per definitionem 2 partis III {3d02}) et consequenter (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}) ejus vis et incrementum sola humana potentia definiri debet. Porro cupiditates quae ex affectibus quibus conflictamur oriuntur, eo etiam majores sunt quo hi affectus vehementiores erunt atque adeo earum vis et incrementum (per propositionem 5 hujus {4p05}) potentia causarum externarum definiri debet quae, si cum nostra comparetur, nostram potentiam indefinite superat (per propositionem 3 hujus {4p03}) atque adeo cupiditates quae ex similibus affectibus oriuntur, vehementiores esse possunt illa quae ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur ac proinde (per propositionem 7 hujus {4p07}) eandem coercere vel [non-excl non-exh] restinguere poterunt. Q.E.D.
4p16 Cupiditas futurum facilius praesentia	4p16 Cupiditas futurum facilius praesentia [geomap]
PROP. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment.	PROPOSITIO XVI: Cupiditas quae ex cognitione boni et mali quatenus haec cognitio futurum respicit, oritur, facilius rerum cupiditate quae in praesentia suaves sunt, coerceri vel [non-excl non-exh] restingui potest.
Proof.-Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future, is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix. Coroll.). But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal application). Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when concerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or quenched, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus erga rem quam futuram imaginamur, remissior est quam erga praesentem (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus {4p09c}). At cupiditas quae ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur, tametsi haec cognitio circa res quae in praesentia bonae sunt, versetur, restingui vel [non-excl non-exh] coerceri potest aliqua temeraria cupiditate (per propositionem praecedentem cujus demonstratio universalis est); ergo cupiditas quae ex eadem cognitione quatenus haec futurum respicit, oritur, facilius coerceri vel [non-excl non-exh] restingui poterit etc. Q.E.D.
4p17 Cupiditas contingentes facilius	4p17 Cupiditas contingentes facilius [geomap]
PROP. XVII. Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire for things that are present.	PROPOSITIO XVII: Cupiditas quae oritur ex vera boni et mali cognitione quatenus haec circa res contingentes versatur, multo adhuc facilius coerceri potest cupiditate rerum quae praesentes sunt.
Proof.-This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop. from IV. xii. Coroll.	DEMONSTRATIO: Propositio haec eodem modo ac propositio praecedens demonstratur ex corollario propositionis 12 hujus.
4p17s video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor, qui auget scientiam, auget dolorem	4p17s video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor, qui auget scientiam, auget dolorem
Note.-I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often yields to every kind of passion. This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet:[12 [12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."]-- "The better path I gaze at and approve, The worse-I follow." Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind, when he says, "He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." I have not written the above with the object of drawing the conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity. The power of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately.	SCHOLIUM: His me causam ostendisse credo cur homines opinione magis quam vera ratione commoveantur et cur vera boni et mali cognitio animi commotiones excitet et spe omni libidinis generi cedat; unde illud poet natum : video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor. Quod idem etiam Ecclesiastes in mente habuisse videtur cum dixit : qui auget scientiam, auget dolorem. Atque haec non eum in finem dico ut inde concludam praestabilius esse ignorare quam scire vel quod stulto intelligens in moderandis affectibus nihil intersit sed ideo quia necesse est nostrae naturae tam potentiam quam impotentiam noscere ut determinare possimus quid ratio in moderandis affectibus possit et quid non possit et in hac parte de sola humana impotentia me acturum dixi. Nam de rationis in affectus potentia separatim agere constitui.
4p18 Cupiditas laetitia fortior tristitia	4p18 Cupiditas laetitia fortior tristitia [geomap]
PROP. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.	PROPOSITIO XVIII: Cupiditas quae ex laetitia oritur, caeteris paribus fortior est cupiditate quae ex tristitia oritur.
Proof.-Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions, i.), that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist in his own being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being felt, diminished or hindered; hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only. Thus the former is the stronger of the two. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia (per 1 {3de01} affectuum definitionem) hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}) conatus quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur. Quare cupiditas quae ex laetitia oritur, ipso laetitiae affectu (per definitionem laetitiae,quam vide in scholio propositionis 11 partis III {non-deductive reference}) juvatur vel [non-excl non-exh] augetur; quae autem contra ex tristitia oritur, ipso tristitiae affectu (per idem scholium) minuitur vel [non-excl non-exh] coercetur atque adeo vis cupiditatis quae ex laetitia oritur, potentia humana simul et potentia causae externae, quae autem ex tristitia sola humana potentia definiri debet ac proinde hac illa fortior est. Q.E.D.
4p18s humanae impotentiae et inconstantiae causas	4p18s humanae impotentiae et inconstantiae causas
Note.-In these few remarks I have explained the causes of human infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of reason. It now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are contrary thereto. But, before I begin to prove my Propositions in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my meaning. As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands, that every man should love himself, should seek that which is useful to him-I mean, that which is really useful to him, should desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection, and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to preserve his own being. This is as necessarily true, as that a whole is greater than its part. (Cf. III. iv.)	SCHOLIUM: His paucis humanae impotenti et inconstanti causas et cur homines rationis praecepta non servent, explicui. Superest jam ut ostendam quid id sit quod ratio nobis prscribit et quinam affectus cum rationis humanae regulis conveniant, quinam contra iisdem contrarii sint. Sed antequam haec prolixo nostro geometrico ordine demonstrare incipiam, lubet ipsa rationis dictamina hic prius breviter ostendere ut ea quae sentio facilius ab unoquoque percipiantur. Cum ratio nihil contra naturam postulet, postulat ergo ipsa ut unusquisque seipsum amet, suum utile, quod revera utile est, qurat et id omne quod hominem ad majorem perfectionem revera ducit, appetat et absolute ut unusquisque suum esse quantum in se est, conservare conetur. Quod quidem tam necessario verum est quam quod totum sit sua parte majus (vide propositionem 4 partis III).
Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and lastly, that suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by external causes repugnant to their nature. Further, it follows from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of our being or living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could understand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to be desired. Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than those which are in entire agreement with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united, they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them singly.	Deinde quandoquidem virtus (per definitionem 8 hujus) nihil aliud est quam ex legibus propri naturae agere et nemo suum esse (per propositionem 7 partis III) conservare conetur nisi ex propri suae naturae legibus, hinc sequitur primo virtutis fundamentum esse ipsum conatum proprium esse conservandi et felicitatem in eo consistere quod homo suum esse conservare potest. Secundo sequitur virtutem propter se esse appetendam nec quicquam quod ipsa prstabilius aut quod utilius nobis sit, dari, cujus causa deberet appeti. Tertio denique sequitur eos qui se interficiunt animo esse impotentes eosque a causis externis suae naturae repugnantibus prorsus vinci. Porro ex postulato 4 partis II sequitur nos efficere nunquam posse ut nihil extra nos indigeamus ad nostrum esse conservandum et ut ita vivamus ut nullum commercium cum rebus quae extra nos sunt, habeamus et si praeterea nostram mentem spectemus, sane noster intellectus imperfectior esset si mens sola esset nec quicquam praeter se ipsam intelligeret. Multa igitur extra nos dantur quae nobis utilia quque propterea appetenda sunt. Ex his nulla praestantiora excogitari possunt quam ea quae cum nostra natura prorsus conveniunt. Si enim duo exempli gratia ejusdem prorsus naturae individua invicem junguntur, individuum componunt singulo duplo potentius.
Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man - nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all. Hence, men who are governed by reason-that is, who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their conduct. Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater detail. I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue. Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I have hitherto proceeded.	Homini igitur nihil homine utilius; nihil inquam homines praestantius ad suum esse conservandum optare possunt quam quod omnes in omnibus ita conveniant ut omnium mentes et corpora unam quasi mentem unumque corpus componant et omnes simul quantum possunt suum esse conservare conentur omnesque simul omnium commune utile sibi qurant; ex quibus sequitur homines qui ratione gubernantur hoc est homines qui ex ductu rationis suum utile qurunt, nihil sibi appetere quod reliquis hominibus non cupiant atque adeo eosdem justos, fidos atque honestos esse. Haec illa rationis dictamina sunt quae hic paucis ostendere proposueram antequam eadem prolixiore ordine demonstrare inciperem, quod ea de causa feci ut, si fieri posset, eorum attentionem mihi conciliarem qui credunt hoc principium, quod scilicet unusquisque suum utile qurere tenetur, impietatis, non autem virtutis et pietatis esse fundamentum. Postquam igitur rem sese contra habere breviter ostenderim, pergo ad eandem eadem via qua huc usque progressi sumus, demonstrandum.
4p19 unusquisque appetit bonum	4p19 unusquisque appetit bonum [geomap]
PROP. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.	PROPOSITIO XIX: Id unusquisque ex legibus suae naturae necessario appetit vel [excl non-exh] aversatur quod bonum vel [excl non-exh] malum esse judicat.
Proof.-The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is nothing else but man's nature or essence (Cf. the Definition of Appetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.). Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires the one, and [Lat: vel B.H.] shrinks from the other, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Boni et [excl non-exh] mali cognitio est (per propositionem 8 hujus {4p08}) ipse laetitiae vel [excl non-exh] tristitiae affectus quatenus ejusdem sumus conscii ac proinde (per propositionem 28 partis III {3p28}) id unusquisque necessario appetit quod bonum et contra id aversatur quod malum esse judicat. Sed hic appetitus nihil aliud est quam ipsa hominis essentia seu [mng eqv] natura (per definitionem appetitus, quam vide in scholio propositionis 9 partis III  {non-deductive reference} et 1 affectuum definitionem {1dg}). Ergo unusquisque ex solis suae naturae legibus id necessario appetit vel [excl non-exh] aversatur etc. Q.E.D.
4p20 conatur virtute	4p20 conatur virtute [geomap]
PROP. XX. The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek what is useful to him-in other words, to preserve his own being-the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.	PROPOSITIO XX: Quo magis unusquisque suum utile quaerere hoc est suum esse conservare conatur et potest eo magis virtute praeditus est et contra quatenus unusquisque suum utile hoc est suum esse  conservare negligit eatenus est impotens.
Proof.-Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by man's essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being. Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently (III. iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Virtus est ipsa humana potentia quae sola hominis essentia definitur (per definitionem 8 hujus {4d08}) hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}) quae solo conatu quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur, definitur. Quo ergo unusquisque magis suum esse conservare conatur et potest eo magis virtute praeditus est et consequenter (per propositiones 4 {3p04} et 6 partis III {3p06}) quatenus aliquis suum esse conservare negligit eatenus est impotens. Q.E.D.
4p20s homo ex necessitate conetur non existere est impossibile	4p20s homo ex necessitate conetur non existere est impossibile
Note.-No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his nature. No one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: which latter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for instance, kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart; or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's command, to open his own veins-that is, to escape a greater evil by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes may so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea cannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become non-existent, is as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little reflection.	SCHOLIUM: Nemo igitur nisi a causis externis et suae naturae contrariis victus suum utile appetere sive suum esse conservare negligit. Nemo inquam ex necessitate suae naturae sed a causis externis coactus alimenta aversatur vel se ipsum interficit, quod multis modis fieri potest nempe interficit aliquis se ipsum coactus ab alio qui ejus dexteram qua ensem ca su prehenderat, contorquet et cogit versus cor ipsum gladium dirigere vel quod ex mandato tyranni ut Seneca cogatur venas aperire suas hoc est majus malum minore vitare cupiat vel denique ex eo quod causae latentes externae ejus imaginationem ita disponunt et corpus ita afficiunt ut id aliam naturam priori contrariam induat et cujus idea in mente dari nequit (per propositionem 10 partis III). At quod homo ex necessitate suae naturae conetur non existere vel in aliam formam mutari, tam est impossibile quam quod ex nihilo aliquid fiat, ut unusquisque mediocri meditatione videre potest.
4p21 beatum bene agere vivere actu existere	4p21 beatum bene agere vivere actu existere [geomap]
PROP. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and to live-in other words, to actually exist.	PROPOSITIO XXI: Nemo potest cupere beatum esse, bene agere et bene vivere qui simul non cupiat esse, agere et vivere hoc est actu existere.
Proof.-The proof of this proposition, or rather the proposition itself, is self-evident, and is also plain from the definition of desire. For the desire of living, acting, &c., blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence of man-that is (III. vii.), the endeavour made by everyone to preserve his own being. Therefore, no one can desire, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus propositionis demonstratio seu potius res ipsa per se patet et etiam ex cupiditatis definitione {3de01}. Est enim cupiditas (per 1 {3de01} affectuum definitionem) beate seu [mng eqv] bene vivendi, agendi etc. ipsa hominis essentia hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}) conatus quo unusquisque suum esse conservare conatur. Ergo nemo potest cupere etc. Q.E.D.
4p22 Nulla virtus prior conatu sese conservandi	4p22 Nulla virtus prior conatu sese conservandi [geomap]
PROP. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavour to preserve one's own being.	PROPOSITIO XXII: Nulla virtus potest prior hac (nempe conatu sese conservandi) concipi.
Proof.-The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a thing (III. vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd. Therefore no virtue, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Conatus sese conservandi est ipsa rei essentia (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}). Si igitur aliqua virtus posset hac nempe hoc conatu prior concipi, conciperetur ergo (per definitionem 8 hujus {4d08}) ipsa rei essentia se ipsa prior, quod (ut per se notum) est absurdum. Ergo nulla virtus etc. Q.E.D.
4p22c Conatus conservandi	4p22c Conatus conservandi [geomap]
Corollary. The effort for self-preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.	COROLLARIUM {4p22}: Conatus sese conservandi primum et unicum virtutis est fundamentum. Nam hoc principio nullum aliud potest prius concipi (per propositionem praecedentem {4p22}) et absque ipso (per propositionem 21 hujus {4p21}) nulla virtus potest concipi.
4p23 ideas inadaequatas non virtute	4p23 ideas inadaequatas non virtute [geomap]
PROP. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.	PROPOSITIO XXIII: Homo quatenus ad aliquid agendum determinatur ex eo quod ideas habet inadaequatas, non potest absolute dici ex virtute agere sed tantum quatenus determinatur ex eo quod intelligit.
Proof.-In so far as a man is determined to an action through having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III. Deff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which does not follow from his virtue. But, in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands, he is active; that is, he does something, which is perceived through his essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus homo ad agendum determinatur ex eo quod inadaequatas habet ideas eatenus (per propositionem 1 partis III {3p01}) patitur hoc est (per definitiones 1 {3d01} et 2 {3d02} partis III) aliquid agit quod per solam ejus essentiam non potest percipi hoc est (per definitionem 8 hujus {4d08}) quod ex ipsius virtute non sequitur. At quatenus ad aliquid agendum determinatur ex eo quod intelligit eatenus (per eandem propositionem 1 partis III {3p01}) agit hoc est (per definitionem 2 partis III {3d02}) aliquid agit quod per solam ipsius essentiam percipitur sive [mng eqv] (per definitionem 8 hujus {4d08}) quod ex ipsius virtute adaequate sequitur. Q.E.D.
4p24  Ex virtute ductu esse conservare idem	4p24  Ex virtute ductu esse conservare idem [geomap]
PROP. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being (these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to one's self.	PROPOSITIO XXIV: Ex virtute absolute agere nihil aliud in nobis est [mng eqv] quam ex ductu rationis agere, [mng eqv] vivere, suum [mng eqv] esse conservare (haec tria idem significant) idque ex fundamento proprium utile quaerendi.
Proof.-To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature. But we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.): therefore to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, and that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii. Coroll.). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ex virtute absolute agere nihil aliud est (per definitionem 8 hujus {4d08}) quam ex legibus propriae naturae agere. At nos eatenus tantummodo agimus quatenus intelligimus (per propositionem 3 partis III {3p03}). Ergo ex virtute agere nihil aliud in nobis est quam ex ductu rationis agere, vivere, suum esse conservare idque (per corollarium propositionis 22 hujus {4p22c}) ex fundamento suum utile quaerendi. Q.E.D.
4p25 Nemo esse alterius rei causa conatur	4p25 Nemo esse alterius rei causa conatur [geomap]
PROP. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of anything else.	PROPOSITIO XXV: Nemo suum esse alterius  rei causa conservare conatur.
Proof.-The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself (III. vii.); from this alone, and not from the essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that everyone endeavours to preserve his being. Moreover, this proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else, the last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue, which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no one, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Conatus quo unaquque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, sola ipsius rei essentia definitur (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}) eaque sola data, non autem ex alterius rei essentia necessario sequitur (per propositionem 6 partis III {3p06}) ut unusquisque suum esse conservare conetur. Patet praeterea haec propositio ex corollario propositionis 22 hujus partis {4p22}. Nam si homo alterius rei causa suum esse conservare conaretur, tum res illa primum esset virtutis fundamentum (ut per se notum) quod (per praedictum corollarium) est absurdum. Ergo nemo suum esse etc. Q.E.D.
4p26 ex ratione est intelligere	4p26 ex ratione est intelligere [geomap]
PROP. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it, save such things as are conducive to understanding.	PROPOSITIO XXVI: Quicquid ex ratione conamur, nihil aliud est quam intelligere nec mens quatenus ratione utitur, aliud sibi utile esse judicat nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit.
Proof.-The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so far as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for continuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of Appetite, III. ix. note). But the essence of reason is nought else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.); therefore (II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand. Again, since this effort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.); on the other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are conducive to understanding.	DEMONSTRATIO: Conatus sese conservandi nihil est praeter ipsius rei essentiam (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}) quae quatenus talis existit, vim habere concipitur ad perseverandum in existendo (per propositionem 6 partis III {3p06}) et ea agendum quae ex data sua natura necessario sequuntur (vide definitionem appetitus in scholio propositionis 9 partis III {non-deductive reference}). At rationis essentia nihil aliud est quam mens nostra quatenus clare et distincte intelligit (vide ejus definitionem in II scholio propositionis 40 partis II {non-deductive reference}). Ergo (per propositionem 40 partis II {2p40}) quicquid ex ratione conamur, nihil aliud est quam intelligere. Deinde quoniam hic mentis conatus quo mens quatenus ratiocinatur suum esse  conatur conservare, nihil aliud est quam intelligere (per primam partem hujus {not found}) est ergo hic intelligendi conatus (per corollarium propositionis 22 hujus {4p22c}) primum et unicum virtutis fundamentum nec alicujus finis causa (per propositionem 25 hujus {4p25}) res intelligere conabimur sed contra mens quatenus ratiocinatur nihil sibi bonum esse concipere poterit nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit (per definitionem 1 hujus {4d01}). Q.E.D.
4p27 scimus intelligendum conducit	4p27 scimus intelligendum conducit [geomap]
PROP. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are able to hinder us from understanding.	PROPOSITIO XXVII: Nihil certo scimus bonum aut [excl non-exh]  malum esse nisi id quod ad intelligendum revera conducit vel [excl non-exh] quod impedire potest quominus intelligamus.
Proof.-The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself, save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing Prop.). But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in so far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be good or evil save such things as really conduce, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mens quatenus ratiocinatur nihil aliud appetit quam intelligere nec aliud sibi utile esse judicat nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit (per propositionem praecedentem {4p26}). At mens (per propositiones 41 {2p41} et 43 {2p43} partis II, cujus etiam scholium vide {non-deductive reference}) rerum certitudinem non habet nisi quatenus ideas habet adaequatas sive [mng eqv] (quod per scholia propositionis 40 partis II {non-deductive reference} idem est ) quatenus ratiocinatur; ergo nihil certo scimus bonum  esse nisi id quod ad intelligendum revera conducit et contra id malum quod impedire potest quominus intelligamus. Q.E.D.
4p28 Summum mentis bonum Dei	4p28 Summum mentis bonum Dei [geomap]
PROP. XXVIII. The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.	PROPOSITIO XXVIII: Summum mentis bonum est Dei cognitio et summa mentis virtus Deum cognoscere.
Proof.-The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be conceived; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind's highest utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God. Again, the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously. The mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand. Now, as we have already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is God; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Summum quod mens intelligere potest, Deus est hoc est (per definitionem 6 partis I {1d06}) Ens absolute infinitum et sine quo (per propositionem 15 partis I {1p15}) nihil esse neque concipi potest adeoque (per propositiones 26 {4p26} et 27 {4p27} hujus) summum mentis utile sive [mng eqv] (per definitionem 1 hujus) bonum est Dei cognitio. Deinde mens quatenus intelligit eatenus tantum agit (per propositiones 1 {3p01} et 3 {3p03} partis III) et eatenus tantum (per propositionem 23 hujus {4p23}) potest absolute dici quod ex virtute agit. Est igitur mentis absoluta virtus intelligere. At summum quod mens intelligere potest, Deus est (ut jam jam demonstravimus). Ergo mentis summa virtus est Deum intelligere seu [a kind of] cognoscere. Q.E.D.
4p29 juvare commune aliquid nobiscum	4p29 juvare commune aliquid nobiscum [geomap]
PROP. XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely different from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has something in common with our nature.	PROPOSITIO XXIX: Res quaecunque singularis cujus natura a nostra prorsus est diversa, nostram agendi potentiam nec juvare nec coercere potest et absolute res nulla potest nobis bona aut [excl non-exh] mala esse nisi commune aliquid nobiscum habeat.
Proof.-The power of every individual thing, and consequently the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II. vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through which human nature is conceived. Therefore our power of activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely different from our own; and since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III. xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Cujuscunque rei singularis et consequenter (per corollarium propositionis 10 partis II {2p10c}) hominis potentia qua existit et operatur, non determinatur nisi ab alia rei singulari (per propositionem 28 partis I {1p28}) cujus natura (per propositionem 6 partis II {2p06}) per idem attributum debet intelligi per quod natura humana concipitur. Nostra igitur agendi potentia quomodocunque ea concipiatur, determinari et consequenter juvari vel [excl non-exh] coerceri potest potentia alterius rei singularis quae aliquid commune nobiscum habet et non potentia rei cujus natura a nostra prorsus est diversa et quia id bonum aut [excl non-exh] malum vocamus quod causa est laetitiae aut [excl non-exh] tristitiae (per propositionem 8 hujus {4p08}) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 partis III {non-deductive reference}) quod nostram agendi  potentiam auget vel [excl non-exh] minuit, juvat vel [excl non-exh] coercet, ergo res cujus natura a nostra prorsus est diversa nobis neque bona neque mala esse potest. Q.E.D.
4p30 Res commune contraria	4p30 Res commune contraria [geomap]
PROP. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature.	PROPOSITIO XXX: Res nulla per id quod cum nostra natura commune habet, potest esse mala sed quatenus nobis mala est eatenus est nobis contraria.
Proof.-We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV. viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when it diminishes or checks our power of action. Therefore, if anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand, in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown), in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is contrary to our nature. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Id malum vocamus quod causa est tristitiae (per propositionem 8 hujus {4p08}) hoc est (per ejus definitionem, quam vide in scholio propositionis 11 partis III {non-deductive reference}) quod nostram agendi potentiam minuit vel [non-excl non-exh] coercet. Si igitur res aliqua per id quod nobiscum habet commune, nobis esset mala, posset ergo res id ipsum quod nobiscum commune habet, minuere [non-excl non-exh] coercere, quod (per propositionem 4 partis III {3p04}) est absurdum. Nulla igitur res per id quod nobiscum commune habet, potest nobis esse mala sed contra quatenus mala est hoc est (ut jam jam ostendimus) quatenus nostram agendi potentiam minuere vel [non-excl non-exh] coercere potest eatenus (per propositionem 5 partis III {3p05}) nobis est contraria. Q.E.D.
4p31 res convenit natura	4p31 res convenit [geomap]
PROP. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good.	PROPOSITIO XXXI: quatenus res aliqua cum nostra natura convenit eatenus necessario bona est.
Proof.-In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it cannot be bad for it. It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent. If it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which tends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself; but this (III. vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: quatenus enim res aliqua cum nostra natura convenit, non potest (per propositionem praecedentem) esse mala. Erit ergo necessario vel [excl non-exh] bona vel [excl non-exh] indifferens. Si hoc ponatur nempe quod neque bona sit neque mala, nihil ergo (per definitionem 1 hujus {4d01}) ex ipsius natura sequetur quod nostrae naturae conservationi inservit hoc est (per hypothesin) quod ipsius rei naturae conservationi inservit sed hoc est absurdum (per propositionem 6 partis III {3p06}); erit ergo quatenus cum nostra natura convenit, necessario bona. Q.E.D.
4p31c convenit utilior magis bona	4p31c convenit utilior magis bona [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing is in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for us, and vice versae, in proportion as a thing is more useful for us, so is it more in harmony with our nature. For, in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be different therefrom or contrary thereto. If different, it can neither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.); if contrary, it will be contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is, contrary to what is good-in short, bad. Nothing, therefore, can be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature; and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony with our nature, and vice versae. Q.E.D.	COROLLARIUM {4p31}: Hinc sequitur quod quo res aliqua magis cum nostra natura convenit, eo nobis est utilior seu [mng eqv] magis bona et contra quo res aliqua nobis est utilior, eatenus cum nostra natura magis convenit. Nam quatenus cum nostra natura non convenit, erit necessario a nostra natura diversa vel [non-excl non- exh] eidem contraria. Si diversa, tum (per propositionem 29 hujus {4p29}) neque bona neque mala esse poterit; si autem contraria, erit ergo etiam ei contraria quae cum nostra natura convenit hoc est (per propositionem praecedentem {4p31}) contraria bono seu [excl non-exh] mala. Nihil igitur nisi quatenus cum nostra natura convenit, potest esse bonum atque adeo quo res aliqua magis cum nostra natura convenit, eo est utilior et contra. Q.E.D.
4p32 passionibus non natura conveniant	4p32 passionibus non natura conveniant [geomap]
PROP. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, they cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.	PROPOSITIO XXXII: Quatenus homines passionibus sunt obnoxii, non possunt eatenus dici quod natura   conveniant.
Proof.-Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note); wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions, cannot be said to be naturally in harmony. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: quae natura convenire dicuntur, potentia convenire  intelliguntur (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}) non autem impotentia seu negatione et consequenter (vide scholium propositionis 3 partis III {3p03}) neque etiam passione; quare homines quatenus passionibus sunt obnoxii, non possunt dici quod natura conveniant. Q.E.D.
4p32s album et nigrum	4p32s album et nigrum
Note. This is also self-evident; for, if we say that white and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm that they do not agree in any respect. So, if we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both are finite-wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes-we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really agree in no respect.	SCHOLIUM: Res etiam per se patet; qui enim ait album et nigrum in eo solummodo convenire quod neutrum sit rubrum, is absolute affirmat album et nigrum nulla in re convenire. Sic etiam si quis ait lapidem et hominem in hoc tantum convenire quod uterque sit finitus, impotens vel quod ex necessitate suae naturae non existit vel denique quod a potentia causarum externarum indefinite superatur, is omnino affirmat lapidem et hominem nulla in re convenire; quae enim in sola negatione sive in eo quod non habent conveniunt, ea revera nulla in re conveniunt.
4p33 Homines natura discrepare passiones	4p33 Homines natura discrepare passiones [geomap]
PROP. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states; and to this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant.	PROPOSITIO XXXIII: Homines natura discrepare possunt quatenus affectibus qui passiones sunt, conflictantur et eatenus etiam unus idemque homo varius est et inconstans.
Proof.-The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i., ii.), but it must be defined by the power, that is (III. vii.), by the nature of external causes in comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected (III. lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and the same object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly, that one and the same man may be differently affected towards the same object, and may therefore be variable and inconstant. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Affectuum natura seu [mng eqv] essentia non potest per solam nostram essentiam seu [mng eqv] naturam explicari (per definitiones 1 {3d01} et 2 {3d02} partis III) sed potentia hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}) natura externarum cum nostra comparata definiri debet; unde fit ut uniuscujusque affectus tot species dentur quot sunt species objectorum a quibus afficimur (vide propositionem 56 partis III {3p56}) et ut homines ab uno eodemque objecto diversimode afficiantur (vide propositionem 51 partis III {3p51}) atque eatenus natura discrepent et denique ut unus idemque homo (per eandem propositionem 51 partis III {3p51}) erga idem objectum diversimode afficiatur atque eatenus varius sit etc. Q.E.D.
4p34 passiones possunt contrarii	4p34 passiones possunt contrarii [geomap]
PROP. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions, they can be contrary one to another.	PROPOSITIO XXXIV: Quatenus homines affectibus qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt invicem esse contrarii.
Proof.-A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to that which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and note), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in III. lv. note); it may therefore happen that Paul should hate Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should endeavour to do the other an injury, (III. xxxix.), that is (IV. xxx.), that they should be contrary one to another. But the emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.); hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions, can be contrary one to another. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Homo exempli gratia Petrus potest esse causa ut Paulus contristetur propterea quod aliquid habet simile rei quam Paulus odit (per propositionem 16 partis III {3p16}) vel [excl exh triple] propterea quod Petrus solus re aliqua potitur quam ipse Paulus etiam amatae (vide propositionem 32 partis III {3p32} cum ejusdem scholio {non-deductive reference}) vel [excl exh triple] ob alias causas (harum praecipuas vide in scholio propositionis 55 partis III {non-deductive reference}) atque adeo inde fiet (per definitionem 7 affectuum {3de07}) ut Paulus Petrum odio habeat et consequenter facile fiet (per propositionem 40 partis III {3p40} cum ejus scholio {non-deductive reference}) ut Petrus Paulum contra odio habeat atque adeo (per propositionem 39 partis III {3p39}) ut invicem malum inferre conentur hoc est (per propositionem 30 hujus {4p30}) ut invicem sint contrarii. At affectus tristitiae semper passio est (per propositionem 59 partis III {3p59}); ergo homines quatenus conflictantur affectibus qui passiones sunt, possunt invicem esse contrarii. Q.E.D.
4p34s prima fronte videtur ex eo quod natura conveniunt, sibi invicem damno sint	4p34s prima fronte videtur ex eo quod natura conveniunt, sibi invicem damno sint
Note.-I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men, through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way; if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be untrue. But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we shall see that the discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures, that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one differing from the other. For, in so far as each loves the same thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is (Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered thereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the agreement in their natures. The cause for their opposition lies, as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ. For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be affected with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus they will be at variance one with another. We can easily show in like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences, and not on the agreement between men's natures.	SCHOLIUM: Dixi quod Paulus odio Petrum habeat quia imaginatur id eundem possidere quod ipse Paulus etiam amat; unde prima fronte videtur sequi quod hi duo ex eo quod idem amant et consequenter ex eo quod natura conveniunt, sibi invicem damno sint atque adeo si hoc verum est, falsae essent propositio 30 et 31 hujus partis. Sed si rem qua lance examinare velimus, haec omnia convenire omnino videbimus. Nam hi duo non sunt invicem molesti quatenus natura conveniunt hoc est quatenus uterque idem amat, sed quatenus ab invicem discrepant. Nam quatenus uterque idem amat, eo ipso utriusque amor fovetur (per propositionem 31 partis III) hoc est (per definitionem 6 affectuum) eo ipso utriusque laetitia fovetur. Quare longe abest ut quatenus idem amant et natura conveniunt, invicem molesti sint. Sed hujus rei causa ut dixi nulla alia est quam quia natura discrepare supponuntur. Supponimus namque Petrum ideam habere rei amatae jam possess et Paulum contra ideam rei amatae amiss. Unde fit ut hic tristitia et ille contra laetitia afficiatur atque eatenus invicem contrarii sint. Et ad hunc modum ostendere facile possumus reliquas odii causas ab hoc solo pendere quod homines natura discrepant et non ab eo in quo conveniunt.
4p35 ex ductu rationis semper conveniunt	4p35 ex ductu rationis semper conveniunt [geomap]
PROP. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always necessarily agree in nature.	PROPOSITIO XXXV: Quatenus homines ex ductu rationis vivunt eatenus tantum natura semper  conveniunt.
Proof.-In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at variance one with another. But men are only said to be active, in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.); therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it is defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely through human nature as its proximate cause. But, since every man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good, and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.); and further, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deem good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.); it follows that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); in other words, such things as are in harmony with each man's nature. Therefore, men in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with another. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus homines affectibus qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt esse natura diversi (per propositionem 33 hujus {4p33}) et invicem contrarii (per propositionem praecedentem {4p34}). Sed eatenus homines tantum agere dicuntur quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt (per propositionem 3 partis III {3p03}) atque adeo quicquid ex humana natura quatenus ratione definitur, sequitur id (per definitionem 2 partis III {3d02}) per solam humanam naturam tanquam per proximam suam causam debet intelligi. Sed quia unusquisque ex suae naturae legibus id appetit quod bonum et id amovere conatur quod malum esse judicat (per propositionem 19 hujus {4p19}) et cum praeterea id quod ex dictamine rationis bonum aut [excl non-exh] malum esse judicamus, necessario bonum aut [excl non-exh] malum sit (per propositionem 41 partis II {2p41}). Ergo homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt eatenus tantum ea necessario agunt quae humanae naturae et consequenter unicuique homini necessario bona sunt hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 31 hujus {4p31c}) quae cum natura uniuscujusque hominis conveniunt atque adeo homines etiam inter se quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, necessario semper conveniunt. Q.E.D.
4p35c1 Nihil utilius homo rationis	4p35c1 Nihil utilius homo rationis [geomap]
Corollary I.-There is no individual thing in nature, which is more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony with his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); that is, obviously, man. But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among individual things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. Q.E.D.	COROLLARIUM {4p35} I: Nihil singulare in rerum natura datur quod homini sit utilius quam homo qui ex ductu rationis vivit. Nam id homini utilissimum est quod cum sua natura maxime convenit (per corollarium propositionis 31 {4p31c} hujus) hoc est (ut per se notum) homo. At homo ex legibus suae naturae absolute agit quando ex ductu rationis vivit (per definitionem 2 partis III {3d02}) et eatenus tantum cum natura alterius hominis necessario semper  convenit (per propositionem praecedentem {4p35}); ergo homini nihil inter res singulares utilius datur quam homo etc. Q.E.D.
4p35c2 maxime utile homines sunt utiles	4p35c2 maxime utile homines sunt utiles [geomap]
Corollary II. As every man seeks most that which is useful to him, so are men most useful one to another. For the more a man seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself, the more is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in obedience to reason. But men are most in natural harmony, when they live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore (by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him. Q.E.D.	COROLLARIUM {4p35} II: Cum maxime unusquisque homo suum sibi utile quaerit, tum maxime homines sunt sibi invicem utiles. Nam quo magis unusquisque suum utile quaerit et [mng eqv]  se conservare conatur eo magis virtute praeditus est (per propositionem 20 hujus {4p20}) sive [mng eqv] quod idem est (per definitionem 8 hujus {4d08}) eo majore potentia praeditus est ad agendum ex suae naturae legibus hoc est [mng eqv] (per propositionem 3 partis III {3p03}) ad vivendum ex ductu rationis. At homines tum maxime natura conveniunt cum ex ductu rationis vivunt (per propositionem praecedentem {4p35}); ergo (per praecedens corollarium {4p35c1}) tum maxime homines erunt sibi invicem utiles cum maxime unusquisque suum utile sibi quaerit. Q.E.D.
4p35s homines mutuo auxilio junctis vitare	4p35s homines mutuo auxilio junctis vitare
Note.-What we have just shown is attested by experience so conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man is to man a God." Yet it rarely happens that men live in obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that they are generally envious and troublesome one to another. Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much more convenience than injury. Let satirists then laugh their fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said, they will find that men can provide for their wants much more easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is, to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts. But I will treat of this more at length elsewhere.	SCHOLIUM: quae modo ostendimus, ipsa etiam experientia quotidie tot tamque luculentis testimoniis testatur ut omnibus fere in ore sit : hominem homini Deum esse. Fit tamen raro ut homines ex ductu rationis vivant sed cum iis ita comparatum est ut plerumque invidi atque invicem molesti sint. At nihilominus vitam solitariam vix transigere queunt ita ut plerisque illa definitio quod homo sit animal sociale, valde arriserit et revera res ita se habet ut ex hominum communi societate multo plura commoda oriantur quam damna. Rideant igitur quantum velint res humanas satyrici easque detestentur theologi et laudent quantum possunt melancholici vitam incultam et agrestem hominesque contemnant et admirentur bruta; experientur tamen homines mutuo auxilio ea quibus indigent multo facilius sibi parare et non nisi junctis viribus pericula quae ubique imminent, vitare posse; ut jam taceam quod multo praestabilius sit et cognitione nostra magis dignum hominum quam brutorum facta contemplari. Sed de his alias prolixius.
4p36 Summum bonum	4p36 Summum bonum [geomap]
PROP. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.	PROPOSITIO XXXVI: Summum bonum eorum qui virtutem sectantur, omnibus commune est eoque omnes que gaudere possunt.
Proof.-To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason (IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God; that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and can be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are of the same nature. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ex virtute agere est ex ductu rationis agere (per propositionem 24 hujus {4p24}) et quicquid ex ratione conamur agere, est intelligere (per propositionem 26 hujus {4p26}) atque adeo (per propositionem 28 hujus {4p28}) summum bonum eorum qui virtutem sectantur, est Deum cognoscere hoc est (per propositionem 47 partis II {2p47} et ejusdem scholium {non-deductive reference}) bonum quod omnibus hominibus commune est et ab omnibus hominibus quatenus ejusdem sunt naturae, possideri que potest. Q.E.D.
4p36s humana essentia	4p36s humana essentia
Note.-Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of those who follow after virtue were not common to all? Would it not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they agree in nature, would be at variance one with another? To such an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good is common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of man, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure in this highest good. For it belongs to the essence of the human mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.	SCHOLIUM: Si quis autem roget quid si summum bonum eorum qui virtutem sectantur, non esset omnibus commune? an non inde ut supra (vide propositionem 34 hujus) sequeretur quod homines qui ex ductu rationis vivunt hoc est (per propositionem 35 hujus) homines quatenus natura conveniunt, essent invicem contrarii? Is hoc sibi responsum habeat non ex accidenti sed ex ipsa natura rationis oriri ut hominis summum bonum omnibus sit commune, nimirum quia ex ipsa humana essentia quatenus ratione definitur, deducitur et quia homo nec esse nec concipi posset si potestatem non haberet gaudendi hoc summo bono. Pertinet namque (per propositionem 47 partis II) ad mentis humanae essentiam adaequatam habere cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei.
4p37 Bonum sibi reliquis hominibus etiam	4p37 Bonum sibi reliquis hominibus etiam [geomap]
PROP. XXXVII. The good which every man, who follows after virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men, and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of God.	PROPOSITIO XXXVII: Bonum quod unusquisque qui sectatur virtutem, sibi appetit, reliquis hominibus etiam cupiet et eo magis quo majorem Dei habuerit cognitionem.
Proof.-Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv; Coroll. i.); therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to reason. But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.); wherefore the good, which each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also for others. Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.); now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.), which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it (I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good for himself. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, sunt homini utilissimi (per corollarium I propositionis 35 {4p35c1} hujus) atque adeo (per propositionem 19 {4p19} hujus) ex ductu rationis conabimur necessario efficere ut homines ex ductu rationis vivant. At bonum quod unusquisque qui ex rationis dictamine vivit hoc est (per propositionem 24 {4p24} hujus) qui virtutem sectatur, sibi appetit, est intelligere (per propositionem 26 {4p26} hujus); ergo bonum quod unusquisque qui virtutem sectatur, sibi appetit, reliquis hominibus etiam cupiet. Deinde cupiditas quatenus ad mentem refertur, est ipsa mentis essentia (per 1 affectuum definitionem {1de01}); mentis autem essentia in cognitione consistit (per propositionem 11 partis II {2p11}) quae Dei cognitionem involvit (per propositionem 47 partis II {2p47}) et sine qua (per propositionem 15 partis I {1p15}) nec esse nec concipi potest adeoque quo mentis essentia majorem Dei cognitionem involvit, eo cupiditas qua is qui virtutem sectatur,v quod sibi appetit, alteri cupit, etiam major erit. Q.E.D.
Another Proof.-The good, which a man desires for himself and loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love it also (III. xxxi.); he will therefore endeavour that others should love it also; and as the good in question is common to all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour, for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice therein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.	ALITER: Bonum quod homo sibi appetit et amat, constantius amabit si viderit alios idem amare (per propositionem 31 partis III) atque adeo (per corollarium ejusdem propositionis) conabitur ut reliqui idem ament et quia hoc bonum (per propositionem praecedentem) omnibus commune est eoque omnes gaudere possunt, conabitur ergo (per eandem rationem) ut omnes eodem gaudeant et (per propositionem 37 partis III) eo magis quo hoc bono magis fruetur. Q.E.D.
4p37s1 religionem pietatem honestatem, quaerendi necessitudinem cum hominibus jungere sed non cum brutis	4p37s1 religionem pietatem honestatem, quaerendi necessitudinem cum hominibus jungere sed non cum brutis
Note I. He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what pleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought by men under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed. But he, who endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent. Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to Religion. The desire of well-doing, which is engendered by a life according to reason, I call piety. Further, the desire, whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate others with himself in friendship, I call honour[13 Honestas]; by honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friendship. I have also shown in addition what are the foundations of a state; and the difference between true virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded by the general disposition of things rather than by his own nature considered solely in itself. Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii. of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions (III. lvii. note). It remains for me to explain what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit. On these points see the following note.	SCHOLIUM I: Qui ex solo affectu conatur ut reliqui ament quod ipse amatae et ut reliqui ex suo ingenio vivant, solo impetu agit et ideo odiosus est praecipue iis quibus alia placent quique propterea etiam student et eodem impetu conantur ut reliqui contra ex ipsorum ingenio vivant. Deinde quoniam summum quod homines ex affectu appetunt bonum spe tale est ut unus tantum ejus possit esse compos, hinc fit ut qui amant mente sibi non constent et dum laudes rei quam amant narrare gaudent, timeant credi. At qui reliquos conatur ratione ducere, non impetu sed humaniter et benigne agit et sibi mente maxime constat. Porro quicquid cupimus et agimus cujus causa sumus quatenus Dei habemus ideam sive quatenus Deum cognoscimus, ad religionem refero. Cupiditatem autem bene faciendi quae eo ingeneratur quod ex rationis ductu vivimus, pietatem voco. Cupiditatem deinde qua homo qui ex ductu rationis vivit, tenetur ut reliquos sibi amicitia jungat, honestatem voco et id honestum quod homines qui ex ductu rationis vivunt, laudant et id contra turpe quod conciliand amiciti repugnat. praeter haec civitatis etiam quaenam sint fundamenta ostendi. Differentia deinde inter veram virtutem et impotentiam facile ex supra dictis percipitur nempe quod vera virtus nihil aliud sit quam ex solo rationis ductu vivere atque adeo impotentia in hoc solo consistit quod homo a rebus quae extra ipsum sunt, duci se patiatur et ab iis ad ea agendum determinetur quae rerum externarum communis constitutio, non autem ea quae ipsa ipsius natura in se sola considerata postulat. Atque haec illa sunt quae in scholio propositionis 18 hujus partis demonstrare promisi, ex quibus apparet legem illam de non mactandis brutis magis vana superstitione et muliebri misericordia quam sana ratione fundatam esse. Docet quidem ratio nostrum utile qurendi necessitudinem cum hominibus jungere sed non cum brutis aut rebus quarum natura a natura humana est diversa sed idem jus quod illa in nos habent, nos in ea habere. Imo quia uniuscujusque jus virtute seu potentia uniuscujusque definitur, longe majus homines in bruta quam haec in homines jus habent. Nec tamen nego bruta sentire sed nego quod propterea non liceat nostrae utilitati consulere et iisdem ad libitum uti eademque tractare prout nobis magis convenit quandoquidem nobiscum natura non conveniunt et eorum affectus ab affectibus humanis sunt natura diversi (vide scholium propositionis 57 partis III). Superest ut explicem quid justum, quid injustum, quid peccatum et quid denique meritum sit. Sed de his vide sequens scholium.
4p37s2 laus et vituperium, meritum et peccatum, justum et injustum	4p37s2 laus et vituperium, meritum et peccatum, justum et injustum
Note II.-In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice. Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note: the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature and in society. Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and, consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.). Now, if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.). But seeing that they are a prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue (IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note). Wherefore, in order that men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure their fellow-men. The way in which this end can be obtained, so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv. Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV. vii. and III. xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves. On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note). Such a society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called a State, while those who live under its protection are called citizens. We may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself. In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State authority. Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is therefore punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, on the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages which a State provides. Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be said to belong to one man rather than another: all things are common to all. Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such ideas are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common consent what belongs to one man and what to another. From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes which display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough.	SCHOLIUM II : In appendice partis prim explicare promisi quid laus et vituperium, quid meritum et peccatum, quid justum et injustum sit. Laudem et vituperium quod attinet, in scholio propositionis 29 partis III explicui; de reliquis autem hic jam erit dicendi locus. Sed prius pauca de statu hominis naturali et civili dicenda sunt. Existit unusquisque summo naturae jure et consequenter summo naturae jure unusquisque ea agit quae ex suae naturae necessitate sequuntur atque adeo summo naturae jure unusquisque judicat quid bonum, quid malum sit suque utilitati ex suo ingenio consulit (vide propositiones 19 et 20 hujus) seseque vindicat (vide corollarium II propositionis 40 partis III) et id quod amat, conservare et id quod odio habet, destruere conatur (vide propositionem 28 partis III). Quod si homines ex ductu rationis viverent, potiretur unusquisque (per corollarium I propositionis 35 hujus) hoc suo jure absque ullo alterius damno. Sed quia affectibus sunt obnoxii (per corollarium propositionis 4 hujus) qui potentiam seu virtutem humanam longe superant (per propositionem 6 hujus) ideo spe diversi trahuntur (per propositionem 33 hujus) atque sibi invicem sunt contrarii (per propositionem 34 hujus) mutuo dum auxilio indigent (per scholium propositionis 35 hujus). Ut igitur homines concorditer vivere et sibi auxilio esse possint, necesse est ut jure suo naturali cedant et se invicem securos reddant se nihil acturos quod possit in alterius damnum cedere. Qua autem ratione hoc fieri possit ut scilicet homines qui affectibus necessario sunt obnoxii (per corollarium propositionis 4 hujus) atque inconstantes et varii (per propositionem 33 hujus) possint se invicem securos reddere et fidem invicem habere, patet ex propositione 7 hujus partis et propositione 39 partis III. Nempe quod nullus affectus coerceri potest nisi affectu fortiore et contrario affectui coercendo et quod unusquisque ab inferendo damno abstinet timore majoris damni. Hac igitur lege societas firmari poterit si modo ipsa sibi vindicet jus quod unusquisque habet sese vindicandi et de bono et malo judicandi quque adeo potestatem habeat communem vivendi rationem prscribendi legesque ferendi easque non ratione quae affectus coercere nequit (per scholium propositionis 17 hujus) sed minis firmandi. Haec autem societas legibus et potestate sese conservandi firmata civitas appellatur et qui ipsius jure defenduntur, cives; ex quibus facile intelligimus nihil in statu naturali dari quod ex omnium consensu bonum aut malum sit quandoquidem unusquisque qui in statu est naturali suae tantummodo utilitati consulit et ex suo ingenio et quatenus suae utilitatis tantum habet rationem quid bonum quidve malum sit, decernit et nemini nisi sibi soli obtemperare lege ulla tenetur atque adeo in statu naturali peccatum concipi nequit. At quidem in statu civili ubi et communi consensu decernitur quid bonum quidve malum sit et unusquisque civitati obtemperare tenetur. Est itaque peccatum nihil aliud quam inobedientia quae propterea solo civitatis jure punitur et contra obedientia civi meritum ducitur quia eo ipso dignus judicatur qui civitatis commodis gaudeat. Deinde in statu naturali nemo ex communi consensu alicujus rei est dominus nec in Natura aliquid datur quod possit dici hujus hominis esse et non illius sed omnia omnium sunt ac proinde in statu naturali nulla potest concipi voluntas unicuique suum tribuendi aut alicui id quod ejus sit eripiendi hoc est in statu naturali nihil fit quod justum aut injustum possit dici; at quidem in statu civili ubi ex communi consensu decernitur quid hujus quidve illius sit. Ex quibus apparet justum et injustum, peccatum et meritum notiones esse extrinsecas, non autem attributa quae mentis naturam explicent. Sed de his satis.
4p38 aptum ad afficiendum utile	4p38 aptum ad afficiendum utile [geomap]
PROP. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man.	PROPOSITIO XXXVIII: Id quod corpus humanum ita disponit ut pluribus modis possit affici vel [excl exh] quod idem aptum reddit ad corpora externa pluribus modis afficiendum, homini est utile et eo utilius quo corpus ab eo aptius redditur ut pluribus modis afficiatur aliaque corpora afficiat et contra id noxium est quod corpus ad haec minus aptum reddit.
Proof.-Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body increases also the mind's capability of perception (II. xiv.); therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it capable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); and is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body capable; contrariwise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quo corpus ad haec aptius redditur, eo mens aptior ad percipiendum redditur (per propositionem 14 partis II {2p14}) adeoque id quod corpus hac ratione disponit aptumque ad haec reddit, est necessario bonum seu [mng eqv] utile (per propositiones 26 {4p26} et 27 {4p27} hujus) et eo utilius quo corpus ad haec aptius potest reddere et contra (per eandem propositionem 14 partis II  {2p14}inversam et propositiones 26 {4p26} et 27 {4p27} hujus) noxium si corpus ad haec minus aptum reddat. Q.E.D.
4p39 motus et quietis ratio	4p39 motus et quietis ratio [geomap]
PROP. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a change in such proportion is bad.	PROPOSITIO XXXIX: quae efficiunt ut motus et quietis ratio quam corporis humani partes ad invicem habent, conservetur, bona sunt et ea contra mala quae efficiunt ut corporis humani partes aliam ad invicem motus et quietis habeant rationem.
Proof.-The human body needs many other bodies for its preservation (II. Post. iv.). But that which constitutes the specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts communicate their several motions one to another in a certain fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.). Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in many ways; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.). Again, whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion causes the human body to assume another specific character, in other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though the point is indeed self-evident), to be destroyed, and consequently totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of ways; therefore it is bad. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Corpus humanum indiget ut conservetur plurimis aliis corporibus (per postulatum 4 partis II {2post04}). At id quod formam humani corporis constituit, in hoc consistit quod ejus partes motus suos certa quadam ratione sibi invicem communicent (per definitionem ante lemma 4 {2a3.3}, quam vide post propositionem 13 partis II). Ergo quae efficiunt ut motus et quietis ratio quam corporis humani partes ad invicem habent, conservetur, eadem humani corporis formam conservant et consequenter efficiunt (per postulata 3 {2post03} et 6 {2post06} partis II) ut corpus humanum multis modis affici et ut idem corpora externa multis modis afficere possit adeoque (per propositionem praecedentem {4p38}) bona sunt. Deinde quae efficiunt ut corporis humani partes aliam motus et quietis rationem obtineant, eadem (per eandem definitionem partis II {not found}) efficiunt ut corpus humanum aliam formam induat hoc est (ut per se notum et in fine praefationis hujus partis monuimus {non-deductive reference}) ut corpus humanum destruatur et consequenter ut omnino ineptum reddatur ne possit pluribus modis affici ac proinde (per propositionem praecedentem {4p38}) mala sunt. Q.E.D.
4p39s mortem	4p39s mortem
Note.-The extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death, when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed. For I do not venture to deny that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally different from its own. There is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion. It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I should hardly call him the same. As I have heard tell of a certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for a grown-up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy of other men. However, I prefer to leave such questions undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for raising new issues.	SCHOLIUM: Quantum haec menti obesse vel prodesse possunt in quinta parte explicabitur. Sed hic notandum quod corpus tum mortem obire intelligam quando ejus partes ita disponuntur ut aliam motus et quietis rationem ad invicem obtineant. Nam negare non audeo corpus humanum retenta sanguinis circulatione et aliis propter quae corpus vivere existimatur, posse nihilominus in aliam naturam a sua prorsus diversam mutari. Nam nulla ratio me cogit ut statuam corpus non mori nisi mutetur in cadaver; quin ipsa experientia aliud suadere videtur. Fit namque aliquando ut homo tales patiatur mutationes ut non facile eundem illum esse dixerim, ut de quodam hispano poeta narrare audivi qui morbo correptus fuerat et quamvis ex eo convaluerit, mansit tamen praeterit suae vit tam oblitus ut fabulas et tragdias quas fecerat suas non crediderit esse et sane pro infante adulto haberi potuisset si vernacul etiam lingu fuisset oblitus. Et si hoc incredibile videtur, quid de infantibus dicemus? Quorum naturam homo provect tatis a sua tam diversam esse credit ut persuaderi non posset se unquam infantem fuisse nisi ex aliis de se conjecturam faceret. Sed ne superstitiosis materiam suppeditem movendi novas qustiones, malo haec in medio relinquere.
4p40 communem societatem utilia	4p40 communem societatem utilia [geomap]
PROP. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad.	PROPOSITIO XL: quae ad hominum communem societatem conducunt sive [mng eqv] quae efficiunt ut homines concorditer vivant, utilia sunt et illa contra mala quae discordiam in civitatem inducunt.
Proof.-For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason) whatsoever brings about discord is bad. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nam quae efficiunt ut homines concorditer vivant, simul efficiunt ut ex ductu rationis vivant (per propositionem 35 hujus {4p35}) atque adeo (per propositiones 26 {4p26} et 27 {4p27} hujus) bona sunt et (per eandem rationem) illa contra mala sunt quae discordias concitant. Q.E.D.
4p41 Laetitia directe mala non	4p41 Laetitia directe mala non [geomap]
PROP. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good: contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.	PROPOSITIO XLI: Laetitia directe mala non est sed bona; tristitia autem contra directe est mala.
Proof.-Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is increased or helped; pain is emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or checked; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Laetitia (per propositionem 11 partis III {3p11} cum ejusdem scholio {non-deductive reference}) est affectus quo corporis agendi potentia augetur vel [non-excl non-exh] juvatur; tristitia autem contra est affectus quo corporis agendi potentia minuitur vel [nonexcl non-exh] coercetur adeoque (per propositionem 38 hujus {4p38}) laetitia directe bona est etc. Q.E.D.
4p42  Hilaritas semper bona	4p42  Hilaritas semper bona [geomap]
PROP. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good; contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.	PROPOSITIO XLII: Hilaritas excessum habere nequit sed semper bona est et contra melancholia semper mala.
Proof.-Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in all parts of the body being affected equally: that is (III. xi.), the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a manner, that the several parts maintain their former proportion of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.), and cannot be excessive. But Melancholy (see its Def. in the same note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or hindrance of the body's power of activity; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it is always bad. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hilaritas (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 11 partis III {non-deductive reference}) est laetitia quae quatenus ad corpus refertur, in hoc consistit quod corporis omnes partes pariter sint affectae hoc est (per propositionem 11 partis III {3p11}) quod corporis agendi potentia augetur vel [non-excl non-exh] juvatur ita ut omnes ejus partes eandem ad invicem motus et quietis rationem obtineant atque adeo (per propositionem 39 hujus {4p39}) hilaritas semper est bona nec excessum habere potest. At melancholia (cujus etiam definitionem vide in scholio propositionis 11 partis III {non-deductive reference}) est tristitia quae quatenus ad corpus refertur, in hoc solo consistit quod corporis  agendi potentia  absolute minuitur vel [non-excl non-exh] coercetur adeoque (per propositionem 38 hujus {4p38}) semper est mala. Q.E.D.
4p43 Titillatio dolor	4p43 Titillatio dolor [geomap]
PROP. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is bad.	PROPOSITIO XLIII: Titillatio excessum habere potest et mala esse; dolor autem eatenus potest esse bonus quatenus titillatio seu [non-excl non-exh] laetitia est mala.
Proof.-Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the rest (see its Definition, III. xi. note); the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body (IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways: therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad. Again, grief, which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.). But, as its force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.); we can, therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Titillatio est laetitia quae quatenus ad corpus refertur, in hoc consistit quod una vel [non-excl non-exh] aliquot ejus partes prae reliquis afficiuntur (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 11 partis III {non-deductive reference}) cujus affectus potentia tanta esse potest ut reliquas corporis actiones superet (per propositionem 6 hujus {4p06}) eique pertinaciter adhaereat atque adeo impediat quominus corpus aptum sit ut plurimis aliis modis afficiatur adeoque (per propositionem 38 hujus {4p38}) mala esse potest. Deinde dolor qui contra tristitia est, in se solo consideratus non potest esse bonus (per propositionem 41 hujus {4p41}). Verum quia ejus vis et incrementum definitur potentia causae externae cum nostra comparata (per propositionem 5 {4p05} hujus) possumus ergo hujus affectus infinitos virium concipere gradus et modos (per propositionem 3 hujus {4p03}) atque adeo eundem talem concipere qui titillationem possit coercere ut excessum non habeat et eatenus (per primam partem propositionis hujus) efficere ne corpus minus aptum reddatur ac proinde eatenus erit bonus. Q.E.D.
4p44 Amor cupiditas excessum possunt	4p44 Amor cupiditas excessum possunt [geomap]
PROP. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive.	PROPOSITIO XLIV: Amor et cupiditas excessum habere possunt.
Proof.-Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.); therefore stimulation, accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi. note); hence love maybe excessive. Again, the strength of desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises (III. xxxvii.). Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's actions (IV. vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from the same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become excessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning stimulation.	DEMONSTRATIO: Amor est laetitia (per definitionem 6 affectuum {3de06}) concomitante idea  causae externae; titillatio igitur (per scholium propositionis 11 partis III {non-deductive reference}) concomitante idea  causae externae amor est atque adeo amor (per propositionem praecedentem {4p43}) excessum habere potest. Deinde cupiditas eo est major quo affectus ex quo oritur major est (per propositionem 37 partis III {3p37}). Quare ut affectus (per propositionem 6 hujus {4p06}) reliquas hominis actiones superare potest, sic etiam cupiditas quae ex eodem affectu oritur, reliquas cupiditates superare ac proinde eundem excessum habere poterit quem in praecedenti propositione titillationem habere ostendimus. Q.E.D.
4p44s Hilaritas concipitur facilius quam observatur	4p44s Hilaritas concipitur facilius quam observatur
Note.-Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived more easily than it can be observed. For the emotions, whereby we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the body which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation of one object, that it is unable to think of others; and although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions-and very few are found who are always assailed by one and the same-yet there are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately fixed. We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that, although it be not present, they think they have it before them; when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is delirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed with love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are made objects of ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing but gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated. But, in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c., are species of madness, though they may not be reckoned among diseases.	SCHOLIUM: Hilaritas quam bonam esse dixi, concipitur facilius quam observatur. Nam affectus quibus quotidie conflictamur, referuntur plerumque ad aliquam corporis partem quae prae reliquis afficitur ac proinde affectus ut plurimum excessum habent et mentem in sola unius objecti contemplatione ita detinent ut de aliis cogitare nequeat et quamvis homines pluribus affectibus obnoxii sint atque adeo rari reperiantur qui semper uno eodemque affectu conflictentur, non desunt tamen quibus unus idemque affectus pertinaciter adhreat. Videmus enim homines aliquando ab uno objecto ita affici ut quamvis praesens non sit, ipsum tamen coram habere credant, quod quando homini non dormienti accidit, eundem delirare dicimus vel insanire nec minus insanire creduntur qui amore ardent quique noctes atque dies solam amasiam vel meretricem somniant quia risum movere solent. At cum avarus de nulla alia re quam de lucro vel de nummis cogitet et ambitiosus de gloria etc. hi non creduntur delirare quia molesti solent esse et odio digni stimantur. Sed revera avaritia, ambitio, libido etc. delirii species sunt quamvis inter morbos non numerentur.
4p45 Odium	4p45 Odium [geomap]
PROP. XLV. Hatred can never be good.	PROPOSITIO XLV: Odium nunquam potest esse bonum.
Proof.-When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III. xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that is bad. Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hominem quem odimus destruere conamur (per propositionem 39 partis III {3p39}) hoc est (per propositionem 37 hujus {4p37}) aliquid conamur quod malum est. Ergo etc. Q.E.D.
4p45s erga homines	4p45s erga homines
N.B. Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred towards men.	SCHOLIUM: Nota me hic et in sequentibus per odium illud tantum intelligere quod est erga homines.
4p45c1 affectus odium referuntur mali	4p45c1 affectus odium referuntur mali [geomap]
Corollary I.-Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are bad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.	COROLLARIUM {4p45} I: Invidia, irrisio, contemptus, ira, vindicta et reliqui affectus qui ad odium referuntur vel [non-excl non-exh] ex eodem oriuntur, mali sunt, quod etiam ex propositione 39 partis III {3p39} et propositione 37 {4p37} hujus patet.
4p45c2 ex odio turpe	4p45c2 ex odio turpe [geomap]
Corollary II.-Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base, and in a State unjust. This also is evident from III. xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV. xxxvii. note.	COROLLARIUM II: Quicquid ex eo quod odio affecti sumus, appetimus, turpe et in civitate injustum est. Quod etiam patet ex propositione 39 {3p39} partis III et ex definitione turpis et injusti, quas vide in scholiis propositionis 37 hujus {non-deductive reference}.
4p45s Inter irrisionem et risum differentiam	4p45s Inter irrisionem et risum differentiam
Note.-Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference. For laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.). Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and gloomy superstition. For why is it more lawful to satiate one's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason, and have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else, save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort, nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like, which axe signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we necessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible (not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is the part of a wise man. I say it is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres, and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to his neighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerous parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from the necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things simultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees best with our principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is the best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.	SCHOLIUM: Inter irrisionem (quam in I corollario malam esse dixi) et risum magnam agnosco differentiam. Nam risus ut et jocus mera est laetitia adeoque modo excessum non habeat, per se bonus est (per propositionem 41 hujus). Nihil profecto nisi torva et tristis superstitio delectari prohibet. Nam qui magis decet famem et sitim extinguere quam melancholiam expellere? Mea haec est ratio et sic animum induxi meum. Nullum numen nec alius nisi invidus mea impotentia et incommodo delectatur nec nobis lacrimas, singultus, metum et alia hujusmodi quae animi impotentis sunt signa, virtuti ducit sed contra quo majore laetitia afficimur eo ad majorem perfectionem transimus hoc est eo nos magis de natura divina participare necesse est. Rebus itaque uti et iis quantum fieri potest delectari (non quidem ad nauseam usque nam hoc delectari non est) viri est sapientis. Viri inquam sapientis est moderato et suavi cibo et potu se reficere et recreare ut et odoribus, plantarum virentium amnitate, ornatu, musica, ludis exercitatoriis, theatris et aliis hujusmodi quibus unusquisque absque ullo alterius damno uti potest. Corpus namque humanum ex plurimis diversae naturae partibus componitur quae continuo novo alimento indigent et vario ut totum corpus ad omnia quae ex ipsius natura sequi possunt, que aptum sit et consequenter ut mens etiam que apta sit ad plura simul intelligendum. Hoc itaque vivendi institutum et cum nostris principiis et cum communi praxi optime convenit; quare si quae alia, haec vivendi ratio optima est et omnibus modis commendanda nec opus est de his clarius neque prolixius agere.
4p46 ex ductu rationis compensare	4p46 ex ductu rationis compensare [geomap]
PROP. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason, endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness, for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him.	PROPOSITIO XLVI: Qui ex ductu rationis vivit, quantum potest conatur alterius in ipsum odium, iram, contemptum etc. amore contra sive [non-excl non-exh] generositate compensare.
Proof.-All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.); therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such emotions (IV. xix.); consequently, he will also endeavour to prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.). But hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love (III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.); therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes odii affectus mali sunt (per corollarium I praecedentis propositionis {4p45c1}) adeoque qui ex ductu rationis vivit, quantum potest conabitur efficere ne odii affectibus conflictetur (per propositionem 19 hujus {4p19}) et consequenter (per propositionem 37 hujus {4p37}) conabitur ne etiam alius eosdem patiatur affectus. At odium odio reciproco augetur et amore contra extingui potest (per propositionem 43 partis III {3p43}) ita ut odium in amorem transeat (per propositionem 44 partis III {3p44}). Ergo qui ex ductu rationis vivit, alterius odium etc. amore contra compensare conabitur hoc est generositate (cujus definitionem vide in scholio propositionis 59 partis III {non-deductive reference}). Q.E.D.
4p46s odium amore expugnare	4p46s odium amore expugnare
Note.-He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly wretched. But he, who strives to conquer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but through increase in their powers; all these consequences follow so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding, that I have no need to prove them in detail.	SCHOLIUM: Qui injurias reciproco odio vindicare vult, misere profecto vivit. At qui contra studet odium amore expugnare, ille sane ltus et secure pugnat; que facile pluribus hominibus ac uni resistit et fortun auxilio quam minime indiget. Quos vero vincit, ii lti cedunt, non quidem ex defectu sed ex incremento virium; quae omnia adeo clare ex solis amoris et intellectus definitionibus sequuntur ut opus non sit eadem sigillatim demonstrare.
4p47 Spei et metus affectus non boni	4p47 Spei et metus affectus non boni [geomap]
PROP. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good.	PROPOSITIO XLVII: Spei et metus affectus non possunt esse per se  boni.
Proof.-Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain. For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without fear; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive pleasure (IV. xliii.). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Spei et metus affectus sine tristitia non dantur. Nam metus est (per 13 affectuum definitionem {3de13}) tristitia et spes (vide explicationem 12 {3de12} et 13 affectuum {3de13} definitionum) non datur sine metu ac proinde (per propositionem 41 hujus {4p41}) hi affectus non possunt esse per se boni sed tantum quatenus laetitiae excessum coercere possunt (per propositionem 43 hujus {4p43}) Q.E.D.
4p47s cognitionis defectum	4p47s cognitionis defectum
Note. We may add, that these emotions show defective knowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the same reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of a want of mental power. For although confidence and joy are pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain, namely, hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to be guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.	SCHOLIUM: Huc accedit quod hi affectus cognitionis defectum et mentis impotentiam indicant et hac de causa etiam securitas, desperatio, gaudium et conscienti morsus animi impotentis sunt signa. Nam quamvis securitas et gaudium affectus sint laetitiae,tristitiam tamen eosdem praecessisse supponunt nempe spem et metum. Quo itaque magis ex ductu rationis vivere conamur eo magis spe minus pendere et metu nosmet liberare et fortun quantum possumus imperare conamur nostrasque actiones certo rationis consilio dirigere.
4p48 existimationis despectus mali	4p48 existimationis despectus mali [geomap]
PROP. XLVIII. The emotions of over-esteem and disparagement are always bad.	PROPOSITIO XLVIII: Affectus existimationis et despectus semper mali sunt.
Proof.-These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.) are repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) bad. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hi enim affectus (per 21 {3de21} et 22 {3de22} affectuum definitiones) rationi repugnant adeoque (per propositiones 26 {4p26} et 27 {4p27} hujus) mali sunt. Q.E.D.
4p49 Existimatio superbum reddit	4p49 Existimatio superbum reddit [geomap]
PROP. XLIX. Over-esteem is apt to render its object proud.	PROPOSITIO XLIX: Existimatio facile hominem qui existimatur superbum reddit.
Proof.-If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's sake, we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be pleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.); the good which we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.); and therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too highly; in other words, we are apt to become proud. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si videmus aliquem de nobis plus justo prae amore sentire, facile gloriabimur (per scholium propositionis 41 partis III {3p41}) sive [non-excl non-exh] laetitia afficiemur (per 30 affectuum definitionem {3de30}) et id boni quod de nobis praedicari audimus, facile credemus (per propositionem 25 partis III {3p25}) atque adeo de nobis prae amore nostri plus justo sentiemus hoc est (per definitionem 28 affectuum {3de28}) facile superbiemus. Q.E.D.
4p50 Commiseratio mala	4p50 Commiseratio mala [geomap]
PROP. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, is in itself bad and useless.	PROPOSITIO L: Commiseratio in homine qui ex ductu rationis vivit, per se  mala et [mng eqv] inutilis est.
Proof.-Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and therefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad. The good effect which follows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pity from misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.); only at the dictation of reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for certain to be good (IV. xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Commiseratio enim (per 18 affectuum definitionem {3de18}) tristitia est ac proinde (per propositionem 41 hujus {4p41}) per se mala; bonum autem quod ex ea sequitur, quod scilicet hominem cujus nos miseret, a miseria liberare conamur (per corollarium III propositionis 27 partis III {3p27c3}) ex solo rationis dictamine facere cupimus (per propositionem 37 hujus {4p37}) nec nisi ex solo rationis dictamine aliquid quod certo scimus bonum esse, agere possumus (per propositionem 27 hujus {4p27}) atque adeo commiseratio in homine qui ex ductu rationis vivit, per se mala est et inutilis. Q.E.D.
4p50c conatur ne commiseratione tangatur	4p50c conatur ne commiseratione tangatur [geomap]
Corollary: From this follows that a man who lives under the guiddance of reason, endeavours as much as he can not to be taken away by pity.	COROLLARIUM {4p50}: Hinc sequitur quod homo qui ex dictamine rationis vivit, conatur quantum potest efficere ne commiseratione tangatur.
4p50s is sane nihil reperiet quod odio dignum	4p50s is sane nihil reperiet quod odio dignum
Note. He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice. We may add, that he, who is easily touched with compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason. He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems unlike a man.	SCHOLIUM: Qui recte novit omnia ex naturae divinae necessitate sequi et secundum aeternas naturae leges et regulas fieri, is sane nihil reperiet quod odio, risu aut contemptu dignum sit nec cujusquam miserebitur sed quantum humana fert virtus, conabitur bene agere ut aiunt et laetari. Huc accedit quod is qui commiserationis affectu facile tangitur et alterius miseria vel lacrimis movetur, spe aliquid agit cujus postea ipsum pnitet tam quia ex affectu nihil agimus quod certo scimus bonum esse quam quia facile falsis lacrimis decipimur. Atque hic expresse loquor de homine qui ex ductu rationis vivit. Nam qui nec ratione nec commiseratione movetur ut aliis auxilio sit, is recte inhumanus appellatur. Nam (per propositionem 27 partis III) homini dissimilis esse videtur.
4p51 Favor rationi convenire potest	4p51 Favor rationi convenire potest [geomap]
PROP. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree therewith and arise therefrom.	PROPOSITIO LI: Favor rationi non repugnat sed cum eadem convenire et ab eadem oriri potest.
Proof.-Approval is love towards one who has done good to another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III. lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands; therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Est enim favor amor erga illum qui alteri benefecit (per 19 affectuum definitionem {3de19}) atque adeo ad mentem referri potest quatenus haec agere dicitur (per propositionem 59 partis III {3p59}) hoc est (per propositionem 3 partis III {3p03}) quatenus intelligit ac proinde cum ratione convenit etc. Q.E.D.
Another Proof.-He, who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV. xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the benefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D.	ALITER: Qui ex ductu rationis vivit, bonum quod sibi appetit alteri etiam cupit (per propositionem 37 hujus); quare ex eo quod ipse aliquem videt alteri benefacere, ipsius benefaciendi conatus juvatur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 partis III) laetabitur idque (ex hypothesi) concomitante idea illius qui alteri benefecit ac proinde (per 19 affectuum definitionem) ei favet. Q.E.D.
4p51s Indignatio necessario mala	4p51s Indignatio necessario mala
Note. Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions, xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.	SCHOLIUM: Indignatio prout ipsa a nobis definitur (vide 20 affectuum definitionem) est necessario mala (per propositionem 45 hujus) sed notandum quod quando summa potestas desiderio quo tenetur tutand pacis, civem punit qui alteri injuriam fecit, eandem civi indignari non dico quia non odio percita ad perdendum civem sed pietate mota eundem punit.
4p52 Acquiescentia ex ratione oriri potest	4p52 Acquiescentia ex ratione oriri potest [geomap]
PROP. LII. Self-approval may arise from reason, and that which arises from reason is the highest possible.	PROPOSITIO LII: Acquiescentia in se ipso ex ratione oriri potest et ea sola acquiescentia quae ex ratione  oritur, summa est quae potest dari.
Proof.-Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.). But a man's true power of action or virtue is reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and distinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.); therefore self-approval arises from reason. Again, when a man is contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action (III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of understanding; therefore in such contemplation alone does the highest possible self-approval arise. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Acquiescentia in se ipso est laetitia orta ex eo quod homo se ipsum suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur (per 25 affectuum definitionem {3de25}). At vera hominis agendi potentia seu [mng eqv] virtus est [mng eqv] ipsa ratio (per propositionem 3 partis III {3p03}) quam homo clare et distincte contemplatur (per propositiones 40 {2p40} et 43 partis II {2p43}). Ergo acquiescentia in se ipso ex ratione oritur. Deinde nihil homo dum se ipsum contemplatur, clare et distincte sive [mng eqv] adaequate percipit nisi ea quae ex ipsius agendi potentia sequuntur (per definitionem 2 partis III {3d02}) hoc est (per propositionem 3 partis III {3p03}) quae ex ipsius intelligendi potentia sequuntur adeoque ex sola hac contemplatione summa quae dari potest acquiescentia oritur. Q.E.D.
4p52s acquiescentia summum	4p52s acquiescentia summum
Note. Self-approval is in reality the highest object for which we can hope. For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary (III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life under disgrace is almost unendurable.	SCHOLIUM: Est revera acquiescentia in se ipso summum quod sperare possumus. Nam (ut propositione 25 hujus ostendimus) nemo suum esse alicujus finis causa conservare conatur et quia haec acquiescentia magis magisque fovetur et corroboratur laudibus (per corollarium propositionis 53 partis III) et contra (per corollarium propositionis 55 partis III) vituperio magis magisque turbatur, ideo gloria maxime ducimur et vitam cum probro vix ferre possumus.
4p53 Humilitas virtus non	4p53 Humilitas virtus non [geomap]
PROP. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason.	PROPOSITIO LIII: Humilitas virtus non est sive [prf eqv] exratione non oritur.
Proof.-Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.). But, in so far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to understand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.). Wherefore, if a man in self-contemplation perceives any infirmity in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but (III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked. But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by virtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because is power of activity is aided. Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion. Q.E.D. __________ [14 Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur" which I have translated above. He suggests as alternative readings to 'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that) [Elwes]]	DEMONSTRATIO: Humilitas est tristitia quae ex eo oritur quod homo suam impotentiam contemplatur (per 26 affectuum definitionem {3de26}). Quatenus autem homo se ipsum vera ratione cognoscit eatenus suam essentiam intelligere supponitur hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III {3p07}) suam potentiam. Quare si homo dum se ipsum contemplatur, aliquam suam impotentiam percipit, id non ex eo est quod se intelligit sed (ut propositione 55 partis III {3p55} ostendimus) ex eo quod ipsius agendi potentia coercetur. Quod si supponamus hominem suam impotentiam concipere ex eo quod aliquid se potentius intelligit cujus cognitione suam agendi potentiam determinat, tum nihil aliud concipimus quam quod homo se ipsum distincte intelligit sive [prf eqv] (per propositionem 26 hujus {4p26}) quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur. Quare humilitas seu [non-excl non-exh] tristitia quae ex eo oritur quod homo suam impotentiam contemplatur, non ex vera contemplatione seu [mng eqv] ratione oritur nec virtus sed passio est. Q.E.D.
4p54 Paenitentia virtus non	4p54 Paenitentia virtus non  [geomap]
PROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm.	PROPOSITIO LIV: Paenitentia virtus non est sive [prf eqv] ex ratione non oritur sed is quem facti paenitet, bis miser seu [mng eqv] impotens est.
Proof.-The first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing one. The second part is proved from the mere definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions, xxvii.). For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by evil desires; secondly, by pain.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus prima pars demonstratur ut praecedens propositio {4p53}. Secunda autem ex sola hujus affectus definitione (vide 27 affectuum definitionem {3de27}) patet. Nam primo prava cupiditate, dein tristitia vinci se patitur.
4p54s plus utilitatis quam damni afferunt	4p54s plus utilitatis quam damni afferunt
Note. As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction. For, if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked together in bonds of union? The crowd plays the tyrant, when it is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.	SCHOLIUM: Quia homines raro ex dictamine rationis vivunt, ideo hi duo affectus nempe humilitas et paenitentia et praeter hos spes et metus plus utilitatis quam damni afferunt atque adeo quandoquidem peccandum est, in istam partem potius peccandum. Nam si homines animo impotentes que omnes superbirent, nullius rei ipsos puderet nec ipsi quicquam metuerent, qui vinculis conjungi constringique possent? Terret vulgus nisi metuat; quare non mirum quod prophet qui non paucorum sed communi utilitati consuluerunt, tantopere humilitatem, paenitentiam et reverentiam commendaverint. Et revera qui hisce affectibus sunt obnoxii, multo facilius quam alii duci possunt ut tandem ex ductu rationis vivant hoc est ut liberi sint et beatorum vita fruantur.
4p55 superbia abjectio est ignorantia	4p55 superbia abjectio est ignorantia [geomap]
PROP. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of self.	PROPOSITIO LV: Maxima superbia vel [excl non-exh] abjectio est maxima sui ignorantia.
Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and xxix.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex definitionibus 28 {3de28} et 29 {3de29} affectuum.
4p56 superbia abjectio animi impotentiam	4p56 superbia abjectio animi impotentiam [geomap]
PROP. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.	PROPOSITIO LVI: Maxima superbia vel [excl non-exh] abjectio maximam animi impotentiam indicat.
Proof.-The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation (IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.). He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues. Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under the guidance of reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.). Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue; in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of sirit. Thus extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Primum virtutis fundamentum est suum esse conservare (per corollarium propositionis 22 hujus {4p22c}) idque ex ductu rationis (per propositionem 24 {4p24} hujus). Qui igitur se ipsum ignorat, omnium virtutum fundamentum et consequenter omnes virtutes ignorat. Deinde ex virtute agere nihil aliud est quam ex ductu rationis agere (per propositionem 24 {4p24} hujus) et qui ex ductu rationis agit, scire necessario debet se ex ductu rationis  agere (per propositionem 43 partis II {2p43}); qui itaque se ipsum et consequenter (ut jam jam ostendimus) omnes virtutes maxime ignorat, is minime ex virtute agit hoc est (ut ex definitione 8 {4d08} hujus patet) maxime animo est impotens atque adeo (per propositionem praecedentem) maxima superbia vel [excl non-exh] abjectio maximam animi impotentiam indicat. Q.E.D.
4p56c superbos abjectos affectibus obnoxios	4p56c superbos abjectos affectibus obnoxios [geomap]
Corollary. Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.	COROLLARIUM {4p56}: Hinc clare sequitur superbos et abjectos maxime affectibus esse obnoxios.
4p56s Abjectio facilius corrigi potest superbia	4p56s Abjectio facilius corrigi potest superbia
Note. Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride; for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful (IV. xviii.).	SCHOLIUM: Abjectio tamen facilius corrigi potest quam superbia quandoquidem haec laetitiae,illa autem tristitiae est affectus atque adeo (per propositionem 18 hujus) haec illa fortior est.
4p57 superbus	4p57 superbus [geomap]
PROP. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded.	PROPOSITIO LVII: Superbus parasitorum seu [non-excl non-exh] adulatorum praesentiam amat, generosorum autem odit.
Proof.-Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.); this estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the means in his power (III. xiii. note); he will therefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the company of high-minded men, who value him according to his deserts. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Superbia est laetitia orta ex eo quod homo de se plus justo sentit (per definitiones 28 {3de28} et 6 {3de06} affectuum) quam opinionem homo superbus quantum potest fovere conabitur (vide scholium propositionis 13 partis III {non-deductive reference}) adeoque superbiae parasitorum vel [non-excl non-exh] adulatorum (horum definitiones omisi quia nimis noti sunt) praesentiam amabunt et generosorum qui de ipsis ut par est, sentiunt, fugient. Q.E.D.
4p57s superbi mala	4p57s superbi mala
Note. It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity. I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may be called proud from his underestimation of other people; and, therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows. Such being the ease, we can easily see that a proud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the dejected man very near akin to the proud man. For, inasmuch as his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and other men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other words, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in contemplating other men's faults; whence arises the proverb, "The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow-sufferers." Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he thinks himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to envy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's actions, with a view to fault-finding rather than correction, in order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory therein, though all the time with a dejected air. These effects follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles. I have already said that I call these and similar emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man. The laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man is but a part. I mention this, in passing, lest any should think that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of men rather than the nature and properties of things. For, as I said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions and their properties as on the same footing with other natural phenomena. Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as other things which we admire, and which we delight to contemplate. But I pass on to note those qualities in the emotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury upon him.	SCHOLIUM: Nimis longum foret hic omnia superbi mala enumerare quandoquidem omnibus affectibus obnoxii sunt superbi sed nullis minus quam affectibus amoris et misericordi. Sed hic minime tacendum est quod ille etiam superbus vocetur qui de reliquis minus justo sentit atque adeo hoc sensu superbia definienda est quod sit laetitia orta ex falsa opinione quod homo se supra reliquos esse putat. Et abjectio huic superbi contraria definienda esset tristitia orta ex falsa opinione quod homo se infra reliquos esse credit. At hoc posito facile concipimus superbum necessario esse invidum (vide scholium propositionis 55 partis III) et eos maxime odio habere qui maxime ob virtutes laudantur nec facile eorum odium amore aut beneficio vinci (vide scholium propositionis 41 partis III) et eorum tantummodo praesentia delectari qui animo ejus impotenti morem gerunt et ex stulto insanum faciunt. Abjectio quamvis superbi sit contraria, est tamen abjectus superbo proximus. Nam quandoquidem ejus tristitia ex eo oritur quod suam impotentiam ex aliorum potentia seu virtute judicat, levabitur ergo ejus tristitia hoc est laetabitur si ejus imaginatio in alienis vitiis contemplandis occupetur, unde illud proverbium natum: solamen miseris socios habuisse malorum; et contra eo magis contristabitur quo se magis infra reliquos esse crediderit; unde fit ut nulli magis ad invidiam sint proni quam abjecti et ut isti maxime hominum facta observare conentur ad carpendum magis quam ad eadem corrigendum et ut tandem solam abjectionem laudent eaque glorientur sed ita ut tamen abjecti videantur. Atque haec ex hoc affectu tam necessario sequuntur quam ex natura trianguli quod ejus tres anguli quales sint duobus rectis et jam dixi me hos et similes affectus malos vocare quatenus ad solam humanam utilitatem attendo. Sed naturae leges communem naturae ordinem cujus homo pars est, respiciunt; quod hic in transitu monere volui ne quis putaret me hic hominum vitia et absurda facta narrare, non autem rerum naturam et proprietates demonstrare voluisse. Nam ut in praefatione partis terti dixi, humanos affectus eorumque proprietates perinde considero ac reliqua naturalia. Et sane humani affectus si non humanam, naturae saltem potentiam et artificium non minus indicant quam multa alia quae admiramur quorumque contemplatione delectamur. Sed pergo de affectibus ea notare quae hominibus utilitatem adferunt vel quae iisdem damnum inferunt.
4p58 Gloria rationi non repugnat	4p58 Gloria rationi non repugnat [geomap]
PROP. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may arise therefrom.	PROPOSITIO LVIII: Gloria rationi non repugnat sed ab ea oriri potest.
Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and also from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note. i.).	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex 30 affectuum definitione {3de30} et ex definitione honesti, quam vide in scholio I propositionis 37 {non-deductive reference} hujus.
4p58s vana gloria, pudore	4p58s vana gloria, pudore
Note. Empty honour, as it is styled, is self-approval, fostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when this good opinion ceases there ceases also the self-approval, in other words, the highest object of each man's love (IV. lii. note); consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must, day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain his reputation. For the populace is variable and inconstant, so that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away. Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and readily represses the fame of others. The object of the strife being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being nothing. The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not mortified. Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no desire to live honourably. Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good or evil emotions. But all, in so far as they are engendered in us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.	SCHOLIUM: Vana quae dicitur gloria est acquiescentia in se ipso quae sola vulgi opinione fovetur eaque cessante cessat ipsa acquiescentia hoc est (per scholium propositionis 52 hujus) summum bonum quod unusquisque amat; unde fit ut qui vulgi opinione gloriatur, quotidiana cura anxius nitatur, faciat, experiatur ut famam conservet. Est namque vulgus varius et inconstans atque adeo nisi conservetur fama, cito abolescit; imo quia omnes vulgi captare applausus cupiunt, facile unusquisque alterius famam reprimit, ex quo quandoquidem de summo quod stimatur bono certatur, ingens libido oritur se invicem quocunque modo opprimendi et qui tandem victor evadit, gloriatur magis quod alteri obfuit quam quod sibi profuit. Est igitur haec gloria seu acquiescentia revera vana quia nulla est. quae de pudore notanda sunt, colliguntur facile ex iis quae de misericordia et paenitentia diximus. Hoc tantum addo quod ut commiseratio sic etiam pudor quamvis non sit virtus, bonus tamen est quatenus indicat homini qui pudore suffunditur, cupiditatem inesse honeste vivendi, sicut dolor qui eatenus bonus dicitur quatenus indicat partem lsam nondum esse putrefactam; quare quamvis homo quem facti alicujus pudet, revera sit tristis, est tamen perfectior impudenti qui nullam habet honeste vivendi cupiditatem. Atque haec sunt quae de affectibus laetitiae et tristitiae notare susceperam. Ad cupiditates quod attinet, hae sane bonae aut malae sunt quatenus ex bonis aut malis affectibus oriuntur. Sed omnes revera quatenus ex affectibus qui passiones sunt in nobis ingenerantur, caecae sunt (ut facile colligitur ex iis quae in scholio propositionis 44 hujus diximus) nec ullius usus essent si homines facile duci possent ut ex solo rationis dictamine viverent, ut jam paucis ostendam.
4p59 passio possumus ratione	4p59 passio possumus ratione [geomap]
PROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive, we can be determined without emotion by reason.	PROPOSITIO LIX: Ad omnes actiones ad quas ex affectu qui passio est, determinamur, possumus absque eo a ratione determinari.
Proof.-To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def. ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action (IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance of reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly, pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions (III. iii., and note). Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv. explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ex ratione agere nihil aliud est (per propositionem 3 {3p03} et definitionem 2 partis III {3d02}) quam ea agere quae ex necessitate nostrae naturae in se sola consideratae sequuntur. At tristitia eatenus mala est quatenus hanc agendi potentiam minuit vel [non-excl non-exh] coercet (per propositionem 41 hujus {4p41}); ergo ex hoc affectu ad nullam actionem possumus determinari quam non possemus agere si ratione duceremur. praeterea laetitia eatenus mala est quatenus impedit quominus homo ad agendum sit aptus (per propositiones 41  {4p41} et 43 {4p43} hujus) atque adeo eatenus etiam ad nullam actionem determinari possumus quam non possemus agere si ratione duceremur. Denique quatenus laetitia bona est eatenus cum ratione  convenit (consistit enim in eo quod hominis agendi potentia augetur vel [non-excl non-exh] juvatur) nec passio est nisi quatenus hominis agendi potentia non eo usque augetur ut se suasque actiones adaequate concipiat (per propositionem 3 partis III {3p03} cum ejus scholio). Quare si homo laetitia affectus ad tantam perfectionem duceretur ut se suasque actiones adaequate conciperet, ad easdem actiones ad quas jam ex affectibus qui passiones sunt, determinatur, aptus, imo aptior esset. At omnes affectus ad laetitiae, tristitiam vel [non-excl exh] cupiditatem referuntur (vide explicationem quartae affectuum definitionis {non-deductive reference}) et cupiditas (per 1 affectuum definitionem {3de01}) nihil aliud est quam ipse agendi conatus; ergo ad omnes actiones ad quas ex affectu qui passio est, determinamur, possumus absque eo sola ratione duci. Q.E.D.
Another Proof.-A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad (as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same action being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion, we may be led by reason (IV. xix.). Q.E.D.	ALITER: Actio quaecunque eatenus dicitur mala quatenus ex eo oritur quod odio aut aliquo malo affectu affecti sumus (vide corollarium I propositionis 45 hujus). At nulla actio in se sola considerata bona aut mala est (ut in praefatione hujus ostendimus) sed una eademque actio jam bona jam mala est; ergo ad eandem actionem quae jam mala est sive quae ex aliquo malo affectu oritur, ratione duci possumus (per propositionem 19 hujus). Q.E.D.
4p59s exemplo verberandi	4p59s exemplo verberandi
Note. An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one and the same action can be associated with various images of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is called by us blind.	SCHOLIUM: Explicantur haec clarius exemplo. Nempe verberandi actio quatenus physice consideratur et ad hoc tantum attendimus quod homo brachium tollit, manum claudit totumque brachium vi deorsum movet, virtus est quae ex corporis humani fabrica concipitur. Si itaque homo ira vel odio commotus determinatur ad claudendam manum vel brachium movendum, id ut in parte secunda ostendimus, fit quia una eademque actio potest jungi quibuscunque rerum imaginibus atque adeo tam ex iis imaginibus rerum quas confuse quam quas clare et distincte concipimus, ad unam eandemque actionem determinari possumus. Apparet itaque quod omnis cupiditas quae ex affectu qui passio est, oritur, nullius esset usus si homines ratione duci possent. Videamus jam cur cupiditas quae ex affectu qui passio est, oritur, cca a nobis appellatur.
4p60 cupiditas oritur laetitia tristitia	4p60 cupiditas oritur laetitia tristitia [geomap]
PROP. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.	PROPOSITIO LX: Cupiditas quae oritur ex laetitia vel [excl non-exh] tristitia quae ad unam vel ad aliquot, non autem ad omnes corporis partes refertur, rationem utilitatis totius hominis non habet.
Proof.-Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails over the remaining parts (IV. vi.). This part will not endeavour to do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office; for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own powers, which (III. vi.) is absurd. The said part, and, consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its condition. Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole. If it be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to a man as a whole. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ponatur exempli gratia corporis pars A vi alicujus  causae externae ita corroborari ut reliquis praevaleat (per propositionem 6 hujus {4p06}); haec pars vires suas amittere propterea non conabitur ut reliquae corporis partes suo fungantur officio. Deberet enim vim seu [mng eqv] potentiam habere vires suas amittendi, quod (per propositionem 6 partis III {3p06}) est absurdum. Conabitur itaque illa pars et consequenter (per propositiones 7 {3p07} et 12 {3p12} partis III) mens etiam illum statum conservare adeoque cupiditas quae ex tali affectu laetitiae oritur, rationem totius non habet. Quod si contra supponatur pars A coerceri ut reliquae praevaleant, eodem modo demonstratur quod nec cupiditas quae ex tristitia oritur, rationem totius habeat. Q.E.D.
4p60s integrae nostrae valetudinis	4p60s integrae nostrae valetudinis
Note. As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to one part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being without taking into consideration our health as a whole: to which it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over us (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future.	SCHOLIUM: Cum itaque laetitia plerumque (per scholium propositionis 44 hujus) ad unam corporis partem referatur, cupimus ergo plerumque nostrum esse conservare nulla habita ratione integrae nostrae valetudinis : ad quod accedit quod cupiditates quibus maxime tenemur (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus) temporis tantum praesentis, non autem futuri habent rationem.
4p61 cupiditas ex ratione excessum nequit	4p61 cupiditas ex ratione excessum nequit [geomap]
PROP. LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive	PROPOSITIO LXI: Cupiditas quae ex ratione oritur, excessum habere nequit.
Proof.-Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Cupiditas (per 1 affectuum definitionem {3de01}) absolute considerata est ipsa hominis essentia quatenus quocunque modo determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum adeoque cupiditas quae ex ratione oritur hoc est (per propositionem 3 {3p03} partis III) quae in nobis ingeneratur quatenus agimus, est ipsa hominis essentia seu [mng eqv] natura quatenus determinata concipitur ad agendum ea quae per solam hominis essentiam adaequate concipiuntur (per definitionem 2 {3d02} partis III) : si itaque haec cupiditas excessum habere posset, posset ergo humana natura in se sola considerata se ipsam excedere sive [mng eqv] plus posset quam potest, quod manifesta est contradictio ac proinde haec cupiditas excessum habere nequit. Q.E.D.
4p62 ex rationis futurae praeterit praesentis	4p62 ex rationis futurae praeterit praesentis [geomap]
PROP. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present.	PROPOSITIO LXII: Quatenus mens ex rationis dictamine res concipit, aeque afficitur sive [excl exh triple] idea sit rei futurae vel [excl exh triple] praeterit sive [excl exh triple] praesentis.
Proof.-Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II. xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same certitude (II. xliii. and note). Wherefore, whether the thing be present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether the idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all cases be equally true (II. xli.); that is, it will always possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.); therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid mens ducente ratione concipit, id omne sub eadem aeternitatis seu  [mng eqv] necessitatis specie concipit (per corollarium II propositionis 44 partis II {2p44c2}) eademque certitudine afficitur (per propositionem 43 partis II {2p43} et ejus scholium {non-deductive reference}). Quare sive [excl exh] idea sit rei futurae vel [excl exh triple] praeterit sive [excl exh triple] praesentis, mens eadem necessitate rem concipit eademque certitudine afficitur et sive [excl exh triple] idea sit rei futurae vel [excl exh triple] praeterit sive [excl exh triple] praesentis, erit nihilominus que vera (per propositionem 41 partis II {2p41}) hoc est (per definitionem 4 partis II {2d04}) habebit nihilominus semper easdem ideae adaequatae proprietates atque adeo quatenus mens ex rationis dictamine res concipit, eodem modo afficitur sive [excl exh triple] idea sit rei futurae vel [excl exh triple] praeterit sive [excl exh triple] praesentis. Q.E.D.
4p62s rerum duratione	4p62s rerum duratione
Note. If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it conceived as future; consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II. xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the present time. (Cf. IV. xvi.)	SCHOLIUM: Si nos de rerum duratione adaequatam cognitionem habere earumque existendi tempora ratione determinare possemus, eodem affectu res futuras ac praesentes contemplaremur et bonum quod mens ut futurum conciperet, perinde ac praesens appeteret et consequenter bonum praesens minus pro majore bono futuro necessario negligeret et quod in praesenti bonum esset sed causa futuri alicujus mali, minime appeteret, ut mox demonstrabimus. Sed nos de duratione rerum (per propositionem 31 partis II) non nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere possumus et rerum existendi tempora (per scholium propositionis 44 partis II) sola imaginatione determinamus quae non que afficitur imagine rei praesentis ac futur; unde fit ut vera boni et mali cognitio quam habemus non nisi abstracta sive universalis sit et judicium quod de rerum ordine et causarum nexu facimus ut determinare possimus quid nobis in praesenti bonum aut malum sit, sit potius imaginarium quam reale atque adeo mirum non est si cupiditas quae ex boni et mali cognitione quatenus haec futurum prospicit, oritur, facilius rerum cupiditate quae in praesentia suaves sunt, coerceri potest, de quo vide propositionem 16 hujus partis.
4p63 ut malum vitet ratione non	4p63 ut malum vitet ratione non [geomap]
PROP. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.	PROPOSITIO LXIII: Qui metu ducitur et bonum ut malum vitet, agit, is ratione non ducitur.
Proof.-All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire (III. lix.); therefore, he who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.	DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes affectus qui ad mentem quatenus agit hoc est (per propositionem 3 partis III {3p03}) qui ad rationem referuntur, nulli alii sunt quam affectus laetitiae et cupiditatis (per propositionem 59 partis III {3p59}) atque adeo (per 13 affectuum definitionem {3de13}) qui metu ducitur et bonum timore mali agit, is ratione non ducitur. Q.E.D.
4p63s Superstitiosi molesti et odiosi	4p63s Superstitiosi molesti et odiosi
Note. Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow-men.	SCHOLIUM: Superstitiosi qui vitia exprobrare magis quam virtutes docere norunt et qui homines non ratione ducere sed metu ita continere student ut malum potius fugiant quam virtutes ament, nil aliud intendunt quam ut reliqui que ac ipsi fiant miseri et ideo non mirum si plerumque molesti et odiosi sint hominibus.
4p63c bonum directe malum indirecte	4p63c bonum directe malum indirecte [geomap]
Corollary.-Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good directly, and shun evil indirectly.	COROLLARIUM {4p63}: Cupiditate quae ex ratione oritur, bonum directe sequimur et malum indirecte fugimus.
Proof.-Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III. lix.), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive (IV. lxi.), and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.); hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by implication shun evil. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nam cupiditas quae ex ratione oritur, ex solo laetitiae affectu quae passio non est, oriri potest (per propositionem 59 {3p59} partis III) hoc est ex laetitia quae excessum habere nequit (per propositionem 61 {4p61} hujus) non autem ex tristitia ac proinde haec cupiditas (per propositionem 8 {4p08} hujus) ex cognitione boni, non autem mali oritur atque adeo ex ductu rationis bonum directe appetimus et eatenus tantum malum fugimus. Q.E.D.
4p63s exemplo aegri et sani	4p63s exemplo aegri et sani
Note. This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a healthy man. The sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to avoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from hatred or anger but from love of the public well-being, is guided solely by reason.	SCHOLIUM: Explicatur hoc corollarium exemplo aegri et sani. Comedit ger id quod aversatur timore mortis; sanus autem cibo gaudet et vita sic melius fruitur quam si mortem timeret eamque directe vitare cuperet. Sic judex qui non odio aut ira etc. sed solo amore salutis public reum mortis damnat, sola ratione ducitur.
4p64 Cognitio mali inadaequata	4p64 Cognitio mali inadaequata [geomap]
PROP. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge	PROPOSITIO LXIV: Cognitio mali cognitio est inadaequata.
Proof.-The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.) and therefore cannot be understood through man's nature (III. vi., and vii.); therefore it is a passive state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.) depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof (II. xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Cognitio mali (per propositionem 8 hujus {4p08}) est ipsa tristitia quatenus ejusdem sumus conscii. Tristitia autem est transitio ad minorem perfectionem (per 3 affectuum definitionem {3de03}) quae propterea per ipsam hominis essentiam intelligi nequit (per propositiones 6 {3p06} et 7 {3p07} partis III) ac proinde (per definitionem 2 {3d02} partis III) passio est quae (per propositionem 3 {3p03} partis III) ab ideis inadaequatis pendet et consequenter (per propositionem 29 {2p29} partis II) ejus cognitio nempe mali cognitio est inadaequata. Q.E.D.
4p64c adaequatas nullam mali notionem	4p64c adaequatas nullam mali notionem [geomap]
Corollary. Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.	COROLLARIUM {4p64}: Hinc sequitur quod si mens humana non nisi adaequatas haberet ideas, nullam mali formaret notionem.
4p65 bonis majus malis minus	4p65 bonis majus malis minus [geomap]
PROP. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils	PROPOSITIO LXV: De duobus bonis majus et de duobus malis minus ex rationis ductu sequemur.
Proof.-A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see preface to this Part); therefore, evil is in reality a lesser good; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Bonum quod impedit quominus majore bono fruamur, est revera malum; malum enim et bonum (ut in praefatione hujus ostendimus) de rebus dicitur quatenus easdem ad invicem comparamus et (per eandem rationem) malum minus revera bonum est; quare (per corollarium propositionis 63 {4p63} hujus) ex rationis ductu bonum tantum majus et malum minus appetemus seu sequemur. Q.E.D.
4p65c Malum minus sequemur	4p65c Malum minus sequemur [geomap]
Corollary.-We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil. For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter. Q.E.D.	COROLLARIUM {4p65}: Malum minus pro majore bono ex rationis ductu sequemur et bonum minus quod causa est majoris mali, negligemus. Nam malum quod hic dicitur minus, revera bonum est et bonum contra malum; quare (per corollarium propositionis 63 {4p63c} hujus) illud appetemus et hoc negligemus. Q.E.D.
4p66 Bonum futurum praesenti	4p66 Bonum futurum praesenti [geomap]
PROP. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future.[15 "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten). Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.) ]	PROPOSITIO LXVI: Bonum majus futurum prae minore praesenti et malum praesens minus prae majore futuro ex rationis ductu appetemus.
Proof.-If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do, there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si mens rei futurae adaequatam posset habere cognitionem, eodem affectu erga rem futuram ac erga praesentem afficeretur (per propositionem 62 {4p62} hujus); quare quatenus ad ipsam rationem attendimus, ut in hac propositione nos facere supponimus, res eadem est sive [excl exh] majus bonum vel [excl exh] malum  futurum sive [excl exh] praesens supponatur ac proinde (per propositionem 65 {4p65} hujus) bonum futurum majus prae minore praesenti etc. appetemus. Q.E.D.
4p66c  Malum praesens futuri boni	4p66c  Malum praesens futuri boni [geomap]
Corollary. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future. This Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.	COROLLARIUM {4p66}: Malum praesens minus quod est causa majoris futuri boni, ex rationis ductu appetemus et bonum praesens minus quod causa est majoris futuri mali, negligemus. Hoc corollarium se habet ad praecedentem propositionem ut corollarium propositionis 65 ad ipsam propositionem 65.
4p66s solo affectu ratione ducitur	4p66s solo affectu ratione ducitur
Note. If these statements be compared with what we have pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason. The former, whether will or no, performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few observations.	SCHOLIUM: Si igitur haec cum iis conferantur quae in hac parte usque ad propositionem 18 de affectuum viribus ostendimus, facile videbimus quid homo qui solo affectu seu opinione homini qui ratione ducitur, intersit. Ille enim velit nolit ea quae maxime ignorat, agit; hic autem nemini nisi sibi morem gerit et ea tantum agit quae in vita prima esse novit quaeque propterea maxime cupit et ideo illum servum, hunc autem liberum voco, de cujus ingenio et vivendi ratione pauca adhuc notare libet.
4p67 liberus^servus	4p67 liberus^servus  [geomap]
PROP. LXVII. A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.	PROPOSITIO LXVII: Homo liber de nulla re minus quam de morte cogitat et ejus sapientia non mortis sed vitae meditatio est.
Proof.-A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words (IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom is a meditation of life. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Homo liber hoc est qui ex solo rationis dictamine vivit, mortis metu non ducitur (per propositionem 63 {4p63} hujus) sed bonum directe cupit (per corollarium ejusdem propositionis) hoc est (per propositionem 24 {4p24} hujus) agere, vivere, suum esse conservare ex fundamento proprium utile quaerendi atque adeo nihil minus quam de morte cogitat sed ejus sapientia vit est meditatio. Q.E.D.
4p68 liberi nullum boni et mali	4p68 liberi nullum boni et mali [geomap]
PROP. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as they remained free, form no conception of good and evil.	PROPOSITIO LXVIII: Si homines liberi nascerentur, nullum boni et mali formarent conceptum quamdiu liberi essent.
Proof.-I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being correlative) of good. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Illum liberum esse dixi qui sola ducitur ratione; qui itaque liber nascitur et liber manet, non nisi adaequatas ideas habet ac proinde mali conceptum habet nullum (per corollarium propositionis 64 {4p64c} hujus) et consequenter (nam bonum et malum correlata sunt) neque boni. Q.E.D.
4p68s Mose	4p68s Mose
Note.-It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence. This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man. For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live. Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown above (IV. xxxvii.).	SCHOLIUM: Hujus propositionis hypothesin falsam esse nec posse concipi nisi quatenus ad solam naturam humanam seu potius ad Deum attendimus, non quatenus infinitus sed quatenus tantummodo causa est cur homo existat, patet ex 4 propositione hujus partis. Atque hoc et alia quae jam demonstravimus, videntur a Mose significari in illa primi hominis historia. In ea enim nulla alia Dei potentia concipitur quam illa qua hominem creavit hoc est potentia qua hominis solummodo utilitati consuluit atque eatenus narratur quod Deus homini libero prohibuerit ne de arbore cognitionis boni et mali comederet et quod simulac de ea comederet, statim mortem metueret potius quam vivere cuperet. Deinde quod inventa ab homine uxore quae cum sua natura prorsus conveniebat, cognovit nihil posse in natura dari quod ipsi posset illa esse utilius sed quod postquam bruta sibi similia esse credidit, statim eorum affectus imitari inceperit (vide propositionem 27 partis III) et libertatem suam amittere quam Patriarch postea recuperaverunt ducti spiritu Christi hoc est Dei idea a qua sola pendet ut homo liber sit et ut bonum quod sibi cupit, reliquis hominibus cupiat, ut supra (per propositionem 37 hujus) demonstravimus.
4p69 virtus declinandis superandis periculis	4p69 virtus declinandis superandis periculis [geomap]
PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.	PROPOSITIO LXIX: Hominis liberi virtus aeque magna cernitur in declinandis quam in superandis periculis.
Proof.-Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining emotion (IV. vii.). But blind daring and fear are emotions, which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.): hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring than in checking fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue, when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus coerceri nec tolli potest nisi affectu contrario et fortiore affectu coercendo (per propositionem 7 hujus). At caeca audacia et metus affectus sunt qui que magni possunt concipi (per propositiones 5 et 3 hujus). Ergo que magna animi virtus seu  [mng eqv] fortitudo (hujus definitionem vide in scholio propositionis 59 partis III) requiritur ad audaciam quam ad metum coercendum hoc est (per definitiones 40 et 41 affectuum) homo liber eadem animi virtute pericula declinat qua eadem superare tentat. Q.E.D.
4p69c fuga ac pugna	4p69c fuga ac pugna [geomap]
Corollary. The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.	COROLLARIUM {4p69}: Homini igitur libero que magnae animositati fuga in tempore ac pugna ducitur sive [mng eqv] homo liber eadem animositate seu [non-excl non-exh] animi praesentia qua certamen fugam eligit.
4p69s scholio propositionis 59 partis III	4p69s scholio propositionis 59 partis III
Note. What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I explained in III. lix. note. By danger I mean everything, which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, &c.	SCHOLIUM: Quid animositas sit vel quid per ipsam intelligam, in scholio propositionis 59 partis III explicui. Per periculum autem id omne intelligo quod potest esse causa alicujus mali nempe tristiti, odii, discordi etc.
4p70 liber inter ignaros beneficia	4p70 liber inter ignaros beneficia [geomap]
PROP. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.	PROPOSITIO LXX: Homo liber qui inter ignaros vivit, eorum quantum potest beneficia declinare studet.
Proof.-Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.). But the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value, but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason, and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance. Therefore the free man, lest he should become hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving their favours.	DEMONSTRATIO: Unusquisque ex suo ingenio judicat quid bonum sit (vide scholium propositionis 39 partis III); ignarus igitur qui in aliquem beneficium contulit, id ex suo ingenio stimabit et si minoris ab eo cui datum est stimari videt, contristabitur (per propositionem 42 partis III). At homo liber reliquos homines amicitia sibi jungere (per propositionem 37 hujus) nec paria hominibus beneficia ex eorum affectu referre sed se et reliquos libero rationis judicio ducere et ea tantum agere studet quae ipse prima esse novit: ergo homo liber ne ignaris odio sit et ne eorum appetitui sed soli rationi obsequatur, eorum beneficia quantum potest declinare conabitur. Q.E.D.
4p70s Dico "quantum potest"	4p70s Dico "quantum potest"
Note.-I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy.	SCHOLIUM: Dico "quantum potest". Nam quamvis homines ignari sint, sunt tamen homines qui in necessitatibus humanum auxilium quo nullum prstabilius est, adferre queunt atque adeo spe fit ut necesse sit ab iisdem beneficium accipere et consequenter iisdem contra ex eorum ingenio congratulari; ad quod accedit quod etiam in declinandis beneficiis, cautio esse debet ne videamur eosdem contemnere vel prae avaritia remunerationem timere atque ita dum eorum odium fugimus, eo ipso in eorum offensionem incurramus. Quare in declinandis beneficiis ratio utilis et honesti habenda est.
4p71 Soli liberi gratissimi	4p71 Soli liberi gratissimi [geomap]
PROP. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another.	PROPOSITIO LXXI: Soli homines liberi erga invicem gratissimi sunt.
Proof.-Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour, with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV. xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one to another. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Soli homines liberi sibi invicem utilissimi sunt et maxima amiciti necessitudine invicem junguntur (per propositionem 35 hujus {4p35} et I ejus corollarium {4p35c1}) parique amoris studio sibi invicem benefacere conantur (per propositionem 37 {4p37} hujus) adeoque (per 34 affectuum definitionem {3de34}) soli homines liberi erga se invicem gratissimi sunt. Q.E.D.
4p71s Gratia homines cupiditate ducuntur	4p71s Gratia homines cupiditate ducuntur
Note. The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c. He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits, is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.	SCHOLIUM: Gratia quam homines qui caeca cupiditate ducuntur, invicem habent, mercatura seu aucupium potius quam gratia plerumque est. Porro ingratitudo affectus non est. Est tamen ingratitudo turpis quia plerumque hominem nimio odio, ira vel superbia vel avaritia etc. affectum esse indicat. Nam qui prae stulaetitia dona compensare nescit, ingratus non est et multo minus ille qui donis non movetur meretricis ut ipsius libidini inserviat nec furis ut ipsius furta celet vel alterius similis. Nam hic contra animum habere constantem ostendit qui scilicet se nullis donis ad suam vel communem perniciem patitur corrumpi.
4p72 Homo liber semper cum fide agit	4p72 Homo liber semper cum fide agit [geomap]
PROP. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in good faith.	PROPOSITIO LXXII: Homo liber nunquam dolo malo sed semper cum fide agit.
Proof. If a free man would in some issue act fraudulently, in so far as he is free, he would act out of the dictate of reason (since in so far we call him free) and thus the fraudulent act would be a virtue (IV.  xxiv.) and by consequence (by the same IV.  xxiv.), each and every person would be better advised to act fraudulently, that is (which is evident) people would be better advised with words simply to agree,  which would be  contrary [to our nature], which (by IV. xxxi. corollary) is absurd. Therefore a free man etc. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si liber homo quicquam dolo malo quatenus liber est, ageret, id ex dictamine rationis ageret (nam eatenus tantum liber a nobis appellatur) atque adeo dolo malo agere virtus esset (per propositionem 24 {4p24} hujus) et consequenter (per eandem propositionem {4p24}) unicuique ad suum esse conservandum consultius esset dolo malo agere hoc est (ut per se notum) hominibus consultius esset verbis solummodo convenire, re autem invicem esse contrarios, quod (per corollarium propositionis 31 {4p31c} hujus) est absurdum. Ergo homo liber etc. Q.E.D.
4p72s perfidia mortis periculo liberare	4p72s perfidia mortis periculo liberare
Proof.-If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of present death? Would not his plan of self-preservation completely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any general laws, which is absurd.	SCHOLIUM: Si jam quaeratur quid si homo se perfidia a praesenti mortis periculo posset liberare, an non ratio suum esse conservandi omnino suadet ut perfidus sit? Respondebitur eodem modo quod si ratio id suadeat, suadet ergo id omnibus hominibus atque adeo ratio omnino suadet hominibus ne nisi dolo malo paciscantur vires conjungere et jura habere communia hoc est ne revera jura habeant communia, quod est absurdum.
4p73 ratione in civitate quam in solitudine	4p73 ratione in civitate quam in solitudine [geomap]
PROP. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent.	PROPOSITIO LXXIII: Homo qui ratione ducitur magis in civitate ubi ex communi decreto vivit quam in solitudine ubi sibi soli obtemperat, liber est.
Proof.-The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey through fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is (IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom, he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV. xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note. ii.), to live according to the laws of his country. Therefore the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Homo qui ratione ducitur, non ducitur metu ad obtemperandum (per propositionem 63 {4p63} hujus) sed quatenus suum esse ex rationis dictamine conservare conatur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 66 hujus {non-deductive reference}) quatenus libere vivere conatur, communis vit et utilitatis rationem tenere (per propositionem 37 {4p37} hujus) et consequenter (ut in scholio II propositionis 37 hujus ostendimus {non-deductive reference}) ex communi civitatis decreto vivere cupit. Cupit ergo homo qui ratione ducitur, ut liberius vivat, communia civitatis jura tenere. Q.E.D.
4p73s per scholium propositionis 59 partis III animositatem generositatem	4p73s per scholium propositionis 59 partis III animositatem generositatem
Note.These and similar observations, which we have made on man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. These propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi.; namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV. l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in the following Part.	SCHOLIUM: Haec et similia quae de vera hominis libertate ostendimus, ad fortitudinem hoc est (per scholium propositionis 59 partis III) ad animositatem et generositatem referuntur. Nec operae pretium duco omnes fortitudinis proprietates hic separatim demonstrare et multo minus quod vir fortis neminem odio habeat, nemini irascatur, invideat, indignetur, neminem despiciat minimeque superbiat. Nam haec et omnia quae ad veram vitam et religionem spectant, facile ex propositione 37 et 46 hujus partis convincuntur nempe quod odium amore contra vincendum sit et quod unusquisque qui ratione ducitur, bonum quod sibi appetit, reliquis etiam ut sit, cupiat. Ad quod accedit id quod in scholio propositionis 50 hujus partis et aliis in locis notavimus quod scilicet vir fortis hoc apprime consideret nempe quod omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae sequantur ac proinde quicquid molestum et malum esse cogitat et quicquid praeterea impium, horrendum, injustum et turpe videtur, ex eo oritur quod res ipsas perturbate, mutilate et confuse concipit et hac de causa apprime conatur res ut in se sunt, concipere et verae cognitionis impedimenta amovere ut sunt odium, ira, invidia, irrisio, superbia et reliqua hujusmodi quae in praecedentibus notavimus atque adeo quantum potest conatur uti diximus bene agere et laetari. Quousque autem humana virtus ad haec consequenda se extendat et quid possit in sequenti parte demonstrabo.
4apx hic recolligere et ad summa capita redigere proposui	4apx hic recolligere et ad summa capita redigere proposui
APPENDIX.	APPENDIX.
What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view, but has been set forth piece-meal, according as I thought each Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it. I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them under leading heads.	APPENDIX: quae in hac parte de recta vivendi ratione tradidi, non sunt ita disposita ut uno aspectu videri possint sed disperse a me demonstrata sunt prout scilicet unum ex alio facilius deducere potuerim. Eadem igitur hic recolligere et ad summa capita redigere proposui.
I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals.	CAPUT I: Omnes nostri conatus seu cupiditates ex necessitate nostrae naturae ita sequuntur ut vel per ipsam solam tanquam per proximam suam causam possint intelligi vel quatenus naturae sumus pars quae per se absque aliis individuis non potest adaequate concipi.
II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter, on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.	CAPUT II: Cupiditates quae ex nostra natura ita sequuntur ut per ipsam solam possit intelligi, sunt illae quae ad mentem referuntur quatenus haec ideis adaequatis constare concipitur; reliquae vero cupiditates ad mentem non referuntur nisi quatenus res inadaequate concipit et quarum vis et incrementum non humana sed rerum quae extra nos sunt potentia definiri debet et ideo illae recte actiones, hae autem passiones vocantur; illae namque nostram potentiam semper indicant et hae contra nostram impotentiam et mutilatam cognitionem.
III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power or reason, are always good. The rest may be either good or bad.	CAPUT III: Nostrae actiones hoc est cupiditates illae quae hominis potentia seu ratione definiuntur, semper bon sunt, reliquae autem tam bon quam mal possunt esse.
IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to moderate al others, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence.	CAPUT IV: In vita itaque apprime utile est intellectum seu rationem quantum possumus perficere et in hoc uno summa hominis felicitas seu beatitudo consistit; quippe beatitudo nihil aliud est quam ipsa animi acquiescentia quae ex Dei intuitiva cognitione oritur : at intellectum perficere nihil etiam aliud est quam Deum Deique attributa et actiones quae ex ipsius naturae necessitate consequuntur, intelligere. Quare hominis qui ratione ducitur finis ultimus hoc est summa cupiditas qua reliquas omnes moderari studet, est illa qua fertur ad se resque omnes quae sub ipsius intelligentiam cadere possunt, adaequate concipiendum.
V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by intelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational life, are alone called evil.	CAPUT V: Nulla igitur vita rationalis est sine intelligentia et res eatenus tantum bon sunt quatenus hominem juvant ut mentis vita fruatur quae intelligentia definitur. quae autem contra impediunt quominus homo rationem perficere et rationali vita frui possit, eas solummodo malas esse dicimus.
VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to conform to in almost infinite ways.	CAPUT VI: Sed quia omnia illa quorum homo efficiens est causa, necessario bona sunt, nihil ergo mali homini evenire potest nisi a causis externis nempe quatenus pars est totius naturae cujus legibus humana natura obtemperare et cui infinitis modis pene sese accommodare cogitur.
VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered, whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.	CAPUT VII: Nec fieri potest ut homo non sit naturae pars et communem ejus ordinem non sequatur sed si inter talia individua versetur quae cum ipsius hominis natura conveniunt, eo ipso hominis agendi potentia juvabitur et fovebitur. At si contra inter talia sit quae cum ipsius natura minime conveniunt, vix absque magna ipsius mutatione iisdem sese accommodare poterit.
VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we think best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.	CAPUT VIII: Quicquid in rerum natura datur quod judicamus malum esse sive posse impedire quominus existere et vita rationali frui queamus, id a nobis removere ea via quae securior videtur, licet et quicquid contra datur quod judicamus bonum sive utile esse ad nostrum esse conservandum et vita rationali fruendum, id ad nostrum usum capere et eo quocunque modo uti nobis licet et absolute id unicuique summo naturae jure facere licet quod ad ipsius utilitatem conferre judicat.
IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing than other individuals of the same species; therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful than his fellow-man who is led by reason. Further, as we know not anything among individual things which is more excellent than a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at last to live under the dominion of their own reason.	CAPUT IX: Nihil magis cum natura alicujus rei convenire potest quam reliqua ejusdem speciei individua adeoque (per caput 7) nihil homini ad suum esse conservandum et vita rationali fruendum utilius datur quam homo qui ratione ducitur. Deinde quia inter res singulares nihil novimus quod homine qui ratione ducitur, sit praestantius, nulla ergo re magis potest unusquisque ostendere quantum arte et ingenio valeat quam in hominibus ita educandis ut tandem ex proprio rationis imperio vivant.
X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful than their fellows.	CAPUT X: quatenus homines invidia aut aliquo odii affectu in se invicem feruntur eatenus invicem contrarii sunt et consequenter eo magis timendi quo plus possunt quam reliqua naturae individua.
XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and high-mindedness.	CAPUT XI: Animi tamen non armis sed amore et generositate vincuntur.
XII. It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.	CAPUT XII: Hominibus apprime utile est consuetudines jungere seseque iis vinculis astringere quibus aptius de se omnibus unum efficiant et absolute ea agere quae firmandis amicitiis inserviunt.
XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness. For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and more prone to revenge than to sympathy. No small force of character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. But those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and others. Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes rather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as they may spite their parents.	CAPUT XIII: Sed ad haec ars et vigilantia requiritur. Sunt enim homines varii (nam rari sunt qui ex rationis prscripto vivunt) et tamen plerumque invidi et magis ad vindictam quam ad misericordiam proclives. Unumquemque igitur ex ipsius ingenio ferre et sese continere ne eorum affectus imitetur, singularis animi potenti opus est. At qui contra homines carpere et vitia potius exprobrare quam virtutes docere et hominum animos non firmare sed frangere norunt, ii et sibi et reliquis molesti sunt; unde multi prae nimia scilicet animi impatientia falsoque religionis studio inter bruta potius quam inter homines vivere maluerunt ut pueri vel adolescentes qui parentum jurgia quo animo ferre nequeunt, militatum confugiunt et incommoda belli et imperium tyrannidis prae domesticis commodis et paternis admonitionibus eligunt et quidvis oneris sibi imponi patiuntur dummodo parentes ulciscantur.
XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common brings many more advantages than drawbacks. Wherefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and friendship.	CAPUT XIV: Quamvis igitur homines omnia plerumque ex sua libidine moderentur, ex eorum tamen communi societate multo plura commoda quam damna sequuntur. Quare satius est eorum injurias quo animo ferre et studium iis adhibere quae concordi et amiciti conciliand inserviunt.
XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living. For men brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received customs of their society. For winning love those qualities are especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf. IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note).	CAPUT XV: quae concordiam gignunt sunt illa quae ad justitiam, quitatem et honestatem referuntur. Nam homines praeter id quod injustum et iniquum est, etiam gre ferunt quod turpe habetur sive quod aliquis receptos civitatis mores aspernatur. Amori autem conciliando illa apprime necessaria sunt quae ad religionem et pietatem spectant. De quibus vide scholia I et II propositionis 37 et scholium propositionis 46 et scholium propositionis 73 partis IV.
XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such harmony is insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance to piety.	CAPUT XVI: Solet praeterea concordia ex metu plerumque gigni sed sine fide. Adde quod metus ex animi impotentia oritur et propterea ad rationis usum non pertinet ut nec commiseratio quamvis pietatis speciem prae se ferre videatur.
XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life. However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any private person. For the riches of any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call. Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence providing for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and has regard only to the general advantage.	CAPUT XVII: Vincuntur praeterea homines etiam largitate, praecipue ii qui non habent unde comparare possint illa quae ad vitam sustentandam necessaria sunt. Attamen unicuique indigenti auxilium ferre vires et utilitatem viri privati longe superat. Diviti namque viri privati longe impares sunt ad id suppeditandum. Unius praeterea viri facultas limitatior est quam ut omnes sibi possit amicitia jungere; quare pauperum cura integr societati incumbit et ad communem tantum utilitatem spectat.
XVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note).	CAPUT XVIII: In beneficiis accipiendis et gratia referenda alia prorsus debet esse cura, de qua vide scholium propositionis 70 et scholium propositionis 71 partis IV.
XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause, readily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).	CAPUT XIX: Amor praeterea meretricius hoc est generandi libido quae ex forma oritur et absolute omnis amor qui aliam causam praeter animi libertatem agnoscit, facile in odium transit nisi, quod pejus est, species delirii sit atque tum magis discordia quam concordia fovetur. Vide scholium propositionis 31 partis III.
XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to beget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.	CAPUT XX: Ad matrimonium quod attinet, certum est ipsum cum ratione convenire si cupiditas miscendi corpora non ex sola forma sed etiam ex amore liberos procreandi et sapienter educandi, ingeneretur et praeterea si utriusque, viri scilicet et fmin amor non solam formam sed animi praecipue libertatem pro causa habeat.
XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery. None are more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be first, but are not.	CAPUT XXI: Gignit praeterea adulatio concordiam sed fdo servitutis crimine vel perfidia; nulli quippe magis adulatione capiuntur quam superbi qui primi esse volunt nec sunt.
XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii. note).	CAPUT XXII: Abjectioni falsa pietatis et religionis species inest. Et quamvis abjectio superbi sit contraria, est tamen abjectus superbo proximus. Vide scholium propositionis 57 partis IV.
XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such matters as cannot be hid. Further, as shame is a species of pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.	CAPUT XXIII: Confert praeterea concordi pudor in iis tantum quae celari non possunt. Deinde quia ipse pudor species est tristiti, ad rationis usum non spectat.
XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion; and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass judgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's rights.	CAPUT XXIV: Caeteri tristitiae erga homines affectus directe justiti, quitati, honestati, pietati et religioni opponuntur et quamvis indignatio quitatis speciem prae se ferre videatur, ibi tamen sine lege vivitur ubi unicuique de factis alterius judicium ferre et suum vel alterius jus vindicare licet.
XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.). But, if it spring from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he, I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love: not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called after his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way whereby it may be perfected. Thus will men be stirred not by fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to reason.	CAPUT XXV: Modestia hoc est cupiditas hominibus placendi quae ex ratione determinatur, ad pietatem (ut in scholio I propositionis 37 partis IV diximus) refertur. Sed si ex affectu oriatur, ambitio est sive cupiditas qua homines falsa pietatis imagine plerumque discordias et seditiones concitant. Nam qui reliquos consilio aut re juvare cupit ut simul summo fruantur bono, is apprime studebit eorum sibi amorem conciliare; non autem eos in admirationem traducere ut disciplina ex ipso habeat vocabulum nec ullas absolute invidi causas dare. In communibus deinde colloquiis cavebit hominum vitia referre et de humana impotentia non nisi parce loqui curabit : at largiter de humana virtute seu potentia et qua via possit perfici ut sic homines non ex metu aut aversione sed solo laetitiae affectu, moti ex rationis prscripto quantum in se est, conentur vivere.
XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we may.	CAPUT XXVI: praeter homines nihil singulare in natura novimus cujus mente gaudere et quod nobis amicitia aut aliquo consuetudinis genere jungere possumus adeoque quicquid in rerum natura extra homines datur, id nostrae utilitatis ratio conservare non postulat sed pro ejus vario usu conservare, destruere vel quocunque modo ad nostrum usum adaptare nos docet.
XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them, and from recombining their elements in different forms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their functions. For, in proportion as the body is capable of being affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.). But there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature. For the human body is composed of very many parts of different nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.	CAPUT XXVII: Utilitas quam ex rebus quae extra nos sunt, capimus, est praeter experientiam et cognitionem quam acquirimus ex eo quod easdem observamus et ex his formis in alias mutamus, praecipua corporis conservatio et hac ratione res illae imprimis utiles sunt quae corpus ita alere et nutrire possunt ut ejus omnes partes officio suo recte fungi queant. Nam quo corpus aptius est ut pluribus modis possit affici et corpora externa pluribus modis afficere, eo mens ad cogitandum est aptior (vide propositiones 38 et 39 partis IV). At hujus not perpauca in natura esse videntur; quare ad corpus ut requiritur nutriendum necesse est multis naturae diversae alimentis uti. Quippe humanum corpus ex plurimis diversae naturae partibus componitur quae continuo alimento indigent et vario ut totum corpus ad omnia quae ex ipsius natura sequi possunt, que aptum sit et consequenter ut mens etiam que apta sit ad plura concipiendum.
XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one another mutual aid. But money has furnished us with a token for everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the idea of money as cause.	CAPUT XXVIII: Ad haec autem comparandum vix uniuscujusque vires sufficerent nisi homines operas mutuas traderent. Verum omnium rerum compendium pecunia attulit, unde factum ut ejus imago mentem vulgi maxime occupare soleat quia vix ullam laetitiae speciem imaginari possunt nisi concomitante nummorum idea tanquam causa.
XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring themselves to great splendour. Certainly they nourish their bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of their body. But they who know the true use of money, and who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs, live content with little.	CAPUT XXIX: Sed hoc vitium eorum tantum est qui non ex indigentia nec propter necessitates nummos qurunt sed quia lucri artes didicerunt quibus se magnifice efferunt. Caeterum corpus ex consuetudine pascunt sed parce quia tantum de suis bonis se perdere credunt quantum sui corporis conservationi impendunt. At qui verum nummorum usum norunt et divitiarum modum ex sola indigentia moderantur, paucis contenti vivunt.
XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body; it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good. But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become excessive. Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally vivid. (IV. xliv. note, and lx. note.)	CAPUT XXX: Cum igitur res illae sint bon quae corporis partes juvant ut suo officio fungantur et laetitia in eo consistat quod hominis potentia quatenus mente et corpore constat, juvatur vel augetur, sunt ergo illa omnia quae laetitiam afferunt, bona. Attamen quoniam contra non eum in finem res agunt ut nos laetitia afficiant nec earum agendi potentia ex nostra utilitate temperatur et denique quoniam laetitia plerumque ad unam corporis partem potissimum refertur, habent ergo plerumque laetitiae affectus (nisi ratio et vigilantia adsit) et consequenter cupiditates etiam quae ex iisdem generantur, excessum; ad quod accedit quod ex affectu id primum habeamus quod in praesentia suave est nec futura quali animi affectu stimare possumus. Vide scholium propositionis 44 et scholium propositionis 60 partis IV.
XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious take delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.	CAPUT XXXI: At superstitio id contra videtur statuere bonum esse quod tristitiam et id contra malum quod laetitiam affert. Sed ut jam diximus (vide scholium propositionis 45 partis IV) nemo nisi invidus mea impotentia et incommodo delectatur. Nam quo majore laetitia afficimur, eo ad majorem perfectionem transimus et consequenter eo magis de natura divina participamus nec laetitia unquam mala esse potest quam nostrae utilitatis vera ratio moderatur. At qui contra metu ducitur et bonum ut malum vitet, agit, is ratione non ducitur.
XXXII. But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely; remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavour to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.	CAPUT XXXII: Sed humana potentia admodum limitata est et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur atque adeo potestatem absolutam non habemus res quae extra nos sunt, ad nostrum usum aptandi. Attamen ea quae nobis eveniunt contra id quod nostrae utilitatis ratio postulat quo animo feremus si conscii simus nos functos nostro officio fuisse et potentiam quam habemus non potuisse se eo usque extendere ut eadem vitare possemus nosque partem totius naturae esse cujus ordinem sequimur. Quod si clare et distincte intelligamus, pars illa nostri quae intelligentia definitur hoc est pars melior nostri, in eo plane acquiescet et in ea acquiescentia perseverare conabitur. Nam quatenus intelligimus nihil appetere nisi id quod necessarium est nec absolute nisi in veris acquiescere possumus adeoque quatenus haec recte intelligimus eatenus conatus melioris partis nostri cum ordine totius naturae convenit. Finis quart partis
PART V: Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom	SPINOZAE ETHICA ORDINE GEOMETRICO DEMONSTRATA ET IN QUINQUE PARTES DISTINCTA PARS QUINTA DE POTENTIA INTELLECTUS SEU DE LIBERTATE HUMANA
5praef POTENTIA INTELLECTUS LIBERTATE	5praef POTENTIA INTELLECTUS LIBERTATE
PREFACE	PRAEFATIO
At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of its functions. The latter question lies in the province of Medicine, the former in the province of Logic. Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation. That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have already shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess, that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog and the other a hunting-dog. For by long training it could be brought about, that the house-dog should become accustomed to hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares. To this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition wherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature to a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to look at remote or very near objects. Lastly, he maintained that, although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de l'me, I.50. He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions as defined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression) are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the spirits." (Passions de l'me, I.27). But, seeing that we can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self-evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace. What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like him to explain this union through its proximate cause. But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body, that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false. Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.	Transeo tandem ad alteram Ethices partem quae est de modo sive via quae ad libertatem ducit. In hac ergo de potentia rationis agam ostendens quid ipsa ratio in affectus possit et deinde quid mentis libertas seu beatitudo sit, ex quibus videbimus quantum sapiens potior sit ignaro. Quomodo autem et qua via debeat intellectus perfici et qua deinde arte corpus sit curandum ut possit suo officio recte fungi, huc non pertinet; hoc enim ad medicinam, illud autem ad logicam spectat. Hic igitur ut dixi de sola mentis seu rationis potentia agam et ante omnia quantum et quale imperium in affectus habeat ad eosdem coercendum et moderandum ostendam. Nam nos in ipsos imperium absolutum non habere jam supra demonstravimus. Stoici tamen putarunt eosdem a nostra voluntate absolute pendere nosque iis absolute imperare posse. Attamen ab experientia reclamante, non vero ex suis principiis coacti sunt fateri usum et studium non parvum requiri ad eosdem coercendum et moderandum; quod quidam exemplo duorum canum (si recte memini) unius scilicet domestici, alterius venatici conatus est ostendere nempe quia usu efficere tandem potuit ut domesticus venari, venaticus contra a leporibus sectandis abstinere assuesceret. Huic opinioni non parum favet Cartesius. Nam statuit animam seu mentem unitam praecipue esse cuidam parti cerebri, glandul scilicet pineali dict cujus ope mens motus omnes qui in corpore excitantur, et objecta externa sentit quamque mens eo solo quod vult, varie movere potest. Hanc glandulam in medio cerebri ita suspensam esse statuit ut minimo spirituum animalium motu possit moveri. Deinde statuit quod haec glans tot variis modis in medio cerebro suspendatur quot variis modis spiritus animales in eandem impingunt et quod praeterea tot varia vestigia in eadem imprimantur quot varia objecta externa ipsos spiritus animales versus eandem propellunt, unde fit ut si glans postea ab anim voluntate illam diversimode movente hoc aut illo modo suspendatur quo semel fuit suspensa a spiritibus hoc aut illo modo agitatis, tum ipsa glans ipsos spiritus animales eodem modo propellet et determinabit ac antea a simili glandul suspensione repulsi fuerant. praeterea statuit unamquamque mentis voluntatem natura esse unitam certo cuidam glandis motui. Exempli gratia si quis voluntatem habet objectum remotum intuendi, haec voluntas efficiet ut pupilla dilatetur sed si de sola dilatanda pupilla cogitet, nihil proderit ejus rei habere voluntatem quia natura non junxit motum glandis qui inservit impellendis spiritibus versus nervum opticum modo conveniente dilatand vel contrahend pupill cum voluntate eandem dilatandi vel contrahendi sed demum cum voluntate intuendi objecta remota vel proxima. Denique statuit quod etsi unusquisque motus hujus glandul videatur connexus esse per naturam singulis ex nostris cogitationibus ab initio nostrae vit, aliis tamen per habitum possunt jungi, quod probare conatur articulo 50 partis I de passionibus anim. Ex his concludit nullam esse tam imbecillem animam quae non possit cum bene dirigitur, acquirere potestatem absolutam in suas passiones. Nam hae ut ab eo definiuntur, sunt "perceptiones aut sensus aut commotiones anim quae ad eam speciatim referuntur quque nota bene producuntur, conservantur et corroborantur per aliquem motum spirituum" (vide articulum 27 partis I passionum anim). At quandoquidem cuilibet voluntati possumus jungere motum quemcunque glandis et consequenter spirituum et determinatio voluntatis a sola nostra potestate pendet, si igitur nostram voluntatem certis et firmis judiciis secundum quae nostrae vit actiones dirigere volumus, determinemus et motus passionum quas habere volumus, hisce judiciis jungamus, imperium acquiremus absolutum in nostras passiones. Haec est clarissimi hujus viri sententia (quantum ex ipsius verbis conjicio) quam ego vix credidissem a tanto viro prolatam esse si minus acuta fuisset. Profecto mirari satis non possum quod vir philosophus qui firmiter statuerat nihil deducere nisi ex principiis per se notis et nihil affirmare nisi quod clare et distincte perciperet et qui toties scholasticos reprehenderat quod per occultas qualitates res obscuras voluerint explicare, hypothesin sumat omni occulta qualitate occultiorem. Quid quso per mentis et corporis unionem intelligit? Quem inquam clarum et distinctum conceptum habet cogitationis arctissime unit cuidam quantitatis portiuncul? Vellem sane ut hanc unionem per proximam suam causam explicuisset. Sed ille mentem a corpore adeo distinctam conceperat ut nec hujus unionis nec ipsius mentis ullam singularem causam assignare potuerit sed necesse ipsi fuerit ad causam totius Universi hoc est ad Deum recurrere. Deinde pervelim scire quot motus gradus potest glandul isti pineali mens tribuere et quanta cum vi eandem suspensam tenere potest. Nam nescio an haec glans tardius vel celerius a mente circumagatur quam a spiritibus animalibus et an motus passionum quos firmis judiciis arcte junximus, non possint ab iisdem iterum a causis corporeis disjungi; ex quo sequeretur ut quamvis mens firmiter proposuerit contra pericula ire atque huic decreto motus audaci junxerit, viso tamen periculo, glans ita suspendatur ut mens non nisi de fuga possit cogitare et sane cum nulla detur ratio voluntatis ad motum, nulla etiam datur comparatio inter mentis et corporis potentiam seu vires et consequenter hujus vires nequaquam viribus illius determinari possunt. His adde quod nec haec glans ita in medio cerebro sita reperiatur ut tam facile totque modis circumagi possit et quod non omnes nervi ad cavitates usque cerebri protendantur. Denique omnia quae de voluntate ejusque libertate asserit, omitto quandoquidem haec falsa esse satis superque ostenderim. Igitur quia mentis potentia ut supra ostendi, sola intelligentia definitur, affectuum remedia quae omnes experiri quidem sed non accurate observare nec distincte videre credo sola mentis cognitione, determinabimus et ex eadem illa omnia quae ad ipsius beatitudinem spectant, deducemus.
AXIOMS	AXIOMATA
5a01 contrari actiones	5a01 contrari actiones [geomap]
I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.	I. Si in eodem subjecto duae contrari actiones excitentur, debebit necessario vel in utraque vel in una sola mutatio fieri donec desinant contrari esse.
5a02 Effectus potentia definitur causae	5a02 Effectus potentia definitur causae [geomap]
II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause. (This axiom is evident from III. vii.)	II. Effectus potentia definitur potentia ipsius causae quatenus ejus essentia per ipsius causae essentiam explicatur vel definitur. Patet hoc axioma ex propositione 7 partis III {non-deductive reference}.
PROPOSITIONS	PROPOSITIONES
5p01 ordinantur concatenantur mente corpore	5p01 ordinantur concatenantur mente corpore [geomap]
PROP. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind, so are the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body.	PROPOSITIO I: Prout cogitationes rerumque [non-excl non-exh] ideae ordinantur et concatenantur in mente, ita corporis affectiones seu [mng eqv] rerum imagines ad amussimae ordinantur et concatenantur in corpore.
Proof.-The order and connection of ideas is the same (II. vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versae the order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and vii.) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore, even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place according to the order and association of modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body (II. xviii.), so vice versae (III. ii.) the order and connection of modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body takes place in accordance with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ordo et connexio idearum idem est (per propositionem 7 partis II {2p07}) ac ordo et connexio rerum et vice versa ordo et connexio rerum idem est (per corollaria propositionum 6 {2p06c} et 7 {2p07c} partis II) ac ordo et connexio  idearum. Quare sicuti ordo et connexio idearum in mente fit secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis (per propositionem 18 {2p18} partis II) sic vice versa (per propositionem 2 {3p02} partis III) ordo et connexio affectionum corporis fit prout cogitationes rerumque ideae ordinantur et concatenantur in mente. Q.E.D.
5p02 animi commotionem destruentur	5p02 animi commotionem destruentur [geomap]
PROP. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions, be destroyed.	PROPOSITIO II: Si animi commotionem seu [non-excl non-exh] affectum a  causae externae cogitatione amoveamus et aliis jungamus cogitationibus, tum amor seu [excl non-exh] odium erga causam externam ut et animi fluctuationes quae ex his affectibus oriuntur, destruentur.
Proof.-That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); wherefore, when this cause is removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Id enim quod formam amoris vel [excl non-exh] odii constituit, est laetitia vel tristitia concomitante idea  causae externae (per definitiones  6 {3de06} et 7 {3de07} affectuum); hac igitur sublata, amoris vel [excl non-exh] odii forma simul tollitur adeoque hi affectus et qui ex his oriuntur, destruuntur. Q.E.D.
5p03 passio desinit claram et distinctam.	5p03 passio desinit claram et distinctam [geomap]
PROP. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.	PROPOSITIO III: Affectus qui passio est, desinit esse passio simulatque ejus claram et distinctam formamus ideam.
Proof.-An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the general Def. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note); therefore (III. iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus qui passio est, idea est confusa (per generalem affectuum definitionem). Si itaque ipsius affectus claram et distinctam formemus ideam, haec idea ab ipso affectu quatenus ad solam mentem refertur, non nisi ratione distinguetur (per propositionem 21 {2p21} partis II cum ejusdem scholio {non-deductive reference}) adeoque (per propositionem 3 {3p03} partis III) affectus desinet esse passio. Q.E.D.
5p03c Affectus in nostra potestate notior	5p03c Affectus in nostra potestate notior [geomap]
Corollary-An emotion therefore becomes more under our control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more known to us.	COROLLARIUM {5p03}: Affectus igitur eo magis in nostra potestate est et mens ab eo minus patitur quo nobis est notior.
5p04 affectio formare conceptum	5p04 affectio formare conceptum [geomap]
PROP. IV. There is no modification [Lat: affectiones] of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.	PROPOSITIO IV: Nulla est corporis affectio cujus aliquem clarum et distinctum non possumus formare conceptum.
Proof.-Properties which are common to all things can only be conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification [Lat: affectiones] of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: quae omnibus communia sunt, non possunt concipi nisi adaequate (per propositionem 38 {2p38} partis II) adeoque (per propositionem 12 {2p12} et lemma 2 {2L02} quod habetur post scholium propositionis 13 partis II) nulla est corporis affectio cujus aliquem clarum et distinctum non possumus formare conceptum. Q.E.D.
5p04c affectus corporis affectionis idea	5p04c affectus corporis affectionis idea [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of a modification [Lat: affectiones] of the body (by the general Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.	COROLLARIUM {5p04}: Hinc sequitur nullum esse affectum cujus non possumus aliquem clarum et distinctum formare conceptum. Est namque affectus corporis affectionis idea (per generalem affectuum definitionem {3dg}) quae propterea (per propositionem praecedentem) aliquem clarum et distinctum involvere debet conceptum.
5p04s unumquemque potestatem se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligendi	5p04s unumquemque potestatem se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligendi
Note.-Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate (II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV. lxi.). For it must be especially remarked, that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV. lix.). Than this remedy for the emotions (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III. iii.).	SCHOLIUM: Quandoquidem nihil datur ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur (per propositionem 36 partis I) et quicquid ex idea quae in nobis est adaequata, sequitur, id omne clare et distincte intelligimus (per propositionem 40 partis II) hinc sequitur unumquemque potestatem habere se suosque affectus, si non absolute, ex parte saltem clare et distincte intelligendi et consequenter efficiendi ut ab iisdem minus patiatur. Huic igitur rei praecipue danda est opera ut unumquemque affectum quantum fieri potest clare et distincte cognoscamus ut sic mens ex affectu ad illa cogitandum determinetur quae clare et distincte percipit et in quibus plane acquiescit atque adeo ut ipse affectus a cogitatione  causae externae separetur et veris jungatur cogitationibus; ex quo fiet ut non tantum amor, odium etc. destruantur (per propositionem 2 hujus) sed ut etiam appetitus seu cupiditates quae ex tali affectu oriri solent, excessum habere nequeant (per propositionem 61 partis IV). Nam apprime notandum est unum eundemque esse appetitum per quem homo tam agere quam pati dicitur. Exempli gratia cum natura humana ita comparatum esse ostendimus ut unusquisque appetat ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant (vide corollarium propositionis 31 partis III) qui quidem appetitus in homine qui ratione non ducitur, passio est quae ambitio vocatur nec multum a superbia discrepat et contra in homine qui ex rationis dictamine vivit, actio seu virtus est quae pietas appellatur (vide scholium I propositionis 37 partis IV et II demonstrationem ejusdem propositionis). Et hoc modo omnes appetitus seu cupiditates eatenus tantum passiones sunt quatenus ex ideis inadaequatis oriuntur atque edem virtuti accensentur quando ab ideis adaequatis excitantur vel generantur. Nam omnes cupiditates quibus ad aliquid agendum determinamur, tam oriri possunt ab adaequatis quam ab inadaequatis ideis (vide propositionem 59 partis IV). Atque hoc (ut eo unde digressus sum revertar) affectuum remedio quod scilicet in eorum vera cognitione consistit, nullum praestantius aliud quod a nostra potestate pendeat, excogitari potest quandoquidem nulla alia mentis potentia datur quam cogitandi et adaequatas ideas formandi, ut supra (per propositionem 3 partis III) ostendimus.
5p05 Affectus erga rem simpliciter	5p05 Affectus erga rem simpliciter [geomap]
PROP. V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.	PROPOSITIO V: Affectus erga rem quam simpliciter et non ut necessariam neque ut possibilem neque ut contingentem imaginamur, caeteris paribus omnium est maximus.
Proof.-An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.). But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note); therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus erga rem quam liberam esse imaginamur, major est quam erga necessariam (per propositionem 49 {3p49} partis III) et consequenter adhuc major quam erga illam quam ut possibilem vel vel [non-excl non-exh] contingentem imaginamur (per propositionem 11 {4p11} partis IV). At rem aliquam ut liberam imaginari nihil aliud esse potest quam quod rem simpliciter imaginamur dum causas a quibus ipsa ad agendum determinata fuit, ignoramus (per illa quae in scholio propositionis 35 partis II ostendimus {non-deductive reference}); ergo affectus erga rem quam simpliciter imaginamur, caeteris paribus major est quam erga necessariam, possibilem vel [non-excl non-exh] contingentem  et consequenter maximus. Q.E.D.
5p06 mens intelligit majorem potentiam	5p06 mens intelligit majorem potentiam [geomap]
PROP. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary.	PROPOSITIO VI: Quatenus mens res omnes ut necessarias intelligit eatenus majorem in affectus potentiam habet seu [mng eqv] minus ab iisdem patitur.
Proof.-The mind understands all things to be necessary (I. xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.) feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mens res omnes necessarias esse intelligit (per propositionem 29 partis I {1p29}) et infinito causarum nexu determinari ad existendum et operandum (per propositionem 28 partis I {1p28}) adeoque (per propositionem praecedentem {5p05}) eatenus efficit ut ab affectibus qui ex iis oriuntur, minus patiatur et (per propositionem 48 partis III {3p48}) minus erga ipsas afficiatur. Q.E.D.
5p06s tristitiam boni periit mitigari servari nulla ratione potuisse.	5p06s tristitiam boni periit mitigari servari nulla ratione potuisse
Note.-The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also testifies. For we see, that the pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. Whereas, if most people were born full-grown and only one here and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may note several other instances of the same sort.	SCHOLIUM: Quo haec cognitio quod scilicet res necessari sint, magis circa res singulares quas distinctius et magis vivide imaginamur, versatur, eo haec mentis in affectus potentia major est, quod ipsa etiam experientia testatur. Videmus enim tristitiam boni alicujus quod periit mitigari simulac homo qui id perdidit, considerat bonum illud servari nulla ratione potuisse. Sic etiam videmus quod nemo miseretur infantis propterea quod nescit loqui, ambulare, ratiocinari et quod denique tot annos quasi sui inscius vivat. At si plerique adulti et unus aut alter infans nascerentur, tum unumquemque misereret infantum quia tum ipsam infantiam non ut rem naturalem et necessariam sed ut naturae vitium seu peccatum consideraret et ad hunc modum plura alia notare possemus.
5p07 Affectus ex ratione potentiores	5p07 Affectus ex ratione potentiores [geomap]
PROP. VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.	PROPOSITIO VII: Affectus qui ex ratione oriuntur vel [mng eqv] excitantur, si ratio temporis habeatur, potentiores sunt iis qui ad res singulares referuntur quas ut absentes contemplamur.
Proof.-We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body, being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing (II. xvii.). Wherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV. vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its external cause (IV. ix.). But an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things (see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their present existence), and which we always conceive in the same manner (II. xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Rem aliquam ut absentem non contemplamur ex affectu quo eandem imaginamur sed ex eo quod corpus alio afficitur affectu qui ejusdem rei existentiam secludit (per propositionem 17 {2p17} partis II). Quare affectus qui ad rem quam ut absentem contemplamur, refertur, ejus naturae non est ut reliquas hominis actiones et potentiam superet (de quibus vide propositionem 6 {4p06} partis IV) sed contra ejus naturae est ut ab iis affectionibus quae existentiam externae ejus causae secludunt, coerceri aliquo modo possit (per propositionem 9 {4p09} partis IV). At affectus qui ex ratione oritur, refertur necessario ad communes rerum proprietates (vide rationis definitionem in II scholio propositionis 40 partis II {non-deductive reference}) quas semper ut praesentes contemplamur (nam nihil dari potest quod earum praesentem existentiam secludat) et quas semper eodem modo imaginamur (per propositionem 38 {2p38} partis II). Quare talis affectus idem semper manet et consequenter (per axioma 1 {5a01} hujus) affectus qui eidem sunt contrarii quique a suis causis externis non foventur, eidem magis magisque sese accommodare debebunt donec non amplius sint contrarii et eatenus affectus qui ex ratione oritur, est potentior. Q.E.D.
5p08 affectus pluribus causis simul	5p08 affectus pluribus causis simul [geomap]
PROP. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.	PROPOSITIO VIII: Quo affectus aliquis a pluribus causis simul concurrentibus excitatur, eo major est.
Proof.-Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few (III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion becomes stronger. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Plures causae simul plus possunt quam si pauciores essent (per propositionem 7 {3p07} partis III) adeoque (per propositionem 5 {4p05} partis IV) quo affectus aliquis a pluribus causis simul excitatur, eo fortior est. Q.E.D.
5p08s ex axiomate 2 hujus partis	5p08s ex axiomate 2 hujus partis
Note-This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.	SCHOLIUM: Haec propositio patet etiam ex axiomate 2 hujus partis.
5p09 Affectus plures diversas causas	5p09 Affectus plures diversas causas [geomap]
PROP. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a single cause.	PROPOSITIO IX: Affectus qui ad plures et diversas causas refertur quas mens cum ipso affectu simul contemplatur, minus noxius est et minus per ipsum patimur et erga unamquamque causam minus afficimur quam alius que magnus affectus qui ad unam solam vel [non-excl non-exh] pauciores causas refertur.
Proof.-An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is unable to think of anything else; this was our first point. Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III. vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus eatenus tantum malus seu [mng eqv] noxius est quatenus mens ab eo impeditur quominus possit cogitare (per propositiones 26 {4p26} et {4p27} 27 partis IV) adeoque ille affectus a quo mens ad plura simul objecta contemplandum determinatur, minus noxius est quam alius que magnus affectus qui mentem in sola unius aut [non-excl non-exh] pauciorum objectorum contemplatione ita detinet ut de aliis cogitare nequeat, quod erat primum. Deinde quia mentis essentia hoc est (per propositionem 7 {3p07} partis III) potentia in sola cogitatione consistit (per propositionem 11 {2p11} partis II) ergo mens per affectum a quo ad plura simul contemplandum determinatur, minus patitur quam per que magnum affectum qui mentem in sola unius aut [non-excl non-exh] pauciorum objectorum contemplatione occupatam tenet, quod erat secundum. Denique hic affectus (per propositionem 48 {3p48} partis III) quatenus ad plures causas externas refertur, est etiam erga unamquamque minor. Q.E.D.
5p10 potestatem ordinandi et concatenandi	5p10 potestatem ordinandi et concatenandi [geomap]
PROP. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of our body according to the intellectual order.	PROPOSITIO X: Quamdiu affectibus qui nostrae naturae sunt contrarii, non conflictamur tamdiu potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones secundum ordinem ad intellectum.
Proof.-The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.). So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV. xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl. note. ii. and II. xlvii. note); consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body according to the intellectual order. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus qui nostrae naturae sunt contrarii hoc est (per propositionem 30 {4p30} partis IV) qui mali sunt, eatenus mali sunt quatenus impediunt quominus mens intelligat (per propositionem 27 {4p27} partis IV). Quamdiu igitur affectibus qui nostrae naturae contrarii sunt, non conflictamur tamdiu mentis potentia qua res intelligere conatur (per propositionem 26 {4p26} partis IV) non impeditur atque adeo tamdiu potestatem habet claras et distinctas ideas formandi et alias ex aliis deducendi (vide II scholium propositionis 40 {non-deductive reference} et scholium propositionis 47 partis II {non-deductive reference}) et consequenter (per propositionem 1 {5p01} hujus) tamdiu potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi affectiones corporis secundum ordinem ad intellectum. Q.E.D.
5p10s efficere possumus ut non malis affectibus afficiamur	5p10s efficere possumus ut non malis affectibus afficiamur
Note.-By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily modifications [Lat: affectiones] we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions. For (V. vii.) a greater force is needed for [forcing from without our] emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the intellectual order, than when they, are uncertain and unsettled.	SCHOLIUM: Hac potestate recte ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones efficere possumus ut non facile malis affectibus afficiamur. Nam (per propositionem 7 hujus) major vis requiritur ad affectus secundum ordinem ad intellectum ordinatos et concatenatos coercendum quam incertos et vagos.
The best we can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always ready to our hand.	Optimum igitur quod efficere possumus quamdiu nostrorum affectuum perfectam cognitionem non habemus, est rectam vivendi rationem seu certa vit dogmata concipere eaque memoriae mandare et rebus particularibus in vita frequenter obviis continuo applicare ut sic nostra imaginatio late iisdem afficiatur et nobis in promptu sint semper.
For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred should be overcome with love or high-mindedness, and not required with hatred in return.	Exempli gratia inter vit dogmata posuimus (vide propositionem 46 partis IV cum ejusdem scholio) odium amore seu generositate vincendum, non autem reciproco odio compensandum.
Now, that this precept of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and in what manner and way they may be best warded off by high-mindedness:	Ut autem hoc rationis praescriptum semper in promptu habeamus ubi usus erit, cogitandae et spe meditandae sunt communes hominum injuri et quomodo et qua via generositate optime propulsentur;
we shall thus associate the image of wrong with the imagination of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.).	sic enim imaginem injuri imaginationi hujus dogmatis jungemus et nobis (per propositionem 18 partis II) in promptu semper erit ubi nobis injuria afferetur.
If we keep also in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;	Quod si etiam in promptu habuerimus rationem nostri veri utilis ac etiam boni quod ex mutua amicitia et communi societate sequitur
further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than everything else, act by the necessity of their nature:	et praeterea quod ex recta vivendi ratione summa animi acquiescentia oriatur (per propositionem 52 partis IV) et quod homines ut reliqua, ex naturae necessitate agant,
in such case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome;	tum injuria sive odium quod ex eadem oriri solet, minimam imaginationis partem occupabit et facile superabitur;
or, if the anger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii.	vel si ira quae ex maximis injuriis oriri solet, non adeo facile superetur, superabitur tamen quamvis non sine animi fluctuatione, longe minore temporis spatio quam si haec non ita praemeditata habuissemus, ut patet ex propositione 6, 7 et 8 hujus partis.
We should, in the same way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.	De animositate ad metum deponendum eodem modo cogitandum est; enumeranda scilicet sunt et spe imaginanda communia vit pericula et quomodo animi praesentia et fortitudine optime vitari et superari possunt.
But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and images we should always bear in mind that which is good in every individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure.	Sed notandum quod nobis in ordinandis nostris cogitationibus et imaginibus semper attendendum est (per corollarium propositionis 63 partis IV et propositionem 59 partis III) ad illa quae in unaquaque re bona sunt ut sic semper ex laetitiae affectu ad agendum determinemur.
For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain it.	Exempli gratia si quis videt se nimis gloriam sectari, de ejus recto usu cogitet et in quem finem sectanda sit et quibus mediis acquiri possit
Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their anger would fain appear wise.	sed non de ipsius abusu et vanitate et hominum inconstantia vel aliis hujusmodi de quibus nemo nisi ex animi gritudine cogitat; talibus enim cogitationibus maxime ambitiosi se maxime afflictant quando de assequendo honore quem ambiunt desperant et dum iram evomunt, sapientes videri volunt.
Wherefore it is certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily covet it.	Quare certum est eos glori maxime esse cupidos qui de ipsius abusu et mundi vanitate maxime clamant.
This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit. For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches.	Nec hoc ambitiosis proprium sed omnibus commune est quibus fortuna est adversa et qui animo impotentes sunt. Nam pauper etiam, avarus de abusu pecuni et divitum vitiis non cessat loqui, quo nihil aliud efficit quam se afflictare et aliis ostendere se non tantum paupertatem suam sed etiam aliorum divitias iniquo animo ferre.
So, again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion, directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.	Sic etiam qui male ab amasia excepti sunt, nihil aliud cogitant quam de mulierum inconstantia et fallaci animo et reliquis earundem decantatis vitiis quae omnia statim oblivioni tradunt simulac ab amasia iterum recipiuntur.
Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom.	Qui itaque suos affectus et appetitus ex solo libertatis amore moderari studet, is quantum potest nitetur virtutes earumque causas noscere et animum gaudio quod ex earum vera cognitione oritur, implere; at minime hominum vitia contemplari hominesque obtrectare et falsa libertatis specie gaudere.
Whosoever will diligently observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the most part, to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason.	Atque haec qui diligenter observabit (neque enim difficilia sunt) et exercebit, n ille brevi temporis spatio actiones suas ex rationis imperio plerumque dirigere poterit.
5p11 plures res mentem magis occupat	5p11 plures res mentem magis occupat [geomap]
PROP. XI. In proportion as an image is referred to more objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and occupies the mind more.	PROPOSITIO XI: Quo imago aliqua ad plures res refertur, eo frequentior est seu [non-excl non-exh] spius viget et mentem magis occupat.
Proof.-In proportion as an image or an emotion is referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion; therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quo enim imago seu [non-excl non-exh] affectus ad plures res refertur, eo plures dantur causae a quibus excitari et foveri potest quas omnes mens (per hypothesin) ex ipso affectu simul contemplatur atque adeo affectus eo frequentior est seu [non-excl non-exh] spius viget et (per propositionem 8 {5p08} hujus) mentem magis occupat. Q.E.D.
5p12 imagines imaginibus clare junguntur	5p12 imagines imaginibus clare junguntur [geomap]
PROP. XII. The images of things are more easily associated with the images referred to things which we clearly and distinctly understand, than with others.	PROPOSITIO XII: Rerum imagines facilius imaginibus quae ad res referuntur quas clare et distincte intelligimus, junguntur quam aliis.
Proof.-Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand, are either the common properties of things or deductions therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us. Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of the said things should be more often associated with the images of these than with the images of something else. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Res quas clare et distincte intelligimus, vel [non-excl non-exh] rerum communes proprietates sunt vel [non-excl non-exh] quae ex iis deducuntur (vide rationis definitionem in II scholio propositionis 40 {non-deductive reference} partis II) et consequenter spius (per propositionem praecedentem {5p11}) in nobis excitantur adeoque facilius fieri potest ut res alias simul cum his quam cum aliis contemplemur et consequenter (per propositionem 18 {2p18} partis II) ut facilius cum his quam cum aliis jungantur. Q.E.D.
5p13 imago pluribus aliis spius viget	5p13 imago pluribus aliis spius viget [geomap]
PROP. XIII. An image is more often vivid, in proportion as it is associated with a greater number of other images.	PROPOSITIO XIII: Quo imago aliqua pluribus aliis juncta est, eo spius viget.
Proof.-In proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes whereby it can be aroused. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nam quo imago aliqua pluribus aliis juncta est, eo (per propositionem 18 {2p18} partis II) plures causae dantur a quibus excitari potest. Q.E.D.
5p14 Mens potest rerum imagines Dei ideam referantur	5p14 Mens potest rerum imagines Dei ideam referantur [geomap]
PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications [Lat: affectiones] or images of things may be referred to the idea of God.	PROPOSITIO XIV: Mens efficere potest ut omnes corporis affectiones seu [mng eqv] rerum imagines ad Dei ideam referantur.
Proof.-There is no modification [Lat: affectiones] of the body, whereof the mind may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.); wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred to the idea of God (I. xv.). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Nulla est corporis affectio cujus aliquem clarum et distinctum non possit mens formare conceptum (per propositionem 4 {5p04} hujus) adeoque efficere potest (per propositionem 15 {1p15} partis I) ut omnes ad Dei ideam referuntur. Q.E.D.
5p15 Qui se intelligit Deum amatae	5p15 Qui se intelligit Deum amatae [geomap]
PROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions, loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions.	PROPOSITIO XV: Qui se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligit, Deum amatae et eo magis quo se suosque affectus magis intelligit.
Proof.-He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Qui se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligit, laetatur (per propositionem 53 {3p53} partis III) idque concomitante idea Dei (per propositionem praecedentem) atque adeo (per 6 {3de06} affectuum definitionem) Deum amatae et (per eandem rationem) eo magis quo se suosque affectus magis intelligit. Q.E.D.
5p16 Deum amor mentem occupare debet	5p16 Deum amor mentem occupare debet [geomap]
PROP. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind.	PROPOSITIO XVI: Hic erga Deum amor  mentem maxime occupare debet.
Proof.-For this love is associated with all the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.); therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Est enim hic amor junctus omnibus corporis affectionibus (per propositionem 14 {5p14} hujus) quibus omnibus fovetur (per propositionem 15 {5p15} hujus) atque adeo (per propositionem 11 {5p11} hujus) mentem maxime occupare debet. Q.E.D.
5p17 Deus expers est passionum	5p17 Deus expers est passionum [geomap]
PROP. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.	PROPOSITIO XVII: Deus expers est passionum nec ullo laetitiae aut [excl non-exh] tristitiae affectu afficitur.
Proof.-All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ideae omnes quatenus ad Deum referuntur, verae sunt (per propositionem 32 {2p32} partis II) hoc est (per definitionem 4 {2d04} partis II) adaequatae atque adeo (per affectuum generalem definitionem {3dg}) Deus expers est passionum. Deinde Deus neque ad majorem neque ad minorem perfectionem transire potest (per II corollarium propositionis 20 {1p20c2} partis I) adeoque (per 2 {3de02} et 3 {3de03} affectuum definitiones) nullo laetitia neque tristitiae affectu afficitur. Q.E.D.
5p17c Deus neminem amatae neque odio habet	5p17c Deus neminem amatae neque odio habet [geomap]
Corollary. Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.	COROLLARIUM {5p17}: Deus proprie loquendo neminem amat neque odio habet. Nam Deus (per propositionem praecedentem {5p17}) nullo laetitia neque tristitiae affectu afficitur et consequenter (per 6 {3de06} et 7 {3de07} affectuum definitiones) neminem etiam amat neque odio habet.
5p18 Nemo potest Deum odio habere	5p18 Nemo potest Deum odio habere [geomap]
PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God.	PROPOSITIO XVIII: Nemo potest Deum odio habere.
Proof.-The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Idea Dei quae in nobis est , est adaequata et perfecta (per propositiones 46 {2p46} et 47 {2p47} partis II) adeoque quatenus Deum contemplamur eatenus agimus (per propositionem 3 {3p03} partis III) et consequenter (per propositionem 59 {3p59} partis III) nulla potest dari tristitia concomitante idea Dei hoc est (per 7 {3de07} affectuum definitionem) nemo Deum odio habere potest. Q.E.D.
5p18c Amor erga Deum in odium verti nequit	5p18c Amor erga Deum in odium verti nequit [geomap]
Corollary.-Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.	COROLLARIUM {5p18}: Amor erga Deum in odium verti nequit.
5p18s  Deum tristitiae causam	5p18s  Deum tristitiae causam
Note.-It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to that extent feel pleasure.	SCHOLIUM: At objici potest quod dum Deum omnium rerum causam intelligimus, eo ipso Deum tristitiae causam consideramus. Sed ad hoc respondeo quod quatenus tristitiae causas intelligimus eatenus (per propositionem 3 hujus) ipsa desinit esse passio hoc est (per propositionem 59 partis III) eatenus desinit esse tristitia atque adeo quatenus Deum tristitiae causam esse intelligimus eatenus laetamur.
5p19 conari non potest Deus contra amet	5p19 conari non potest Deus contra amet [geomap]
PROP. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should love him in return.	PROPOSITIO XIX: Qui Deum amat, conari non potest ut Deus ipsum contra amet.
Proof.-For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V. xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is absurd (III. xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves God, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Si homo id conaretur, cuperet ergo (per corollarium propositionis 17 {5p17c} hujus) ut Deus quem amatae non esset Deus et consequenter (per propositionem 19 {3p19} partis III) contristari cuperet, quod (per propositionem 28 {3p28} partis III) est absurdum. Ergo qui Deum amat etc. Q.E.D.
5p20 erga Deum amor neque invidi	5p20 erga Deum amor neque invidi [geomap]
PROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love.	PROPOSITIO XX: Hic erga Deum amor neque invidi neque zelotypi affectu inquinari potest sed eo magis fovetur quo plures homines eodem amoris vinculo cum Deo junctos imaginamur.
Proof.-This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.), it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hic erga Deum amor summum bonum est quod ex dictamine rationis appetere possumus (per propositionem 28 {4p28} partis IV) et omnibus hominibus commune est (per propositionem 36 {4p36} partis IV) et omnes ut eodem gaudeant cupimus (per propositionem 37 {4p37} partis IV) atque adeo (per 23 {3de23} affectuum definitionem) invidiae affectu maculari nequit neque etiam (per propositionem 18 {5p18} hujus et definitionem zelotypi, quam vide in scholio propositionis 35 {3p35} partis III) zelotypi affectu sed contra (per propositionem 31 {3p31} partis III) eo magis foveri debet quo plures homines eodem gaudere imaginamur. Q.E.D.
5p20s nullum affectum directe contrarius	5p20s nullum affectum directe contrarius
Note.-We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire. I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:-- I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note). II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V. ii. and V. iv. note). III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V. vii.). IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications [Lat: affectiones][17] are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of things or to God (V. ix. xi.). V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and xii. xiii. xiv.). But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better understood, it should be specially observed that the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another, and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than by another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by a comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause. Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive, whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active, whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many variations, and which we can never become masters of. For no one is solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it; neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in regard to things whereof no one can be really master. We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge (II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God, possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind (V. xiv.). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession (II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and deeply penetrate it. And now I have finished with all that concerns this present life: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have briefly described all the remedies against the emotions. And this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to Propositions i. and iii. of Part III. It is now, therefore, time to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of the mind, without relation to the body.	SCHOLIUM: Possumus hoc eodem modo ostendere nullum dari affectum qui huic amori directe sit contrarius, a quo hic ipse amor possit destrui atque adeo concludere possumus hunc erga Deum amorem omnium affectuum est constantissimum nec quatenus ad corpus refertur, posse destrui nisi cum ipso corpore. Cujus autem naturae sit quatenus ad solam mentem refertur, postea videbimus. Atque his omnia affectuum remedia sive id omne quod mens in se sola considerata adversus affectus potest, comprehendi; ex quibus apparet mentis in affectus potentiam consistere I. in ipsa affectuum cognitione (vide scholium propositionis 4 hujus). II. in eo quod affectus a cogitatione  causae externae quam confuse imaginamur, separat (vide propositionem 2 cum eodem scholio propositionis 4 hujus). III. in tempore quo affectiones quae ad res quas intelligimus referuntur, illas superant quae ad res referuntur quas confuse seu mutilate concipimus (vide propositionem 7 hujus). IV. in multitudine causarum a quibus affectiones quae ad rerum communes proprietates vel ad Deum referuntur, foventur (vide propositiones 9 et 11 hujus). V. denique in ordine quo mens suos affectus ordinare et invicem concatenare potest (vide scholium propositionis 10 et insuper propositiones 12, 13 et 14 hujus). Sed ut haec mentis in affectus potentia melius intelligatur, venit apprime notandum quod affectus a nobis magni appellantur quando unius hominis affectum cum affectu alterius comparamus et unum magis quam alium eodem affectu conflictari videmus; vel quando unius ejusdemque hominis affectus ad invicem comparamus eundemque uno affectu magis quam alio affici sive moveri comperimus. Nam (per propositionem 5 partis IV) vis cujuscunque affectus definitur potentia  causae externae cum nostra comparata. At mentis potentia sola cognitione definitur; impotentia autem seu passio a sola cognitionis privatione hoc est ab eo per quod ideae dicuntur inadaequatae, stimatur; ex quo sequitur mentem illam maxime pati cujus maximam partem ideae inadaequatae constituunt ita ut magis per id quod patitur quam per id quod agit dignoscatur et illam contra maxime agere cujus maximam partem ideae adaequatae constituunt ita ut quamvis huic tot inadaequatae ideae quam illi insint, magis tamen per illas quae humanae virtuti tribuuntur quam per has quae humanam impotentiam arguunt, dignoscatur. Deinde notandum animi gritudines et infortunia potissimum originem trahere ex nimio amore erga rem quae multis variationibus est obnoxia et cujus nunquam compotes esse possumus. Nam nemo de re ulla nisi quam amatae sollicitus anxiusve est neque injuri, suspiciones, inimiciti etc. oriuntur nisi ex amore erga res quarum nemo potest revera esse compos. Ex his itaque facile concipimus quid clara et distincta cognitio et praecipue tertium illud cognitionis genus (de quo vide scholium propositionis 47 partis II) cujus fundamentum est ipsa Dei cognitio, in affectus potest quos nempe quatenus passiones sunt, si non absolute tollit (vide propositionem 3 cum scholio propositionis 4 hujus) saltem efficit ut minimam mentis partem constituant (vide propositionem 14 hujus). Deinde amorem gignit erga rem immutabilem et aeternam (vide propositionem 15 hujus) et cujus revera sumus compotes (vide propositionem 45 partis II) et qui propterea nullis vitiis quae in communi amore insunt, inquinari sed semper major ac major esse potest (per propositionem 15 hujus) et mentis maximam partem occupare (per propositionem 16 hujus) lateque afficere. Atque his omnia quae praesentem hanc vitam spectant, absolvi. Nam quod in hujus scholii principio dixi me his paucis omnia affectuum remedia amplexum esse, facile poterit unusquisque videre qui ad haec quae in hoc scholio diximus et simul ad mentis ejusque affectuum definitiones et denique ad propositiones 1 et 3 partis III attenderit. Tempus igitur jam est ut ad illa transeam quae ad mentis durationem sine relatione ad corpus pertinent.
5p21 Mens potest durante corpore	5p21 Mens potest durante corpore [geomap]
PROP. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what is past, while the body endures.	PROPOSITIO XXI: Mens nihil imaginari potest neque rerum praeteritarum recordari nisi durante corpore.
Proof.-The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it imagine the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body as actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and, consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures. Thus it cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II. xvii. note), or remember things past, except while the body endures (see definition of Memory, II. xviii. note). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mens actualem sui corporis existentiam non exprimit neque etiam corporis affectiones ut actuales concipit nisi durante corpore (per corollarium propositionis 8 {2p08c} partis II) et consequenter (per propositionem 26 {2p26} partis II) nullum corpus ut actu existens concipit nisi durante suo corpore ac proinde nihil imaginari (vide imaginationis definitionem in scholio propositionis 17 partis II {non-deductive reference}) neque rerum praeteritarum recordari potest nisi durante corpore (vide definitionem memori in scholio propositionis 18 partis II {non-deductive reference}). Q.E.D.
5p22 In Deo datur idea corporis humani	5p22 In Deo datur idea corporis humani [geomap]
PROP. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea, which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity.	PROPOSITIO XXII: In Deo tamen datur necessario idea quae hujus et illius corporis humani essentiam sub aeternitatis specie exprimit.
Proof.-God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.). This essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must necessarily exist in God (II. iii.). Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Deus non tantum est causa hujus et illius corporis humani existenti sed etiam essentiae (per propositionem 25 {1p25} partis I) quae propterea per ipsam Dei essentiam necessario debet concipi (per axioma 4 {1a04} partis I) idque aeterna quadam necessitate (per propositionem 16 {1p16} partis I) qui quidem conceptus necessario in Deo dari debet (per propositionem 3 {2p03} partis II). Q.E.D.
5p23 Mens non absolute destrui	5p23 Mens non absolute destrui [geomap]
PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.	PROPOSITIO XXIII: Mens humana non potest cum corpore absolute destrui sed ejus aliquid remanet quod aeternum est.
Proof.-There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which, therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence of the human mind (II. xiii.). But we have not assigned to the human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained through duration, and may be defined by time-that is (II. viii. Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: In Deo  datur necessario conceptus seu [mng eqv] idea quae corporis humani essentiam exprimit (per propositionem praecedentem {5p22}) quae propterea aliquid necessario est quod ad essentiam mentis humanae pertinet (per propositionem 13 partis II). Sed menti humanae nullam durationem quae tempore definiri potest, tribuimus nisi quatenus corporis actualem existentiam quae per durationem explicatur et tempore definiri potest, exprimit hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 8 {2p08} partis II) ipsi durationem non tribuimus nisi durante corpore. Cum tamen aliquid nihilominus sit id quod aeterna quadam necessitate per ipsam Dei essentiam concipitur (per propositionem praecedentem) erit necessario hoc aliquid quod ad mentis essentiam pertinet, aeternum. Q.E.D.
5p23s Nec tamen fieri potest ut recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse	5p23s Nec tamen fieri potest ut recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse
Note.-This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in terms of time, or have any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.	SCHOLIUM: Est uti diximus haec idea quae corporis essentiam sub specie aeternitatis exprimit, certus cogitandi modus qui ad mentis essentiam pertinet quique necessario aeternus est. Nec tamen fieri potest ut recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse quandoquidem nec in corpore ulla ejus vestigia dari nec aeternitas tempore definiri nec ullam ad tempus relationem habere potest. At nihilominus sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse. Nam mens non minus res illas sentit quas intelligendo concipit quam quas in memoria habet. Mentis enim oculi quibus res videt observatque, sunt ipsae demonstrationes. Quamvis itaque non recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse, sentimus tamen mentem nostram quatenus corporis essentiam sub aeternitatis specie involvit, aeternam esse et hanc ejus existentiam tempore definiri sive per durationem explicari non posse. Mens igitur nostra eatenus tantum potest dici durare ejusque existentia certo tempore definiri potest quatenus actualem corporis existentiam involvit et eatenus tantum potentiam habet rerum existentiam tempore determinandi easque sub duratione concipiendi.
5p24 res singulares intelligimus Deum	5p24 res singulares intelligimus Deum [geomap]
PROP. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more do we understand God.	PROPOSITIO XXIV: Quo magis res singulares intelligimus eo magis Deum intelligimus.
Proof.-This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex corollario propositionis 25 {1p24c} partis I.
5p25 Summus est tertio cognitionis genere	5p25 Summus est tertio cognitionis genere [geomap]
PROP. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.	PROPOSITIO XXV: Summus mentis conatus summaque virtus est res intelligere tertio cognitionis genere.
Proof.-The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and, in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Tertium cognitionis genus procedit ab adaequata idea quorundam Dei attributorum ad adaequatam cognitionem essentiae rerum (vide hujus definitionem in II scholio propositionis 40 partis II {non-deductive reference}) et quo magis hoc modo res intelligimus eo magis (per propositionem praecedentem {5p24}) Deum intelligimus ac proinde (per propositionem 28 {4p28} partis IV) summa mentis virtus hoc est [mng eqv] (per definitionem 8 {4d08} partis IV) mentis potentia seu [mng eqv]  natura sive [prf eqv] (per propositionem 7 {3p07} partis III) summus conatus est [mng eqv] res intelligere tertio cognitionis genere. Q.E.D.
5p26 aptior tertio cognitionis magis cupit	5p26 aptior tertio cognitionis magis cupit [geomap]
PROP. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires more to understand things by that kind.	PROPOSITIO XXVI: Quo mens aptior est ad res tertio cognitionis genere intelligendum, eo magis cupit res eodem hoc cognitionis genere intelligere.
Proof-This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable thereof. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Patet. Nam quatenus concipimus mentem aptam esse ad res hoc cognitionis genere intelligendum eatenus eandem determinatam concipimus ad res eodem cognitionis genere intelligendum et consequenter (per 1 {3de01} affectuum definitionem) quo mens ad hoc aptior est, eo magis hoc cupit. Q.E.D.
5p27 tertio cognitionis mentis acquiescentia	5p27 tertio cognitionis mentis acquiescentia [geomap]
PROP. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence.	PROPOSITIO XXVII: Ex hoc tertio cognitionis genere summa quae dari potest mentis acquiescentia, oritur.
Proof.-The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV. xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.): consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def. of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Summa mentis virtus est Deum cognoscere (per propositionem 28 {4p28} partis IV) sive [prf eqv] res tertio cognitionis genere intelligere (per propositionem 25 {5p25} hujus); quae quidem virtus eo major est quo mens hoc cognitionis genere magis res cognoscit (per propositionem 24 {5p24} hujus) adeoque qui res hoc cognitionis genere cognoscit, is ad summam humanam perfectionem transit et consequenter (per 2 {3de02} affectuum definitionem) summa laetitia afficitur idque (per propositionem 43 {2p43} partis II) concomitante idea sui suaeque virtutis ac proinde (per 25 {3de25} affectuum definitionem) ex hoc cognitionis genere summa quae dari potest oritur acquiescentia. Q.E.D.
5p28 cupiditas tertio oriri non primo secundo	5p28 cupiditas tertio oriri non primo secundo [geomap]
PROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge.	PROPOSITIO XXVIII: Conatus seu [non-excl non-exh] cupiditas cognoscendi res tertio cognitionis genere oriri non potest ex primo, at quidem ex secundo cognitionis genere.
Proof.-This proposition is self-evident. For whatsoever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.) cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Haec propositio per se patet. Nam quicquid clare et distincte intelligimus, id vel [excl exh] per se vel [excl exh] per aliud quod per se concipitur, intelligimus hoc est ideae quae in nobis clarae  et distinctae sunt sive [or even] quae ad tertium cognitionis genus referuntur (vide II scholium propositionis 40 partis II {non-deductive reference}) non possunt sequi ex ideis mutilatis et confusis quae (per idem scholium {non-deductive reference}) ad primum cognitionis genus referuntur sed ex ideis adaequatis sive [mng eqv] (per idem scholium {non-deductive reference}) ex secundo et tertio cognitionis genere ac proinde (per 1 {3de01} affectuum definitionem) cupiditas cognoscendi res tertio cognitionis genere non potest oriri ex primo, at quidem ex secundo. Q.E.D.
5p29 mens intelligit corporis essentiam	5p29 mens intelligit corporis essentiam [geomap]
PROP. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity.	PROPOSITIO XXIX: Quicquid mens sub specie  intelligit, id ex eo non intelligit quod corporis praesentem actualem existentiam concipit sed ex eo quod corporis essentiam concipit sub specie  aeternitatis.
Proof.-In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii. and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll. ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V. xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus mens praesentem sui corporis existentiam concipit eatenus durationem concipit quae tempore determinari potest et eatenus tantum potentiam habet concipiendi res cum relatione ad tempus (per propositionem {5p21} 21 hujus et propositionem 26 {2p26} partis II). At aeternitas per durationem explicari nequit (per definitionem 8 {1d08} partis I et ipsius explicationem {non-deductive reference}). Ergo mens eatenus potestatem non habet concipiendi res sub specie aeternitatis sed quia de natura rationis est res sub specie aeternitatis concipere (per II corollarium propositionis 44 {2p44c2} partis II) et ad mentis naturam etiam pertinet corporis essentiam sub specie aeternitatis concipere (per propositionem 23 {5p23} hujus) et praeter haec duo nihil aliud ad mentis essentiam pertinet (per propositionem 13 {2p13} partis II) ergo haec potentia concipiendi res sub specie aeternitatis ad mentem non pertinet nisi quatenus corporis essentiam sub specie aeternitatis concipit. Q.E.D.
5p29s relatione ad certum tempus et locum existere vel quatenus ipsas in Deo	5p29s relatione ad certum tempus et locum existere vel quatenus ipsas in Deo
Note.-Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and note, which see.	SCHOLIUM: Res duobus modis a nobis ut actuales concipiuntur vel quatenus easdem cum relatione ad certum tempus et locum existere vel quatenus ipsas in Deo contineri et ex naturae divinae necessitate consequi concipimus. quae autem hoc secundo modo ut verae seu reales concipiuntur, eas sub aeternitatis specie concipimus et earum ideae aeternam et infinitam Dei essentiam involvunt, ut propositione 45 partis II ostendimus, cujus etiam scholium vide.
5p30 sub aeternitatis specie Dei cognitionem	5p30 sub aeternitatis specie Dei cognitionem [geomap]
PROP. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God.	PROPOSITIO XXX: Mens nostra quatenus se et corpus sub aeternitatis specie cognoscit eatenus Dei cognitionem necessario habet scitque se in Deo esse et per Deum concipi.
Proof.-Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore to conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Aeternitas est ipsa Dei essentia quatenus haec necessariam involvit existentiam (per definitionem 8 {1d08} partis I). Res igitur sub specie aeternitatis concipere est [mng eqv] res concipere quatenus per Dei essentiam ut entia realia concipiuntur sive [mng eqv] quatenus per Dei essentiam involvunt existentiam adeoque mens nostra quatenus se et corpus sub specie aeternitatis concipit eatenus Dei cognitionem necessario habet scitque etc. Q.E.D.
5p31 Tertium mente aeterna	5p31 Tertium mente aeterna [geomap]
PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.	PROPOSITIO XXXI: Tertium cognitionis genus pendet a mente tanquam a formali causa quatenus mens ipsa aeterna est.
Proof.-The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind (III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mens nihil sub aeternitatis specie  nisi quatenus sui corporis essentiam sub aeternitatis specie concipit (per propositionem 29 {5p29} hujus) hoc est (per propositiones 21 {5p21} et 23 {5p23} hujus) nisi quatenus aeterna est adeoque (per propositionem praecedentem {5p30}) quatenus aeterna est, Dei habet cognitionem, quae quidem cognitio est necessario adaequata (per propositionem 46 {2p46} partis II) ac proinde mens quatenus aeterna est, ad illa omnia cognoscendum est apta quae ex data hac Dei cognitione consequi possunt (per propositionem 40 {2p40} partis II) hoc est ad res tertio cognitionis genere cognoscendum(vide hujus definitionem in II scholio propositionis 40 partis II {non-deductive reference}) cujus propterea mens (per definitionem 1 {3d01} partis III) quatenus aeterna est, causa est adaequata seu [mng eqv] formalis. Q.E.D.
5p31s sui et Dei conscius est hoc est eo est perfectior et beatior	5p31s sui et Dei conscius est hoc est eo est perfectior et beatior
Note.-In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more readily explained and better understood, we will consider the mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our premisses are plain.	SCHOLIUM: Quo igitur unusquisque hoc cognitionis genere plus pollet, eo melius sui et Dei conscius est hoc est eo est perfectior et beatior, quod adhuc clarius ex sequentibus patebit. Sed hic notandum quod tametsi jam certi sumus mentem aeternam esse quatenus res sub aeternitatis specie concipit, nos tamen, ut ea quae ostendere volumus facilius explicentur et melius intelligantur, ipsam tanquam jam inciperet esse et res sub aeternitatis specie intelligere jam inciperet, considerabimus, ut huc usque fecimus; quod nobis absque ullo erroris periculo facere licet modo nobis cautio sit nihil concludere nisi ex perspicuis praemissis.
5p32 tertio cognitionis delectamur	5p32 tertio cognitionis delectamur [geomap]
PROP. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause.	PROPOSITIO XXXII: Quicquid intelligimus tertio cognitionis genere, eo delectamur et quidem concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa.
Proof.-From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions, xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the idea also of God as cause. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Ex hoc cognitionis genere summa quae dari potest mentis acquiescentia (per propositionem 27 {5p27} hujus) hoc est (per 25 {3de25} affectuum definitionem) laetitia oritur eaque concomitante idea sui et consequenter (per propositionem 30 {5p30} hujus) concomitante etiam idea Dei tanquam causa. Q.E.D.
5p32c amor Dei intellectualis	5p32c amor Dei intellectualis [geomap]
Corollary.-From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the intellectual love of God.	COROLLARIUM: Ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur necessario amor  Dei intellectualis. Nam ex hoc cognitionis genere oritur (per propositionem {5p31} praecedentem) laetitia concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa hoc est (per 6 {3de06} affectuum definitionem) amor Dei non quatenus ipsum ut praesentem imaginamur (per propositionem 29 {5p29} hujus) sed quatenus Deum aeternum esse intelligimus et hoc est quod amorem Dei intellectualem voco.
5p33 Amor Dei intellectualis aeternus	5p33 Amor Dei intellectualis aeternus [geomap]
PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.	PROPOSITIO XXXIII: Amor Dei intellectualis qui ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur, est aeternus.
Proof.-The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I. Ax. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises therefrom is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Tertium enim cognitionis genus (per propositionem 31 {5p31} hujus et axioma 3 {1a03} partis I) est aeternum adeoque (per idem axioma partis I) amor qui ex eodem oritur, est etiam necessario aeternus. Q.E.D.
5p33s  Deum amor habet omnes amoris perfectiones	5p33s  Deum amor habet omnes amoris perfectiones
Note.-Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll. of the last Prop. Nor is there here any difference, except that the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of God as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the mind being endowed with perfection itself.	SCHOLIUM: Quamvis hic erga Deum amor principium non habuerit (per propositionem praecedentem) habet tamen omnes amoris perfectiones perinde ac si ortus fuisset, sicut in corollario propositionis praecedentis finximus. Nec ulla hic est differentia nisi quod mens easdem has perfectiones quas eidem jam accedere finximus aeternas habuerit idque concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa aeterna. Quod si laetitia in transitione ad majorem perfectionem consistit, beatitudo sane in eo consistere debet quod mens ipsa perfectione sit praedita.
5p34 nisi durante corpore passiones	5p34 nisi durante corpore passiones [geomap]
PROP. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions.	PROPOSITIO XXXIV: Mens non nisi durante corpore obnoxia est affectibus qui ad passiones referuntur.
Proof.-Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination, in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body; therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures, subject to emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Imaginatio est idea qua mens rem aliquam ut praesentem contemplatur (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 17 partis II {non-deductive reference}) quae tamen magis corporis humani praesentem constitutionem quam rei externae naturam indicat (per II corollarium propositionis 16 {2p16c2} partis II). Est igitur affectus (per generalem affectuum definitionem {3dg}}) imaginatio quatenus corporis praesentem constitutionem indicat atque adeo (per propositionem 21 {5p21} hujus) mens non nisi durante corpore obnoxia est affectibus qui ad passiones referuntur. Q.E.D.
5p34c amorem intellectualem aeternum	5p34c amorem intellectualem aeternum [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal.	COROLLARIUM {5p34}: Hinc sequitur nullum amorem praeter amorem intellectualem esse aeternum.
5p34s communem opinionem aeternitatis cum duratione confundere eamque imaginationi post mortem remanere credunt	5p34s communem opinionem aeternitatis cum duratione confundere eamque imaginationi post mortem remanere credunt
Note.-If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after death.	SCHOLIUM: Si ad hominum communem opinionem attendamus, videbimus eos suae mentis aeternitatis esse quidem conscios sed ipsos eandem cum duratione confundere eamque imaginationi seu memori tribuere quam post mortem remanere credunt.
5p35 Deus se ipsum amat	5p35 Deus se ipsum amat [geomap]
PROP. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.	PROPOSITIO XXXV: Deus se ipsum amore intellectuali infinito amat.
Proof.-God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II. Def. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection; and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause: now this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as intellectual love.	DEMONSTRATIO: Deus est absolute infinitus (per definitionem 6 {1d06} partis I) hoc est (per definitionem 6 {2d06} partis II) Dei natura gaudet infinita perfectione idque (per propositionem 3 {2p03} partis II) concomitante idea sui hoc est (per propositionem 11 {1p11} et definitionem 1 partis I {1d01}) idea suae causae et hoc est quod in corollario propositionis 32 {5p32c} hujus amorem intellectualem esse diximus.
5p36 Deum amor intellectualis se ipsum	5p36 Deum amor intellectualis se ipsum [geomap]
PROP. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.	PROPOSITIO XXXVI: Mentis amor intellectualis erga Deum est ipse Dei amor quo Deus se ipsum amat, non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus per essentiam humanae mentis sub specie aeternitatis consideratam explicari potest hoc est [mng eqv] mentis erga Deum amor intellectualis pars est infiniti amoris quo Deus se ipsum amat.
Proof.-This love of the mind must be referred to the activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.); that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself; therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hic mentis amor ad mentis actiones referri debet (per corollarium propositionis 32 {5p32c} hujus et per propositionem 3 {3p03} partis III) qui proinde actio est qua mens se ipsam contemplatur concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa (per propositionem 32 {5p32} hujus et ejus corollarium {non-deductive reference}) [mng eqv] (per corollarium propositionis 25 {1p25c} partis I et corollarium propositionis 11 {2p11c} partis II) actio qua Deus quatenus per mentem humanam explicari potest, seipsum contemplatur concomitante idea sui atque adeo (per propositionem praecedentem {5p35}) hic mentis amor pars est infiniti amoris quo Deus seipsum amat. Q.E.D.
5p36c amor Dei erga homines Deum amor intellectualis idem	5p36c amor Dei erga homines Deum amor intellectualis idem [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are identical.	COROLLARIUM {5p36}: Hinc sequitur quod Deus quatenus seipsum amat, homines amatae et consequenter quod amor Dei erga homines et mentis erga Deum amor intellectualis unum et idem sit.
5p36s Deum amore sive in amore Dei in sacris codicibus gloria appellatur nec immerito	5p36s Deum amore sive in amore Dei in sacris codicibus gloria appellatur nec immerito
Note.-From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love towards men. This love or blessedness is, in the holy books, called Glory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love be referred to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really distinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term, accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.). Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I. xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from the divine nature and constantly depends on God. I have thought it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.), is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge of the second kind. For, although in Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.	SCHOLIUM: Ex his clare intelligimus qua in re nostra salus seu beatitudo seu libertas consistit nempe in constanti et aeterno erga Deum amore sive in amore Dei erga homines. Atque hic amor seu beatitudo in sacris codicibus gloria appellatur nec immerito. Nam sive hic amor ad Deum referatur sive ad mentem, recte animi acquiescentia quae revera a gloria (per 25 et 30 affectuum definitiones) non distinguitur, appellari potest. Nam quatenus ad Deum refertur, est (per propositionem 35 hujus) laetitia, liceat hoc adhuc vocabulo uti, concomitante idea sui ut et quatenus ad mentem refertur (per propositionem 27 hujus). Deinde quia nostrae mentis essentia in sola cognitione consistit cujus principium et fundamentum Deus est (per propositionem 15 partis I et scholium propositionis 47 partis II) hinc perspicuum nobis fit quomodo et qua ratione mens nostra secundum essentiam et existentiam ex natura divina sequatur et continuo a Deo pendeat; quod hic notare operae pretium duxi ut hoc exemplo ostenderem quantum rerum singularium cognitio quam intuitivam sive tertii generis appellavi (vide II scholium propositionis 40 partis II) polleat potiorque sit cognitione universali quam secundi generis esse dixi. Nam quamvis in prima parte generaliter ostenderim omnia (et consequenter mentem etiam humanam) a Deo secundum essentiam et existentiam pendere, illa tamen demonstratio tametsi legitima sit et extra dubitationis aleam posita, non ita tamen mentem nostram afficit quam quando id ipsum ex ipsa essentia rei cujuscunque singularis quam a Deo pendere dicimus, concluditur.
5p37 Nihil amori intellectuali contrarium	5p37 Nihil amori intellectuali contrarium [geomap]
PROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away.	PROPOSITIO XXXVII: Nihil in natura datur quod huic amori intellectuali sit contrarium sive [mng eqv] quod ipsum possit tollere.
Proof.-This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.). If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true; consequently, that, which should be able to take away this love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious absurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Hic intellectualis amor ex mentis natura necessario sequitur quatenus ipsa ut aeterna veritas per Dei naturam consideratur (per propositiones 33 {5p33} et 29 {5p29} hujus). Si quid ergo daretur quod huic amori esset contrarium, id contrarium esset vero et consequenter id quod hunc amorem posset tollere, efficeret ut id quod verum est, falsum esset, quod (ut per se notum) est absurdum. Ergo nihil in natura datur etc. Q.E.D.
5p37s Partis quartae axioma res singulares	5p37s Partis quartae axioma res singulares
Note.-The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt.	SCHOLIUM: Partis quartae axioma res singulares respicit quatenus cum relatione ad certum tempus et locum considerantur, de quo neminem dubitare credo.
5p38 secundo tertio cognitionis minus mali minus timet	5p38 secundo tertio cognitionis minus mali minus timet [geomap]
PROP. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.	PROPOSITIO XXXVIII: Quo plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere mens intelligit, eo minus ipsa ab affectibus qui mali sunt, patitur et mortem minus timet.
Proof.-The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.); therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently (by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in other words, evil (IV. xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis essentia in cognitione consistit (per propositionem 11 partis II {2p11}); quo igitur mens plures res cognoscit secundo et tertio cognitionis genere, eo major ejus pars remanet (per propositiones 23 {5p23} et 29 {5p29} hujus) et consequenter (per propositionem praecedentem {5p37}) eo major ejus pars non tangitur ab affectibus qui nostrae naturae sunt contrarii hoc est (per propositionem 30 {4p30} partis IV) qui mali sunt. Quo itaque mens plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere intelligit, eo major ejus pars illsa manet et consequenter minus ab affectibus patitur etc. Q.E.D.
5p38s scholio propositionis 39 partis IV mors minus noxia	5p38s scholio propositionis 39 partis IV mors minus noxia
Note.-Hence we understand that point which I touched on in IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part; namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again, since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of little importance when compared with the part which endures. But I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.	SCHOLIUM: Hinc intelligimus id quod in scholio propositionis 39 partis IV attigi et quod in hac parte explicare promisi nempe quod mors eo minus est noxia quo mentis clara et distincta cognitio major est et consequenter quo mens magis Deum amat. Deinde quia (per propositionem 27 hujus) ex tertio cognitionis genere summa quae dari potest oritur acquiescentia, hinc sequitur mentem humanam posse ejus naturae esse ut id quod ejus cum corpore perire ostendimus (vide propositionem 21 hujus) in respectu ad id quod ipsius remanet, nullius sit momenti. Sed de his mox prolixius.
5p39 corpus aptum mentem aeterna	5p39 corpus aptum mentem aeterna [geomap]
PROP. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal.	PROPOSITIO XXXIX: Qui corpus ad plurima aptum habet, is mentem habet cujus maxima pars est aeterna.
Proof.-He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which are evil (IV. xxxviii.)-that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions which are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. x.), he possesses the power of arranging and associating the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body according to the intellectual order, and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body should be referred to the idea of God; whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected with love towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute the chief part of the mind; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Qui corpus ad plurima agendum aptum habet, is minime affectibus qui mali sunt, conflictatur (per propositionem 38 {4p38} partis IV) hoc est (per propositionem 30 {4p30} partis IV) affectibus qui naturae nostrae sunt contrarii atque adeo (per propositionem 10 {5p10} hujus) potestatem habet ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones secundum ordinem ad intellectum et consequenter efficiendi (per propositionem 14 {5p14} hujus) ut omnes corporis affectiones ad Dei ideam referantur, ex quo fiet (per propositionem 15 {5p15} hujus) ut erga Deum afficiatur amore qui (per propositionem 16 {5p16} hujus) mentis maximam partem occupare sive [mng eqv] constituere debet ac proinde (per propositionem 33 {5p33} hujus) mentem habet cujus maxima pars est aeterna. Q.E.D.
5p39s continua vivimus variatione eo felices aut infelices	5p39s continua vivimus variatione eo felices aut infelices
Note.-Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely fear death. But, in order that this may be understood more clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy. For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness, if we have been able to live through the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. And, in reality, he, who, as in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely conscious of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, therefore, we primarily endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into something else capable of very many activities, and referable to a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things; and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the last Proposition.	SCHOLIUM: Quia corpora humana ad plurima apta sunt, non dubium est quin ejus naturae possint esse ut ad mentes referantur quae magnam sui et Dei habeant cognitionem et quarum maxima seu praecipua pars est aeterna atque adeo ut mortem vix timeant. Sed ut haec clarius intelligantur, animadvertendum hic est quod nos in continua vivimus variatione et prout in melius sive in pejus mutamur, eo felices aut infelices dicimur.  Qui enim ex infante vel puero in cadaver transiit, infelix dicitur et contra id felicitati tribuitur, quod totum vit spatium mente sana in corpore sano percurrere potuerimus. Et revera qui corpus habet ut infans vel puer ad paucissima aptum et maxime pendens a causis externis, mentem habet quae in se sola considerata nihil fere sui nec Dei nec rerum sit conscia et contra qui corpus habet ad plurima aptum, mentem habet quae in se sola considerata multum sui et Dei et rerum sit conscia. In hac vita igitur apprime conamur ut corpus infanti in aliud quantum ejus natura patitur eique conducit, mutetur quod ad plurima aptum sit quodque ad mentem referatur quae sui et Dei et rerum plurimum sit conscia atque ita ut id omne quod ad ipsius memoriam vel imaginationem refertur, in respectu ad intellectum vix alicujus sit momenti, ut in scholio propositionis praecedentis jam dixi.
5p40 plus perfectionis magis agit	5p40 plus perfectionis magis agit [geomap]
PROP. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice versae, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.	PROPOSITIO XL: Quo unaquque res plus perfectionis habet, eo magis agit et minus patitur et contra quo magis agit, eo perfectior est.
Proof.-In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III. iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less passive. This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more perfect. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Quo unaquque res perfectior est, eo plus habet realitatis (per definitionem 6 partis {2d06} II) et consequenter (per propositionem 3 {3p03} partis III cum ejus scholio {non-deductive reference}) eo magis agit et minus patitur; quae quidem demonstratio inverso ordine eodem modo procedit, ex quo sequitur ut res contra eo sit perfectior quo magis agit. Q.E.D.
5p40c quae remanet perfectiorem	5p40c quae remanet perfectiorem [geomap]
Corollary.-Hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.); the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V. xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii. and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it great or small, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.	COROLLARIUM {5p40}: Hinc sequitur partem mentis quae remanet quantacunque ea sit, perfectiorem esse reliqua. Nam pars mentis aeterna (per propositiones 23 {5p23} et 29 {5p29} hujus) est intellectus per quem solum nos agere dicimur (per propositionem 3 {3p03} partis III); illa autem quam perire ostendimus, est ipsa imaginatio (per propositionem 21 {5p21} hujus) per quam solam dicimur pati (per propositionem 3 {3p03} partis III et generalem affectuum definitionem {3dg}) atque adeo (per propositionem praecedentem {5p40}) illa quantacunque ea sit, hac est perfectior. Q.E.D.
5p40s mens nostra alio cogitandi modo determinatur et hic iterum	5p40s mens nostra alio cogitandi modo determinatur et hic iterum
Note.-Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without relation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God.	SCHOLIUM: Haec sunt quae de mente quatenus sine relatione ad corporis existentiam consideratur, ostendere constitueram; ex quibus et simul ex propositione 21 partis I et aliis apparet quod mens nostra quatenus intelligit aeternus cogitandi modus sit qui alio cogitandi modo determinatur et hic iterum ab alio et sic in infinitum ita ut omnes simul Dei aeternum et infinitum intellectum constituant.
5p41 pietatem religionem ad animositatem generositatem	5p41 pietatem religionem ad animositatem generositatem [geomap]
PROP. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness.	PROPOSITIO XLI: Quamvis nesciremus mentem nostram aeternam esse, pietatem tamen et religionem et absolute omnia quae ad animositatem et generositatem referri ostendimus in quarta parte, prima haberemus.
Proof.-The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one's own true interest. Now, while we determined what reason prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind's eternity, which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part. Although we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage and high-mindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, even if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Primum et unicum virtutis seu [mng eqv] recte vivendi rationis fundamentum (per corollarium propositionis 22 {4p22c} et per propositionem 24 {4p24} partis IV) est [mng eqv] suum utile quaerere. Ad illa autem determinandum quae ratio utilia esse dictat, nullam rationem habuimus mentis aeternitatis quam demum in hac quinta parte novimus. Quamvis igitur tum temporis ignoraverimus mentem esse aeternam, illa tamen quae ad animositatem et generositatem referri ostendimus, prima habuimus atque adeo quamvis etiam nunc hoc ipsum ignoraremus, eadem tamen praescripta prima haberemus. Q.E.D.
5p41s plerique credere de suo jure cedere quatenus ex legis divinae praescripto vivere	5p41s plerique credere de suo jure cedere quatenus ex legis divinae praescripto vivere
Note.-The general belief of the multitude seems to be different. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live according to the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry them. If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting.	SCHOLIUM: Communis vulgi persuasio alia videtur esse. Nam plerique videntur credere se eatenus liberos esse quatenus libidini parere licet et eatenus de suo jure cedere quatenus ex legis divinae praescripto vivere tenentur. Pietatem igitur et religionem et absolute omnia quae ad animi fortitudinem referuntur, onera esse credunt quae post mortem deponere et pretium servitutis nempe pietatis et religionis accipere sperant nec hac spe sola sed etiam et praecipue metu ne diris scilicet suppliciis post mortem puniantur, inducuntur ut ex legis divinae praescripto quantum eorum fert tenuitas et impotens animus, vivant et nisi haec spes et metus hominibus inessent, at contra si crederent mentes cum corpore interire nec restare miseris pietatis onere confectis vivere longius, ad ingenium redirent et ex libidine omnia moderari et fortun potius quam sibi parere vellent. quae mihi non minus absurda videntur quam si quis propterea quod non credit se posse bonis alimentis corpus in aeternum nutrire, venenis potius et lethiferis se exsaturare vellet vel quia videt mentem non esse aeternam seu immortalem, ideo amens mavult esse et sine ratione vivere: quae adeo absurda sunt ut vix recenseri mereantur.
5p42 Beatitudo est virtus	5p42 Beatitudo est virtus [geomap]
PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts.	PROPOSITIO XLII: Beatitudo non est virtutis praemium sed ipsa virtus nec eadem gaudemus quia libidines coercemus sed contra quia eadem gaudemus, ideo libidines coercere possumus.
Proof.-Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V. xxxii. Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active; therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself. This was our first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand (V. xxxii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself. Q.E.D.	DEMONSTRATIO: Beatitudo in amore erga Deum consistit (per propositionem 36 {5p36} hujus et ejus scholium {non-deductive reference}) qui quidem amor ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur (per corollarium propositionis 32 {5p32c} hujus) atque adeo hic amor (per propositiones 59 {3p59} et 3 {3p03} partis III) ad mentem quatenus agit referri debet ac proinde (per definitionem 8 {4d08} partis IV) ipsa virtus est, quod erat primum. Deinde quo mens hoc amore  seu [mng eqv] beatitudine magis gaudet, eo plus intelligit (per propositionem 32 {5p32} hujus) hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 3 {5p03c} hujus) eo majorem in affectus habet potentiam et (per propositionem 38 {5p38} hujus) eo minus ab affectibus qui mali sunt, patitur atque adeo ex eo quod mens hoc amore divino seu [mng eqv] beatitudine gaudet, potestatem habet libidines coercendi et quia humana potentia ad coercendos affectus in solo intellectu consistit, ergo nemo beatitudine gaudet quia affectus coercuit sed contra potestas libidines coercendi ex ipsa beatitudine oritur. Q.E.D.
5p42s Ignarus vivit praeterea sui et Dei et rerum quasi inscius, sapiens nunquam esse desinit	5p42s Ignarus vivit praeterea sui et Dei et rerum quasi inscius, sapiens nunquam esse desinit
Note.-I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's freedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be. Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit. If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.	SCHOLIUM: His omnia quae de mentis in affectus potentia quque de mentis libertate ostendere volueram, absolvi. Ex quibus apparet quantum sapiens polleat potiorque sit ignaro qui sola libidine agitur. Ignarus enim praeterquam quod a causis externis multis modis agitatur nec unquam vera animi acquiescentia potitur, vivit praeterea sui et Dei et rerum quasi inscius et simulac pati desinit, simul etiam esse desinit. Cum contra sapiens quatenus ut talis consideratur, vix animo movetur sed sui et Dei et rerum aeterna quadam necessitate conscius, nunquam esse desinit sed semper vera animi acquiescentia potitur. Si jam via quam ad haec ducere ostendi, perardua videatur, inveniri tamen potest. Et sane arduum debet esse quod adeo raro reperitur. Qui enim posset fieri si salus in promptu esset et sine magno labore reperiri posset ut ab omnibus fere negligeretur? Sed omnia praeclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt.
End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza	Finis
notes by English translation: [1] "Affectiones" [2] "Forma" [3] "Animata" [4] A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n.] [5] Conscienti morsus-thus rendered by Mr. Pollock. [6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion. [7] So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read, "an internal cause." "Honor" = Gloria. [8] See previous endnote. [9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5. Spinoza transposes the verses. "Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;