| Meaning | Structure.
The term is crucially used in
{2p07} a linchpin
theorem of Ethica.
Attributes
as a whole have a structure, but also subsystems of
them like the human body
and the mind. There are two kinds of
things (res): bodies,
corpora, extended
things of corporeal
nature, with a weight and a position, and
on the other hand: thoughts
(ideas, cogitatio-res). Each kind
is part of its own
attribute:
bodies are in the
attribute of
extension and
ideas in the
attribute of thought
(cogitatio
[att]).
Ethica's
notion of an
attribute of
extension
is inspired by cartesian corpuscular
physics.
{2p07} states that the attribute
of
extension is isomorphic (structure-alike)
to the
attribute
of
thinking:
In the same way as in
extension bodies (corpora) are part of greater bodies
and limited by other bodies,
ideas are part of ideas
and limited (terminare) by other
ideas. To every body corresponds an
idea, and to
every relation between bodies corresponds a logical relation between
ideas (more about this: Appendix
to pp1p02 res concerning {2p07}). The emphatic introduction of res-sense -2 (res-corpus), in {2p07} ("rerum^idearum"), and sharp decrease thereafter of the use of res when referring to ideas is only rivalled in interest by the almost consistent subsequent reference to {2p07} using "rerum^causarum". |
| Mantras [what is] |
Naturae
ordo (potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi affectiones corporis secundum) ordinem ad intellectum |
| Related concepts | res |
| Occurrence | [geomap] Emphatic introduction {2p07} |
| {1d02 in suo genere finita^absoluta infinita} ...terminare of one thing by another works in extension in the same way as in thought... | |
| ...A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body. | ...Ea res dicitur in suo genere finita quae alia ejusdem naturae terminari potest. Exempli gratia corpus dicitur finitum quia aliud semper majus concipimus. Sic cogitatio alia cogitatione terminatur. At corpus non terminatur cogitatione nec cogitatio corpore. |
| {2p07 ordo et connexio} ...{2p05} and {2p06} lead up to this theorem..."rerum ^ idearum" is subsequently referred to as "rerum ^ causarum"... in context of {2p07} the meaning of rerum is res-corpus that is, res restricted to rerum extensarum, while elsewhere, especially above {2p07}, thoughts are called res as well... | |
| ... The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. | ... ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum. |
| 2p07s substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una ... puzzling, if not dangerous quote ... the attribute of extension (harbouring res extensae), is here associated with an expression unique in Ethica: substantia extensa. The attribute of thought however is associated NOT with res cogitandi but is called substantia cogitans, referring NOT to idea = res cogitandi but to cogitatio-operatio, the operation that produces ideas. A few words further down, in "idea illius modi", the opposition is changed back from cogitatio-operatio to idea (= cogitatio-res). Res is used here as res sense 3, that is: NOT to referring to modi, as it elsewhere does in expressions like res extensa or (in {1p14c2}) rem cogitantem, but for the substantial thing that expresses itself in two modi (1. an extended modus and 2. a modus cogitandi) ... moreover, in the expression in natura existens the term natura is used, absolutely unique in Ethica, as extended nature ... but at the end of the quote, the expression totius naturae refers again to the rare but not unique meaning of natura-substantia. [more: notes page on natura] | |
| ... substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways ... | ... substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia quae jam sub hoc jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur. Sic etiam modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res sed duobus modis expressa... |
| ... For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes-that is, the same things following in either case... | ... Exempli gratia circulus in natura existens et idea circuli existentis quae etiam in Deo est, una eademque est res quae per diversa attributa explicatur et ideo sive naturam sub extensionis sive sub attributo cogitationis sive sub alio quocunque concipiamus, unum eundemque ordinem sive unam eandemque causarum connexionem hoc est easdem res invicem sequi reperiemus. |
| ...God is the cause of an idea-for instance, of the idea of a circle,-in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so on to infinity; | ...Deus sit causa ideae exempli gratia circuli quatenus tantum est res cogitans et circuli quatenus tantum est res extensa nisi quia esse formale ideae circuli non nisi per alium cogitandi modum tanquam causam proximam et ille iterum per alium et sic in infinitum, potest percipi |
| so that, so long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of thought only. | ita ut quamdiu res ut cogitandi modi considerantur, ordinem totius naturae sive causarum connexionem per solum cogitationis attributum explicare debemus |
| ... in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension only... | et quatenus ut modi extensionis considerantur, ordo etiam totius naturae per solum extensionis attributum explicari debet... |
| {2p09 Idea rei singularis causa} ...(not only bodies) but also ideas affect or cause each other......since {2p09} and other loci ({2p19}, {2p20}) using the ordo et connexio-mantra, explicitly referring to the rerum^idearum proposition {2p07}, use rerum^causarum instead, hence causarum, in the context of {2p07}, locally has the meaning of idea... | |
| ...the order and connection of ideas is (by Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of causes... | ...ordo et connexio idearum (per propositionem 7 hujus {2p07}) idem est ac ordo et connexio causarum... |
| {2p38c dari quasdam ideas omnibus communes} ...there are ideas common to all people. Why? Because there are some respects in which bodies of all people are equal (proof based on {2p07})... | |
| ...there are certain ideas or notions common to all men; for ... all bodies agree in certain respects, which ... must be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all. | ... dari quasdam ideas sive [mng-eqv] notiones omnibus hominibus communes. Nam ... omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt, quae ... ab omnibus debent adaequate sive [mng-eqv] clare et distincte percipi. |
| {5p01 ordinantur concatenantur mente corpore} ... the attribute-isomorphism applied to the unity of human body and mind ... | |
| ...Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind, so are the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body. | ...Prout cogitationes rerumque [non-excl non-exh] ideae ordinantur et concatenantur in mente, ita corporis affectiones seu [mng-eqv] rerum imagines ad amussimae ordinantur et concatenantur in corpore. |
|
...
The order and connection of ideas is the same (II. vii.) as the
order and connection of things, and vice versae the order and connection
of things is the same ... as the order and
connection of ideas. ... Wherefore, even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place according to the order and association of modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body ... so vice versae ... the order and connection of modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the body takes place in accordance with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind... |
... Ordo et connexio
idearum idem est (per propositionem 7
partis II
{2p07}) ac ordo et connexio
rerum et vice versa
ordo et connexio rerum idem est ... ac ordo et connexio
idearum. ... Quare sicuti ordo et connexio idearum in mente fit secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis ... sic vice versa ... ordo et connexio affectionum corporis fit prout cogitationes rerumque ideae ordinantur et concatenantur in mente... |
| {5p10 potestatem ordinandi et concatenandi} ... rational fencing against bad emotions allows for the Great Inversion: the mind not modified by passive perception of affections of the body, but the body actively modified by the mind using its acquired understanding ... note the explicit reference to {2p07}'s ordo et connexio ... but both inverse-active (ordinare et concatenare) and straight-passive (percipere) interaction between body (attribute of extension) and mind (attribute of thought) involve causation between attributes, thus outside the range of {2p07} ... [more about limits to the scope of {2p07}] | |
| ... So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of our body according to the intellectual order. | ... Quamdiu affectibus qui nostrae naturae sunt contrarii, non conflictamur tamdiu potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones secundum ordinem ad intellectum. |
|
5p10s efficere possumus ut non malis affectibus afficiamur ... a curious practical quick start reordering guide for minds ... containing many new expressions denoting actions, actiones in the technical sense, of the mind, such as: memoriae mandare, continuo applicare, in promptu habere ... (see there) |
|
| ... The best we can do ... so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to ... | Optimum ... quod efficere possumus quamdiu nostrorum affectuum perfectam cognitionem non habemus, est ... |
| Equivalence claim involving ordo | ||
| {1p33} | 1. If things could have been of a different nature 2. [If things] have been conditioned to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have been different, | 1. [si res] alterius naturae potuissent esse 2. [si res] alio modo ad operandum determinari ut naturae ordo alius esset |