pp1d01 sive, seu, aut,
vel
Eng.: "or". Each
of these four Latin "or"-words occurs in eight clearly distinctive senses of "A or B".
Moreover, these six senses are elsewhere expressed in terms other
than "sive", "seu" "aut" or "vel", like "est"
"idem" "idem est", "hoc est" "idem
intelligo".
"Sive", "seu", "aut", "vel"
are linked from everywhere. Other expressions are linked from only where
confusion is possible. This is by far the hardest notes page and linking
procedure of this web. It is improbable that my labeling of 530 connectors
is totally flawless. But the issue has to be cleared at every single locus if we ever want
to understand what exactly is claimed to be proven. As everywhere, I target Spinoza's locally intended meaning, even if that
seems to lead to compounded meanings that are puzzling from other
perspectives.
[geomap]
|
Link text ‡) |
Meaning variant (A and B can be statements as well as concepts) |
1 |
A [mng eqv] B |
Equivalent by meaning*): A
or, put in another way: B |
2 |
A [prf eqv] B |
Equivalent by proof: A or, as we proved to be equivalent: B. Label
[prf eqv] only applied
when Ethica contains a proof, else [mng eqv]. |
3 |
A [or at least, a kind of, hence] B |
For concepts: A is a GENUINE subset (NON-empty difference) of B. For statements: A,
NOT
equivalent to B, implies B. |
4 |
A [or even, because] B |
A [because] B is
equivalent to B [hence]
A: A GENUINELY includes (NON-empty difference) B. For
statements: A NOT equivalent, is implied by B. |
5 |
A [excl exh] B |
Exclusive exhaustive: either A or B, never
both, tertium non datur. (A, B) are then called a
complement pair. In case of a
complement triples (like "more or equal or
less") the label is [excl exh
triple], similarly quadruples and higher. |
6 |
A [excl non-exh] B |
Exclusive non-exhaustive: either A or B, never
both, but may be something else †). In all quantitative contexts, "more
or less" (when used as pair, NOT as [excl exh
triple] with "equal") is labeled:
[excl non-exh]. |
7 |
A [non-excl exh] B |
Non-exclusive exhaustive: A or B or both, no other
possibilities |
8 |
A [non-excl non-exh] B |
Non-exclusive non-exhaustive: A or B or both, or something else,
or all †) |
*) we say "by meaning", not "by definition", to
include, in category #1, "A or B"-strings in which the meanings of undefined terms are at
stake.
†) exhaustivity is to be judged by the
locally intended
range of the
term (exempli gratia: are we locally talking about all things, or only
about extended things, about all ideas, or only about adequate ideas, etc). This
is prone indeed to dissension. In
all quantitative contexts, "more or less" is labled
[excl non-exh], because forming an or [excl exh
triple] with "equal".
‡)
NOT linked:
hanc vel illam (this or that),
"unam vel ad aliquot", "two or more" when pleonastic
("...can differ...").
Explaining every single of the 530 "or"-labelling and linking decisions to
this page is
unfeasible. Below some examples.
{2d02 essentia}
... essentia,
used crucially in Pars Prima, features in
Pars Secunda in a formal dico (intelligo)
- definition ... the second phrasing (below vel),
contrary to the first, implies symmetry: if A is part of the
essence of B then B is part of the essence
of A ... yet, vel is labeled
[mng-eqv] because the two strings are claimed to be
equivalent; readers may disagree ... |
... I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that,
which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and, which being
removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in other words, that
without which the thing, and which itself without the thing, can neither
be nor be conceived. |
... Ad essentiam alicujus rei id
pertinere
dico quo
dato res
necessario
ponitur et quo sublato res
necessario tollitur; vel
[mng-eqv] id sine quo res et vice versa id quod sine re nec
esse nec
concipi
potest. |
{2d08 corpora unita} ..."same or different" is exhaustive, since there is
logically no third possibility..."compelled or move...[uncompelled]...preserve...relation" is
non-exhaustive: third cases are logically possible, even the usual cases. The
first and second form the special cases of "corpora unita"... |
...When any given bodies of the same or different magnitude are
compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or if they be moved at
the same or different rates of speed, so that their mutual movements
should preserve among themselves a certain fixed relation, we say that
such bodies are in union, and that together they compose one body or
individual, which is distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this
union. |
...Cum
corpora aliquot ejusdem aut
[excl exh] diversae magnitudinis a
reliquis ita coercentur ut invicem incumbant vel
[excl non-exh] si eodem
aut
[excl exh] diversis
celeritatis gradibus moventur ut motus suos invicem certa quadam ratione
communicent, illa corpora invicem
unita dicemus et omnia simul
unum
corpus sive
[mng eqv] individuum componere quod a reliquis per hanc
corporum
unionem distinguitur. |
{2L07 motum retineat
antea reliquis communicet} ...the
second
sive
[excl exh]
has operational priority (like multiplication over addition), ranging
over moveatur..quiescat...the first and the third
sive
[non-excl exh]
form, as a pair, one single logical operator (or...or...). The fourth,
in hanc sive illam
not linked - by general protocol -
note ‡)
above) |
....the individual thus composed preserves its nature, whether it be, as
a whole, in motion or at rest, whether it be moved in this or that
direction; so long as each part retains its motion, and preserves its
communication with other parts as before. |
...Retinet ...individuum sic compositum suam
naturam sive
[non-excl exh] id
secundum totum moveatur sive
[excl exh] quiescat
sive
[non-excl exh]
versus hanc sive versus illam partem moveatur dummodo unaquque pars
motum suum retineat eumque uti antea reliquis communicet. |
...
in-proof-frequency record: proof of
{3p57} with 12
"or"s... |
Proof.-This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see after Lemma
iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.). Nevertheless, we will prove it from the
nature of the three primary emotions. All emotions are attributable to
desire, pleasure, or pain, as their definitions above given show. But
desire is each man's nature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire
in one individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so
far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature or
essence of the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passive states or
passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to persist in his being
is increased or diminished, helped or hindered (III. xi. and note). But
by the endeavour to persist in its being, in so far as it is
attributable to mind and body in conjunction, we mean appetite and
desire (III. ix. note); therefore pleasure and pain are identical with
desire or appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased
or diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every man's
nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the
pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so far as the nature or
essence of the one man differs from the essence of the other;
consequently, any emotion of one individual only differs, &c. Q.E.D. |
DEMONSTRATIO: Haec propositio patet ex axiomate 1, quod vide post lemma
3 {2a3.1} scholiumque propositionis 13 partis II
{non-deductive reference}. At nihilominus eandem ex trium primitivorum
affectuum definitionibus demonstrabimus. Omnes
affectus
ad cupiditatem,
laetitiam
vel [excl non-exh]
tristitiam
referuntur ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones, ostendunt. At
cupiditas
est ipsa uniuscujusque natura seu
[mng eqv] essentia
(vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 9 hujus {non-deductive
reference}); ergo uniuscujusque individui
cupiditas
a cupiditate alterius tantum discrepat quantum natura seu
[mng eqv]
essentia
unius ab essentia
alterius differt.
Laetitia deinde et
tristitia
passiones sunt quibus uniuscujusque
potentia
seu
[mng eqv] conatus in suo
esse perseverandi augetur vel
[excl non-exh]
minuitur, juvatur vel
[excl non-exh] coercetur (per propositionem 11 hujus{3p11}
et ejus scholium {non-deductive reference}). At per
conatum in suo esse
perseverandi quatenus ad mentem et
corpus simul refertur,
appetitum et
cupiditatem
intelligimus (vide scholium propositionis 9 hujus); ergo
laetitia et tristitia est ipsa
cupiditas sive
[non-excl exh]
appetitus quatenus a
causis
externis augetur vel
[excl non-exh]
minuitur, juvatur vel
[excl non-exh] coercetur hoc est (per idem scholium) est ipsa
cujusque natura atque adeo uniuscujusque laetitia vel
[excl non-exh]
tristitia
a laetitia vel [excl
non-exh]
tristitia
alterius tantum etiam
discrepat quantum natura seu
[mng eqv]
essentia
unius ab essentia
alterius differt et consequenter quilibet
uniuscujusque individui
affectus ab
affectu
alterius tantum discrepat etc. Q.E.D. |