|
{1p31
Intellectus naturatam naturantem}
... to
some modi cogitandi the term res
(at least the common notion) applies exceptionally badly: those are the
different kinds of cogitatio actu (that is:
actual operations in the attribute of thought). Examples are:
intellectus actu (understanding in operation), voluntas,
cupiditas,
amor ... in the quote, "absolutam cogitationem"
refers to the attribute of thought ... because they are
modi they must be passive nature
... it is puzzling whether intellectus actu refers only to the
acts of understanding by specific human minds or the attribute of thought
"contains" a general intellectus actu ... |
|
... The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite,
just like will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive
nature and not to active nature. |
...
Intellectus
actu
sive
[excl exh] is
finitus sit
sive
[excl exh] infinitus, ut
et voluntas,
cupiditas,
amor etc. ad
Naturam
naturatam, non vero ad
naturantem referri debent. |
|
... By the intellect we ... do not mean absolute thought, but
only a certain mode of thinking, differing from other modes, such as
love, desire, &c., and therefore ... requiring to be conceived
through absolute thought. It must ... through some attribute of God
which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so conceived,
that without such attribute it could neither be nor be conceived. It must
therefore be referred to nature passive rather than to nature active, as must
also the other modes of thinking ... |
... Per
intellectum ... non
intelligimus
absolutam
cogitationem sed certum tantum
modum
cogitandi, qui
modus ab
aliis scilicet
cupiditate, amore, etc. differt adeoque
... per absolutam
cogitationem
concipi debet nempe ... per aliquod Dei
attributum
quod
aeternam et
infinitam
cogitationis
essentiam
exprimit, ita
concipi debet ut sine ipso nec
esse nec
concipi
possit ac propterea
... ad
Naturam
naturatam, non vero
naturantem referri debet ut etiam reliqui
modi
cogitandi. |
|
Sense 3: |
cogitatio-operatio
Go to: Sense 1:
cogitatio(-res)
Sense 2:
(attributus-)cogitationis |
| Meaning |
Thinking as the
operation of the mind when it goes from one thought to
another. Everything everything that happens in the mind is
part of thinking (cogitatio-operatio),
including the operations
of will and the
emotions. Thus thinking in this sense comes in
a host of different types like:
understanding,
conceiving,
perceiving,
willing,
desiring,
loving. All these types
of cogitatio-operatio (intellectus-actu
included!) are
passive, not
active
nature (see below).
An
operation is by definition a dynamic process, that is, a process in
time (duratio). In these dynamic processes, thoughts (cogitatio-res) in people's minds tend to get associated by accidental
dynamic experience in
life: as a result, a soldier and a farmer both seeing a horse print on the ground, will have
different thoughts (cogitatio-res) next (2p18s). But there are ways to
improve this and instead reconnect the thought (cogitatio-res) of the horse to the thought
(cogitatio-res) of its
essence
-
which for the soldier, the farmer and all other men is the same.
This proper ordering and connection of thoughts
(cogitatio-res) is the general way to more
perfection of the
mind, the central subject of Ethica.
Its vehicle is understanding (intelligere, informally defined as
conceiving adequate
ideas), which is -
contrary to
intellectus
actu! (see quote of {1p31} below) -
claimed an active
operation (see
quote of {3p58} below). |
| Subsets (kinds) |
Everything
that happens in the mind is part of thinking (cogitatio-operatio).
1.
Operations of the mind that
cause the formation and
change of
ideas of
external bodies. There are 9 terms used for such
operations: sentire,
percipere, concipere,
imaginare, considerare,
contemplare,
comprehendere, intelligere
and
ratiocinare
2. All other
operations of the mind: will (voluntas),
desire (cupiditas),
love (amor) and all
other emotions. |
| Mantras
[what is] |
mentis
cogitandi
potentia |
|
Occurrence |
[geomap
(all senses)] First occurrence sense 2:
{1p31} |
|
{1p31 Intellectus naturatam naturantem}
... There
are many types of cogitatio-operatio very
different from
intelligere,
comprehendere,
concipere,
percipere
etc.:
voluntas,
cupiditas,
amor and all other
emotions ... everything
that happens in the mind is cogitatio-operatio
... |
|
... The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, just like will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive
nature and not to active nature. |
... Intellectus
actu
sive
[excl exh] is
finitus sit
sive
[excl exh] infinitus, ut
et voluntas,
cupiditas,
amor etc. ad
Naturam
naturatam, non vero ad
naturantem referri debent. |
|
... intellect ... a certain mode of thinking, differing from other modes, such as
love, desire, &c. ... .must ... be referred to nature
passive rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of
thinking ... |
... Intellectum enim
... certum tantum
modum
cogitandi, qui
modus ab
aliis scilicet
cupiditate,
amore, etc. ... concipi debet ut sine ipso nec esse
nec concipi
possit
... ad Naturam
naturatam, non vero
naturantem referri debet ut etiam
reliqui modi cogitandi
... |
|
{2p01
Deus res cogitans} ... here all three senses
(marked [res][att][op]) are used in one proposition ... |
|
... Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing. |
... Cogitatio [att]
attributum
Dei est
sive
[mng-eqv] Deus est
res cogitans [op]. |
|
... Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain
conditioned manner, express the nature of God ... God therefore possesses the attribute
... of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts,
which latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of the
infinite attributes of God, which express God's eternal and infinite
essence ... In other words, God is a thinking thing ... |
... Singulares
cogitationes
[res]
sive
[mng-eqv] haec et illa cogitatio
[op]
modi
sunt qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo
exprimunt ... Competit ergo
Deo ... attributum
cujus
conceptum
singulares omnes
cogitationes [res]
involvunt, per quod etiam
concipiuntur. Est igitur cogitatio
[att] unum ex
infinitis Dei
attributis quod
Dei
aeternam et
infinitam
essentiam
exprimit ... sive
[mng-eqv] Deus
est res cogitans
[op] ... |
|
2p07s substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una
... puzzling, if not dangerous quote ... the attribute of extension
(harbouring
res
extensae),
is associated with an expression unique in Ethica:
substantia extensa. The
attribute of thought however is
associated NOT with res cogitandi but is called substantia cogitans, referring
NOT to idea = res cogitandi but to
cogitatio-operatio, the
operation
that produces
ideas. A few words further down, in "idea illius modi",
the opposition is changed back from cogitatio-operatio to
idea (=
cogitatio-res). Res
is used here as res sense 3,
that is: NOT to referring to modi, as it elsewhere
does in expressions like res extensa or
(in
{1p14c2})
rem cogitantem, but for the
substantial thing that
expresses itself in two modi (1. an
extended
modus and 2. a modus
cogitandi)
...
moreover, in the expression
in natura
existens the term
natura is used,
absolutely unique in Ethica,
as extended nature
... but at the end of the quote, the expression
totius naturae
refers again to the rare but not unique meaning of
natura-substantia.
[more: notes page on natura] |
|
... substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same
substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So,
also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing,
though expressed in two ways ... |
...
substantia
cogitans et
substantia
extensa
una eademque est substantia quae jam sub hoc jam sub illo
attributo
comprehenditur. Sic etiam
modus extensionis et
idea illius
modi una
eademque est res sed duobus
modis
expressa ... |
|
... For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a
circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed
through different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other
attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of
causes-that is, the same things following in either case ... |
... Exempli gratia circulus in
natura
existens
et
idea circuli
existentis quae etiam in
Deo est, una eademque est res quae per
diversa
attributa explicatur et
ideo sive
naturam
sub extensionis sive sub
attributo cogitationis sive sub alio quocunque
concipiamus, unum eundemque
ordinem sive unam eandemque
causarum connexionem hoc est easdem res invicem sequi reperiemus. |
|
... God is the cause of an idea-for instance, of the idea of a
circle,-in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far
as he is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the idea
of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another
mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so on to infinity; |
... Deus sit
causa
ideae exempli gratia circuli quatenus
tantum est res
cogitans
et circuli quatenus tantum est res
extensa nisi
quia esse
formale
ideae circuli non nisi per alium
cogitandi
modum
tanquam causam
proximam et ille iterum per
alium et sic in
infinitum, potest
percipi |
|
so that, so long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must
explain the order of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes,
through the attribute of thought only. |
ita ut quamdiu res ut
cogitandi
modi considerantur,
ordinem totius naturae sive
causarum
connexionem per solum
cogitationis
attributum explicare debemus |
|
... in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must
explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension
only ... |
et quatenus ut modi extensionis
considerantur,
ordo etiam totius naturae per solum
extensionis
attributum
explicari debet ... |