| Meaning | An emotion (affectus) toward a thing (res). Having an emotion towards a thing does not require the actual presence or existence of that thing. |
| Occurrence | [geomap] Preoccurs from {3p35} |
| 3p18s1 praeteritam futuram ... presence of the thing not required to have emotion towards it... | |
| ...the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore... is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way as if the thing were actually present.... | ... corpus nullo affectu afficitur qui rei existentiam secludat atque adeo...ejusdem rei imagine eodem modo afficitur ac si res ipsa praesens adesset... |
| 3p18s2 spes, metus, securitas, desperatio, gaudium et conscienti morsus ... examples of emotions towards things that may not be present or existent ... | |
| ... Hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we are in doubt. If the element of doubt be removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear becomes Despair. ...Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof we have doubted the issue. Disappointment is the Pain opposed to Joy... | ...Spes namque nihil aliud est quam inconstans laetitia orta ex imagine rei futurae vel praeterit de cujus eventu dubitamus, metus contra inconstans tristitia ex rei dubi imagine etiam orta. Porro si horum affectuum dubitatio tollatur, ex spe sit securitas et ex metu desperatio...Gaudium deinde est laetitia orta ex imagine rei praeterit de cujus eventu dubitavimus. Conscienti denique morsus est tristitia opposita gaudio ... |
| {4d06 (affectum) erga rem} ... The definition of (affectus) erga rem seems to be a draft, does not (yet) satisfy geometrical standards, since it consists solely of references to the two scholia quotes above: 3p18s1 and 3p18s2 ... | |
| ... What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future, present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii., which see. (But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit; that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance from us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the same moment of time.) | VI. Quid per affectum erga rem futuram, praesentem et [excl exh triple] praeteritam intelligam, explicui in scholiis I et II propositionis 18 partis III, quod vide {non-deductive reference}. Sed venit hic praeterea notandum quod ut loci sic etiam temporis distantiam non nisi usque ad certum quendam limitem possumus distincte imaginari hoc est sicut omnia illa objecta quae ultra ducentos pedes a nobis distant seu [non-excl non-exh] quorum distantia a loco in quo sumus, illam superat quam distincte imaginamur, que longe a nobis distare et perinde ac si in eodem plano essent, imaginari solemus, sic etiam objecta quorum existendi tempus longiore a praesenti intervallo abesse imaginamur quam quod distincte imaginari solemus, omnia que longe a praesenti distare imaginamur et ad unum quasi temporis momentum referimus. |